United States v. Sabaini: Indirect Tax Proof, Structuring Liability, and § 1001 Concealment After Thompson

I. Introduction

In United States v. Anthony Sabaini, No. 23‑3216 (7th Cir. Dec. 10, 2025), the Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions of a Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) special agent for filing false tax returns, structuring cash deposits, and concealing material facts from the federal government. The case sits at the intersection of white‑collar crime, law‑enforcement corruption, and evidentiary sufficiency.

The government proved that Sabaini:

stole cash from drug dealers and confidential sources,
embezzled agency funds intended for controlled buys,
entered a cash‑for‑protection arrangement with an informant (Gary Howard),
structured cash deposits to avoid banking disclosure requirements, and
omitted critical information about Howard’s unauthorized drug activity when seeking to use him as an HSI confidential source.

On appeal, Sabaini did not challenge trial procedure, jury instructions, or evidentiary rulings. He mounted a pure sufficiency attack on all three groupings of charges:

False tax returns under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (tax years 2014–2018),
Structuring under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3), and
Concealment of a material fact under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1).

The Seventh Circuit’s opinion is especially significant in three respects:

It reaffirms, and concretely applies, the indirect “cash method” and “net worth method” of proving unreported income, including the scope of the government’s duty to investigate claimed non‑taxable sources.
It clarifies that structuring liability does not require deposits clustered just below $10,000 and that internal Department of Justice (DOJ) guidance does not define or limit the elements of the offense.
It confirms that, even after the Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson v. United States, 604 U.S. 408 (2025), 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) independently penalizes concealment of material facts, and that materiality turns on “capacity to influence,” not actual outcome.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The opinion, authored by Judge Kolar and joined by Chief Judge Brennan and Judge Maldonado, proceeds in three broad steps.

A. Factual Background

The government’s trial evidence painted a consistent picture of long‑running corruption:

Thefts from targets and informants. Multiple drug dealers and confidential sources testified that Sabaini and his HSI partner, Fernando Zambrano, seized cash during operations but materially under‑reported the amounts in official reports—sometimes omitting tens of thousands of dollars.
Embezzlement of HSI funds. In a 2017 operation, HSI authorized $50,000 in cash for a controlled heroin purchase. Records showed that Sabaini drew the $50,000 from HSI, signed paperwork stating he gave it to a source, but in fact used counterfeit money in the operation and kept the real cash.
Cash‑for‑protection arrangement with Gary Howard. Text messages showed coded requests (e.g., “50 words on a page” for $50,000). The government tied those communications to contemporaneous car purchases made largely in cash, and to evidence that Sabaini actively shielded Howard from DEA investigations and leaked operational details.
Structured cash deposits. From 2014 through 2018, over $250,000 in cash was deposited into an account held solely by Sabaini in 162 deposits over 66 days—never in amounts of $10,000 or more. After a car dealership filed a mandatory report for a cash car payment exceeding $10,000 and notified him, his deposit behavior shifted to noticeably smaller average amounts.
Unreported income analysis. An IRS agent testified that:
- the cash thefts were never reported as income, and
- using both the “cash method” and “net worth method” of proof, Sabaini’s expenditures and asset growth could not be reconciled with his reported income for 2014–2018, absent substantial unreported taxable income.

In response, Sabaini argued legitimate non‑taxable sources:

a supposed large cash and gold‑coin gift from his father, allegedly sold for cash between 2013 and 2015, and
cash reimbursements from parents of children on sports teams he coached.

The government countered these claims with:

family testimony that they were unaware of such a stash,
Mint testimony undermining the claimed vintage of some coins,
records showing that when Sabaini did sell coins, he received checks, not cash,
financial disclosures that omitted any such hoard, and
interviews with parents and documentary evidence showing no large cash reimbursements.

A jury convicted Sabaini on all seven counts. The district court denied his Rule 29 (acquittal) and Rule 33 (new trial) motions. He appealed, arguing insufficiency of the evidence across the board.

B. Holdings

The Seventh Circuit:

Affirmed all tax‑fraud convictions, holding that:
- Direct evidence of theft and unreported cash income fully supported the convictions for 2015–2018, and
- Circumstantial evidence via the cash and net‑worth methods, coupled with the government’s reasonable negation of claimed non‑taxable sources, sufficed for 2014.
Affirmed the structuring conviction under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3), finding that:
- Sabaini’s knowledge of reporting thresholds,
- his specialized training in money‑laundering investigations,
- the volume and pattern of deposits, and
- the behavioral change after receiving a Form 8300 notice
permitted a rational jury to find that he intentionally structured deposits to evade reporting.
Affirmed the concealment conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1), concluding that:
- the omission of Howard’s unauthorized DEA‑related drug transaction was material to HSI’s decision to use him as a confidential informant, and
- the jury had ample basis to find that the omission was knowing and willful.

The court rejected Sabaini’s attempts to:

discredit government witnesses on appeal,
invoke DOJ’s internal “seven factors” for structuring as a quasi‑legal standard, and
import Thompson’s limitation on “misleading” but not “false” statements under § 1014 into the distinct context of § 1001(a)(1), which expressly criminalizes concealment of material facts.

III. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

A. Standards of Review and Post‑Trial Motions

United States v. Farmer, 38 F.4th 591 (7th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Anderson, 988 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 2021)
These cases supply the familiar standard for reviewing the denial of a Rule 29 motion: de novo review of sufficiency, but in the light most favorable to the government, and with no authority to reweigh evidence or reassess witness credibility. The panel repeats that it may overturn a conviction only if “no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Peoples, 119 F.4th 1097 (7th Cir. 2024) and United States v. Conley, 875 F.3d 391 (7th Cir. 2017)
These decisions underscore that Rule 33 new‑trial motions should be granted only in “the most extreme cases” that leave a “strong doubt” as to guilt. Unlike Rule 29, Rule 33 allows the district court to consider credibility, but appellate review of the denial of such a motion is “highly deferential” because the trial judge is best positioned to assess witnesses.
United States v. Cox, 54 F.4th 502 (7th Cir. 2022)
Used to emphasize that appellate courts do not intrude on the jury’s determinations of witness credibility on a Rule 29 challenge. This is particularly important here because many of the key witnesses were drug dealers or informants whose credibility Sabaini attacked.

These precedents frame the opinion: the panel repeatedly returns to the concepts of “rational trier of fact” and deference to the jury and the trial judge, signaling that Sabaini’s arguments largely sought impermissible re‑weighing of evidence.

B. Indirect Methods of Proving Unreported Income

United States v. Perez, 612 F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2010)
Provides the elements for a § 7206(1) false‑return prosecution: making and verifying a return, material falsity, willfulness, and declaration under penalty of perjury. The dispute in Sabaini centers on the second and third elements—material falsity and willfulness through unreported income—not on the formalities of return filing.
United States v. Hogan, 886 F.2d 1497 (7th Cir. 1989) and Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954)
These foundational cases endorse the use of indirect methods (cash expenditures and net worth) to prove unreported income when direct evidence is limited. Hogan describes the cash‑expenditures method; Holland establishes the net‑worth method’s contours and the need to establish a reasonably certain opening net worth.
United States v. Chu, 779 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1985) and United States v. Marrinson, 832 F.2d 1465 (7th Cir. 1987)
These decisions elaborate on the net‑worth method: the government must show beginning net worth with reasonable certainty, then demonstrate increases in net worth (plus nondeductible expenditures) not attributable to reported income, creating a “circumstantial conclusion” of unreported income.
United States v. Massei, 355 U.S. 595 (1958) (per curiam)
Clarifies that in an indirect‑proof tax case, the government must either:
- identify a likely taxable source, or
- negate plausible non‑taxable sources offered by the defendant.
This principle is central in Sabaini, where the defendant proposed specific nontaxable sources (sports reimbursements and a coin‑and‑cash gift).
Holland, again, and “relevant leads” doctrine
Holland also requires the government to “track down relevant leads furnished by the taxpayer—leads reasonably susceptible of being checked” when the taxpayer claims non‑taxable sources that could explain his wealth. The panel quotes this requirement and evaluates whether the government satisfied it regarding the alleged gift from Sabaini’s father and coaching‑related reimbursements.
United States v. Blandina, 895 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1989)
A close factual analog: there, the defendant claimed his net worth increase stemmed from a cash gift and coin collection inherited from his father. The government interviewed family members, consulted coin dealers, and examined financial records, but could not substantiate the claim. The Seventh Circuit held that this effort satisfied the duty to investigate “relevant leads.” In Sabaini, the panel expressly invokes Blandina and applies its reasoning to uphold the government’s similar investigative approach.

C. Structuring and Internal DOJ Guidance

United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169 (7th Cir. 1991)
Defines structuring as “altering the form of the [cash deposit] in order to avoid activating the bank’s duty to file a currency transaction report.” This succinct formulation frames the statutory concept in § 5324(a)(3).
United States v. Van Allen, 524 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 2008)
Clarifies that, to sustain a structuring conviction, the government need only prove that:
- the defendant knew of the reporting requirements, and
- acted to avoid them.
Van Allen also exemplifies how irrational or inefficient financial behavior (e.g., high‑volume check‑cashing with significant fees) can support an inference of structuring intent, even if deposits are not all near the $10,000 mark.
United States v. Malewicka, 664 F.3d 1099 (7th Cir. 2011)
Holds that “repeated transactions below $10,000 are evidence of intent to structure,” especially when combined with knowledge of reporting requirements and other contextual facts (e.g., withdrawals close in time). This language is pivotal for rejecting Sabaini’s argument that his deposits were “too small” to support a structuring inference.
United States v. Cassano, 372 F.3d 868 (7th Cir. 2004)
Confirms that courts may look at the full factual matrix (e.g., business norms, defendant’s role in filling out financial instruments) when inferring awareness of reporting rules and intent to evade them.
United States v. Gillespie, 974 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1992) and United States v. Lopez‑Matias, 522 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2008)
These cases stand for the proposition that internal DOJ policies do not create enforceable substantive rights for defendants and are not grounds for vacating convictions. The panel relies on them to dismiss Sabaini’s argument that the government was obliged to satisfy DOJ’s internal “seven factors” for identifying structuring.

D. Materiality and § 1001 After Thompson

United States v. Moore, 446 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 2006)
Provides the elements for a § 1001(a)(1) concealment charge: duty to disclose, concealment by acts or omissions, materiality, knowing and willful mental state, and federal jurisdiction. The court tracks these elements in analyzing Sabaini’s omission about Howard’s unauthorized drug deal.
United States v. Clark, 787 F.3d 451 (7th Cir. 2015) and United States v. Lupton, 620 F.3d 790 (7th Cir. 2010)
Both cases articulate the materiality standard: a statement (or omission) is material if it has a “natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing” agency action; actual influence is not required. They also confirm that materiality is a factual question for the jury.
Thompson v. United States, 604 U.S. 408 (2025)
Thompson held that 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (false statements to financial institutions) covers false statements, but not merely “misleading” ones. The panel notes Thompson to clarify that § 1001(a)(1), unlike § 1014, expressly reaches “conceal[ing] or cover[ing] up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact.” Because Sabaini was convicted for omission—concealment, not an ambiguous or merely misleading statement—Thompson’s holding is inapplicable.

IV. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Tax Fraud: Direct and Indirect Proof of Unreported Income

1. Years with Direct Evidence (2015–2018)

For 2015–2018, the government’s case did not rely purely on inferences from financial patterns. Witnesses—drug dealers, confidential sources, and other law‑enforcement personnel—described specific incidents where:

large sums of cash were seized in law‑enforcement operations,
reports under‑recorded seized amounts by tens of thousands of dollars, and
HSI operational funds intended for controlled buys were diverted.

These narratives were cross‑checked against bank records showing substantial cash deposits and IRS testimony that those deposits were not reported as income. The court’s analysis here is straightforward:

The jury heard direct testimony of theft and cash diversion.
Bank and tax records corroborated that these funds entered Sabaini’s accounts without being reported on tax returns.
Attacks on the credibility of drug‑dealer witnesses cannot be re‑litigated on appeal under Rule 29, and the district court’s acceptance of their credibility for Rule 33 purposes is entitled to substantial deference.

Therefore, a rational jury could easily conclude that the returns were materially false and that Sabaini knowingly and willfully omitted taxable income for those years.

2. The Harder Year: 2014 and Indirect Proof

The 2014 conviction is analytically richer because the government lacked direct evidence of theft or specific illegal income events that year. Instead, it used:

the cash‑expenditures method (suggesting $19,791 in unreported cash income), and
the net‑worth method (suggesting $13,780 in unreported income).

The opinion carefully recites the requirements for these methods from Hogan, Holland, and Chu:

establishing opening net worth or cash‑on‑hand with reasonable certainty,
tracking expenditures and net‑worth changes over the period, and
comparing those figures with reported income.

Crucially, under Massei and Holland, once the government has established a prima facie indirect case, it must either:

identify a likely taxable source, or
reasonably negate the defendant’s claimed nontaxable sources.

Sabaini supplied two leads:

Sports‑coaching reimbursements – cash allegedly repaid by parents for team expenses.
Father’s cash and coin “gift” – a box of gold coins and cash supposedly transferred in 2012, with the coins sold for cash between 2013–2015.

The court methodically evaluates the government’s efforts:

Parents from youth sports teams were interviewed; one parent testified there were no substantial cash reimbursements in 2014, and overall evidence showed no large cash flows from this source.
Family members testified they knew of no large coin or cash hoard; the father had taken out personal loans, inconsistent with holding substantial hidden wealth.
Mint officials testified that some coins Sabaini claimed were from the 1970s were not minted until 1986, directly undermining his story.
Local coin dealers had no records of paying Sabaini cash for coin sales.
Financial forms for Sabaini and his parents disclosed no such assets.

This mirrors Blandina, where the government similarly investigated a claimed cash‑and‑coin inheritance and found no corroborating evidence. There, the Seventh Circuit held that the “track down all reasonably checkable leads” standard was satisfied even though some family members partially corroborated the defendant’s story.

Applying Blandina, the Sabaini panel concludes:

The government reasonably investigated the coaching and coin‑gift narratives.
The resulting evidence undermined rather than supported those explanations.
The defense thus presented a “factual jury question,” which the jury resolved against Sabaini.

Because the jury’s choice between competing factual narratives was rational, and the government met its obligation to probe “relevant leads reasonably susceptible of being checked,” the 2014 conviction stands.

B. Structuring: Knowledge, Pattern, and the Irrelevance of DOJ Guidelines

1. Elements Applied to a Financial‑Crimes Agent

Under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3), the government had to show that Sabaini:

knew banks must report cash transactions of $10,000 or more, and
structured his transactions to evade that requirement.

The court emphasizes that this case is not about an unsophisticated consumer:

As an HSI agent, Sabaini investigated money laundering and attended trainings on detecting structuring.
He trained others on such methods and promoted his expertise on his résumé.

The pattern of conduct:

Over $250,000 deposited in cash between 2014–2018.
162 deposits over 66 days.
Not one deposit reached $10,000.
Before April 25, 2016, average cash deposit > $2,000; after receiving notice that a car dealership filed a report because he paid > $10,000 in cash, average deposit dropped to slightly over $1,000.

The court also notes:

A video showing him making multiple deposits in rapid succession at a drive‑through ATM.
Texts indicating he received $50,000 from Howard around April 2016, followed by three deposits totaling more than $10,000 but each kept under the $10,000 threshold.

Taken together—and in light of his specialized knowledge—a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that he structured with intent to evade reporting.

2. Rejection of the DOJ “Seven Factors” Argument

Sabaini argued that the government failed to establish certain behavior identified in DOJ’s internal “seven‑factor” structuring guidance, implying that this failure undermined the conviction. The panel decisively rejects this contention:

Internal DOJ manuals and guidance do not create substantive rights for defendants.
Relying on Gillespie and Lopez‑Matias, the court reiterates that such policies are not mandated by statute or the Constitution; non‑compliance is not a basis to dismiss charges or reverse convictions.

In other words, the government’s trial burden remains tied to the statutory elements and case law (e.g., Van Allen, Malewicka), not to internal prosecution checklists.

3. Deposit Sizes and Inferences of Intent

Sabaini also contended that his average deposit (between $1,000 and $2,000) made it unreasonable to infer that he ever had ≥ $10,000 in cash at once, and thus unreasonable to infer structuring. The court responds by:

Emphasizing that there is no legal requirement that deposits be “close to but less than” $10,000 to sustain a structuring conviction.
Citing Malewicka for the proposition that “repeated transactions below $10,000 are evidence of intent to structure.”
Pointing to its own precedents (Van Allen, Cassano) where multiple contextual indicators—timing, volume, business norms, knowledge—supported structuring inferences even without near‑threshold deposits.

The panel then underscores the totality:

Sabaini’s expert knowledge of structuring from his HSI role,
the volume and pattern of sub‑threshold deposits,
the marked behavioral change after a Form 8300 notice, and
the logical inference that stolen cash payments (sometimes in large lump sums) were being broken up precisely to avoid detection.

This holistic approach to intent, rather than a mechanical focus on the amount of individual deposits, is consistent with prior Seventh Circuit precedent and reinforces that structuring can be proven by circumstantial evidence plus specialized knowledge.

C. Concealment Under § 1001(a)(1) and Materiality After Thompson

1. Duty to Disclose and Materiality

Under Moore, the elements of § 1001(a)(1) concealment are:

a statement or a duty to disclose,
false statement or acts amounting to concealment,
materiality,
knowing and willful mental state, and
federal jurisdiction.

Here, the government’s theory was that:

HSI’s procedures and forms imposed a duty on Sabaini to disclose significant information about a prospective confidential informant’s conduct and law‑enforcement contacts,
he omitted Howard’s January 2017 arrest and unauthorized drug deal with a DEA confidential source, and
this omission was material to HSI’s decision to approve and manage Howard as a confidential source.

On materiality, Clark and Lupton establish that the test is whether the omission had a “natural tendency to influence” or was “capable” of influencing agency action; actual influence is unnecessary. Applying that standard:

Both of Sabaini’s supervisors testified that:
- he should have disclosed the DEA‑related unauthorized drug deal, and
- they would have taken this information into account when deciding whether to use Howard as a confidential informant.
The panel deems this testimony sufficient for a rational jury to find materiality. Whether HSI would ultimately have declined to use Howard is “not dispositive.”

Materiality was thus properly left as a factual question for the jury, which had ample basis to conclude that knowledge of unauthorized criminal activity and competing agency interests would naturally bear on HSI’s informant‑management decisions.

2. Thompson’s Limited Reach and Concealment

While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Thompson v. United States, which held that § 1014 covers only false statements, not statements that are merely “misleading.” Sabaini sought to leverage Thompson to challenge his § 1001 conviction.

The Seventh Circuit carefully distinguishes Thompson:

Thompson interpreted § 1014, whose text is limited to “false” statements; by contrast, § 1001(a)(1) explicitly criminalizes:
“conceal[ing] or cover[ing] up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact.”
Sabaini was prosecuted not for a “misleading” half‑truth but for omission—a failure to disclose material information he was duty‑bound to report.
Therefore, Thompson’s narrowing construction of “false statements” does not undercut or modify § 1001(a)(1)’s separate prohibition on concealment.

In effect, the panel confirms a clean doctrinal line: Thompson limits § 1014 but has no effect on § 1001(a)(1)’s concealment prong, which remains fully applicable to omissions.

3. Knowing and Willful Concealment

On mens rea, the court looks to:

Evidence of a “mutually beneficial relationship” between Sabaini and Howard, involving cash payments and protection from investigations.
Proof that Sabaini knew of:
- the January 2017 unauthorized drug deal involving a DEA confidential source, and
- the FBI investigation into Howard.
Text messages in which Sabaini warned Howard about pending law‑enforcement operations and inquired about phone numbers that had triggered DEA database hits.

From this evidence, a rational jury could infer that:

Sabaini understood the significance of the unauthorized drug deal and law‑enforcement interest in Howard,
he knew these facts were required to be disclosed, and
he intentionally omitted them to preserve Howard’s viability as a “golden goose” of illicit income.

Accordingly, the panel finds more than sufficient evidence to support the “knowing and willful” element of § 1001(a)(1).

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Indirect Methods of Proving Tax Evasion

1. Cash‑Expenditures (Cash Method)

Think of this as a household cash‑flow audit:

The IRS estimates how much cash you had at the start of the year.
It then adds all known legitimate sources of cash during the year (salary, known gifts, etc.).
Next, it totals your cash outflows (purchases, cash payments) during that year.
If your spending is more than the cash you legitimately had or received, the “extra” is inferred to be unreported taxable income.

2. Net‑Worth Method

This technique focuses on overall wealth rather than individual transactions:

Determine your net worth at the beginning of a period (assets minus liabilities).
Determine your net worth at the end of each tax year.
Add nondeductible expenditures (like living expenses) to the increase in net worth.
Compare that total to the income you reported on your tax return.
If your net worth and expenditures grew more than your reported income would allow, the difference is inferred to be unreported income.

In both methods, the government must consider and rule out plausible non‑taxable sources (inheritances, gifts, loans) that might explain the discrepancy. That is why investigating “relevant leads” is critical.

B. “Structuring” of Financial Transactions

Banks must report cash transactions of $10,000 or more. “Structuring” occurs when someone deliberately breaks a large amount of cash into smaller pieces—say eleven deposits of $9,000 each—to avoid triggering these reports.

Key points:

The law focuses on intent to evade reporting, not on any precise dollar pattern.
Repeated deposits below $10,000, especially following a reminder that big cash payments are reported, can strongly suggest structuring.
Knowledge is crucial: a person with specialized training in money‑laundering detection, like Sabaini, will find it particularly hard to claim ignorance.

C. Materiality in False‑Statement and Concealment Offenses

In § 1001 and similar statutes, “materiality” does not mean the government must prove the agency actually acted differently. Instead, a fact is material if:

it naturally tends to influence, or
is capable of influencing

a decision the agency might make.

So in this case, even if HSI would have still used Howard as an informant after learning about his unauthorized drug deal, the fact remains material if reasonable officials testify that they would have considered it in deciding whether, or how, to use him.

D. Duty to Disclose and Concealment Under § 1001(a)(1)

Concealment under § 1001(a)(1) does not require an affirmative lie. It is enough that a person:

has a legal or regulatory duty to disclose certain information to the government,
knowingly withholds that information, and
does so willfully (i.e., not by accident or misunderstanding).

Here, HSI’s informant‑management process imposed a duty on agents like Sabaini to disclose significant information about an informant’s ongoing criminal conduct and other agency contacts. His failure to disclose Howard’s unauthorized drug deal and arrest therefore constitutes a concealment, not just a failure to volunteer extraneous detail.

E. Rule 29 vs. Rule 33

Rule 29 (Judgment of Acquittal) – asks whether any rational jury could have found all elements beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing evidence in the government’s favor. Appellate courts may not second‑guess credibility or reweigh evidence.
Rule 33 (New Trial) – allows the district court to grant a new trial “in the interest of justice” when the weight of the evidence leaves strong doubt about guilt. The standard is high, and appellate review is deferential because the trial judge observed the witnesses first‑hand.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Reinforcing the Government’s Use of Indirect Tax‑Proof Methods

Sabaini solidifies the Seventh Circuit’s support for the cash‑expenditures and net‑worth methods, particularly when:

there is a robust combination of direct and indirect evidence across multiple tax years, and
the government credibly investigates and undercuts the defendant’s claimed non‑taxable sources.

By explicitly analogizing to Blandina, the court sends a signal that:

Vague or self‑serving stories about “cash gifts” and “coin collections” will not defeat an indirect‑proof case so long as the government reasonably pursues and assesses those leads.
Even when defense witnesses (e.g., family) offer some supporting testimony, the jury retains discretion to reject that narrative if the broader record undermines it.

This opinion thus provides prosecutors with a detailed, appellate‑approved blueprint for building and defending indirect‑proof tax cases, especially in corruption contexts where direct tracing of each illicit dollar is difficult.

B. Structuring: Beyond Near‑Threshold Deposits and DOJ Checklists

The decision has two important implications for structuring prosecutions:

Deposit size alone is not determinative. Repeated sub‑$10,000 deposits, with atypical timing or volume, and especially in the hands of a trained law‑enforcement financial‑crimes investigator, can suffice to infer structuring. Courts will look at the totality of circumstances rather than any rigid “near $10,000” requirement.
Internal DOJ criteria have no binding effect. By rejecting Sabaini’s reliance on DOJ’s internal “seven factors,” the court reinforces that statutory elements and judicial precedent—not internal manuals—govern sufficiency analysis. Defendants cannot demand that prosecutors meet internal policy markers as a condition of conviction.

This will be particularly relevant in future cases involving sophisticated actors—lawyers, financial professionals, or law‑enforcement agents—whose specialized knowledge may make structuring inferences more readily drawn.

C. § 1001(a)(1) Concealment in the Shadow of Thompson

By directly addressing Thompson v. United States and distinguishing § 1001(a)(1) from § 1014, the panel:

prevents an overbroad reading of Thompson that might otherwise embolden defendants to argue that omission‑based or “misleading” conduct is categorically beyond the reach of federal false‑statement statutes, and
clarifies that concealment remains independently criminal where the statute so provides.

For federal agencies, the decision underscores the importance of:

clear documentation of agents’ affirmative duties to disclose certain categories of information (e.g., CI arrests, unauthorized criminal conduct), and
training agents that “leaving something off the form” can constitute a felony if the omitted fact is material and the omission is knowing and willful.

For defense counsel, Sabaini is a reminder that Thompson is not a universal shield; any argument about “misleading but not false” statements must be closely tailored to the specific statute at issue.

D. Law‑Enforcement Corruption and Evidentiary Sufficiency

Substantively, the case sends a strong policy message: when law‑enforcement officers exploit their position to:

steal from investigative targets,
divert agency funds,
accept protection money from informants, and
manipulate official processes through omission,

courts will not hesitate to affirm convictions supported by a mosaic of circumstantial and direct evidence.

Doctrinally, the case illustrates how:

specialized training and job responsibilities can be used to prove knowledge and intent (for both structuring and concealment), and
patterns of behavior—deletion of messages, shifts in deposit habits, selective under‑reporting in official documents—are powerful circumstantial indicators of corrupt intent.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Sabaini is a comprehensive reaffirmation of three important strands of federal criminal law:

The indirect methods of proving unreported income remain fully viable and potent tools when coupled with reasonable investigation into claimed non‑taxable sources.
Structuring liability does not depend on near‑threshold deposits or compliance with internal DOJ checklists; intent can be inferred from repeated sub‑threshold deposits, behavioral changes, and especially from a defendant’s specialized knowledge of financial‑reporting rules.
After Thompson, § 1001(a)(1)’s concealment prong stands undiminished: omissions of material facts, in violation of a duty to disclose, can sustain felony convictions if knowing and willful, regardless of whether the agency was ultimately misled in fact.

Against the backdrop of law‑enforcement corruption, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion emphasizes deference to juries’ factual determinations and to district courts’ denial of post‑trial motions, while at the same time offering clear, structured guidance on how these complex white‑collar doctrines ought to be applied. For prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges alike, Sabaini provides a detailed, modern template for litigating tax‑fraud, structuring, and concealment cases involving sophisticated defendants.