United States v. Pineda: Clarifying the Non-Jurisdictional Nature of MDLEA Vessel Status and the Breadth of Sentence-Appeal Waivers

Introduction

In United States v. Braudimil Pineda, No. 22-13661 (11th Cir. June 30, 2025) (non-published), the Eleventh Circuit addressed two recurring questions in prosecutions under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (MDLEA):

Whether the statute’s expanded definition of a “vessel without nationality” violates the U.S. Constitution—specifically the Felonies Clause—because it is said to sweep in vessels that possess a nationality under customary international law; and
Whether a district court’s omission to orally enumerate standard conditions of supervised release at sentencing invalidates those conditions, notwithstanding a defendant’s sentence-appeal waiver.

The panel—Judges Newsom, Branch, and Grant (per curiam)—concluded that:

The constitutional challenge is non-jurisdictional, forfeited by the defendant’s silence below, and plainly foreclosed by United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024), and United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025).
A broad, unambiguous sentence-appeal waiver bars appellate review of a claim that the district court failed to read the standard conditions aloud—squarely following the circuit’s recent decision in United States v. Read, 118 F.4th 1317 (11th Cir. 2024).

Although labeled “Do Not Publish,” the opinion cements two doctrinal messages: (1) challenges to MDLEA vessel status are constitutional merits questions—not subject-matter jurisdiction questions—and will be reviewed only for plain error if not timely raised; and (2) post-Read, sentence-appeal waivers extend to due-process objections about the formal pronouncement of supervised-release conditions.

Summary of the Judgment

Braudimil Pineda pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute cocaine on a vessel deemed “without nationality” under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(C). On appeal, he argued:

(1) The MDLEA’s definition renders the statute facially unconstitutional because it allows U.S. jurisdiction over vessels that are not stateless under international law.
(2) The district court violated due process by referencing “mandatory and standard” supervised-release conditions without reading them into the record.

The Eleventh Circuit:

Applied plain-error review to the constitutional claim (because it was not raised below) and held that binding circuit precedent foreclosed the argument; therefore, no plain error existed.
Held that Pineda’s sentence-appeal waiver, knowingly executed during the plea colloquy, barred the supervised-release challenge. The district court’s oral and written pronouncements were also consistent, eliminating any alleged variance.
Affirmed both conviction and sentence.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th 815 (11th Cir. 2024)
Alfonso held that the Felonies Clause is not limited by customary international law; thus, Congress may criminalize high-seas conduct in ways that exceed traditional international norms. The Pineda panel relied on Alfonso to declare that the same logic “squarely forecloses” any constitutional objection to § 70502(d)(1)(C).
United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th 1374 (11th Cir. 2025)
This post-Alfonso case reiterated that international law does not cabin Congress’s Felonies Clause authority, specifically in defining “vessel without nationality.” Pineda cites it as a twin precedent mandating affirmance.
United States v. Read, 118 F.4th 1317 (11th Cir. 2024)
Read resolved that an appeal waiver envelops objections to a district court’s failure to recite standard supervised-release conditions. Pineda extends Read by eliminating any purported loophole where the defendant lacked “notice” of the conditions before judgment.
Bushert, Bascomb, and related waiver cases
These cases define when an appeal waiver is knowing and voluntary. The panel deployed the classic Bushert two-pronged inquiry and found the waiver valid.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

Jurisdiction vs. Merits Dichotomy
The panel underscored that a statute’s constitutionality is a merits question, not a jurisdictional one. Hence, Pineda’s failure to raise the argument in the district court triggered forfeiture and plain-error review.
No “Plain” Error
To be “plain,” an error must be clear under current law. Because binding panel precedent holds that § 70502(d)(1)(C) is constitutional, any error would not be “plain”—in fact, there is none.
Appeal Waiver Enforcement
The court meticulously recited the waiver colloquy, applying a strong presumption that plea-colloquy statements are truthful. Having found the waiver valid, it summarily rejected the supervised-release argument as “within the waiver’s scope.”
Consistency Between Oral and Written Sentences
The court added that, even absent the waiver, there was no discrepancy because the judge referenced “mandatory and standard conditions” orally and the written judgment simply catalogued the same pre-published district-wide conditions.

C. Potential Impact of the Decision

Reinforced Circuit Wall Against MDLEA Constitutional Attacks
Pineda deters defendants from re-litigating the vessel-status issue by clarifying that: (a) the argument is not jurisdictional, and (b) Alfonso/Canario-Vilomar are controlling. Unless and until the Supreme Court intervenes or the court sits en banc, the constitutional validity of § 70502(d)(1)(C) is settled in the Eleventh Circuit.
Expanded Force of Sentence-Appeal Waivers
Prosecutors can rely on a broad waiver to foreclose post-sentencing challenges that the court failed to read standard conditions aloud. Defense counsel must object before pleading or carve out specific exceptions in plea agreements.
Clarification of Preservation Rules
Litigants are reminded that failing to raise a constitutional objection at trial will usually relegate the claim to plain-error review, a near-insurmountable hurdle when contrary precedent exists.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Felonies Clause (Art. I, § 8, cl. 10) – Gives Congress power to “define and punish felonies committed on the high seas.” The Eleventh Circuit reads this broadly, untethered from international consensus.
“Vessel Without Nationality” – A ship treated as stateless for MDLEA purposes if: (a) it makes no claim of nationality; or (b) it does, but the claimed nation does not “affirmatively and unequivocally” confirm that claim. Such vessels are deemed under U.S. jurisdiction.
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction vs. Merits – Courts must always have the power to hear a type of case (jurisdiction). Whether the statute underlying prosecution is constitutional affects the merits, not jurisdiction.
Plain-Error Review – A four-prong standard (error, plainness, substantial rights, and impact on judicial integrity). If prior precedent defeats the claim, the error cannot be “plain.”
Sentence-Appeal Waiver – A contractual provision in a plea agreement where the defendant waives the right to appeal most sentencing issues. Valid if knowing, voluntary, and unambiguous.
Standard Conditions of Supervised Release – A uniform set of behavioral rules adopted by each federal district (e.g., no new crimes, report to probation officer, etc.). Judges sometimes incorporate them by reference instead of reading them one-by-one.

Conclusion

United States v. Pineda may not be a published blockbuster, but its doctrinal signals are unmistakable. By:

Affirming that Congress’s high-seas authority under the Felonies Clause extends beyond international norms, and
Applying and expanding the reach of sentence-appeal waivers to supervised-release conditions,

the Eleventh Circuit further stabilizes MDLEA prosecutions and clarifies procedural landmines for defense counsel. Until the Supreme Court or an en banc Eleventh Circuit rules otherwise, defendants challenging MDLEA jurisdiction on international-law grounds will face an uphill battle, and broad appeal waivers will continue to silence most post-sentencing grievances.