III. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Decision

The Second Circuit, in a per curiam summary order issued by a panel of Judges Susan L. Carney, William J. Nardini, and Eunice C. Lee, held:

1. Drug treatment, mental health treatment, and search conditions:
   • The district court adequately explained the sentence and associated conditions by adopting the PSR and expressly referencing Jones’s history, characteristics, criminal conduct, and the § 3553(a) factors.
   • Even if the explanation were thought insufficient, the bases for these conditions are self-evident from the record (substance abuse and mental health history, leadership in a violent gang, and need for effective supervision).
   • The conditions were therefore neither procedurally erroneous nor substantively unreasonable.
2. Non-association condition:
   • The terms “associate,” “frequent,” “neighborhood,” “controlled,” and “street gang” are not unconstitutionally vague in this context.
   Reeves, Green, MacMillen), conditions need only be clear enough for a person of ordinary intelligence to understand what is prohibited; they need not specify every conceivable detail.
   • Given the PSR’s factual findings about Jones’s long-term involvement in the Goonies and his awareness of their territory in Mount Vernon, he can reasonably understand which neighborhoods are “known to be controlled” by the gang.
3. “Place of business” addition to the search condition:
   • Both Jones and the Government agreed that the written judgment’s search condition was broader than the condition recommended in the PSR adopted by the district court.
   • The addition of “place of business” in the judgment was not part of the adopted search condition.
   • The court therefore issued a limited remand for the sole purpose of conforming the written judgment’s search condition to the PSR’s version.

In short, the Second Circuit affirmed the judgment in all substantive respects and remanded only to correct the written search condition to match the condition actually imposed by incorporating the PSR.

IV. Detailed Legal Analysis

A. Standard of Review: Plain Error (Thompson)

Because Jones did not object to the special conditions at the sentencing hearing, the Second Circuit applied plain-error review, citing United States v. Thompson, 143 F.4th 169, 176 (2d Cir. 2025).

Under plain-error review, a defendant must show:

1. There was an error;
2. The error was plain (clear or obvious under current law);
3. The error affected the defendant’s substantial rights (usually meaning a reasonable probability of a different result but for the error); and
4. The error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

The order does not walk through these four prongs explicitly, but its structure implies that the panel found no error at all with respect to the challenged conditions (save for the technical discrepancy in the “place of business” language), making it unnecessary to move through the remaining prongs.

This framing is significant: when a defendant fails to object below, appellate courts are notably reluctant to find plain error in well-supported supervised release conditions, especially when the record (PSR and sentencing colloquy) clearly justifies them.

B. Drug Treatment, Mental Health Treatment, and Search Conditions

1. The Requirement of an Individualized Explanation

Jones argued that the district court failed to provide sufficiently individualized findings on the record justifying the drug treatment, mental health treatment, and search conditions. He essentially raised a procedural reasonableness challenge, claiming that the judge needed to specifically connect each special condition to his unique circumstances.

The Second Circuit rejected that argument by relying on its own recent precedent in United States v. Thompson and United States v. Kunz.

• In Thompson, the court held that a sentencing court satisfies its obligation to explain a special condition if, as part of its explanation for the overall sentence, it states that it has:

  “tak[en] into account the nature and circumstances of [the defendant’s] offense, as well as his history and characteristics—all of which were laid out in detail in the PSR and sentencing submissions.”

  When such an overall explanation is given, the court “generally need not articulate separate reasons for imposing every single special condition.”
• Kunz reinforces this approach, making clear that once the court has explained the reasons for its overall sentence, it is “under no obligation … to pick through every condition and explain, point-by-point, how each was responsive to the offending conduct.”

The Second Circuit applied this framework to Jones and concluded that the district court complied with its procedural obligations.

2. How the District Court Met the Explanation Requirement

At sentencing, the district court:

• Expressly adopted the PSR’s factual findings—which included detailed information about:
  • Jones’s substance abuse history;
  • His mental health history and desire for treatment;
  • His longstanding gang involvement and violent conduct; and
  • His leadership role in the Goonies.
• Stated on the record that it had considered:
  • The arguments of both sides;
  • Jones’s acceptance of responsibility;
  • The nature and circumstances of the crime;
  • His prior criminal history and history and characteristics; and
  • The seriousness of the offense.
• Recited in detail many of the violent acts Jones committed with the Goonies.

Under Thompson and Kunz, that level of explanation for the total sentence and the adoption of the PSR is sufficient. The district court was not required to give a separate mini-justification for each special condition (e.g., “I am imposing a drug-treatment condition because of X facts in the PSR,” etc.).

3. “Self-Evident” Justifications from the Record

Even assuming arguendo that the explanation was sparse, the Second Circuit held that the justifications for the drug treatment, mental health treatment, and search conditions are “self-evident in the record.” This provides an important doctrinal backstop: when the record plainly supports a condition, the appellate court may uphold it even if the district court’s explanation is brief.

• Drug treatment: The PSR and sentencing record emphasized Jones’s long history of substance abuse, and he himself expressed a desire for treatment. A condition requiring participation in drug treatment is naturally and obviously related to his rehabilitation and risk management.
• Mental health treatment: The PSR documented his mental health issues, and Jones likewise expressed a desire for treatment. Given his background, a mental health condition is facially reasonable and beneficial both to him and to public safety.
• Search condition (including electronic devices): The record reflected that:
  • Jones was a leader in a violent gang;
  • He was directly involved in multiple violent crimes; and
  • These factors warranted robust supervision tools.
  Citing Thompson, the Second Circuit reiterated that search conditions are often crucial for “ensuring the effectiveness of supervision”, and this includes both:
  • Electronic searches (computers, phones, cloud accounts, data storage devices); and
  • Non-electronic searches (person, residence, physical locations).
  Importantly, the court reaffirmed the principle that such electronic search conditions may be appropriate “even where the record does not indicate electronic devices were misused in the underlying crime of conviction or criminal history.” The condition is justified not as a punishment for prior misuse of technology, but as a forward-looking supervisory tool.

4. Substantive Reasonableness of These Conditions

Jones also claimed that the conditions were substantively unreasonable because there was “no individualized need” in the record. The Second Circuit rejected this notion for the same reasons:

• The documented substance abuse and mental health history justify treatment conditions;
• His role in violent, organized gang activity justifies a strong search condition aimed at deterrence and detection of reoffending; and
• Supervised release is specifically designed to assist the defendant’s reintegration and to protect the public.

On this record, the panel found “ample basis” to support each condition, defeating both procedural and substantive challenges under the demanding plain-error standard.

C. Non-Association Condition and Vagueness Doctrine

1. The Challenged Condition

The non-association condition at issue provided that Jones must not:

• “associate or interact in any way with members of the Goonies gang or any other street gang”, and
• “frequent any neighborhood known to be controlled by the Goonies gang”,

subject to limited exceptions (e.g., Probation-authorized family visits).

Jones argued that the condition was unconstitutionally vague because of words and phrases he considered ambiguous:

• “associate”
• “frequent”
• “neighborhood”
• “controlled”
• “street gang”

2. Vagueness Standard: Reeves

The Second Circuit began its analysis by citing United States v. Reeves, 591 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2010), which sets forth the constitutional standard for supervised release conditions challenged as vague:

• Conditions must be “sufficiently clear to give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.”
• They do not have to:
  • Be “cast in letters six feet high”;
  • “Describe every possible permutation”; or
  • “Spell out every last, self-evident detail.”

This is a practical, common-sense standard: the law demands enough clarity so that a typical person can understand what is forbidden, not mathematical precision or exhaustive enumeration of all scenarios.

3. Prior Approvals of Similar Conditions: Green and MacMillen

The panel noted that it has often upheld non-association and location-based conditions in prior cases:

• United States v. Green, 618 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2010):
  • Upheld a condition prohibiting the defendant from “associat[ing]” with members of criminal street gangs.
  • The court implicitly found that “associate” in this context is sufficiently clear.
• United States v. MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008):
  • Upheld a condition prohibiting the defendant from “being on” locations “where children are likely to congregate.”
  • Like “neighborhood” or “controlled,” this term required line-drawing but was still considered constitutionally adequate.

These precedents show the Second Circuit’s willingness to uphold conditions with inherently general terms, so long as they are reasonably understandable in context.

4. Application to Jones’s Non-Association Condition

Applying Reeves, Green, and MacMillen, the Second Circuit concluded that the terms challenged by Jones do not render the condition unconstitutionally vague.

Key points:

• “Associate” / “interact in any way”:
  • Prior case law has upheld similar language.
  • An ordinary person understands that “associating” or “interacting” involves more than accidental or incidental contact; it refers to knowing, purposeful contact or relationship.
• “Frequent”:
  • This term is common in everyday speech and law—connoting repeated or habitual presence.
  • It is not so vague as to be incomprehensible to a person under supervision.
• “Neighborhood”:
  • While geographic boundaries may sometimes be debatable, in ordinary usage “neighborhood” refers to an identifiable residential area or region.
  • Supervision officers can and do work with defendants to clarify such terms in practice.
• “Controlled” by the Goonies:
  • The PSR established that Jones was a longtime Goonies member who operated in Mount Vernon, committing multiple shootings and at least one murder over several years.
  • Given his intimate familiarity with the gang’s territory, the court found no reason to think he would be confused about which neighborhoods are “controlled” by the Goonies.
• “Street gang”:
  • This is a standard term in criminal law and supervision.
  • Jones, as a former gang leader, plainly understands what “street gang” refers to in this context.

In light of his history and the factual findings expressly adopted by the district court, the panel concluded that the condition gave him adequate notice of the prohibited conduct. The vagueness challenge therefore failed.

D. Discrepancy Between the PSR/Adopted Conditions and the Written Judgment

1. The Error: “Place of Business” in the Search Condition

The only point of agreement between Jones and the Government concerned a mismatch between:

• The search condition as recommended in the PSR and adopted orally by the district court; and
• The search condition as written in the judgment of conviction.

The written judgment expanded the condition by specifying that Jones must submit his “place of business” to search, a phrase not included in the PSR’s version. Thus, the judgment arguably imposed a broader search authority than the court had actually announced at sentencing by adopting the PSR.

2. Limited Remand to Conform the Judgment

Recognizing this discrepancy, the Second Circuit ordered a limited remand “for the limited purpose of conforming the search condition in the judgment of conviction to the search condition in the Presentence Report.”

This reflects a familiar principle in federal sentencing: where the oral pronouncement of sentence (or the clearly adopted terms, such as a PSR’s conditions) conflicts with the written judgment, the oral pronouncement generally controls. The proper remedy is to correct the written judgment so it accurately reflects what the district court actually imposed.

Here, the court did not suggest that including “place of business” would have been impermissible in itself; it simply recognized that this addition did not reflect the condition as adopted. The remand is thus technical and ministerial, not substantive.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. United States v. Thompson, 143 F.4th 169 (2d Cir. 2025)

Thompson serves as the key recent authority governing:

• The standard of review (plain error) for unpreserved challenges to supervised release conditions; and
• The sufficiency of an “overall” explanation for special conditions, particularly where the court adopts a PSR and references the defendant’s history and offense conduct.

The Second Circuit quotes Thompson to emphasize:

• A court satisfies its duty to explain special conditions by indicating that it has taken into account the nature of the offense, and the defendant’s history and characteristics, as laid out in the PSR and submissions.
• When such an explanation is given, the court generally need not articulate individualized reasons for each condition.
• Even in the absence of a detailed explanation, conditions may be upheld if their justification is “self-evident in the record.”
• Electronic search conditions are often appropriate and may be imposed even if the underlying offense did not involve misuse of electronic devices, provided they serve the goals of effective supervision.

In Jones, these principles led the court to uphold the drug, mental health, and search conditions, despite the lack of item-by-item justification at sentencing.

B. United States v. Kunz, 68 F.4th 748 (2d Cir. 2023)

Kunz complements Thompson by underscoring that a district court is not required to “pick through every condition and explain, point-by-point, how each was responsive to the offending conduct.” This is particularly important in complex cases with numerous special conditions.

In Jones, the panel relies on Kunz to reject the argument that the district court had to provide individual justifications for every condition, so long as it explained the sentence as a whole and adopted the detailed PSR.

C. United States v. Reeves, 591 F.3d 77 (2d Cir. 2010)

Reeves provides the governing vagueness standard for supervised release conditions:

• Conditions must give a person of ordinary intelligence reasonable notice of what they may or may not do.
• Absolute precision is not required; conditions need not anticipate every fact pattern or be drafted in exhaustive detail.

In Jones, this framework is used to evaluate the non-association condition’s terms, such as “associate,” “frequent,” and “neighborhood known to be controlled by the Goonies.” The court finds that under Reeves, these terms are sufficiently definite in light of Jones’s background and the PSR facts.

D. United States v. Green, 618 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2010)

In Green, the Second Circuit upheld a non-association condition that prohibited the defendant from “associat[ing]” with gang members. That case is central to the rejection of Jones’s challenge to the term “associate,” which he argued was ambiguous.

The court in Jones treats Green as confirming that such language is common, workable, and not unconstitutionally vague.

E. United States v. MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008)

MacMillen upheld a condition barring the defendant from being in places where “children are likely to congregate.” That phrase, much like “neighborhood controlled by the Goonies,” involves some generality and judgment.

By citing MacMillen, the panel reinforces the idea that supervised release conditions can use everyday terms that rely on context and common sense, without violating due process.

VI. Impact and Practical Implications

Although issued as a non-precedential summary order, United States v. Jones provides practical guidance for district courts, probation officers, and defense counsel in several respects:

A. Confirmation of a Flexible Explanation Standard

The Second Circuit again endorses a flexible, holistic approach to explaining supervised release conditions:

• District courts can satisfy their duty to explain by:
  • Adopting the PSR’s factual findings; and
  • Stating they have considered the defendant’s history, characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the offense under § 3553(a).
• They are not required to give individualized mini-justifications for each special condition, especially when the basis for a condition is obvious from the record.

This lowers the risk of appellate reversal on procedural grounds, particularly where the record is robust and the conditions clearly relate to rehabilitation and public safety.

B. Continued Acceptance of Broad Search Conditions (Including Electronics)

The decision reiterates the Second Circuit’s openness to broad search conditions—including searches of electronic devices and cloud storage—even when the underlying offense did not involve technology misuse. For gang-involved or violent defendants, courts and probation can rely on such conditions as:

• Deterrence tools;
• Means of detecting renewed criminal activity; and
• Mechanisms to ensure compliance with other conditions (e.g., non-association and geographical restrictions).

Defense counsel must therefore be prepared to object specifically at sentencing if they wish to preserve narrower challenges to search conditions; failure to do so will render any appellate review subject to the deferential plain-error standard.

C. Endorsement of Gang-Related Non-Association Conditions

Jones confirms that gang-related non-association conditions can be drafted with relatively broad language (“associate,” “frequent,” “neighborhood,” “controlled”) without being struck down as vague, especially when:

• The defendant has in-depth knowledge of the gang and its territory;
• The PSR documents that knowledge; and
• The condition includes limited exceptions (e.g., for family visits authorized by Probation).

Courts and probation officers can draw on this approach when tailoring conditions for defendants leaving gang environments, particularly in cases involving entrenched gang territories.

D. Technical Precision in Drafting Written Judgments

The limited remand highlights the importance of ensuring that the written judgment precisely matches the conditions actually imposed—which, in cases like this, may be those in the PSR adopted wholesale at sentencing.

For practitioners:

• Defense counsel should compare the final judgment against the oral sentence and PSR to detect discrepancies that may broaden or alter conditions.
• Prosecutors and courts should avoid unconsciously expanding conditions when drafting the written judgment.
• If an expansion is intended, it should be clearly announced and justified on the record at sentencing.

VII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. What Is Supervised Release?

Supervised release is a period of community supervision that follows a federal prison sentence. It is not a substitute for prison but an additional term aimed at:

• Helping the defendant reintegrate into society;
• Monitoring compliance with the law and specific conditions; and
• Protecting the public.

Violations of supervised release conditions can lead to new sanctions, including additional imprisonment.

B. Special Conditions of Supervised Release

In addition to “standard” conditions (like reporting to a probation officer and not committing new crimes), courts may impose special conditions tailored to the individual—such as:

• Drug or alcohol treatment;
• Mental health counseling;
• Residence or travel restrictions;
• Search conditions (for person, home, or electronic devices); and
• Association or contact restrictions (e.g., with victims, minors, or gang members).

These must be reasonably related to the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than necessary.

C. Plain Error Review

When a defendant fails to object to a condition at sentencing, appellate courts review only for plain error. This is a tough standard:

• The defendant must show a clear or obvious error;
• The error must have affected the outcome or “substantial rights”; and
• The error must seriously affect the fairness and integrity of the proceedings.

This is why timely and specific objections at sentencing are crucial if the defense wishes to challenge conditions later on appeal.

D. Vagueness Doctrine in Supervised Release

The vagueness doctrine, rooted in the Due Process Clause, requires that individuals have fair notice of what conduct is prohibited. For supervised release:

• Conditions must be clear enough that an ordinary person can understand what is allowed and what is not.
• Conditions may use general terms (e.g., “associate,” “neighborhood,” “likely to congregate”) so long as their meaning is reasonably understandable in context.
• Absolute precision is not required; courts rely on common sense, context, and the defendant’s known history.

E. The Role of the Presentence Report (PSR)

The PSR is a report prepared by Probation prior to sentencing that:

• Summarizes the offense conduct;
• Describes the defendant’s background (family, education, employment, substance abuse, mental health, prior record); and
• Often recommends special conditions of supervised release.

When a judge adopts the PSR’s factual findings, those facts become part of the record justifying the sentence and conditions. As we see in Jones, appellate courts may rely heavily on the PSR to find that the basis for a condition is “self-evident.”

VIII. Conclusion: Significance of United States v. Jones in the Broader Legal Context

United States v. Raheem Jones does not announce new binding law, as it is a non-precedential summary order. Nonetheless, it reinforces and illustrates several important trends in Second Circuit supervised release jurisprudence:

• District courts can fulfill their duty to explain supervised release conditions through a global, holistic explanation grounded in the PSR and § 3553(a) factors, without individualized, condition-by-condition justification.
• Search conditions—including broad authority over electronic devices—are widely accepted as tools for ensuring effective supervision, even absent prior misuse of such devices.
• Gang-related non-association conditions employing terms like “associate,” “frequent,” and “neighborhood known to be controlled” are constitutionally sound when applied to defendants intimately familiar with the gang and its territory.
• Technical discrepancies between the PSR/adopted oral sentence and the written judgment are remedied via limited remands to conform the judgment, underscoring the primacy of the oral pronouncement (and explicitly adopted documents) in defining the sentence.

For courts, probation officers, and counsel, Jones underscores the importance of:

• Making a clear, on-the-record linkage between the defendant’s history and the overall sentence and conditions;
• Using the PSR as a central vehicle for documenting the factual basis of supervisory needs; and
• Carefully drafting written judgments to mirror the conditions actually imposed at sentencing.

In the broader context, Jones reflects the Second Circuit’s continuing effort to balance public safety, effective supervision, and constitutional protections in the design and review of supervised release conditions, particularly in complex and dangerous gang-related cases.