United States v. Robinson: Redressability, Mootness, and the Nonjurisdictional Character of AEDPA’s Second-or-Successive Bar

United States v. Robinson: Redressability, Mootness, and the Nonjurisdictional Character of AEDPA’s Second-or-Successive Bar

I. Introduction

In United States v. Carlos Demond Robinson, No. 22‑7200 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 2025) (published), the Fourth Circuit dismissed a federal prisoner’s appeal from the denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion as moot. The panel did not reach the headline substantive question on which it had granted a certificate of appealability (COA) – whether an amended judgment entered after a First Step Act sentence reduction is a “new judgment” for purposes of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Instead, the court held that it lacked Article III power to act because, given the posture of the case, no ruling it could issue would redress the prisoner’s injury.

In resolving that jurisdictional problem, the Fourth Circuit made two significant contributions to federal habeas law:

  • It held that AEDPA’s “second or successive” authorization provisions governing § 2255 motions – 28 U.S.C. §§ 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3) – are nonjurisdictional claim‑processing rules, not limits on the subject‑matter jurisdiction of the district courts.
  • It clarified that where a district court denies a § 2255 motion on alternative grounds, and an appellate court grants a COA on only one of those grounds and later refuses to expand it, the appeal may become moot for lack of redressability if success on the certified issue would not disturb the unreviewable alternative ground.

The case therefore sits at the intersection of Article III doctrine (standing, redressability, mootness), AEDPA’s intricate habeas restrictions, and the mechanics of COA practice. While the panel expressly “left for another day” the “new judgment” issue under the First Step Act, the decision has important implications for how future § 2255 litigation will be framed and for how courts label and treat AEDPA’s second‑or‑successive rules.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Original Conviction and Direct Appeals

In 2002, Carlos Robinson was convicted by a jury in the District of South Carolina of multiple drug and firearm offenses, including:

  • Conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute crack and powder cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 846);
  • Two counts of possession with intent to distribute crack and cocaine (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1));
  • Two counts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); and
  • Two counts of felon‑in‑possession (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)).

He was sentenced to a total of 960 months’ imprisonment: 360 months for the drug offenses, plus two consecutive 300‑month terms for the § 924(c) counts.

On direct appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed Robinson’s convictions but remanded for resentencing in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), because the district court had treated the Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory. See United States v. Robinson, 221 F. App’x 236 (4th Cir. 2007). On remand the district court again imposed the same 960‑month sentence, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. United States v. Robinson, 264 F. App’x 332 (4th Cir. 2008).

B. First § 2255 Motion (2008) and Johnson-Based Successive Motion

In October 2008, Robinson filed his first § 2255 motion. He alleged:

  • Vindictive prosecution;
  • Violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); and
  • Ineffective assistance of counsel.

The district court denied relief on the merits. Robinson sought a COA, but the Fourth Circuit denied it and dismissed the appeal. United States v. Robinson, 350 F. App’x 837 (4th Cir. 2009).

In 2016, Robinson sought authorization from the Fourth Circuit to file a second or successive § 2255 motion based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), which invalidated the Armed Career Criminal Act’s residual clause as unconstitutionally vague. The Fourth Circuit granted authorization, holding that Johnson might apply to his Guidelines career offender status.

On remand, however, the district court concluded that even if Johnson applied to the Guidelines, Robinson still qualified as a career offender due to two qualifying predicate convictions. Robinson appealed, but the Fourth Circuit denied a COA, holding that he had not made a substantial showing that the district court’s predicates finding was debatable or wrong. United States v. Robinson, 672 F. App’x 330 (4th Cir. 2017).

C. First Step Act Sentence Reduction and Amended Judgment

In 2019, Robinson moved for:

  • Compassionate release; and
  • A sentence reduction and vacatur of his § 924(c) convictions under §§ 403 and 404 of the First Step Act, via 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).

The district court denied compassionate release but granted partial First Step Act relief. It amended the criminal judgment to reduce Robinson’s overall sentence to 601 months (reflecting lower penalties for drug offenses) but did not vacate the § 924(c) counts.

D. The 2022 § 2255 Motion at Issue

In August 2022, Robinson filed the § 2255 motion that generated this appeal. Proceeding pro se, he argued that he was actually innocent of his second § 924(c) conviction because:

  • Both § 924(c) violations allegedly occurred during the same overarching drug‑trafficking conspiracy; and
  • He used the same firearm in both incidents.

In his words, selling drugs twice while armed “in the same Drug Conspiracy with the same gun” should not “be counted as TWO section § 924(c) violations.” He contended that the two firearm counts were in essence the same offense.

The district court dismissed the motion on two independent grounds:

  1. Second or successive status: The court held that Robinson’s motion was a “second or successive” § 2255 motion that had not been authorized by the court of appeals, and therefore dismissed it for lack of “jurisdiction.” It relied on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Telcy v. United States, 20 F.4th 735 (11th Cir. 2021), to conclude that a First Step Act sentence reduction does not create a “new judgment” for AEDPA purposes.
  2. Untimeliness: Alternatively, the court held that even if the motion were not successive, it was time‑barred under § 2255(f)’s one‑year limitations period. Treating the amended judgment as the latest possible trigger, the court found that the limitations period expired in June 2021, while Robinson filed in August 2022. It rejected equitable tolling because Robinson gave no excuse for the delay and – crucially – because his underlying § 924(c) claim lacked merit in light of binding Fourth Circuit precedent, particularly United States v. Camps, 32 F.3d 102 (4th Cir. 1994), which allows multiple § 924(c) counts based on a single predicate crime.

In invoking untimeliness sua sponte, the district court cited Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701 (4th Cir. 2002), which ordinarily requires notice before sua sponte dismissal on limitations grounds, but allows dismissal without notice when it is “indisputably clear” that the petition is time‑barred and cannot be salvaged by equitable tolling.

E. COA Proceedings in the Fourth Circuit

Robinson applied to the Fourth Circuit for a COA. He:

  • Conceded he had not obtained prior authorization for a second § 2255 motion, but argued that no such authorization was required if his First Step Act resentencing produced a “new judgment.”
  • Asserted that his 2022 motion should be treated as his first § 2255 challenge to that new judgment.
  • Contended that the district court erred in relying on equitable tolling principles without proper notice and in misreading the merits of his § 924(c) argument.

Initially, the Fourth Circuit held the COA application in abeyance pending United States v. Newby, 91 F.4th 196 (4th Cir. 2024), which touched related issues about First Step Act amended judgments but ultimately declined to resolve the precise “new judgment” question Robinson raised. The panel then:

  • Granted a COA on a single issue: whether an amended criminal judgment entered after a First Step Act sentence reduction qualifies as a “new judgment” for AEDPA purposes.
  • Denied Robinson’s motion to expand the COA to cover the district court’s alternative ruling on untimeliness and its merits assessment of his § 924(c) claim.

In his opening brief, Robinson acknowledged that his underlying § 924(c) theory was foreclosed by existing Fourth Circuit precedent, particularly Camps, but he maintained that the district court had misapprehended the predicates and that equitable tolling should apply.

III. Summary of the Opinion

Judge Quattlebaum, writing for a unanimous panel (joined by Judge Thacker and Senior Judge Floyd), dismissed the appeal as moot.

The panel held:

  1. Article III redressability is lacking. Because the district court’s untimeliness ruling was an alternative and independent ground for denying § 2255 relief, and because the Fourth Circuit had refused to expand the COA to permit appeal of that ruling, even a complete victory for Robinson on the “new judgment” question would not change the outcome of his § 2255 proceeding. His injury therefore was not redressable on appeal, and his case became moot.
  2. AEDPA’s second‑or‑successive rules are nonjurisdictional. The panel rejected Robinson’s argument that the district court’s untimeliness ruling was “void” because the court had already found it lacked “jurisdiction” under § 2255(h). Relying on the Supreme Court’s recent “discipline” in the use of the term “jurisdictional,” the panel held that §§ 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3) are claim‑processing rules, not limits on subject‑matter jurisdiction. The district court thus did not violate Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), by issuing an alternative timeliness ruling after labeling the motion “successive.”
  3. The “new judgment” question remains unresolved in the Fourth Circuit. Because Article III barred consideration of the merits, the panel expressly “leave[s] for another day” whether a First Step Act amended judgment is a “new judgment” for AEDPA’s second‑or‑successive bar.

In short, the court concluded that, due to the combination of (i) the district court’s alternative untimeliness ruling; (ii) the denial of a COA expansion to include that ruling; and (iii) the binding merits precedent (Camps) that made equitable tolling unattainable, the Fourth Circuit was powerless to grant Robinson meaningful relief even if it agreed with him on the certified “new judgment” issue. The appeal therefore had to be dismissed.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. Article III Case or Controversy, Standing, and Mootness

The opinion anchors its jurisdictional analysis in familiar Article III doctrine:

  • Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), and TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), which define the three elements of constitutional standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.
  • Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167 (2000), and Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997), which emphasize that standing must persist “throughout” the case; if circumstances change so that the injury ceases to be redressable, the case becomes moot.
  • Townes v. Jarvis, 577 F.3d 543 (4th Cir. 2009), and Menders v. Loudoun County School Board, 65 F.4th 157 (4th Cir. 2023), applying these principles within the Fourth Circuit.
  • Wells v. Johnson, 150 F.4th 289 (4th Cir. 2025), for the proposition that “courts do not exist to answer questions. They exist to redress injuries.”

The panel uses these authorities to frame the core inquiry: whether, at the appellate stage, an order addressing the “new judgment” status of Robinson’s amended judgment could plausibly change the legal reality that his § 2255 motion was dismissed as untimely on an unappealable ground.

2. AEDPA’s Second‑or‑Successive Restrictions and the “New Judgment” Question

The AEDPA framework at issue consists primarily of:

  • 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h), which requires that a “second or successive” § 2255 motion be certified by the court of appeals based on newly discovered evidence or a new, retroactive rule of constitutional law.
  • 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3), which establishes the pre‑filing authorization process in the court of appeals for second‑or‑successive applications.

The key antecedent question – left undecided in this case – is when a filing is “second or successive” for AEDPA purposes. Under Supreme Court jurisprudence (e.g., Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010)), a new judgment generally resets the count, meaning the first collateral attack on a new judgment is not “second or successive” even if the prisoner previously litigated a § 2254/§ 2255 challenge to an earlier judgment.

On that front, the district court relied on:

  • Telcy v. United States, 20 F.4th 735 (11th Cir. 2021), where the Eleventh Circuit held that a First Step Act sentence reduction is not a “new judgment” under AEDPA.
  • United States v. Newby, 91 F.4th 196 (4th Cir. 2024), a Fourth Circuit case involving a First Step Act resentencing that the panel in Robinson initially awaited, but which ultimately did not resolve the “new judgment” issue.

Because the Fourth Circuit dismissed Robinson’s appeal as moot, it did not adopt either Telcy’s approach or an alternative rule. The issue remains open in this circuit.

3. Timeliness and Equitable Tolling in § 2255 Proceedings

The time‑bar aspect of the case implicates:

  • 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f), which imposes a one‑year statute of limitations for § 2255 motions, running from the latest of several possible events (typically, the date on which the conviction becomes final).
  • Hill v. Braxton, 277 F.3d 701 (4th Cir. 2002), which generally requires that a district court give a § 2255 (or § 2254) petitioner notice and an opportunity to respond before dismissing on limitations grounds sua sponte, unless it is “indisputably clear” that the petition is untimely and cannot be saved by equitable tolling.
  • United States v. Sexton, 2003 WL 601443 (4th Cir. 2003) (unpublished), applying this exception.

The district court concluded that Robinson’s motion was plainly untimely even if time was measured from the 2020 amended judgment, and that equitable tolling could not apply because:

  • Robinson offered no excuse for his delay; and
  • His underlying § 924(c) argument was “so lacking on the merits” (given Camps) that it could not support tolling based on actual innocence or other equitable grounds.

The Fourth Circuit’s refusal to expand the COA necessarily reflected a conclusion that there was no debatable constitutional issue associated with this alternative untimeliness ruling.

4. Multiple § 924(c) Convictions – United States v. Camps

Robinson’s underlying substantive claim – that two § 924(c) convictions based on the same drug conspiracy and the same firearm could not both stand – runs headlong into United States v. Camps, 32 F.3d 102 (4th Cir. 1994).

In Camps, the Fourth Circuit held that:

“A defendant in this Circuit can be convicted of multiple Section 924(c) offenses that all rely on the same predicate crime.”

The district court relied on Camps in rejecting Robinson’s § 924(c) innocence claim and in finding that equitable tolling was unavailable. The appellate panel in Robinson notes that Robinson himself conceded that current Fourth Circuit precedent “dooms his claim on the merits.”

5. Jurisdiction vs. Claims‑Processing Rules: Gonzalez, Arbaugh, Riley, Harrow

The most doctrinally significant part of the opinion is its treatment of AEDPA’s second‑or‑successive rules as nonjurisdictional. The panel draws from the Supreme Court’s modern “clear‑statement” approach, including:

  • Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134 (2012), admonishing courts to “bring some discipline” to use of the term “jurisdictional.”
  • Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006), which held that Title VII’s 15‑employee threshold is not jurisdictional because Congress did not clearly state that it was.
  • Riley v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 2190 (2025), reiterating that a rule is jurisdictional only if it genuinely limits the court’s adjudicatory power and Congress “clearly states” that the provision has jurisdictional consequences; otherwise it is a claim‑processing rule.
  • Harrow v. Department of Defense, 601 U.S. 480 (2024), reinforcing that absence of jurisdictional language and the presence of party‑directed procedural instructions are strong signals that a requirement is nonjurisdictional.
  • Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), rejecting “hypothetical jurisdiction” and requiring courts to resolve jurisdictional questions before merits issues.

The panel applies these principles to §§ 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3) and finds no language that purports to limit the district court’s subject‑matter jurisdiction. Instead, these provisions regulate when and how a prisoner may file a second‑or‑successive motion, and what showing must be made to the court of appeals before such a filing is allowed.

The opinion also notes:

  • The Sixth Circuit’s decision in Williams v. United States, 927 F.3d 427 (6th Cir. 2019), which concluded that § 2244(b)(4)’s mandatory dismissal directive is nonjurisdictional.
  • A district court decision, Moss v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 3d 697 (W.D.N.C. 2024), which, relying on Williams, treated § 2244(b)(4) as a claim‑processing rule rather than a jurisdictional bar.

These authorities help the panel contextualize its own conclusion that §§ 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3) similarly do not limit the court’s power but rather prescribe procedural prerequisites for litigants.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. From Standing to Mootness: The Loss of Redressability

The panel begins with first principles. Under Article III, federal courts can only decide “Cases” and “Controversies.” Standing doctrine – injury, causation, redressability – identifies which disputes are appropriate for judicial resolution. But standing is not static: the plaintiff’s interest must remain live throughout the litigation; otherwise, the case becomes moot.

In Robinson’s case:

  1. At the time he filed his § 2255 motion, he plainly had standing: he was incarcerated under a federal judgment, and he alleged that one of his § 924(c) convictions was invalid.
  2. The district court’s denial of relief created an appealable adverse judgment. The Fourth Circuit granted a COA, but only on the question whether the First Step Act amended judgment constituted a “new judgment” for AEDPA purposes.
  3. The district court’s alternative ruling – that the motion was untimely and not eligible for equitable tolling – remained intact and unreviewable because the Fourth Circuit declined to expand the COA to include it.

The court emphasizes redressability: to satisfy Article III, it must be “likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision” (Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). Here, even if the appellate court accepted Robinson’s argument and held that his First Step Act resentencing produced a “new judgment,” that would only eliminate the second‑or‑successive rationale for dismissing his § 2255 motion. It would not affect the alternative untimeliness ruling, which independently prevents relief.

Because the denial of COA expansion made the timeliness issue unreviewable, it effectively functions as an independent, unassailable barrier to relief. The panel thus concludes that there is no scenario in which a favorable decision on the certified issue could lead to an order granting Robinson’s § 2255 motion or even remanding for further proceedings on the merits. In that sense, his injury is no longer redressable on appeal, and the case is moot.

2. The COA Denial and Its Jurisdictional Effect

The opinion links this redressability problem directly to the structure of 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c):

  • To appeal a final order in a § 2255 proceeding, a prisoner must obtain a COA specifying the issues on which appeal is permitted.
  • A COA issues only if the applicant has made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”

By granting a COA solely on the “new judgment” question and denying expansion to cover the timeliness issue, the Fourth Circuit necessarily held that Robinson’s arguments about timeliness (and the related merits of his § 924(c) claim) were not debatable among jurists of reason and did not warrant appellate review.

That denial has teeth: without a COA, the court has no authority to review that aspect of the district court’s ruling at all. The untimeliness determination therefore stands as a conclusive, unreviewable obstacle to Robinson’s success. The court’s inability to disturb that determination is what collapses redressability and renders the case moot.

3. The “Jurisdictional” Label on Second‑or‑Successive Rules

Robinson tried to escape the mootness conclusion by arguing that the district court’s untimeliness ruling was itself invalid. He pointed out that the court first said it lacked “jurisdiction” to consider his motion as a second‑or‑successive petition, and only then addressed the statute of limitations. Relying on Steel Co. and related cases, he argued that a court cannot “assume” jurisdiction to reach the merits; therefore, anything the district court said after its “jurisdiction” ruling was ultra vires and void. If that were correct, the untimeliness ruling would fall away, and a favorable ruling on the “new judgment” issue might again have redressable consequences.

The panel rejects this argument by reclassifying the nature of the “second‑or‑successive” bar:

  1. Textual analysis of § 2255(h). The provision requires certification by the court of appeals but:
    • Does not mention “jurisdiction”; and
    • Speaks entirely in terms of what the applicant and the court of appeals must do before filing, not in terms of the district court’s adjudicatory power.
  2. Textual analysis of § 2244(b)(3). Similarly, subsection (b)(3):
    • Requires an applicant to move in the court of appeals for authorization before filing in the district court (§ 2244(b)(3)(A));
    • Sets deadlines and procedures for the court of appeals (§ 2244(b)(3)(B)–(E)); and
    • Again, says nothing about the district court’s subject‑matter jurisdiction.
  3. Application of the clear‑statement rule. Under Arbaugh, Gonzalez, Riley, and Harrow, a rule is jurisdictional only if Congress clearly states that it is. Requirements that speak to party conduct, timing, or procedural gateways are typically claim‑processing rules unless Congress unmistakably indicates otherwise.

Applying these principles, the panel holds that §§ 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3) are “a threshold requirement that a party has to satisfy in order to go forward” in the district court – in other words, classic claim‑processing rules. They do “not speak to a district court’s jurisdiction,” nor do they demarcate the bounds of judicial power.

The court is candid that both the district court and the Fourth Circuit itself (in prior cases like United States v. Winestock, 340 F.3d 200 (4th Cir. 2003)) have loosely used “jurisdictional” language in the AEDPA context. But in light of the Supreme Court’s repeated insistence on precision, the panel recharacterizes that usage as “casual” and no longer doctrinally correct.

Because the second‑or‑successive bar is nonjurisdictional, the district court did not actually lack subject‑matter jurisdiction when it proceeded to analyze timeliness. Rather, it determined that Robinson had failed to comply with a mandatory procedural prerequisite, and then – in the alternative – concluded that, even if that prerequisite did not apply, the motion was independently barred by the statute of limitations. That alternative ruling is valid and not a forbidden exercise in “hypothetical jurisdiction.”

The panel adds in a footnote that even if §§ 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3) were jurisdictional, its conclusion about mootness would not change, because the district court’s timeliness ruling did not skip over unresolved Article III questions in the manner criticized by Steel Co.

4. Why the Case Is Moot Despite a Live Legal Question

The opinion underscores a key institutional point: federal courts are not in the business of issuing advisory opinions or resolving abstract legal conflicts. The “new judgment” issue is interesting, contested, and important, but in the posture of Robinson’s case, resolving it would have no practical effect on his custody or on the disposition of his § 2255 motion.

In the panel’s own words:

“[E]ven the most favorable ruling on appeal won’t change things for him because the district court also dismissed his motion for untimeliness. And the dismissal on that ground cannot be appealed.”

Thus, the case ceases to satisfy the “case or controversy” requirement, even though a purely legal question remains unresolved. That is the heart of the redressability‑based mootness holding.

C. Impact and Implications

1. Reclassification of AEDPA’s Second‑or‑Successive Bar

The court’s determination that §§ 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3) are claim‑processing rules rather than jurisdictional has several practical consequences:

  • Potential for waiver or forfeiture. Claim‑processing rules can typically be waived or forfeited if not timely raised by the parties. Although the panel does not expressly address waiver, its reasoning aligns with Supreme Court precedent under which nonjurisdictional requirements do not automatically deprive courts of power and may be relaxed if not invoked.
  • Sua sponte enforcement still possible. Many mandatory claim‑processing rules can be enforced sua sponte by courts, but they are not conceptually jurisdictional. That distinction matters for issues like retroactivity, cure of defects, and appellate review.
  • Correction of earlier “jurisdictional” dicta. Prior Fourth Circuit decisions describing the second‑or‑successive bar as a jurisdictional limit (e.g., Winestock) are effectively narrowed to the extent they used that label loosely. District courts in the Fourth Circuit now have firm guidance to treat the pre‑authorization requirement as mandatory but nonjurisdictional.

2. Strategic Lessons for Habeas Litigants and Counsel

The case offers important practice lessons:

  • Importance of COA framing. The scope of the COA can determine whether a case remains redressable. Here, Robinson’s failure to secure a COA on the timeliness question meant that the adverse limitations ruling was immune from appellate review. Where a district court denies a § 2255 motion on multiple grounds, petitioners and counsel must be strategic and comprehensive in seeking COAs on all potentially dispositive grounds.
  • Alternative grounds matter. Even if a petitioner has a strong argument on one legal issue (e.g., the “new judgment” question), an unchallenged alternative ground (like untimeliness) will block relief and can render the appeal moot if not included within the COA.
  • Know your circuit precedent on the merits. Because Robinson’s own theory of § 924(c) actual innocence was foreclosed by Camps, the district court correctly found his claim weak on the merits. That weakness influenced both the equitable‑tolling analysis and the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that no COA should issue on the timeliness/merits issue. Habeas litigants must carefully consider whether they can realistically show a debatable constitutional claim in light of binding precedent.

3. The Still‑Open “New Judgment” Question After First Step Act Resentencing

The panel’s explicit decision to “leave for another day” the question whether a First Step Act amended judgment is a “new judgment” for AEDPA purposes is itself significant. Combined with Newby, it means:

  • The Fourth Circuit has not yet adopted the Eleventh Circuit’s Telcy approach;
  • There remains a live doctrinal question whether and when sentence‑modification proceedings under the First Step Act generate “new judgments” that reset AEDPA’s second‑or‑successive clock; and
  • Future litigants may continue to press the “new judgment” argument, especially where their appeals are not rendered moot by unreviewable alternative grounds.

Practically, this preserves space for creative litigation in the Fourth Circuit on the relationship between First Step Act resentencings and AEDPA’s one‑bite‑at‑the‑apple rule.

4. Article III Discipline and the Avoidance of Advisory Opinions

Looking more broadly, Robinson exemplifies the Supreme Court‑driven trend of enforcing strict Article III limits:

  • Courts must police their own jurisdiction, including redressability, even if parties do not raise the issue.
  • A genuinely interesting or even recurring legal question (like the First Step Act “new judgment” issue) cannot be resolved in a case where the answer would not affect the parties’ rights.

This reinforces the message from Wells v. Johnson and similar decisions: federal courts are not advisory bodies and may not treat legal questions in isolation from their real‑world consequences for litigants.

V. Key Concepts and Terminology Explained

A. Article III Standing, Redressability, and Mootness

  • Standing: A plaintiff must show (1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the defendant’s conduct; and (3) redressability – a likelihood that the requested relief will alleviate the injury.
  • Redressability: At issue here. Even if a plaintiff was injured and the defendant caused it, the court must have the power to issue an order that actually changes the plaintiff’s legal situation. If all possible relief would be ineffectual, redressability fails.
  • Mootness: If at any point in the litigation one of the standing elements (including redressability) is lost, the case becomes moot and must be dismissed. In Robinson, redressability was lost at the appellate stage because the COA’s limited scope meant the appellate court could not disturb an independent, outcome‑determinative ground (untimeliness).

B. AEDPA’s Second‑or‑Successive Bar and “New Judgments”

  • Second or successive applications: AEDPA generally allows only one full round of § 2254/§ 2255 collateral review. A later application that challenges the same judgment is often deemed “second or successive” and requires pre‑authorization by the court of appeals.
  • Pre‑filing authorization (§ 2244(b)(3), § 2255(h)): Before filing in district court, a prisoner must obtain authorization from a three‑judge panel of the court of appeals by making a threshold showing (new evidence or a new, retroactive constitutional rule).
  • New judgment doctrine: Under cases like Magwood, if a prisoner is resentenced and a new judgment is entered, his first collateral attack on that new judgment is not “second or successive,” even if he already pursued collateral review of the earlier judgment.
  • First Step Act resentencing: The unresolved question is whether sentence‑reduction orders and amended judgments under the First Step Act count as “new judgments” for these purposes.

C. Jurisdiction vs. Claim‑Processing Rules

  • Jurisdictional rules: Define a court’s power to hear a case. If a rule is jurisdictional, courts must enforce it sua sponte; parties cannot waive or forfeit it; and any action taken without jurisdiction is void.
  • Claim‑processing rules: Procedural rules that direct how parties must present claims (e.g., time limits, sequencing requirements). They are often mandatory but can be waived or forfeited if not asserted.
  • Clear‑statement requirement: The Supreme Court insists that Congress “clearly state” when it intends a rule to be jurisdictional. Absent explicit jurisdictional language, courts should treat provisions as claim‑processing rules.
  • Application in Robinson: Sections 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3) were held to be claim‑processing rules: they regulate who may file what, when, and in what sequence, but do not limit the Article III jurisdiction of the district courts.

D. Certificate of Appealability (COA)

  • A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to appeal in § 2254 and § 2255 cases.
  • It may be limited to particular issues; the appellate court lacks authority to consider uncertified issues unless the COA is expanded.
  • The standard is whether the petitioner has made a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” – i.e., that reasonable jurists could debate the correctness of the district court’s ruling on that issue.
  • In Robinson, the COA was granted only on the “new judgment” issue and denied as to timeliness and the merits of the § 924(c) claim, which made those latter rulings unreviewable and central to the mootness finding.

E. Hypothetical Jurisdiction

  • Hypothetical jurisdiction: The disapproved practice of assuming (without deciding) that jurisdiction exists and then deciding a case on the merits. Steel Co. condemns this practice as incompatible with separation of powers.
  • Relevance in Robinson: Robinson argued that once the district court said it lacked “jurisdiction” under AEDPA’s second‑or‑successive bar, it could not validly issue an alternative timeliness ruling without violating Steel Co. The Fourth Circuit avoided that problem by holding that the AEDPA bar is not jurisdictional at all, so the district court never truly lacked subject‑matter jurisdiction when it turned to timeliness.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Robinson is a procedurally intricate but doctrinally important decision. Even though the court declined to resolve the high‑profile question whether First Step Act resentencings produce “new judgments” for AEDPA purposes, the opinion significantly clarifies two areas of federal habeas law.

First, it reinforces the centrality of Article III’s redressability requirement in the habeas context. An appellate court cannot reach even weighty legal questions where its resolution cannot change the outcome for the prisoner, whether because of the limited scope of a COA or because of unappealable alternative grounds below. Habeas practitioners must therefore pay close attention to the interplay between COA practice, alternative grounds for denial, and the preservation of a live controversy on appeal.

Second, the opinion brings the Fourth Circuit’s treatment of AEDPA’s second‑or‑successive bar into alignment with the Supreme Court’s modern jurisdictional jurisprudence. By recognizing §§ 2255(h) and 2244(b)(3) as nonjurisdictional claim‑processing rules, the court corrects earlier “casual” references to jurisdiction, clarifies the nature of the pre‑filing authorization requirement, and potentially opens the door to more nuanced treatment of waiver, forfeiture, and procedural default in successive‑petition litigation.

Going forward, Robinson will be cited not only for its specific holding that this particular appeal was moot, but also as a leading Fourth Circuit authority on (1) redressability and mootness in collateral‑review appeals constrained by narrow COAs, and (2) the proper, nonjurisdictional characterization of AEDPA’s second‑or‑successive restrictions. The unresolved “new judgment” question under the First Step Act remains fertile ground for future litigation, but when that question is finally answered in the Fourth Circuit, it will have to be in a case that, unlike Robinson’s, presents a live, redressable controversy.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

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