United States v. Riley: Pro se allegations that counsel entered a sentencing stipulation without client consent trigger a mandatory judicial inquiry; the hybrid-representation bar does not apply

Introduction

In a published decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated a district court’s denial of a post-resentencing motion that had been rejected as improper “hybrid representation.” The panel held that when a represented defendant files a pro se submission alleging that counsel acted without the defendant’s knowledge or assent on a fundamental decision—here, agreeing to a stipulated sentence at a retroactive-guideline resentencing—the filing triggers the district court’s obligation to inquire into a potential breakdown in the attorney–client relationship. The court may not dismiss such a filing simply because the defendant is represented.

The case arises from resentencing proceedings under Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines. After defense counsel and the government jointly recommended a new sentence, the district court adopted that stipulation. Within a month, Derek Duane Riley moved for reconsideration pro se, asserting that his appointed lawyer had agreed to the stipulation without his knowledge and against his wishes and asking for a lower sentence (time served). The district court denied the motion as improper hybrid representation, instructing Riley to file any motion through counsel. Riley appealed. The Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded, directing the district court to conduct the necessary inquiry into representation before addressing the merits.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Stranch held that:

A represented defendant’s pro se filing that, in substance, alleges serious dissatisfaction with counsel—specifically that counsel made a major, outcome-determinative decision without the client’s consent—requires the district court to inquire into whether the attorney–client relationship has broken down and whether the defendant wishes to dismiss counsel or proceed pro se.
The district court erred by denying Riley’s motion for reconsideration solely as improper hybrid representation without first addressing the antecedent Sixth Amendment issue raised by the motion (i.e., whether counsel had acted without Riley’s consent in agreeing to the sentencing stipulation).
Not every disagreement between counsel and client triggers such an inquiry; routine strategic disputes and nonspecific complaints may be handled under ordinary hybrid-representation rules. But allegations that counsel overrode the defendant’s fundamental choices—and particularly those affecting plea or sentencing dispositions—are different and require judicial engagement.

The Sixth Circuit vacated the denial of Riley’s motion and remanded with instructions:

First, the district court must conduct the appropriate inquiry into whether Riley wishes to dismiss counsel and whether he is entitled to do so.
Then, consistent with the results of that inquiry, the court should proceed to the remainder of Riley’s motion, including his argument that the imposed sentence is improper.

Factual and Procedural Background

In 2016, Riley pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute controlled substances (21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846). He was sentenced to 160 months, based on an offense level of 31 and a criminal-history category III (five points), yielding a guideline range of 135–168 months.

In 2023, Amendment 821 retroactively lowered certain criminal-history status points. Under the amended guideline, Riley’s criminal-history points dropped to three, producing category II and a new range of 121–151 months. Appointed counsel and the government stipulated that Riley was eligible and jointly recommended 144 months. On February 6, 2024, the district court resentenced Riley to 144 months.

On March 5, 2024, Riley filed a “Motion for Reconsideration” pro se stating he was acting “in his pro-se litigant capacity.” He alleged that counsel, “unbeknownst to [him],” agreed to the stipulation without his consent and asked the court to reconsider and impose time served. The district court denied the motion as improper hybrid representation and told Riley to file any motion for reconsideration through his appointed lawyer. Riley noticed a pro se appeal.

Detailed Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975): Establishes a defendant’s constitutional right to self-representation. The Sixth Circuit invokes Faretta for the principle that the right to counsel includes its inverse: the right to decline counsel and conduct one’s own defense.
United States v. Conder, 423 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1970): Describes the rights to counsel and to self-representation as “two faces of the same coin,” framing how a waiver of one constitutes assertion of the other.
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012): Clarifies counsel’s duty to communicate plea offers, underscoring that defendants must be informed of key dispositions; the court analogizes to sentencing stipulations as materially similar in significance.
Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) and Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988): Distinguish fundamental decisions reserved to the client (e.g., plea decisions, waivers of basic trial rights) from tactical decisions reserved to counsel. A lawyer cannot make or override a client’s decision to accept or reject a dispositive resolution.
United States v. Iles, 906 F.2d 1122 (6th Cir. 1990): When an indigent defendant timely and in good faith seeks to discharge counsel or proceed pro se, the district court must inquire into the reasons for and nature of the dissatisfaction and act accordingly. The opinion quotes Iles’s “show his hand” formulation: once the defendant signals a problem, the court must respond.
Benitez v. United States, 521 F.3d 625 (6th Cir. 2008): No “magic words” are required to trigger the duty to inquire; courts must examine the “thrust” of a pro se filing to determine whether it approximates a request for new counsel or self-representation.
United States v. Liggins, 76 F.4th 500 (6th Cir. 2023): A district court abuses its discretion if, in a proceeding about whether counsel should be replaced, it refuses to hear directly from the defendant on the asserted breakdown. The case rejects using the hybrid-representation bar to silence a defendant in that posture.
United States v. Powell, 847 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 2017): Once “any serious dissatisfaction” with counsel is brought to the court’s attention, a duty to inquire arises into the source and nature of that dissatisfaction.
United States v. Flowers, 428 F. App’x 526 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Lathan, No. 21-4177, 2023 WL 2523299 (6th Cir. Mar. 15, 2023); United States v. Williams, 641 F.3d 758 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Martinez, 588 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 2009): Stand for the general proposition that courts may, and often should, reject hybrid representation. Riley distinguishes these cases because they lacked credible allegations of fundamental, consent-based breakdowns.
Moreno v. Estelle, 717 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1983): General statements of dissatisfaction do not require an inquiry; however, “particular instances of disagreement” about defense strategy support judicial inquiry. The Sixth Circuit cites this to delineate the threshold between ordinary friction and a breakdown.
United States v. Durachinsky, No. 23-4019, 2025 WL 1833941 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 2025) (unpublished): Confirms that a defendant’s disagreement with counsel over matters within counsel’s strategic discretion does not automatically justify new counsel.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct r. 1.2(a): Ethics rule allocating ultimate authority over the objectives of representation to the client, including decisions to accept plea offers or other dispositive agreements. The Sixth Circuit uses the rule to underscore the client-consent requirement for significant decisions like sentencing stipulations.

Legal Reasoning

The right to counsel includes the right to self-representation. Citing Faretta and Conder, the court reiterates that a defendant may not be compelled to accept representation he does not want, and a defendant retains the right to direct the overarching aims of the defense.
The court is not a general monitor of attorney performance, but it must act when a breakdown is credibly alleged. While there is no constitutional duty for district courts to police counsel–client communication proactively, once a defendant brings “any serious dissatisfaction” to the court’s attention, the duty to inquire attaches (Powell; Iles; Benitez). A defendant need not use “magic words” or formally request substitution: the court must consider the “thrust” of the pro se filing (Benitez; Burton).
Not all disputes require judicial inquiry; fundamental consent-based decisions do. Routine strategic disagreements—like whether to file a particular motion—remain within counsel’s discretion, and courts may deny pro se motions as hybrid representation in such contexts (Flowers; Lathan; Williams; Martinez; Taylor; Nixon). But when a defendant alleges counsel acted without his consent on matters reserved to the client (e.g., accepting a plea or agreeing to a dispositive sentencing stipulation), the allegation, if true, indicates a breakdown and triggers the court’s duty to inquire (Nixon; Frye; Model Rule 1.2(a); Moreno n.6).
Pro se complaints about representation are not “hybrid representation.” The panel emphasizes that the hybrid-representation bar does not apply to the antecedent right to be heard on the adequacy of representation. As Liggins teaches, where the proceeding concerns whether counsel should be replaced, the defendant must be allowed to speak; labeling his effort as “hybrid” would paradoxically require the defendant to rely on the very counsel he says is not acting in accordance with his wishes. The Sixth Circuit explicitly rejects that bootstrap.
Application to Riley. Riley’s motion expressly stated that he was acting pro se and specifically alleged that counsel, “unbeknownst to [him],” agreed to a binding sentencing stipulation contrary to his wishes. That allegation is qualitatively different from a garden-variety strategic disagreement; it goes to a fundamental dispositional decision that counsel may not make unilaterally. Thus, the district court was obligated to inquire into whether Riley wanted to discharge counsel and whether good cause existed to do so. Only after resolving representation could the court address the merits of the reconsideration request. The government’s suggestion that an inquiry requires preliminary proof of a breakdown misstates the law: the purpose of the inquiry is to determine whether a breakdown exists.

Impact and Implications

This decision materially clarifies Sixth Circuit practice at the intersection of pro se filings and appointed representation, especially in post-conviction or post-sentencing settings:

Judicial screening of pro se filings must look for representation issues. District courts may continue to strike or deny pro se filings from represented defendants that raise only merits arguments or routine disagreements. But where the pro se filing—viewed for its “thrust,” not magic words—alleges serious dissatisfaction rooted in counsel’s failure to obtain consent for a dispositive decision (such as a stipulated sentence), the court must pause and conduct an inquiry before invoking the hybrid-representation bar.
Procedural roadmap for district courts. Upon receiving such a filing, courts should:
- Docket a limited inquiry hearing focused on representation.
- Allow the defendant to be heard directly (consistent with Liggins).
- Solicit counsel’s response, mindful of privilege constraints (in camera or ex parte procedures may be appropriate).
- Decide whether there is good cause to substitute counsel or whether the defendant knowingly and voluntarily wishes to proceed pro se (with a Faretta-type colloquy if applicable).
- Only then address the merits of any pending motion (e.g., reconsideration; resentencing arguments).
Defense practice adjustments. Appointed counsel should:
- Secure and document client consent for any stipulations that effectively fix or recommend a specific sentence or otherwise dispose of a resentencing motion.
- Proactively communicate terms and consequences of stipulations (Frye duties), and contemporaneously memorialize the client’s assent (written confirmation is prudent).
Government practice. Prosecutors entering stipulated resentencing agreements should:
- Confirm on the record that defense counsel has communicated the terms and obtained client consent; when feasible, request a brief on-the-record colloquy.
- Be prepared to address representation challenges without resisting the court’s threshold inquiry; the inquiry protects finality by reducing later ineffective-assistance claims.
Amendment 821 and § 3582 resentencings. The decision arrives amid large numbers of retroactive reductions. Riley ensures defendants retain meaningful control over dispositive choices in those streamlined proceedings. It may modestly increase case-management burdens (short inquiry hearings) but will likely reduce collateral litigation by clarifying expectations.
Doctrinal clarification of hybrid representation in the Sixth Circuit. Riley carves an important, published exception: the hybrid-representation bar cannot be used to dismiss or silence a represented defendant’s pro se assertion that counsel has acted without consent on a fundamental decision. This harmonizes earlier case law permitting rejections of ordinary hybrid filings with Liggins’s insistence that a defendant be heard on counsel-breakdown claims.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Pro se: Latin for “on one’s own behalf.” A pro se litigant represents himself without a lawyer.
Hybrid representation: When a defendant attempts to act pro se while also being represented by counsel. There is generally no right to hybrid representation; courts can require a represented defendant to speak through counsel. Riley clarifies that this bar does not prevent a defendant from alerting the court that counsel is not following his wishes.
Breakdown in the attorney–client relationship: A serious deterioration, such as lack of communication or counsel overriding the client’s fundamental choices. When credibly alleged, courts must inquire to determine whether to substitute counsel or allow self-representation.
Fundamental vs. tactical decisions:
- Fundamental (client’s choice): whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify, appeal, or accept a dispositive sentencing arrangement. Counsel must obtain the client’s consent.
- Tactical (counsel’s discretion): what objections to raise, what motions to file, how to cross-examine. Counsel may act without seeking approval for every step.
Stipulation: An agreement between the parties on a fact or outcome. Here, defense and prosecution jointly recommended a specific sentence at resentencing. Such a stipulation can be outcome-determinative, requiring client consent.
Amendment 821: A 2023 Sentencing Guidelines amendment that retroactively reduced certain criminal-history status points, lowering guideline ranges for many defendants. Riley’s range dropped from 135–168 months to 121–151 months, enabling resentencing.
Inquiry hearing: A limited proceeding where the judge asks the defendant and counsel about the alleged breakdown to decide whether to replace counsel or allow the defendant to proceed pro se before tackling the case’s merits.

Key Passages

“An indigent defendant’s timely and good faith motion that counsel be discharged and the defendant permitted to proceed pro se, or have new counsel appointed, places on the district court a responsibility to inquire into the reasons for, and nature of, the defendant’s dissatisfaction with counsel and to replace or dismiss counsel if necessary.” (citing Iles)

“Our circuit has held that a defendant is not required to make an explicit request in order to make known his dissatisfaction with his representation and his desire to proceed pro se or to have new counsel appointed.” (citing Benitez)

“A defendant must be permitted to make important decisions as to the direction of his case regardless of whether he is represented. A lawyer may not override a defendant’s decision to accept or reject a plea offer or disposition.” (citing Nixon; Frye; Model Rule 1.2(a))

“Riley’s filed motion was not improper hybrid representation; it was a defendant’s proper assertion of dissatisfaction with his representation. The district court erred in denying Riley’s motion as hybrid representation before conducting the appropriate inquiry.” (citing Liggins)

What Happens on Remand

The district court must hold an inquiry to determine whether Riley wishes to dismiss his appointed counsel and, if so, whether he is entitled to new counsel or to proceed pro se. If Riley elects self-representation, the court must ensure a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel.
Depending on the outcome, the court must then address the merits of Riley’s motion for reconsideration—including his claim for a lower sentence—either through new counsel, with Riley pro se, or with continued representation if no breakdown is found.

Conclusion

United States v. Riley establishes an important, published clarification in the Sixth Circuit: a represented defendant’s pro se statement that counsel agreed to a dispositive sentencing stipulation without his consent is not mere “hybrid representation.” It is a red flag that triggers the district court’s duty to inquire into the adequacy of representation and the defendant’s wishes regarding counsel. Only after resolving that threshold Sixth Amendment concern may the court proceed to the merits of the defendant’s motion.

By carefully distinguishing between ordinary strategy disputes (where the hybrid-representation bar applies) and fundamental consent-based decisions (where it does not), the court harmonizes prior Sixth Circuit authority with core principles from Faretta, Nixon, and Frye. In the current wave of Amendment 821 resentencings and other post-judgment proceedings, Riley provides a practical framework that protects defendants’ autonomy without unduly burdening courts: conduct a focused inquiry when serious dissatisfaction is credibly alleged, then move to the merits with the proper representative—whether appointed counsel, substitute counsel, or the defendant himself.