United States v. Elias Xavier Rosario Torres & Veronica Estefania Rodriguez Pinuela
Eleventh Circuit, Aug. 19 2025

Commentary Title

“No Duty to Prove the Legibility or Proper Positioning of Road Markings: The Eleventh Circuit’s Clarification of Reasonable Suspicion for Traffic Stops.”

1. Introduction

United States v. Rosario-Torres arose from a late–night traffic stop in Tampa, Florida, that yielded cocaine, fentanyl, a converted Glock-style machine gun, and ammunition. Three occupants were in the car: driver Veronica Estefania Rodriguez Pinuela (hereafter “Pinuela”), her uncle, and front-seat passenger Elias Xavier Rosario Torres (“Torres”). Both defendants were indicted on drug-trafficking and firearms charges; Torres faced an additional felon-in-possession count because of his criminal history.

Two discrete legal issues reached the Eleventh Circuit:

• Suppression Issue (Pinuela): Did officers have the requisite legal basis to stop the vehicle and later search the passenger-side bags?
• Jury-Instruction Issue (Torres): Was it plain error not to instruct jurors that Torres had to know his firearm possessed “machine-gun characteristics” to be guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)?

2. Summary of the Judgment

In a unanimous unpublished opinion, the panel (Newsom, Branch & Grant, JJ.) affirmed both convictions. Key holdings were:

1. Police possessed at least reasonable suspicion—indeed probable cause—that Pinuela violated Florida Statute § 316.089 by driving straight through a “right-turn only” lane and continuing in the shoulder. Therefore, the stop and ensuing automobile search were lawful. The Government need not prove the road markings were “in proper position and sufficiently legible” to justify the stop.
2. Torres’s instructional challenge was barred under the “invited error” doctrine because defense counsel jointly proposed—indeed requested—the very instruction now alleged to be defective. Even if the instruction were wrong, any error was waived.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) — Re-affirmed that reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, is the constitutional minimum for traffic stops. The panel applied Campbell to refocus the inquiry from probable-cause language used below to reasonable suspicion.
• Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54 (2014) — Established that reasonable suspicion can rest on mistakes of fact or law so long as they are objectively reasonable. The opinion leverages Heien to emphasize that officers need not ultimately prove a violation occurred, only that they reasonably suspected it.
• Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014) and United States v. Boyce, 351 F.3d 1102 (11th Cir. 2003) — Provided the definitional contours of reasonable suspicion (“specific and articulable facts”).
• United States v. Wilson, 979 F.3d 889 (11th Cir. 2020) — Restated the allocation of burdens on a suppression movant and characterized probable cause when an officer personally observes a traffic violation.
• United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2010), United States v. Maradiaga, 987 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2021) — Articulated the invited-error doctrine; central to denying Torres relief.
• United States v. Duldulao, 87 F.4th 1239 (11th Cir. 2023) — Mentioned only to reject Torres’s speculation about an intervening change in law.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

3.2.1 Traffic Stop & Search

1. Reasonable Suspicion Exists. Officer testimony plus aerial photographs showed the BMW entering a right-turn-only lane, bypassing the turn, and driving along the shoulder—conduct violating § 316.089(3)–(4). The court stressed that visibility and placement of the markings are irrelevant to the officer’s contemporaneous judgment; they matter only to ultimate citation enforcement.

2. Probable Cause Alternatively Present. The court agreed with the district judge that the same facts likely satisfied the higher probable-cause threshold, citing Wilson.

3. Automobile Exception. Upon approach, officers smelled burnt marijuana and saw Torres smoking a “blunt”; under Florida law, even medicinal users may not smoke in vehicles. Smell of contraband furnished independent probable cause to search passenger-side bags under the long-standing automobile exception.

3.2.2 Jury Instruction & Invited Error

Defense counsel had jointly drafted and endorsed jury instructions that tracked Eleventh Circuit Pattern charges, requiring proof that Torres knowingly possessed a firearm “in furtherance” of drug trafficking but not that he knew it was a machine gun. Because he “proposed the exact language the district court adopted,” Torres “invited” any error. Under Frank and Maradiaga, invited error extinguishes even plain-error review unless an intervening change in law reveals the instruction became incorrect—something that has not occurred.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

• Clarification for Law Enforcement: Officers in the Eleventh Circuit can rely on observed non-compliance with pavement-applied traffic control markings alone to establish reasonable suspicion; they need not later demonstrate the markings met § 316.074’s positioning/legibility requirements.
• Litigation Practice: Suppression movants must raise granular statutory arguments in their written motions; appellate courts will not rescue overlooked theories. The opinion repeatedly notes counsel’s failure to plead specific grounds.
• Invited Error Doctrine Strengthened: The case is a cautionary tale—jointly proposed jury instructions are virtually unassailable on appeal absent a supervening change in substantive law.
• Firearm Enhancements Under § 924(c): The decision leaves untouched current precedent that knowledge of “machine-gun characteristics” is not an element the Government must prove for the separate § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) penalty enhancement, foreshadowing the continued use of “Glock switches” prosecutions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Reasonable Suspicion vs. Probable Cause – Reasonable suspicion is a commonsense, low-level belief that “something may be afoot,” justifying brief investigative stops. – Probable cause is a higher standard—enough facts and circumstances to convince a reasonable person that a crime likely occurred.
• Traffic-Control “Devices” Florida law defines these broadly to include not only physical signs and signals but also arrows, lines, and lane markings painted on the pavement.
• Automobile Exception Police may search a vehicle without a warrant when they have probable cause to believe it contains contraband; the vehicle’s inherent mobility supplies the exigency.
• Invited Error A party cannot complain on appeal about an error it prompted the trial court to commit. The rationale is fairness and prevention of “sandbagging.”
• Plain Error Review A four-part appellate test for unpreserved errors: (1) error, (2) plain (obvious) at the time of appeal, (3) affecting substantial rights (outcome determinative), and (4) seriously impairing the integrity of proceedings.
• § 924(c) & Machine Guns Section 924(c) criminalizes possession of a firearm during a drug-trafficking crime. Subparagraph (B)(ii) increases the mandatory minimum from 5 to 30 years if the firearm is a “machine gun,” i.e., capable of firing more than one round per trigger pull. A tiny “switch” or “chip” can convert a semi-automatic Glock into a machine gun.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Rosario-Torres underscores two critical doctrines. First, when an officer personally observes a motorist disregard lane-direction arrows or shoulder delineations, that alone generates reasonable suspicion—and likely probable cause—to stop the vehicle; prosecutors need not litigate whether the paint met technical placement standards. Second, defendants who affirmatively endorse jury instructions will find the appellate courthouse doors closed under the invited-error rule unless the law changes mid-appeal. Moving forward, the ruling supplies law enforcement with clear guidance on traffic stops predicated on road-marking violations and warns defense counsel to raise all suppression theories early and to scrutinize pattern instructions carefully. In the broader landscape, the case cements the Eleventh Circuit’s post-Campbell trajectory: pragmatic, officer-centric assessments of roadside encounters combined with strict procedural bars for unpreserved or invited errors.