United States v. Roper: Supervised Release Revocation Arrests Do Not Trigger the Speedy Trial Act’s 30‑Day Indictment Clock

I. Introduction

In United States v. Roper, No. 25‑2037 (10th Cir. Nov. 18, 2025), the Tenth Circuit addressed an increasingly common procedural puzzle: when a defendant on federal supervised release allegedly commits new criminal conduct, and is arrested and imprisoned for a supervised release violation based on that same conduct, does that arrest start the Speedy Trial Act’s 30‑day clock for filing a federal indictment on the new offense?

Jason Pete Roper, while serving a term of supervised release for a prior federal conviction, allegedly committed three Hobbs Act robberies of Ross Dress For Less stores in New Mexico in August and September 2022. He was then arrested—not on new federal robbery charges—but on a federal supervised release violation warrant premised in part on the same alleged robberies and a failed drug test. After serving a revocation sentence, he was eventually indicted and arrested on federal Hobbs Act charges more than a year later.

Roper moved to dismiss the federal indictment, arguing:

the indictment violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b), because it was filed more than 30 days after his September 29, 2022 arrest; and
even if not strictly covered by § 3161(b), the indictment should be dismissed under the “ruse exception” recognized in United States v. Pasillas‑Castanon, 525 F.3d 994 (10th Cir. 2008), which allows certain civil or non‑criminal detentions to trigger the Act when used as a pretext for later criminal prosecution.

The district court denied the motion in a detailed written order, he went to trial and was convicted on all three Hobbs Act counts, and the court imposed a 20‑year sentence. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Although styled as an “Order and Judgment” and expressly designated non‑precedential under Tenth Circuit Rule 32.1, the decision is significant as persuasive authority. It squarely holds that:

an arrest for supervised release violations does not start the Speedy Trial Act’s 30‑day indictment clock, even if the alleged violations are based on the same conduct later charged in a federal indictment; and
the ruse exception remains narrow and is unavailable where there is an undisputed, lawful basis for the non‑criminal detention (here, a drug‑use violation of supervised release conditions).

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

The core timeline is critical to the Speedy Trial Act analysis:

August 14 & 15, and September 8, 2022 – While on federal supervised release, Roper robbed three Ross Dress For Less stores, stealing about $1,800. These robberies later formed the basis for three Hobbs Act counts (18 U.S.C. § 1951).
Late September 2022 – He failed a drug test, another violation of supervised release conditions.
September 28, 2022 – The State of New Mexico filed state armed robbery charges arising out of the same incidents.
September 29, 2022 – Roper’s federal probation officer filed a petition to revoke supervised release, premised on (a) the state robbery charges and (b) the failed drug test. A federal arrest warrant issued on the supervised release violations, and Roper was arrested the same day—on that supervised release warrant.
Revocation Proceedings – After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that the evidence did not sufficiently prove that Roper committed the robberies, but did find that he violated supervised release by using a controlled substance. The court revoked supervised release and imposed a 13‑month prison term for that violation.
September 1, 2023 – Upon his release from Bureau of Prisons custody on the revocation sentence, New Mexico immediately arrested him on the state robbery charges.
November 1, 2023 – The federal government filed a three‑count indictment charging Roper with Hobbs Act robbery, § 1951. A new federal arrest warrant issued on the indictment.
Shortly thereafter – New Mexico dismissed the state charges, and on November 8, 2023, Roper was arrested on the new federal charges and warrant.

Roper then moved to dismiss the indictment, raising two principal arguments, both ultimately rejected:

Speedy Trial Act violation: He claimed the 30‑day indictment clock in § 3161(b) began on September 29, 2022—the date of his supervised release arrest—because that arrest was “in connection with” the same robberies later charged in the federal indictment.
Ruse exception: He argued that the government used the revocation process as a “mere ruse” to hold him in custody for investigative purposes and to delay formal charging, thereby triggering the Speedy Trial Act under the ruse exception.

The district court rejected both and the jury later convicted him on all three robbery counts. On appeal, Roper challenged solely the denial of his pre‑trial motion to dismiss.

B. Holdings

The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding:

No Speedy Trial Act violation under § 3161(b) – The 30‑day clock did not begin on September 29, 2022, because that arrest was for supervised release violations, not “in connection with” the “offense” charged in the later indictment. Supervised release revocation is part of the original sentence, not a new “offense” or set of “charges,” and not a stage of a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, the clock began only when Roper was arrested on the federal indictment—on November 8, 2023—and the indictment (filed November 1, 2023) was timely.
No relief under the ruse exception – Even assuming the ruse exception might conceptually apply to supervised release arrests, it is “not easily triggered” and requires a showing that the primary or exclusive purpose of the detention was to hold the defendant for future criminal prosecution. Because there was an undisputed, lawful basis for the revocation (Roper’s drug use violation), the exception did not apply.

The panel emphasized that Roper’s arguments were “novel” and largely unsupported by authority, and that the district court had correctly applied existing law.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

1. Statutory Framework and Core Tenth Circuit Authority

Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(b): Requires that an “indictment charging an individual with the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty days from the date on which such individual was arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges.” The opinion turns on the meaning of “arrested … in connection with such charges” and “offense.”

The district court (and the panel) rely heavily on:

United States v. Bagster, 915 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1990) – The Tenth Circuit held that a person is not “arrested in connection with” a charge under § 3161(b) unless there is:
1. a pending federal complaint, and
2. federal custody based on that complaint.
The Roper panel notes this test and concludes that, for Roper, these conditions were not satisfied until November 8, 2023, when he was arrested pursuant to the November 1, 2023 indictment. His supervised release arrest in September 2022 plainly did not satisfy Bagster’s “federal complaint + custody on that complaint” requirement.

Thus, Bagster provides the structural framework: mere federal custody is not enough; it must be federal custody tied to a pending federal criminal complaint or indictment “in connection with” the charges ultimately prosecuted.

2. Supervised Release Revocation Is Not a New Criminal Prosecution

The district court—and the panel by adoption—draw on a well‑established line of authority distinguishing revocation proceedings from new criminal prosecutions.

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3): Governs revocation of supervised release. The statute authorizes the court to revoke supervised release and impose a term of imprisonment where the defendant has “violated a condition of supervised release.” The text refers to conditions, not to “offenses” or “charges.”
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) – The Supreme Court characterized parole revocation as not part of a criminal prosecution. This language has been widely extended to probation and supervised release revocations.
Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000) – The Court described supervised release sanctions as “postrevocation sanctions as part of the penalty for the initial offense” and explained that revocation “is not to be viewed as punishment for the violation of the conditions of supervised release, but, rather, as part of the penalty for the original offense.”
United States v. Salazar, 987 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 2021) – The Tenth Circuit reiterated that supervised release is “a separate part of the original sentence,” not a new offense.
United States v. Fay, 547 F.3d 1231 (10th Cir. 2008) – Emphasized that revocation hearings are not part of a criminal prosecution, and thus various procedural protections applicable to criminal trials do not apply.
United States v. Cordova, 461 F.3d 1184 (10th Cir. 2006) – Similarly distinguished revocation proceedings from new criminal charges.

These authorities anchor the core holding that a supervised release violation is not an “offense” within the meaning of § 3161(b). Instead, it is part of the sentencing consequences of the original conviction. That conceptual distinction allows the court to say that the September 29, 2022 arrest was not “in connection with” the “offense” later charged in the robbery indictment.

3. Nationwide Agreement: Supervised Release Revocation and the Speedy Trial Act

The district court also surveyed out‑of‑circuit decisions and concluded that all circuits to address the issue agree that the Speedy Trial Act does not apply to supervised release revocation proceedings. The panel accepted that conclusion.

United States v. Hinojosa, 67 F.4th 334 (6th Cir. 2023) – In Hinojosa, the Sixth Circuit held that § 3161(b)’s 30‑day clock did not apply where the defendant’s arrest was based on alleged supervised release violations rather than on federal charges in an indictment. The Roper opinion quotes Hinojosa’s key insight: just because an arrest has a ‘connection with’ the factual conduct underlying a crime does not mean that it has a ‘connection with’ the formal accusation in an indictment.

The Tenth Circuit aligns itself with this reasoning: factual overlap between the conduct underlying a supervised release violation and the conduct charged in a later indictment does not transform the earlier revocation arrest into a Speedy Trial Act arrest “in connection with” the later charges.

4. The Ruse Exception and Civil or Non‑Criminal Detentions

For the ruse exception analysis, the panel’s primary reliance is:

United States v. Pasillas‑Castanon, 525 F.3d 994 (10th Cir. 2008) – The Tenth Circuit held that generally “civil arrests and detentions do not ordinarily trigger the Speedy Trial Act,” but recognized a narrow “ruse exception”: a civil detention might trigger the Act when civil or state authorities are used as a “mere ruse” for later criminal prosecution, and:
The ruse exception applies only when a defendant demonstrates that the primary or exclusive purpose of a civil detention was to hold the defendant for future criminal prosecution … Without evidence of wrongful collusion, the exception does not apply. In short, if the detaining authorities have a lawful basis for their civil detention, a defendant is not entitled to invoke the exception.

Pasillas‑Castanon is typically applied in contexts like immigration detention or state custody where federal prosecutors may delay formal federal charges. In Roper, the panel assumes, for the sake of argument, that the doctrine might extend to supervised release revocation arrests, but then holds the exception inapplicable because there was an undisputed, legitimate basis for the revocation detention (the drug‑use violation).

5. Additional Supporting Authority

Roper himself cited two significant out‑of‑circuit decisions, but their language ultimately undermined his position:

United States v. Johnson, 815 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1987) – The Fifth Circuit stated that Courts uniformly hold that an individual is not arrested under 3161(b) until he is taken into custody after a federal arrest for the purpose of responding to a federal charge. This reinforces that an arrest for supervised release violations—though federal—is not “for the purpose of responding to” new federal criminal charges.
United States v. Bloom, 865 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1989) – The Second Circuit similarly explained that an arrest that is not for purposes of answering to federal criminal charges does not trigger the Speedy Trial Act.

The panel also cites:

United States v. Dermen, 143 F.4th 1148 (10th Cir. 2025) – For the general appellate principle that a court of appeals may affirm a district court decision on any ground supported by the record, even if the district court used different reasoning. This is noted in a footnote in connection with the ruse exception issue.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Interpretation of § 3161(b)

The panel endorses the district court’s textual reading of § 3161(b). That section triggers the 30‑day clock when an individual is:

arrested or served with a summons in connection with such charges.

The opinion emphasizes:

The word “such” refers back to the specific charges in the indictment or information—federal criminal charges carrying their own statutory offenses.
A supervised release violation under § 3583(e)(3) is not itself an “offense” or “charge” but rather a finding that the defendant has violated a condition of an existing sentence.

Hence, an arrest on a supervised release warrant—even if predicated in part on conduct that is eventually charged as a federal crime—is not an arrest “in connection with” the later indictment’s “offense” for § 3161(b) purposes.

2. Conceptual Separation: Revocation vs. New Criminal Prosecution

Central to the panel’s reasoning is the conceptual separation between:

Revocation proceedings – which are post‑judgment, part of the original sentence, and focus on whether the defendant violated conditions of supervised release; and
New criminal prosecutions – which involve new “offenses,” new “charges,” and the full panoply of constitutional and statutory criminal‑procedure rights.

Drawing from Morrissey, Johnson, Salazar, Fay, and Cordova, the court underscores that:

Revocation is not part of a new criminal prosecution.
It is a “separate part of the original sentence,” not a charge of an “offense.”
Therefore, revocation proceedings exist outside the Speedy Trial Act’s framework, which is designed for new criminal charges.

This leads to a key conclusion: even when the same conduct (e.g., the alleged robberies) is used as:

a factual basis for supervised release violations; and
the basis for later substantive federal charges;

those two uses are legally distinct. As the district court put it and the panel endorsed:

What [Roper's argument] fails to understand is that his arrest, and subsequent incarceration, for the supervised release violation is separate and distinct from the indictment which initiated this case. Even when the charges in the indictment stem from the same facts which led to an arrest for supervised release violations, the offenses are considered separate.

3. Application of Bagster and When § 3161(b) Is Triggered

The panel applies Bagster’s “pending federal complaint + custody on that complaint” formulation. There was:

no federal criminal complaint or indictment for the robberies pending on September 29, 2022; and
Roper’s federal custody at that time was based solely on the supervised release revocation warrant, not on a criminal complaint.

Accordingly, the statutory clock did not begin to run. By the time the clock could possibly start—on the November 8, 2023 arrest following the November 1, 2023 indictment—it was already satisfied (the indictment pre‑dated the arrest).

4. Rejection of Roper’s “Formal Charge via Revocation Petition” Theory

Roper attempted to recast the revocation petition as a kind of “formal charge” that should, in his view, suffice to trigger § 3161(b). He argued that because the revocation petition alleged he committed the robberies, it satisfied the requirement of a formal accusation.

The panel rejects this, noting:

Roper cited no authority equating a revocation petition with a federal criminal “complaint,” “indictment,” or “information” under the Speedy Trial Act.
To the contrary, the court’s own precedents (e.g., Fay) and the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence treat revocations as categorically different from new charges.
Hinojosa further clarifies that a mere factual connection between an arrest and later criminal charges does not convert the earlier civil or revocation arrest into an arrest “in connection with” the later indictment.

Thus, a revocation petition alleging new criminal conduct remains exactly that: a petition about conditions of supervised release, not a charging instrument commencing a new prosecution.

5. Addressing Policy and “Congressional Intent” Arguments

Roper criticized existing interpretations of § 3161(b) as too “narrow” and argued that the district court’s reading was “contrary to Congressional intent” because it allowed the government to delay indictment while holding him under a different label (revocation).

The panel’s response is straightforward:

Even if Roper’s criticisms point to policy concerns, they do not overcome controlling case law or the statutory text.
His arguments amount to disagreement with how courts have interpreted § 3161(b), not a demonstration of legal error in the district court’s application of that law.

Implicitly, the court leaves any broader policy reform to Congress rather than judicially expanding the Speedy Trial Act beyond its current doctrinal boundaries.

6. The Ruse Exception: Lawful Basis Defeats the Claim

On the ruse exception, the panel walks through the Pasillas‑Castanon framework:

Civil or non‑criminal detentions (including immigration or state civil custody) generally do not trigger the Speedy Trial Act.
The “ruse exception” is narrow: it applies only when a defendant shows that the primary or exclusive purpose of the detention was to hold him for future criminal prosecution, typically involving collusion between agencies.
Where there is a lawful, independent basis for the detention, the exception does not apply.

Applying this to Roper:

He was arrested on September 29, 2022, for supervised release violations, including an undisputed drug‑use violation.
He did not contest that he had used a controlled substance in violation of his conditions of supervision.
This violation provided a legally sufficient, stand‑alone basis for his revocation and 13‑month term.

Because the supervised release detention had an undeniable lawful basis, and Roper did not produce evidence that the primary or exclusive purpose was to warehouse him for future robbery prosecution, the ruse exception was unavailable. The panel summarized:

That violation established a “lawful basis” for his detention. Roper therefore is “not entitled to invoke” the ruse exception.

Importantly, the panel explicitly sidesteps deciding a potentially broader doctrinal question:

The government argued that the ruse exception should not be extended to supervised release arrests at all.
The panel assumes without deciding that it could apply in some supervised release contexts, but affirms on the narrower ground that Roper’s case does not qualify because of the lawful, uncontested drug‑use violation.
Relying on Dermen, the court notes it may affirm on any ground supported by the record, even if the district court’s rationale differed.

C. Impact and Significance

1. Clarifying the Trigger for § 3161(b) in the Supervised Release Context

Though designated non‑precedential, Roper is likely to be cited persuasively for the clear proposition that:

An arrest on a supervised release violation warrant does not start the Speedy Trial Act’s 30‑day indictment clock for later substantive federal charges—even when the alleged violations and the later charges are factually identical.

For practitioners in the Tenth Circuit:

Defense counsel must recognize that time spent in custody on a revocation warrant does not generally count for Speedy Trial Act purposes on separate future charges.
Prosecutors have confirmation that they may pursue revocation based on new conduct and decide later whether, and when, to file substantive criminal charges based on that conduct—without automatically triggering § 3161(b).

2. Strong Reinforcement of the Revocation/Prosecution Divide

The decision reinforces a firm doctrinal boundary:

Revocation is part of the penalty for the original conviction.
Criminal prosecution for new conduct is a separate proceeding.

This has implications beyond the Speedy Trial Act:

It supports the continued understanding that most constitutional trial rights (e.g., jury trial, proof beyond a reasonable doubt, etc.) do not apply in revocation proceedings.
It bolsters the government’s ability to use the same underlying conduct for both revocation and later criminal prosecution without double jeopardy problems, because revocation is not punishment for the new conduct as such.

3. A Narrow and Difficult Ruse Exception

By reaffirming the stringent Pasillas‑Castanon standard, the panel underscores that the ruse exception is difficult to invoke:

Defendants must show wrongful collusion and that the detention’s primary or exclusive purpose was to delay criminal charging.
If any independent, lawful reason for detention exists (such as an undisputed supervised release violation), the exception is effectively off the table.

Practically, this means:

Where a defendant on supervision admits or cannot credibly contest a violation (like drug use), it will be almost impossible to show that the revocation process was a mere pretext or “ruse.”

4. Possible Concerns and Unaddressed Issues

The opinion implicitly acknowledges, but does not remedy, a potential gap in protection:

A defendant may be detained and imprisoned for months or years on supervised release violations based on conduct that eventually becomes the basis for new federal charges.
During that period, the defendant receives none of the Speedy Trial Act protections regarding the timing of indictment or trial on those new charges.

The panel’s answer is essentially that this structure is the one Congress and prior precedent have created. If this dual‑track approach is seen as unfair or vulnerable to abuse, any fix lies in legislative amendment or a change in Supreme Court doctrine, not in a lower court’s expansion of § 3161(b).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. The Speedy Trial Act and the 30‑Day Indictment Rule

The Speedy Trial Act provides several time limits in federal criminal cases. The one at issue here, § 3161(b), says:

Once a person is arrested or served with a summons in connection with a federal charge, the government normally has 30 days to file an indictment or information for that charge.

Key points:

Not every arrest starts the clock—only arrests that are for the purpose of answering to federal criminal charges.
Being in custody for some other reason (state custody, immigration detention, supervised release revocation) does not start the clock unless that custody is specifically tied to pending federal charges.

2. Supervised Release and Revocation

Supervised release is a term of community supervision that follows a federal prison sentence. Conditions can include:

obeying all laws,
drug testing,
reporting to a probation officer, and more.

If the defendant violates these conditions, the court can revoke supervised release and send the defendant back to prison. This revocation:

is not a new criminal case;
is considered part of the penalty for the original conviction;
does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or a jury trial; and
is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3583 and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1.

The same conduct (e.g., a robbery) can both:

serve as a basis for revocation; and
be prosecuted as a new federal or state crime.

3. “In Connection With Such Charges” in § 3161(b)

The phrase “in connection with such charges” means:

There must be a direct relationship between the arrest and the specific federal criminal charges in the eventual indictment or information.

Simply being arrested for something factually related (like a revocation based on the same conduct) is not enough. Courts look to:

whether there is a federal complaint or indictment already filed, and
whether the arrest is to bring the person before the court on those charges.

4. The “Ruse Exception” Explained

The ruse exception addresses a potential abuse: Suppose authorities use a civil or non‑criminal process (like immigration detention) solely to hold someone while they prepare a criminal case, avoiding Speedy Trial Act timelines. The ruse exception allows the court to treat that detention as if it were a criminal arrest for Speedy Trial Act purposes, but only if:

the primary or exclusive purpose of the civil detention is to hold the person for future criminal prosecution; and
there is evidence of wrongful collusion between agencies.

If there is any clear, independent, lawful reason for the detention (e.g., a valid immigration removal case, or—here—an admitted supervised release violation), the ruse exception usually does not apply.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Roper represents a careful, text‑driven and precedent‑aligned application of the Speedy Trial Act to a familiar but legally nuanced situation: a defendant arrested and imprisoned for supervised release violations later faces substantive federal charges based on the same underlying conduct.

The Tenth Circuit’s key takeaways are:

Supervised release revocation arrests do not trigger § 3161(b). An arrest for violating supervised release is not an arrest “in connection with” the “offense” later charged in an indictment. Revocation is part of the original sentence, not a new criminal prosecution.
The 30‑day indictment clock starts only when there is a federal criminal complaint or indictment and custody “for the purpose of responding to” those criminal charges. Bagster’s “pending complaint + custody on that complaint” test remains the operative benchmark.
Revocation petitions are not criminal charging instruments. They cannot substitute for an indictment, information, or complaint under the Speedy Trial Act, even when they allege specific new crimes.
The ruse exception is narrow and rarely applicable. When there is a legitimate, uncontested basis for a civil or revocation detention—as with Roper’s drug‑use violation—the exception is foreclosed.
Any perceived gap in protection is a matter for Congress, not the courts. The panel acknowledges that existing doctrine allows the government some latitude to use revocation proceedings without triggering Speedy Trial Act protections, but it emphasizes that this result flows from established statutory and Supreme Court precedent.

Though non‑precedential, Roper provides a clear and persuasive articulation of how the Speedy Trial Act interacts with supervised release revocations and the ruse exception. It reaffirms a strong conceptual boundary between post‑judgment supervision proceedings and new criminal prosecutions, and it signals to both prosecutors and defense counsel that the 30‑day indictment rule will not be extended to revocation‑based arrests absent a clear, formal, and direct connection to pending federal criminal charges.