United States v. Rivera-Rivera (1st Cir. 2025)
Circumstantial Knowledge as a Sufficient Basis for Aiding-and-Abetting Liability in Federal Carjacking Cases

1. Introduction

The consolidated appeal in United States v. Rivera-Rivera presented the First Circuit with a violent fact pattern born of a home-invasion robbery that escalated into a federal carjacking. Three defendants—Anthony Rivera-Rivera, Victor M. Hernández-Carrasquillo, and Jimmy Ríos-Alvarez—were convicted by a Puerto Rico jury of:

• 18 U.S.C. § 2119(2) – armed carjacking (aiding and abetting, § 2), and
• 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) – brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence.

On appeal, the defendants raised a formidable array of issues: insufficiency of the evidence, Brady/Giglio violations, severance, Confrontation Clause challenges, and sentencing errors. The First Circuit ultimately affirmed all convictions and sentences, but—in doing so—articulated a significant clarification:

2. Summary of the Judgment

Key holdings include:

• Sufficiency of Evidence: The panel held that a reasonable jury could convict each defendant of aiding and abetting the carjacking, even though only two accomplices actually drove the stolen Nissan. The court relied heavily on circumstantial proof that the appellants guarded the victims, coordinated by phone, and left only after the ATM withdrawal succeeded.
• Brady/Giglio: Although the government’s discovery delays were “wholly inadequate,” the court found no prejudice because the district court granted a one-month continuance and the defense used the late materials effectively.
• Severance: Denial of severance was proper; appellants failed to demonstrate that the codefendant would testify if trials were severed, as required by United States v. Drougas.
• Confrontation Clause: The challenged statements were non-testimonial or otherwise outside Crawford’s bar; objections were either waived or lacked merit.
• Sentencing: Application of Guideline enhancements for serious bodily injury, abduction, and carjacking were sustained; the sentences were within-guideline and reasonable.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014) – Established that aiding-and-abetting requires an affirmative act plus knowledge of the full scope of the offense when the defendant can still withdraw. The panel used Rosemond as the analytical backbone for determining whether each appellant knew of the carjacking before it was too late to opt out.
• United States v. Rodríguez-Adorno, 695 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2012) – Provided guidance on conditional intent in carjacking (intent to cause serious harm if necessary). The decision helped the court reject the appellants’ “lack-of-intent” argument.
• United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1984) – The yardstick for severance when exculpatory testimony from a co-defendant is alleged. Rivera and Hernández could not satisfy Drougas’s requirement to show that Ríos would in fact testify.
• Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) – Anchored the Confrontation Clause analysis; the court emphasized that only testimonial hearsay triggers Crawford’s prohibition.
• Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) and a host of Guideline cases (e.g., Whooten, Moore) – Guided the sentencing reasonableness review.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

The decision unfolds in three analytical tiers:

1. Establishing the underlying carjacking. The panel confirmed that:
   • The Nissan was taken “from the person or presence of another” once the assailants seized the keys and placed Luis Emilio at gunpoint inside the vehicle.
   • Force/intimidation and conditional intent were self-evident from the brutal violence and firearms displayed.
2. Applying aiding-and-abetting doctrine.

   The crux: Did each appellant both (a) act in furtherance and (b) intend to facilitate the carjacking, knowing its scope?

   • Ríos – Direct evidence (his own FBI statement) showed he saw the Nissan leave for the ATM and stayed to guard the victims.
   • Hernández – Waived knowledge argument; presence and coordinated actions sufficed.
   • Rivera – No direct proof of knowledge existed, but circumstantial factors (constant guarding of Carmen, overhearing discussion of taking the Nissan, synchronized departure after successful ATM call) allowed the inference of knowledge “at a time he could still walk away.” This is the decision’s most doctrinally significant part.
3. Harmlessness and prejudice analyses.

   Whether discussing Brady, severance, or sentencing, the court repeatedly asked: “What concrete prejudice flowed?” Absent a plausible alternate strategy or impact on the verdict, relief was denied.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

• Evidentiary Threshold in Group Crimes: Prosecutors can now rely on circumstantial mosaics to prove knowledge for accomplice liability in carjackings within the First Circuit, even where the defendant never physically handles the vehicle.
• Trial Strategy—Severance Requests: Defendants seeking severance to secure co-defendant testimony must present affirmative proof (affidavits or counsel proffers) that the witness will testify. Merely pointing to suppressed, exculpatory statements is insufficient.
• Discovery Practices: While the convictions were upheld, the opinion highlights the judiciary’s intolerance for “astounding” discovery delays. USAOs in the circuit can expect closer scrutiny.
• Sentencing Enhancements: The decision confirms that moving a victim within the curtilage (downstairs, into the yard, or to a vehicle) can trigger § 2B3.1’s abduction enhancement; serious bodily injury includes short hospitalizations coupled with extreme pain and ongoing treatment.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Conditional Intent (Carjacking): The government need not prove defendants wanted to injure the victim—only that they were prepared to do so if the victim resisted.
• Aiding & Abetting (§ 2): Think of it as “criminal teamwork.” A helper is guilty if he knows what the main offender is up to and does something—however small—that helps.
• Circumstantial Evidence: Facts that, when pieced together, allow a logical inference (e.g., coordinated phone calls, simultaneous departures) even if no witness utters the magic words.
• Brady Material: Evidence favorable to the defense that the prosecution must disclose; late disclosure demands a showing of prejudice for a conviction to be disturbed.
• Guideline Enhancements:
  • Serious Bodily Injury: Injuries causing extreme pain, requiring hospitalization or extended treatment.
  • Abduction: Forcing a victim to accompany an offender to a different location—sometimes only yards away.

5. Conclusion

The First Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Rivera-Rivera re-affirms that the federal aiding-and-abetting statute is powerful: direct proof of a defendant’s subjective awareness is unnecessary where the surrounding circumstances make ignorance implausible. Future defendants in multi-actor carjackings (and analogous crimes) should prepare for the government to stitch circumstantial threads into a robust tapestry of knowledge and intent. Simultaneously, the decision cautions prosecutors about discovery lapses and reiterates stringent standards for severance. Overall, the ruling refines First Circuit law on accomplice liability, provides practical guidance on evidentiary and procedural pitfalls, and underscores the judiciary’s commitment to balancing defendants’ rights with the realities of complex, violent crime.