United States v. Roberts: Tightening Rule 1006 Summary Evidence and Clarifying the Line Between Concealment and Promotional Money Laundering

I. Introduction

This consolidated Fifth Circuit decision, styled here as United States v. Roberts, arises from a multi‑defendant marijuana trafficking and money laundering conspiracy that operated out of Texas and spanned 21 states. The conspirators bought marijuana and THC products in legalization states (California, Oregon), transported them by van using a nominal “car sales” business as cover, and distributed them nationwide. Payments moved in bulk cash, largely outside the banking system, coordinated through encrypted Signal messaging and code words such as “units,” “bags,” and “paper.”

Five defendants – Eric Roberts (the organizer), Ronald McGuire, Lowell Sargent, Christopher Ragle, and Philip Lala – went to trial. Eight co‑defendants pleaded guilty and testified for the government. A jury convicted:

• All five of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 1,000 kg or more of marijuana (21 U.S.C. § 846, § 841(b)(1)(A)(vii)).
• All five of conspiracy to commit money laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)), on multiple domestic and international theories.
• Roberts of operating a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) under 21 U.S.C. § 848(a).
• Roberts of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)); McGuire was acquitted on a separate § 924(c) count.

On appeal—and then on rehearing, which produced this substituted opinion—the panel addresses a strikingly broad range of issues:

• The admissibility and use of a government-created Rule 1006 summary chart (Exhibit 190) that extrapolated drug quantities across the conspiracy from partial data and highly questionable math.
• The sufficiency and reliability of presentence investigation reports (PSRs) that simply adopted that chart to assign guidelines drug quantities.
• The elements and charging requirements for a CCE under § 848, including whether the indictment must specify the individual predicate drug felonies.
• The boundary between “concealment” and “promotional” money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956, particularly where defendants use cash and avoid financial institutions.
• Alleyne/Apprendi error in imposing a higher mandatory minimum 924(c) sentence based on a “short‑barreled rifle” finding not submitted to the jury.
• Clerical errors in judgments and PSRs that mischaracterized the nature of the money laundering conspiracy as involving international transactions.
• Venue and other residual issues.

The court ultimately affirms all convictions except that it narrows the money laundering conspiracy to domestic promotional money laundering only. It vacates and remands multiple sentences—primarily because of defective Rule 1006 summary evidence and PSR reliance—and orders correction of clerical errors in the records.

As a matter of doctrine, the opinion substantially tightens the Fifth Circuit’s approach to:

• Rule 1006 summary charts in criminal trials.
• Approximation of drug quantities at sentencing.
• What counts (and does not count) as “concealment” money laundering after Cuellar and Brown.
• How CCE counts must be charged, and when indictment defects are harmless.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Disposition by Defendant

• McGuire
  • Convictions for drug conspiracy (§ 846) and conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering (§ 1956(h), premised on § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)) are affirmed.
  • Drug quantity element of the § 841(b)(1)(A) count was tainted by erroneous Rule 1006 summary evidence; the court vacates his sentence on both conspiracy counts and remands for resentencing under the default marijuana penalty provision, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D), with fresh drug-quantity findings.
  • Judgment and PSR must be corrected to reflect only domestic promotional money laundering, and to fix statutory subsections.
• Sargent
  • Convictions for drug conspiracy (§ 846) and conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering are affirmed.
  • Sentences on both counts are vacated and remanded for resentencing under § 841(b)(1)(D), due to the same Rule 1006 / PSR errors as McGuire.
  • Judgment and PSR to be corrected as above.
• Lala
  • Convictions for drug conspiracy and conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering are affirmed.
  • His sentencing drug-quantity challenge fails because any error was harmless: the district court explicitly stated it would impose the same sentence regardless of drug quantity.
• Ragle
  • Conviction for conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering is affirmed.
  • Judgment and PSR to be corrected to delete any reference to international money laundering or concealment money laundering.
• Roberts
  • Conviction for CCE under 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) is affirmed despite a deficient indictment; the defect is held harmless.
  • Convictions for drug conspiracy and conspiracy to commit promotional money laundering remain undisturbed.
  • His § 924(c) sentence based on a short‑barreled rifle is vacated under Alleyne, because the firearm type was not submitted to the jury, and the case is remanded for resentencing on that count.
  • Venue in the Eastern District of Texas is affirmed, consistent with prior Fifth Circuit conspiracy venue law.
  • Judgment and PSR require clerical correction to reflect domestic promotional money laundering only.

B. Major Legal Holdings

1. Rule 1006 Summary Charts Must Be Mathematically Reliable; They Cannot Be Used to Prove Unproven “Operative Facts.” The court finds plain error in admitting the government’s spreadsheet (Exhibit 190) under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 where:
   • The chart contained clear and substantial math and logic errors.
   • It extrapolated a single “average” shipment weight to many trips labeled “unknown” without adequate explanation.
   • The officer himself described the extrapolations as “guesstimates.”
   The government impermissibly used that chart to “assume that which it was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt”—namely, that each defendant’s conduct involved ≥ 1,000 kg of marijuana.
2. Plain Error Relief: Convictions Stand but Drug-Quantity Findings and Sentences Do Not. Under Puckett/Olano plain-error review, the admission of Exhibit 190:
   • Did not require vacating the convictions on Count 1, but
   • Did affect the defendants’ substantial rights regarding the statutory penalty range and guidelines calculations.
   The court therefore leaves the drug conspiracy convictions in place but remands for resentencing under the default marijuana penalty (§ 841(b)(1)(D)) for McGuire and Sargent.
3. PSRs Cannot Cure a Defective Evidentiary Foundation; Adoption of a Bad Summary Chart Is Clear Error at Sentencing. The court vacates McGuire’s and Sargent’s sentences because their PSRs simply adopted the same flawed Exhibit 190 and the district court, without further analysis, accepted those quantities. Under Rudolph and Melendez, PSR facts must have an “adequate evidentiary basis” with “sufficient indicia of reliability.”
4. Mere Use of Cash and Avoidance of Banks Is Not “Concealment” Money Laundering. Applying Cuellar v. United States, 553 U.S. 550 (2008), and its own precedent in United States v. Brown, 553 F.3d 768 (5th Cir. 2008), the court holds that:
   • The government’s evidence showed cash transportation and avoidance of banking channels, but
   • Did not show that the purpose of the financial transactions was to conceal or disguise the nature, source, etc., of the funds.
   Therefore, the convictions cannot be sustained on a domestic concealment theory under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
5. Promotional Money Laundering Is Established Where Proceeds Pay Co‑Conspirators and Purchase More Drugs. The same evidence does suffice for domestic promotional money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), because:
   • Drivers knowingly transported and delivered drug proceeds (“paperwork”) to Roberts and others.
   • Those proceeds paid drivers and bought more marijuana, directly “promoting” the ongoing trafficking scheme.
   • Conspiracy under § 1956(h) requires only an agreement to engage in such transactions, which can be inferred from the concerted conduct.
6. CCE Indictment Defective for Failure to Specify Predicate Felonies, but Error Is Harmless. Relying on Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999), and Fifth Circuit pleading standards, the court holds:
   • The CCE count was deficient because it named only the § 846 conspiracy as a predicate “violation” and did not identify the required three distinct underlying drug felonies.
   • However, the defect was harmless: Roberts was on notice that his operation’s substantive drug crimes and communications could serve as predicates, and any rational grand jury would have found probable cause for those underlying violations given the trial evidence.
7. No Reversible Constructive Amendment in Identifying CCE Predicates in Jury Instructions. The trial court’s later identification of two specific predicate offenses (a substantive § 841 trafficking offense and a § 843(b) use of a communication facility) in the jury instructions did not amount to a constructive amendment requiring reversal.
8. Alleyne Error in § 924(c) Firearm Sentencing. The court vacates Roberts’s § 924(c) sentence because the district court imposed a higher mandatory minimum for a “short‑barreled rifle” without that firearm characteristic being found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).
9. Clerical Errors in Judgments and PSRs Are Correctable under Rule 36, Including in PSRs. The panel orders correction of all judgments and PSRs that erroneously referenced violations of § 1956(a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(B)(i) (international money laundering) instead of § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(1)(B)(i) (domestic), and further limits the underlying offense to domestic promotional money laundering only, since concealment was unsupported.
10. Venue in the Eastern District of Texas Is Valid for the Entire Conspiracy. Following cases like Romans and Garcia Mendoza, the court holds that acts by any co‑conspirator in the Eastern District—such as transportation of drug proceeds—establish venue for all co‑conspirators. Roberts acknowledges the issue is foreclosed but preserves it for further review.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Rule 1006 Summary Charts, Plain Error, and Drug Quantity

1. Precedents and Framework

Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 allows a party to “use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court,” provided that:

• The underlying materials are admissible,
• They are made available to the opposing party,
• The summary is accurate and non‑argumentative, and
• The preparer is subject to cross‑examination and the jury is appropriately instructed.

The Fifth Circuit has long warned that Rule 1006 charts can easily become substitutes for proof of substantive elements rather than faithful summaries:

• United States v. Smyth, 556 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1977): warned that because summaries are “elevated” to evidence, courts must “omit argumentative matter” lest juries treat inferences as fact.
• United States v. Taylor, 210 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2000) and United States v. Hart, 295 F.3d 451 (5th Cir. 2002): the government cannot use a “summary” chart to “assume that which it was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt as operative facts of the alleged offense.”
• United States v. Ocampo‑Vergara, 857 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2017) and United States v. Spalding, 894 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2018): reversible error where the government effectively tried to prove an element solely through a summary chart absent a proper evidentiary foundation.

Rule 103 and plain-error doctrine (as articulated in Puckett and Olano) frame when an unpreserved evidentiary error can still warrant relief:

1. There must be an error.
2. The error must be clear or obvious.
3. The error must affect the defendant’s substantial rights (usually, outcome determinative).
4. The court must exercise its discretion to correct only if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Here, only Roberts objected at trial, and he focused on whether the officer had reviewed “all 80,000 pages” of the phone extraction, not on the mathematical accuracy of the chart. That specific ground was not “apparent from the context,” so McGuire’s and Sargent’s attacks on Exhibit 190’s math trigger plain-error review.

2. The Defective Chart: From “Average” to “Guesstimate”

Exhibit 190 was an extensive spreadsheet prepared by lead investigator Offutt. Key features:

• It tallied specific shipments where the quantity was known from seizures or messages.
• It labeled many other trips as “unk” (unknown weight).
• On a summary page, Offutt calculated an “average” shipment weight of 506 lbs and multiplied that figure by a supposed number of “trips” for each driver to generate a total quantity attributable to each defendant.
• He then used these extrapolated quantities both to:
  • Help the government prove the statutory ≥ 1,000 kg threshold at trial, and
  • Support PSR guideline calculations.

The opinion exposes multiple deep defects:

• Unclear and unexplained methodology for grouping “deliveries” into “trips” and for deciding how many “trips” each defendant made.
• Arithmetic errors in at least seven places on the “conversations with sources” section.
• Omissions of known trip weights from the “average” computation, for no articulated reason—omissions that, when corrected, materially lowered the mean and median.
• The officer admitted on the stand he was “making a guesstimate” and that nobody double‑checked the math.
• When recalculated from the visible data:
  • Total known deliveries = 4,079 lbs across 33 trips → average ≈ 123.61 lbs per delivery.
  • The standard deviation around that mean is ≈ 990 lbs, indicating extreme variability and the danger of imputing a single “average” to all unknown trips.

For McGuire, the chart:

• Identified about 764 lbs of known marijuana (plus 500 vape pens) from specific trips, plus 247 lbs seized in New Mexico.
• Nevertheless declared he was responsible for over 11,132 lbs by multiplying the 506‑lb “average” across 22 purported “trips.”

The panel emphasizes that replacing known trip weights with a global average and then extrapolating to unknown quantities, without solid statistical justification or transparency, is not “summary” evidence—it is new evidence created by the government.

3. Why Admission of Exhibit 190 Was Clear Error

The court first finds that Rule 1006’s requirements were not satisfied:

• A Rule 1006 chart must accurately summarize voluminous evidence; it cannot smuggle in speculative estimates as if they were found facts.
• Offutt’s repeated characterization of the extrapolated figures as “guesstimates,” combined with obvious arithmetic mistakes and unexplained decisions about which trips to include in the average, destroyed the necessary “accuracy” and reliability.
• The chart thus “assumed that which the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt”—drug quantity per defendant—and did so via opaque arithmetic.

The panel describes this as “guesswork . . . wrongly elevated to the position of evidence.” That violates the caution in Spalding and Smyth about the “argumentative matter” that must be excluded from Rule 1006 charts.

On the second plain‑error prong (clear or obvious error), the court stresses:

• Speculative extrapolation cannot serve as the evidentiary “anchor” for a criminal conviction or a statutory enhancement.
• Given the manifest math errors and the officer’s own concessions, the absence of a reliable mathematical foundation was not reasonably disputable.

4. Effect on Substantial Rights and the Remedy

The crucial question is what role Exhibit 190 played in the verdicts and sentences.

For conviction on Count 1, the jury had to find:

1. The conspiracy as a whole involved ≥ 1,000 kg of marijuana, and
2. Each defendant was individually responsible for, or could reasonably foresee, that ≥ 1,000 kg threshold.

Because other evidence (seizures, co‑conspirator testimony) could support conviction under some plausible view of the facts, the court is unwilling to say that, absent Exhibit 190, no rational jury could have found the conspiracy and foreseeability elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the conviction itself stands.

But Exhibit 190 was central to the jury’s drug-quantity finding and to the PSR’s and judge’s sentencing decisions. There is “a reasonable probability that the result of the proceedings would have been different” without the chart, at least as to:

• Which statutory penalty range applied under § 841(b); and
• What guidelines base offense level was used.

Accordingly, the panel:

• Affirms the Count 1 convictions, but
• Remands McGuire and Sargent for resentencing under § 841(b)(1)(D), the default marijuana penalty provision (no mandatory minimum, lower maximum), and
• Separately vacates guidelines fact‑finding for McGuire and Sargent under the sentencing analysis (Part IV), requiring the district court to reconsider drug quantity based on reliable evidence.

The court explicitly identifies the fairness and legitimacy harms in allowing “hypothetical quantities of drugs masquerading as hard evidence” to drive sentencing outcomes.

B. PSR Reliability, Drug-Quantity Approximation, and Harmless Error

1. General Principles on PSRs and Drug Approximation

Drug-quantity findings for guidelines purposes are factual determinations, reviewed for clear error. While a PSR “generally bears sufficient indicia of reliability” to be used at sentencing, that presumption is not automatic:

• Facts in a PSR must have “an adequate evidentiary basis” and “sufficient indicia of reliability.” (Rudolph, Melendez.)
• Mere inclusion in a PSR does not convert unsupported assertions into reliable facts.
• Objections—even if not accompanied by affirmative evidence—can flag reliability concerns that require the court to scrutinize the PSR’s foundation.

Guideline § 2D1.1 cmt. n.5 specifically allows courts to “approximate” drug quantities when seizures understate the scale of the offense. But approximation must still be grounded in the record, not guesswork.

2. McGuire and Sargent: PSR Reliance on Exhibit 190 Is Clear Error

McGuire’s PSR attributed 5,060 kg of marijuana to him and Sargent’s PSR attributed proportionally large amounts, all by simply adopting Exhibit 190. Both defendants objected that:

• The chart lacked a transparent basis for number of trips and quantities.
• Many trips were designated “unknown,” yet assigned the same 506‑lb “average.”
• Offutt himself admitted possible error.

The district court:

• Overruled the objections,
• Relied on having “sat through the trial,” and
• Formally “adopted” the PSR’s facts and calculations without an independent reliability analysis.

The Fifth Circuit holds this was clear error. Sole reliance on a challenged, mathematically suspect chart is not enough to support a finding that McGuire was responsible for more than 3,000 kg of marijuana by a preponderance of the evidence. The district court might still reach that conclusion on remand, but it must:

• Engage with the evidence and methodology, and
• Make a reliability determination based on more than a bare PSR reference to Exhibit 190.

Because guidelines levels (e.g., § 2D1.1(c)(4) vs (c)(5)) turn on these quantities, the error is not harmless. Sentences on both the drug and money laundering conspiracies (the latter via § 2S1.1’s incorporation of the “underlying offense” level) are vacated for McGuire and Sargent.

3. Lala: Any Similar Error Is Harmless

By contrast, Lala’s sentence survives because the district judge expressly said:

“[I]rrespective if I’m wrong on the drug amounts, this still is the sentence that I would impose for everything that happened in this case.”

Under Fifth Circuit harmless-error doctrine (Halverson, Ibarra‑Luna), that statement:

• Satisfies prong (1): the court would have imposed the same sentence absent any drug-quantity error.
• Satisfies prong (2): it would have done so for the same reasons—Lala’s role, history, safety valve, military service, behavior on bond, and disparity concerns.

Therefore, even if the PSR’s use of Exhibit 190 was problematic, the error did not affect Lala’s substantial rights or the outcome, and his sentence is affirmed.

C. Money Laundering: Concealment vs. Promotion

1. Concealment Money Laundering After Cuellar and Brown

The defendants were convicted under § 1956(h) of conspiring to commit money laundering premised on four possible substantive offenses:

• Domestic promotional, § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).
• Domestic concealment, § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).
• International promotional, § 1956(a)(2)(A).
• International concealment, § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i).

This opinion narrows that significantly. First, on concealment

In Cuellar, the Supreme Court held that merely hiding money during transportation—even if done skillfully—does not satisfy the “designed . . . to conceal” element of § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i). The statute focuses on the purpose (“design”), not the method (“how”) of moving money. The Fifth Circuit adopted that reading in Brown, requiring proof that transactions were intended to make funds more difficult to trace or identify as criminal.

Here, the government pointed to:

• Use of bulk cash,
• Avoidance of banks and electronic transfers,
• Use of unmarked vans and encrypted communication,
• Bulk cash hidden in vehicles and moved to stash locations.

But the panel holds this only shows how defendants moved money and how they avoided law enforcement, not why they conducted the financial transactions. The purpose was to:

• Pay marijuana suppliers, and
• Return proceeds to Roberts/Simonds for distribution and reinvestment.

The secretive aspects facilitated payment and movement; they did not have as their objective the concealment of the source or nature of the funds in the sense contemplated by § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i).

Unlike Brown, where:

• Proceeds were deposited in bank accounts in carefully structured amounts below reporting thresholds, and
• Those accounts were used to obscure the illicit nature and origin of the funds,

here there was:

• No bank activity designed to mask the source, and
• No evidence of layering, bogus businesses, shell entities, or similar concealment strategies.

Therefore, the evidence is insufficient for conspiracy to commit concealment money laundering. The conspiracy convictions must be sustained, if at all, on another theory.

2. Promotional Money Laundering: Paying Drivers and Re‑upping Supply

By contrast, promotional money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) requires:

1. A “financial transaction.”
2. Involving proceeds of a specified unlawful activity (here, drug trafficking) that the defendant knows are such.
3. Conducted with the intent to promote the carrying on of that unlawful activity.

A “financial transaction” includes the “delivery” or “other disposition” of funds, including cash, even if no financial institution is involved. Precedents:

• Puig‑Infante, 19 F.3d 929 (5th Cir. 1994): transporting proceeds by car alone is not a financial transaction; there must be a “disposition”—a giving over to someone else.
• Lozano, 158 F. App’x 632 (5th Cir. 2005): giving cash proceeds to co‑conspirators for further distribution is a financial transaction.
• Wilson, 249 F.3d 366 (5th Cir. 2001): paying participants to continue the conspiracy promotes the criminal activity.
• Brown: reinvesting proceeds to buy more of the controlled substance “clearly promote[s] their illegal activity.”
• Trejo, 610 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2010) & Stanford, 823 F.3d 814 (5th Cir. 2016): the intent element can be shown circumstantially, especially where the defendant knows the operation’s inner workings and receives proceeds for helping further the scheme.

The Roberts panel applies these principles and finds sufficient evidence that:

• Drivers knowingly picked up cash proceeds from customers and delivered them to Roberts/Simonds (a disposition and thus a “financial transaction”).
• They understood the cash as drug proceeds (“paperwork”), reinforced by:
  • Text messages referencing “paper” and photos of vacuum‑sealed money,
  • Prior police seizures of marijuana and cash from their vehicles, and
  • Co‑defendant testimony about “money being brought back for cannabis.”
• Those funds:
  • Paid drivers for trips, and
  • Were used to buy more marijuana, clearly promoting the continuing trafficking operation.

For the conspiracy charge under § 1956(h), the government need not show that each driver personally executed a promotional transaction. It suffices to show:

• There was an agreement to use proceeds to pay participants and sustain the scheme, and
• Each defendant knowingly joined that agreement, which can be inferred from “concert of action” and participation in the pattern of runs and cash deliveries.

Thus, Count 3 is sustained purely on a domestic promotional theory; the international and concealment theories fall away.

3. Consequence for Records: Limiting the Underlying Offense

Because the concealment and international theories lack evidentiary support—and because the jury instructions had already narrowed the indictment to domestic theories—the panel orders that:

• Each defendant’s judgment and PSR must be amended to reflect that Count 3 involves:
  • Conspiracy, § 1956(h),
  • with underlying offense: domestic promotional money laundering, § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) only.

This matters practically for:

• Future supervised release and recidivist analyses.
• Statutory and guidelines considerations if the convictions are used for enhancement in later cases.

D. CCE Indictment Sufficiency and Constructive Amendment

1. Elements of a CCE and the “Continuing Series” Requirement

A CCE conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) requires proof that:

1. The defendant committed a felony violation of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA).
2. That violation was part of a “continuing series” of CSA violations (at least three),
3. Undertaken in concert with at least five other persons,
   • Over whom the defendant occupied a supervisory/organizational role, and
   • From which the defendant obtained substantial income or resources.

In Richardson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that each underlying “violation” in the “continuing series” is itself an element that must be:

• Identified, and
• Found unanimously by the jury.

Under Fifth Circuit indictment standards (Russell, Davis), an indictment must:

• Contain all essential elements,
• Fairly inform the defendant of the charges he must meet, and
• Enable him to plead former jeopardy in future prosecutions.

2. The Defect: Only the Conspiracy Count Was Named

The Roberts CCE count alleged:

• Violation of § 846 (conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana), “including but not limited to” Count 1,
• As part of a continuing series of CSA violations, undertaken with at least five other persons, with Roberts as organizer/manager, and
• Yielding substantial income/resources.

Critically, it did not enumerate three distinct predicate drug felonies in the way Richardson presupposes. Nor can a single conspiracy count, by itself, supply all three underlying “violations” (each violation must be a distinct substantive offense, not merely multiple acts within the same conspiracy).

The government concedes the CCE count is formally deficient in this regard.

3. Harmless-Error Analysis: Notice and Grand Jury Functions

Indictment defects can be harmless if:

1. The defendant had adequate notice of the actual offense and theory, and
2. He was not harmed by “losing the right to have the public determine whether there existed probable cause to charge” the missing element (i.e., a rational grand jury would certainly have indicted on the complete offense).

On notice, the panel acknowledges:

• The indictment did not list the specific predicate offenses.
• However, the rest of the indictment and the government’s theory (including in the jury-charge conference) made clear that Roberts’s substantive drug trafficking conduct and his use of communication facilities (§ 843(b)) were at issue.
• The government explicitly indicated (by the end of trial) the predicates it would rely on: a substantive § 841 offense and a § 843(b) offense.

The court distinguishes United States v. Adams, where the indictment limited the charged false statement to one line on a tax schedule, leaving the defendant unaware he had to defend against alleged falsity in a different form (Form 1040X) prepared by another person. Here, Roberts’s conduct throughout the trafficking scheme was within the zone of foreseeable predicate offenses; the defense structure would not have materially shifted if those particular underlying acts had been named earlier.

On the grand jury prong, the panel asks whether any rational grand jury, given the evidence available, would have found probable cause for the three-plus predicate drug felonies. Given:

• Roberts’s extensive role as organizer and supplier,
• Physical seizures of large quantities of marijuana and THC products from his properties and vehicles, and
• Electronic communications corroborating repeated distributions and communications about drug shipments,

the answer is plainly “yes.” No plausible scenario exists in which a rational grand jury, properly instructed, would have declined to indict on the three underlying violations.

Thus, while the indictment is deficient, the defect is held harmless and the CCE conviction stands.

4. Constructive Amendment Claim

Roberts also argues the district court constructively amended the indictment by identifying specific predicate offenses in the jury instructions not named in the CCE count.

A constructive amendment occurs when:

• Actions by the judge or prosecutor allow conviction “upon a factual basis that effectively modifies an essential element of the offense charged,”
• So that the defendant is convicted of a different crime from that which the grand jury actually charged.

Here, the panel concludes:

• The predicate offenses specified in the instructions (substantive § 841 trafficking and § 843(b) phone use) were not new crimes outside the indictment’s scope; they flowed from the same marijuana trafficking operation alleged in Count 1 and elsewhere.
• The selection of particular predicate acts is a refinement, not a change in the crime charged. The CCE count already alleged a “continuing series of violations of the CSA” under Roberts’s leadership; specifying which violations the jury had to agree upon did not broaden the indictment.
• Roberts fails to show he was convicted of a “separate crime” or that he suffered prejudice from the variance between the indictment’s general language and the instructions’ specificity.

Accordingly, no reversible constructive amendment is found.

E. Firearm Sentencing and Alleyne

Roberts received an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence on his § 924(c) conviction based on a judicial finding that he possessed a short‑barreled rifle. Under Alleyne, “any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.”

The government concedes:

• The short‑barrel characteristic was not charged as an element,
• Not submitted to the jury, and
• Yet used to raise the mandatory minimum.

The panel therefore vacates the § 924(c) sentence and remands for resentencing on that count, presumably under the base 5‑year minimum unless the government chooses—and is permitted—to pursue a properly charged and proved enhancement.

F. Clerical Errors and Rule 36

All five defendants’ judgments (and PSRs) label Count 3 as conspiracy to commit money laundering under § 1956(h) with underlying violations of § 1956(a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(B)(i)—international promotional and concealment money laundering.

But:

• The jury instructions had expressly excluded the international theories; only domestic § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(1)(B)(i) were submitted.
• And, as discussed, the evidence does not support concealment at all.

Under Rule 36, courts may correct “clerical error[s]” in “judgment[s] or other part[s] of the record.” The Fifth Circuit has previously held PSRs are part of the “record” subject to Rule 36 (Mackay).

The panel directs the district court on remand to:

• Amend each judgment and PSR to reflect § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) as the sole underlying substantive offense for the § 1956(h) conspiracy.
• Eliminate references to international money laundering or to § 1956(a)(2).

G. Venue in the Eastern District of Texas

Venue issues in federal conspiracy cases are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) and longstanding circuit precedent:

• An offense begun in one district and completed in another, or committed in more than one district, may be prosecuted “in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.”
• In conspiracies, venue is proper “based on evidence of any single act that initiated, perpetuated, or completed the crime,” even by a single co‑conspirator (Thomas, Romans).
• This remains true “even where it permits trial against defendants in a district they never even set foot in” (Caldwell).

Here, co‑conspirators:

• Transported marijuana and drug proceeds through (and within) the Eastern District of Texas,
• Maintained operations tied to properties and customers in that district.

That suffices. Roberts concedes his challenge is foreclosed by circuit law, and the panel reaffirms that precedent without elaboration.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Rule 1006 Summary Charts

Think of a Rule 1006 chart as a “big picture” tool: if there are thousands of pages of phone records, the government can’t realistically show them all to the jury. Instead, it may prepare a chart summarizing the key data—as long as:

• The chart faithfully reflects what is in the underlying records (no invention),
• The opposing side can inspect those records, and
• The chart isn’t a vehicle for arguments or estimates disguised as facts.

Here, the problem was that the chart didn’t simply add up real numbers—it created new numbers (average trip weights) and plugged them into unknown slots in a way that was neither transparent nor reliable.

2. Plain Error

Plain error is an appellate safety valve when:

• An objection wasn’t properly raised in the trial court, but
• The mistake is obvious and serious enough to risk an unjust result or undermine public confidence.

The appellate court then asks: Was there an error? Was it clearly wrong? Did it likely matter to the outcome? And should the court intervene despite the lack of a timely objection? In Roberts, the answer to all four questions was “yes” on the sentencing dimension of the Rule 1006 problem.

3. Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE)

A CCE is essentially a “kingpin” statute for major drug traffickers. To prove it, the government must show:

• The defendant committed at least three felony drug crimes,
• As part of an ongoing series of such crimes,
• With five or more underlings he supervised, and
• He made substantial money from it.

Because each of those underlying drug crimes is an “element,” they normally must be spelled out in the indictment and unanimously found by the jury. In Roberts, the CCE count fell short of that ideal but survived on harmless-error grounds.

4. Concealment vs. Promotional Money Laundering

Federal money laundering law distinguishes two primary theories:

• Concealment (§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)):
  • The defendant conducts a financial transaction with criminal proceeds
  • and does so with the purpose of hiding where the money came from, who owns it, or what it is.
  • Typical example: run drug cash through a fake business and structured bank deposits to make it look like legitimate revenue.
• Promotional (§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i>)):
  • The defendant conducts a financial transaction with criminal proceeds
  • Intending to further the underlying crime—paying participants, buying more drugs, etc.
  • Typical example: use proceeds from one drug sale to buy the next load or to pay couriers.

In this case, the defendants were engaged in promotional laundering when they:

• Delivered big bags of drug money to Roberts,
• Got paid for their trips, and
• Funded more wholesale marijuana purchases.

But they were not engaged in concealment laundering in the strict sense just by avoiding banks and carrying cash; that was about avoiding detection, not disguising the money’s nature or origin in a more permanent way.

5. PSRs and Reliability

A presentence investigation report is the probation officer’s narrative and guideline calculation for sentencing. Judges can and often do rely heavily on PSRs, but:

• They must be based on reliable evidence, not speculation.
• When a defendant challenges a PSR’s factual assertion, and that assertion’s only foundation is a flawed chart or inference, the court cannot simply say “I adopt the PSR” and move on.

6. Constructive Amendment

An indictment says what the grand jury has charged. A constructive amendment occurs when the court or prosecutor effectively allows conviction for something different from what the grand jury approved. For example:

• If the indictment charges making a false statement on Line 1 of a form, but the jury is allowed to convict for a false statement only on Line 2.

In Roberts, the court concluded that specifying the predicate drug offenses within the existing CCE framework did not alter the nature of the crime charged (operating the same marijuana enterprise); it simply clarified which acts the jury had to agree upon.

V. Impact and Significance

1. Government Use of Summaries and Digital Evidence

In modern drug cases, agents often mine large volumes of digital messages and then present summary spreadsheets—especially where encrypted apps like Signal are used. Roberts sends a strong warning:

• Summaries must be traceable back to actual data with coherent methodology.
• Interpolations and statistical extrapolations are perilous, especially when:
  • Drug quantity triggers statutory mandatory minimums and maxima, and
  • The extrapolation essentially supplies an essential element.
• Agents who “guesstimate” must expect aggressive cross-examination, and courts must be prepared to exclude such charts.

Defense counsel, in turn, can use Roberts to demand:

• Access to underlying data and formulas,
• Pretrial Daubert‑style scrutiny where statistical techniques are used, and
• Limiting instructions that confine charts to true summary functions.

2. Sentencing Reliability and Guidelines Integrity

By vacating sentences over PSR reliance on a flawed chart, the panel reinforces an important message:

• Guideline fact‑finding, although under a lower standard of proof, cannot rest on unexplained extrapolations.
• Probation officers cannot simply import an agent’s spreadsheet without verifying its reliability.
• District courts must do more than say “I adopt the PSR”; they must ensure a factual foundation exists when defendants raise concrete reliability objections.

This may complicate sentencing in large conspiracy cases but improves the accuracy and defensibility of drug-quantity determinations.

3. Narrowing Concealment Money Laundering Theories

Roberts continues a trend of courts rigorously enforcing Cuellar’s distinction between:

• Secrecy as an incident of transporting money, and
• Transactions whose purpose is to disguise the criminal character of funds.

Federal prosecutors in the Fifth Circuit will face a higher bar when charging § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) in cash‑heavy drug cases that lack banking or layering activities. In many such cases, the safer route will be:

• Promotional laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), or
• For some fact patterns, perhaps no money‑laundering charge at all, relying instead on substantive drug offenses and forfeiture.

4. CCE Indictment Practice

The opinion encourages—but stops short of mandating—more precise CCE charging:

• Best practice: the CCE count should itself identify the predicate drug felonies (by count number or by specifying their nature, date, and statute).
• At minimum: the CCE count should incorporate by reference other counts that list those predicate offenses.

Although Roberts salvages the defective indictment via harmless-error analysis, prudent prosecutors are unlikely to rely on that safety net going forward.

5. Alleyne Compliance in Firearm Cases

The decision reinforces that in § 924(c) and similar statutes:

• Firearm type or features that enhance mandatory minimums are elements, not sentencing factors.
• They must be:
  • Pled in the indictment,
  • Submitted to the jury, and
  • Proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Failure to do so exposes sentences to vacatur even where the underlying firearm possession conviction is valid.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Roberts is a wide‑ranging Fifth Circuit opinion that simultaneously:

• Upholds serious drug trafficking and money laundering convictions,
• Insists on mathematical and evidentiary rigor in Rule 1006 summaries and PSRs,
• Tightens the distinction between concealment and promotional money laundering,
• Clarifies charging expectations for CCE indictments,
• Enforces Alleyne at the firearm‑sentencing stage, and
• Uses Rule 36 to clean up the record for future proceedings.

The core message is not that large, complex drug conspiracies cannot be proved or sentenced robustly; they can. Rather, Roberts underscores that:

• Summary charts must truly summarize; they cannot manufacture facts.
• Sentencing approximations must rest on transparent and reliable methods, especially when they trigger higher statutory ranges or guideline levels.
• Money laundering theories must match the purpose of the financial transactions, not merely their secrecy.

Going forward, Roberts will stand in the Fifth Circuit as a leading case on the proper role and limits of summary evidence in criminal trials and on the careful line between concealment and promotional money laundering in cash‑based drug enterprises.