United States v. Ray: Permissible Coercive Control Expert Testimony and Reinforced RICO Enterprise Doctrine

Introduction

In United States v. Ray, 23-6114-cr (2d Cir. June 2, 2025), the Second Circuit affirmed the convictions and 720-month sentence imposed on defendant Lawrence Ray. Ray was found guilty after a jury trial in the Southern District of New York on charges including racketeering conspiracy, extortion, sex trafficking, forced labor, money laundering, tax evasion, and violent crime in aid of racketeering. On appeal, Ray raised four principal challenges:

• Insufficiency of the evidence on multiple charges;
• A vagueness challenge to the RICO statutes;
• A motion to exclude expert testimony on coercive control under Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 704(b);
• The substantive reasonableness of a 720-month sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

The Court rejected each argument and affirmed. This commentary examines the decision’s key findings, legal reasoning, and its likely impact on future RICO, human-trafficking, and expert-testimony jurisprudence.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit’s per curiam opinion affirmed a jury-verdict conviction of Ray on twelve counts arising from a decade-long scheme in which Ray recruited and manipulated victims—largely his daughter’s college roommates—into coerced labor, extortion payments and commercial sex acts at a property in Pinehurst, North Carolina. The district court had admitted expert testimony on “coercive control” tactics, found the evidence sufficient on all counts, rejected constitutional challenges to RICO’s “enterprise” element, and imposed a within-Guidelines sentence of 720 months’ imprisonment plus lifetime supervised release. On appeal, the Court:

• Upheld sufficiency of the evidence for RICO conspiracy, violent-crime-in-aid-of-racketeering, sex trafficking, forced labor and related counts;
• Rejected the claim that RICO’s “enterprise” requirement is unconstitutionally vague;
• Found no abuse of discretion in admitting expert testimony under Rule 702 and no violation of Rule 704(b);
• Deemed the within-Guidelines sentence substantively reasonable under § 3553(a) and the parsimony clause.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

The panel relied on established Second Circuit authority in multiple areas:

• RICO Enterprise & Conspiracy:
  • Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938 (2009): association-in-fact enterprise standard;
  • Applins, 637 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2011): conspiracy requires only agreement to general criminal objective, not proof of formal structure;
  • Pizzonia, 577 F.3d 455 (2d Cir. 2009), Arrington, 941 F.3d 24 (2d Cir. 2019), White, 7 F.4th 90 (2d Cir. 2021): application of enterprise doctrine and proof of pattern.
• Violent Crime in Aid of Racketeering:
  • 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(3) and Arrington: intent requirement satisfied if violent act furthers position in the enterprise;
  • United States v. Payne, 591 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2010): overview of RICO predicate acts.
• Sex Trafficking & Forced Labor:
  • 18 U.S.C. §§ 1590–1594, 1589: statutory definitions of trafficking, forced labor and conspiracies;
  • Raniere, 55 F.4th 354 (2d Cir. 2022): elements of § 1591;
  • Adia v. Grandeur Mgmt., 933 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2019): violation of § 1589 triggers § 1590 liability;
  • Zhong, 26 F.4th 536 (2d Cir. 2022): expert testimony on forced labor schemes.
• Expert Testimony:
  • Fed. R. Evid. 702: admissibility criteria (Meija, 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008); Felder, 993 F.3d 57 (2d Cir. 2021));
  • Daubert v. Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993): reliability and Rule 403 balancing;
  • Rule 704(b) and DiDomenico, 985 F.2d 1159 (2d Cir. 1993): prohibition on experts opining on a defendant’s mental state;
  • Locascio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993) & Boissoneault, 926 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1991): background on organized-crime and narcotics expert testimony;
  • Sister-circuit support: Halamek, 5 F.4th 1081 (9th Cir. 2021); Young, 955 F.3d 608 (7th Cir. 2020); Hitt, 473 F.3d 146 (5th Cir. 2006).
• Sentencing & Parsimony Clause:
  • 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): sentencing factors and “parsimony” requirement;
  • Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc): deference to district court’s § 3553(a) analysis;
  • Park, 758 F.3d 193 (2d Cir. 2014): substantive-reasonableness standard;
  • Ministro-Tapia, 470 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 2006): presumption of compliance with parsimony.
• Vagueness Challenges:
  • Bingham v. Zolt, 66 F.3d 553 (2d Cir. 1995) & Burden, 600 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2010): RICO is not unconstitutionally vague.

2. Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolded in four parts:

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Viewing all inferences in the government’s favor, a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ray:
   • Agreed to participate in an association-in-fact enterprise targeting victims for extortion, labor and sex trafficking;
   • Committed assault in aid of racketeering to maintain authority;
   • Recruited and coerced a victim into commercial sex acts (§ 1591) and conspired with Isabella Pollok (§ 1594);
   • Employed physical abuse, threats of legal process and psychological coercion to force labor (§ 1589) and trafficking (§ 1590).
2. Vagueness Challenge to RICO:

   The “enterprise” element of §§ 1962(d) and 1959(a)(3) is well defined by statute and caselaw and poses no void-for-vagueness problem. The panel reiterated that “RICO’s enterprise requirement is not unconstitutionally vague.”

3. Expert Testimony:

   The district court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 702 by allowing Dr. Dawn Hughes to explain the dynamics of coercive control—tactics, grooming, psychological effects—that are commonly deployed by sexual and interpersonal abusers. Such background expertise helps jurors understand victim behavior (nonreporting, recantations, re-engagement) that may otherwise appear counterintuitive. Rule 403 confirmed that the probative value outweighed any risk of unfair prejudice. And there was no Rule 704(b) violation because Dr. Hughes testified in the abstract about “abusers in general,” not about Ray’s particular mens rea.

4. Sentence and Parsimony:

   The within-Guidelines 720-month term was substantively reasonable. The district court expressly acknowledged and applied the § 3553(a) factors—nature and seriousness of the offense, history and characteristics of the defendant, deterrence, incapacitation, and the need for sentences no greater than necessary. It weighed aggravating factors (prolonged abuse, multiple victims, violent tactics) against mitigating arguments (age, health, supervision) and concluded the extreme sentence was required to protect the public and deter similar crimes.

3. Impact

United States v. Ray will guide future prosecutions and trials in several key respects:

• RICO Prosecutions: Reinforces that an “association-in-fact” enterprise may be proven by showing a shared criminal purpose and coordinated predicate acts, without formal structure or profit-sharing formalities.
• Human-Trafficking Cases: Confirms that evidence of psychological coercion, threats of legal process and non-physical forms of control satisfies both forced labor (§ 1589) and forced labor trafficking (§ 1590) statutes.
• Expert Testimony: Authorizes experts to testify on “coercive control” tactics and trauma dynamics where such background knowledge aids juror understanding—so long as experts do not opine on a defendant’s specific mens rea.
• Vagueness Doctrine: Upholds RICO’s “enterprise” element against void-for-vagueness attacks.
• Sentencing Practice: Illustrates robust application of the parsimony clause in extreme abuse and trafficking cases, showing that non-murder convictions can warrant de facto life terms when justified by § 3553(a).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Association-in-Fact Enterprise (RICO): A group of people working together toward a common criminal goal—even informally—qualifies as a “RICO enterprise.” No corporate charter or profit-sharing agreement is needed.
• Racketeering Conspiracy (§ 1962(d)): Punishes agreement to conduct an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of criminal acts (predicate offenses).
• Violent Crime in Aid of Racketeering (§ 1959(a)(3)): Requires proof that the defendant used violence to maintain or enhance his role in a RICO enterprise.
• Sex Trafficking (§ 1591): Criminalizes recruiting or coercing another to perform commercial sex acts. Coercion can be physical, psychological or legal.
• Forced Labor (§ 1589): Bans obtaining labor through force, threats, legal process or a “scheme or pattern” that causes fear of serious harm.
• Expert Testimony (Rule 702): Experts may explain specialized background—like how abusers groom and control victims—when that knowledge is beyond lay experience and helps the jury evaluate evidence.
• Rule 704(b): Prohibits experts from directly opining on whether the defendant possessed a criminal intent element, but allows them to discuss general behaviors and mental states common in certain crimes.
• Parsimony Clause (§ 3553(a)): Sentences must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve retribution, deterrence and public protection.

Conclusion

United States v. Ray is a landmark affirmation of Second Circuit precedent in four pivotal areas: the breadth of RICO’s enterprise concept, the evidentiary sufficiency of psychological coercion in trafficking and forced labor prosecutions, the admissibility of expert testimony on coercive control under Rules 702 and 704(b), and the rigorous application of the sentencing parsimony principle in cases of extreme abuse. Future litigants and courts will look to Ray as binding authority on how to prove association-in-fact enterprises, structure human-trafficking cases around coercion theories, deploy expert witnesses to elucidate victim-abuser dynamics, and craft sentences that balance public safety, deterrence and proportionality.