United States v. Sanford: Uncharged Child Sexual Abuse and Related Pornography Searches Are Admissible as Intrinsic/Rule 404(b)/Rule 414 Evidence in Child-Pornography Production Prosecutions

Introduction

In United States v. Jarrod Sanford (6th Cir. Jan. 7, 2026), the Sixth Circuit affirmed convictions and a 960-month sentence for production of child pornography (18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)&(e)), possession of child pornography (18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B)), and committing a felony offense with a minor while required to register as a sex offender (18 U.S.C. § 2260A). The case arose from a minor victim’s report that Sanford—her cohabiting caretaker—had repeatedly raped her and that a hidden phone contained images of the abuse.

The appeal centered on four issue clusters: (1) whether the district court improperly admitted evidence of uncharged rapes and selected pornographic search activity; (2) whether admitting testimony about the victim’s out-of-court disclosures to a friend constituted plain error; (3) whether the sentence was procedurally and substantively unreasonable; and (4) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the production and § 2260A convictions.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that evidence of Sanford’s uncharged sexual abuse of the victim was admissible as intrinsic/background (“res gestae”) evidence and, in any event, was properly admitted under Rule 404(b) and Rule 414. It also upheld admission of limited evidence of Sanford’s internet searches for simulated child pornography resembling the charged images as probative of identity, intent, and motive.

As to out-of-court disclosures, the court applied plain-error review and found no basis for reversal—principally because any arguable error did not affect substantial rights. The court further rejected sentencing challenges, relying on binding precedent that prior convictions may be found by the sentencing judge and emphasizing that the sentence fell within the constrained Guidelines-plus-mandatory-consecutive framework. Finally, the court held the evidence more than sufficient under the deferential Jackson v. Virginia standard.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Standards of review; evidentiary discretion

• United States v. Brown, 367 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2004): The panel invoked Brown for the abuse-of-discretion lens on evidentiary rulings and the formulation that appellate review takes a “maximal view” of probative value and “minimal view” of unfair prejudice. This framing helped sustain admission of both uncharged-rape evidence and search-term evidence.
• United States v. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 2009): Cited for the harmless-error inquiry following evidentiary error—supporting the court’s posture that even if a mistake occurred, reversal would require prejudice affecting the verdict.
• United States v. Ray, 549 F. App’x 428 (6th Cir. 2013) and Gen. Elec. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997): The opinion flagged an intra-circuit conflict over Rule 404(b) review (some panels using a three-step approach with differing scrutiny) and adopted Ray’s view that abuse-of-discretion governs, consistent with Joiner’s rejection of “heightened standards” inconsistent with deference to trial courts. This mattered because Sanford’s appellate argument implicitly sought more aggressive reweighing of probative value versus prejudice than abuse-of-discretion permits.

2) Intrinsic/background (“res gestae”) evidence doctrine

• United States v. Churn, 800 F.3d 768 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Clay, 667 F.3d 689 (6th Cir. 2012), and quoting United States v. Grooms, 566 F. App’x 485 (6th Cir. 2014)): Churn provided the operative test for admitting “inextricably intertwined” evidence that is a prelude to the charged offense, directly probative, part of the same events, integral to testimony, or completing the story. The panel used these guideposts to characterize the victim’s testimony and corroborating physical evidence of repeated rapes as necessary narrative context for how the charged photos came to exist and to identify the participants.

3) Rule 404(b) admissibility framework

• United States v. De Oleo, 697 F.3d 338 (6th Cir. 2012): Provided the familiar three-step 404(b) framework (occurrence; permissible purpose; Rule 403 balancing). The court used De Oleo to reject Sanford’s claim that the district court “never analyzed” prejudice versus probative value, citing explicit findings that probative value was “quite high” and outweighed prejudicial effect, plus limiting instructions.
• Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635 (2023): Used to reinforce the baseline assumption that jurors follow limiting instructions—supporting the district court’s mitigation of potential unfair prejudice from evidence of other sexual assaults and related material.

4) Pornographic searches: Rule 403 “lurid” concern

• United States v. Hough, 385 F. App’x 535 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Stout, 509 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 2007)): These cases supplied the articulation that evidence becomes unfairly prejudicial when it is “more lurid and frankly more interesting” than the charged conduct and risks diverting the jury. The court applied that principle to uphold admission of selected search terms because they were not more sensational than the charged production-by-rape images and were tightly linked to identity/motive.

5) Out-of-court statements; plain error

• United States v. Yancy, 725 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 2013): Set out the four-prong plain-error test the panel applied because Sanford did not object at trial.
• Rosales-Mireles v. United States, 585 U.S. 129 (2018): Supplied the “reasonable probability” standard for substantial-rights prejudice under plain error. The panel relied on this to conclude Sanford could not show outcome-determinative prejudice given the photographic evidence, victim identification, and DNA corroboration.

6) Sentencing review; reasonableness

• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), and United States v. Jeter, 721 F.3d 746 (6th Cir. 2013): Provided the framework distinguishing procedural from substantive reasonableness and the abuse-of-discretion standard for both.
• United States v. Schrank, 975 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Robinson, 778 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2015)): Supplied the Sixth Circuit’s proportionality formulation for substantive reasonableness—used to uphold the effective life sentence.
• United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc), and United States v. Pirosko, 787 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 2015): Provided the presumption of substantive reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences, which Sanford failed to rebut.

7) Prior convictions as sentencing factors

• Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998): The key procedural-reasonableness precedent: prior convictions may be found by the judge and need not be charged/proven to a jury.
• Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Rangel-Reyes v. United States, 547 U.S. 1200 (2006) (mem.): The panel acknowledged Apprendi’s rule but emphasized Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres and cited Rangel-Reyes to reflect the Supreme Court’s continued refusal to revisit the exception.
• United States v. Walker, 761 F. App’x. 547 (6th Cir. 2019): Cited to underscore that Almendarez-Torres makes the contrary argument “dead on arrival” in the Sixth Circuit. The opinion also independently stressed Sanford’s stipulation to the qualifying conviction—further undermining any jury-right complaint.

8) Sufficiency of the evidence

• Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), and United States v. Avery, 128 F.3d 966 (6th Cir. 1997): Provided the governing test: whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the government.
• United States v. Abboud, 438 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Fekete, 535 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Suarez, 263 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 2001)): These cases supplied the “very heavy burden” on a sufficiency challenger and the instruction to give the government all reasonable inferences while not reweighing credibility. The panel then catalogued the identifying and forensic proof tying Sanford to the phone and images.

Legal Reasoning

1) Uncharged rapes as intrinsic/background evidence

The court treated repeated, uncharged rapes not as propensity evidence offered merely to show character, but as narrative-integrity evidence: the ongoing abuse explained (a) how the charged images could be produced in a household setting, (b) why the victim could identify the perpetrator and setting with specificity, and (c) how the charged conduct fit into the sequence of events leading to discovery of the phone. Using United States v. Churn, the panel emphasized “prelude,” “integral testimony,” and “completes the story” rationales.

2) Rule 404(b) and Rule 414 as independent bases

Even if the evidence were not intrinsic, the court held it admissible under:

• Rule 404(b)(2): for non-propensity purposes such as identity, intent, and opportunity, with the district court expressly finding high probative value and issuing limiting instructions.
• Rule 414(a): because this was a “child molestation” prosecution, evidence of “any other child molestation” could be admitted “on any matter to which it is relevant,” expanding admissibility beyond classic 404(b) constraints (though still subject to Rule 403 balancing in practice).

3) Search terms as identity/motive evidence (and not unfairly prejudicial)

The panel upheld admission of a curated set of search/view evidence because it tended to show: (i) identity (the same person using the phone to search for highly similar content is more likely the possessor/producer of the charged images), and (ii) motive (arousal interest aligned with the precise conduct depicted). Under United States v. Hough/United States v. Stout, the court deferred to the district judge’s conclusion that the evidence was not “more lurid” than the charged conduct and thus not unfairly prejudicial.

4) Out-of-court disclosures: plain-error failure on prejudice

Although Sanford framed the issue in terms of Rule 801(d)(1)(B)(i), the panel emphasized that the district court admitted the communications as non-hearsay to explain ensuing actions (why the friend and counselor contacted police), not for truth. The Sixth Circuit declined to definitively resolve admissibility because, under Rosales-Mireles v. United States, Sanford could not show a reasonable probability of a different outcome given: photographic evidence of rape, victim and mother identification, and DNA corroboration.

Notably, the opinion states the disclosures were made “in 2003,” despite the surrounding timeline being 2023; the panel did not treat the date discrepancy as material to the plain-error analysis.

5) Sentencing: prior convictions; Guidelines-plus-mandatory consecutive structure

The panel rejected procedural error because Almendarez-Torres v. United States allows judge-found prior convictions, and Sanford’s stipulation independently removed any factual dispute. Substantively, the sentence was presumed reasonable under United States v. Vonner and United States v. Pirosko, particularly where the total range was constrained by statutory minimums/maximums and a mandatory consecutive term under § 2260A. The district court’s reliance on repeated recidivism and refusal to accept responsibility was treated as an appropriate § 3553(a) analysis under Gall v. United States.

6) Sufficiency: identity and production proved by layered corroboration

Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the panel found ample evidence Sanford was the producer depicted: victim identification, mother’s identification, matching setting (sofa/home), phone attribution via accounts/messages/forensics, and DNA linking Sanford to the contemporaneous assault described. Under United States v. Fekete and United States v. Abboud, the court refused to reweigh credibility and granted all reasonable inferences to the government.

Impact

Although “not recommended for publication,” the opinion crystallizes several practical litigation points in Sixth Circuit child-exploitation prosecutions:

• Broad admissibility of contextual abuse evidence: When production images arise from an ongoing abusive relationship, testimony and corroboration of uncharged assaults are likely to be treated as intrinsic/background evidence under United States v. Churn, and alternatively admissible under Rule 404(b) and especially Rule 414.
• Search-history evidence can be identity and motive evidence: Carefully limited search/view evidence closely resembling charged depictions may survive Rule 403 scrutiny when it is not more sensational than the charged conduct and is probative of who used the device.
• Plain-error review is a steep hill for hearsay-admission challenges: Even if an arguable hearsay mistake exists, defendants must show outcome-changing prejudice—difficult where the government has photographic and forensic corroboration.
• Apprendi challenges to prior-conviction enhancements remain foreclosed in the Sixth Circuit by Almendarez-Torres v. United States and circuit precedent like United States v. Walker, particularly where the defendant stipulates to the conviction.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Intrinsic/background (res gestae) evidence: Evidence that helps the jury understand the full story of the charged crime—what led up to it, how it happened, and why events unfolded as they did—rather than separate “other crimes” offered only to show bad character.
• Rule 404(b): Generally bars “propensity” reasoning (he did it before, so he did it again), but allows other-acts evidence for specific non-propensity purposes like identity, intent, plan, knowledge, or absence of mistake—subject to Rule 403 balancing.
• Rule 414: A special rule for child-molestation cases allowing admission of other child-molestation evidence if relevant—reflecting a policy judgment that such history can be especially probative in these prosecutions.
• Rule 403 unfair prejudice: The question is not whether evidence hurts the defendant (most prosecution evidence does), but whether it risks an improper verdict because it is overly inflammatory or distracts the jury from the charged facts.
• Non-hearsay “effect on the listener”: Statements can be admitted not to prove what they say is true, but to explain why someone acted (e.g., why a friend went to a counselor, why a counselor called police).
• Plain error: A demanding appellate standard used when there was no trial objection. The defendant must show an obvious error that likely changed the outcome and seriously undermines the proceeding’s integrity.
• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural concerns how the sentence was calculated/explained; substantive concerns whether the length is proportionate given the offender and offense.

Conclusion

United States v. Sanford affirms a robust evidentiary pathway for the government in child-pornography production cases arising from ongoing sexual abuse: uncharged assaults may be admitted as intrinsic “story-completing” evidence and, alternatively, under Rules 404(b) and 414; related search activity may be admitted to prove identity and motive when tightly connected to the charged depictions. The opinion also underscores how difficult it is to obtain reversal under plain-error review, reaffirms the continued force of Almendarez-Torres v. United States on prior-conviction sentencing arguments, and applies conventional deference to both jury verdicts and within-Guidelines sentences under the Sixth Circuit’s reasonableness framework.