United States v. Sanchez-Urias: The Tenth Circuit Clarifies that Appeal-Waiver Exceptions are Triggered by the Sentence Imposed, Not by Guideline-Level Calculations

United States v. Sanchez-Urias: The Tenth Circuit Clarifies that Appeal-Waiver Exceptions are Triggered by the Sentence Imposed, Not by Guideline-Level Calculations

1. Introduction

In United States v. Sanchez-Urias, No. 24-1506 (10th Cir. June 24, 2025), the Tenth Circuit confronted a familiar but legally intricate problem: when does an exception to an appellate-waiver clause in a plea agreement allow an appeal? The defendant, Magdiel Sanchez-Urias (“Sanchez”), had pleaded guilty to a methamphetamine offense and received a 121-month sentence. His written plea agreement barred most appeals but carved out a narrow exception if “the sentence exceeds the top end of the advisory Guideline range ... at a total offense level of 29.” Believing the exception applied once the district court found his offense level to be 31, Sanchez filed a notice of appeal. The Government moved to enforce the waiver under United States v. Hahn, the Tenth Circuit’s leading en banc authority on appeal waivers.

The Court granted the Government’s motion, dismissed the appeal, and in doing so set a clear precedent: an appeal-waiver exception drafted in terms of the “sentence” is triggered only by the actual length of the sentence imposed, not by whether the district court ultimately calculated a higher total-offense level.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • The Court applied the three-part Hahn test—scope, knowledge/voluntariness, and miscarriage of justice—to the written waiver.
  • Scope: Because Sanchez’s 121-month sentence did not exceed the 121- to 151-month Guideline range tied to an offense level of 29 and Criminal-History Category IV, the appeal fell squarely within the waiver.
  • Knowing & Voluntary: No evidence showed that Sanchez misunderstood the waiver; the plea colloquy was adequate, and any alleged confusion arose from an unreasonable reading of the clause.
  • Miscarriage of Justice: None of the four circumstances identified in Hahn existed; counsel even conceded no miscarriage would result.
  • Outcome: Government’s motion to enforce was granted; counsel’s Anders motion to withdraw was also granted; the appeal was dismissed.

3. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  1. United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
    Hahn furnishes the governing three-step framework for enforcing plea-agreement appeal waivers. The Court meticulously tracked each step, underscoring Hahn’s enduring centrality. Importantly, the panel reinforced Hahn’s plain-language approach to scope.
  2. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967)
    Defense counsel had already filed an Anders brief stating that no non-frivolous issues existed, attempting to steer the Court toward dismissal on the merits rather than waiver grounds. The panel referenced Anders primarily to explain procedural background.
  3. United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2005)
    Porter was cited for the principle that waiver scope is interpreted through the plea agreement’s plain text, bolstering the Court’s refusal to read the exception as level-dependent.
  4. United States v. Scott, 469 F.3d 1335 (10th Cir. 2006)
    Provided authority that only a reasonable defendant’s understanding governs — if an interpretation is unreasonable, claimed confusion cannot vitiate voluntariness.
  5. United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d 867 (10th Cir. 2003)
    Supplied the plain-error framework when a defendant fails to object to a waiver colloquy in the district court.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

  1. Plain-Language Interpretation of the Waiver (Scope)
    The heart of the opinion lies in differentiating between (1) the offense-level calculation and (2) the sentence imposed. The clause allowed an appeal only if the sentence exceeds the top of the Guideline range connected to offense level 29. Once Criminal-History Category IV was determined, that top end was 151 months. A 121-month sentence did not exceed it; therefore, the appeal was barred.
  2. Voluntariness Despite Alleged Confusion
    The panel treated defense counsel’s argument—that the waiver was confusing to an uneducated defendant—as an insufficient showing. The plea colloquy accurately restated the clause; no record evidence demonstrated actual confusion; and any misinterpretation was found unreasonable given the text. Even assuming confusion, Sanchez could not show he would have foregone the plea but for that misunderstanding, which is required under Edgar to establish prejudice.
  3. Miscarriage-of-Justice Inquiry
    The Court noted counsel’s concession that none of the four Hahn miscarriage factors applied—especially pertinent because the 121-month sentence was well below the 188-month ceiling and within statutory limits.

C. Anticipated Impact on Future Cases

  • Sharper Drafting & Interpretation of Appeal Waivers
    Prosecutors frequently draft waivers using Guideline-range references. This decision instructs both prosecutors and defense counsel that unless the waiver’s exception expressly keys off Guideline calculations, courts will treat it as keyed to the sentence length alone.
  • Strategic Significance in Plea Negotiations
    Defense counsel may seek revised language—e.g., tying the exception to an offense-level finding—if they wish to preserve appellate review of Guideline methodology. Conversely, the Government now has clear precedent to enforce waivers even when the district court’s actual level exceeds the negotiated reference point.
  • Procedural Efficiency
    The Court gently rebuked defense counsel’s effort to bypass Hahn with an Anders brief, signaling that waiver enforcement remains the preferred threshold inquiry. Future counsel will likely address Hahn factors squarely rather than invite advisory merits rulings.
  • Educational Value for District Judges
    Although the panel found the plea colloquy sufficient, its detailed analysis serves as a reminder to district courts to spell out waiver exceptions in concrete terms, minimizing potential misunderstandings.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Appeal Waiver – A defendant’s contractual promise—usually in a plea agreement—not to challenge the conviction or sentence on appeal, except under narrowly defined circumstances.

Guideline “Total Offense Level” – A numerical score within the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines derived from offense characteristics (base level, enhancements, reductions). Combined with the Criminal-History Category, it yields an advisory sentencing range in months.

Criminal-History Category (I–VI) – Reflects a defendant’s prior criminal record. The higher the category, the longer the advisory range for the same offense level.

Anders Brief – A submission by defense counsel stating that, after conscientious examination, no non-frivolous issues exist for appeal. Counsel seeks to withdraw but must identify anything in the record that arguably supports the appeal.

Hahn Three-Part Test – The Tenth Circuit’s framework for enforcing appeal waivers: (1) scope, (2) knowledge/voluntariness, (3) miscarriage of justice.

Plain-Error Review – When an issue is not raised in the district court, the appellate court grants relief only if there is (a) error, (b) that is plain, (c) affects substantial rights, and (d) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Sanchez-Urias crystallizes a precise rule: when an appeal-waiver exception is drafted around the “sentence,” courts will look solely to the number of months imposed, not to interim Guideline computations. By reaffirming the Hahn framework and insisting on a “plain-language” reading, the Tenth Circuit provides clarity to plea-agreement drafters, district judges conducting Rule 11 colloquies, and defendants weighing appellate options. The decision is non-precedential by rule, yet its persuasive authority will likely influence waiver enforcement across the circuit and perhaps beyond. Ultimately, Sanchez-Urias’s appeal was doomed not by an absence of substantive merit but by the very contract he signed—underscoring the maxim that in federal criminal practice, waive at your peril.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

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