United States v. Piaquadio: Factually Erroneous § 3553(a) Analyses and Ignored Post‑Sentencing Rehabilitation as Abuse of Discretion in Compassionate Release

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (non‑precedential opinion)
Case No.: 25‑1149
Date: November 21, 2025
Panel: Judges Phipps, Roth, and Rendell (opinion by Judge Rendell; separate view by Judge Phipps in footnote 3)

I. Introduction

This appeal arises from the denial of a motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), filed by defendant‑appellant David Piaquadio, a 69‑year‑old federal inmate suffering from multiple serious medical conditions including stage IV kidney disease. The core of the Third Circuit’s decision is procedural: the panel vacates and remands because the District Court conducted its 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) analysis on two flawed bases:

It made a clear factual error about how much of the sentence had been served—treating a ten‑year served term as “less than five years.”
It failed to consider, or even indicate that it had considered, the defendant’s nonfrivolous post‑sentencing mitigation evidence, including extensive rehabilitation and a favorable Bureau of Prisons (BOP) risk assessment.

Though designated “not precedential” under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7, the opinion is a useful and detailed application of:

the abuse‑of‑discretion standard in sentence‑modification contexts,
the harmless‑error framework in sentencing and post‑sentencing decisions, and
recent Supreme Court guidance (especially Pepper and Concepcion) on the obligation to engage with post‑sentencing rehabilitation and nonfrivolous arguments.

The decision also exposes a subtle but important intra‑panel disagreement: while the majority holds that the government failed to establish harmless error, Judge Phipps would affirm on harmless‑error grounds despite the acknowledged factual mistake.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Procedural Background

Piaquadio developed opioid addiction after being over‑prescribed oxycodone pills and fentanyl patches for pain. He sold his prescriptions to finance his heroin use. Among the transactions, he supplied a fentanyl patch to Joshua Moroschok, who overdosed but survived after medical intervention.

The key procedural milestones:

April 2015: Arrest by state authorities.
October 2015: Transfer to federal custody.
July 25, 2019: After a bench trial, the District Court (Judge Christopher C. Conner) finds him guilty of:
- One count of conspiracy to distribute oxycodone, fentanyl, and heroin (21 U.S.C. § 846);
- Three counts of possession with intent to distribute controlled substances (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), 18 U.S.C. § 2);
- With a specific finding that his fentanyl distribution resulted in serious bodily injury (to Moroschok).
August 31, 2020: Sentenced to 240 months (20 years) of imprisonment.

Later, citing severe and deteriorating health (stage IV kidney disease—a terminal condition—along with insulin‑dependent diabetes, chronic hepatitis C, hypothyroidism, spinal stenosis, and degenerative joint disease), and evidence of extensive rehabilitation, Piaquadio filed a motion for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A).

The District Court:

Assumed (without formally deciding) that his medical condition constituted “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” but
Denied the motion based on its application of the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, relying on three articulated considerations:
1. The seriousness of the offense;
2. The need to protect the public;
3. “Time served” — expressed as a concern about reducing a 20‑year sentence “began serving less than five years ago” to time served.

In reality, by the time of the denial, Piaquadio had served nearly ten years, not five. He also presented substantial post‑sentencing mitigation evidence:

BOP classification as minimum security and minimal recidivism risk;
Maintenance of a work assignment;
Completion of vocational, educational, wellness, and drug programs;
A detailed release plan to live with family and obtain medical treatment.

The District Court’s written order did not mention any of these mitigation materials in its § 3553(a) analysis.

B. Holding and Disposition

The Third Circuit holds that the District Court abused its discretion in denying compassionate release because:

Its § 3553(a) analysis was built in part on a clearly erroneous factual premise (time served); and
It failed to consider, or acknowledge consideration of, nonfrivolous post‑sentencing mitigation evidence central to § 3553(a)’s “history and characteristics” and “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” mandate.

The court:

Vacates the order denying compassionate release;
Remands for further proceedings so that the District Court can:
- Re‑evaluate the § 3553(a) factors using the correct amount of time served; and
- Expressly consider Piaquadio’s post‑sentencing mitigation evidence.
Declines to address, on this appeal, whether the medical conditions qualify as “extraordinary and compelling,” leaving that issue fully open to the District Court on remand (though the District Court previously assumed they did).

In a separate footnote‑style statement, Judge Phipps agrees there was factual error but would find it harmless and affirm, emphasizing the seriousness of the offense and ongoing public‑safety concerns even after ten years served.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Standard of Review and Framework

The panel applies an abuse‑of‑discretion standard to the District Court’s denial of compassionate release, following United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2020). Under that standard:

The appellate court does not re‑weigh factors de novo;
It asks whether there is a “definite and firm conviction” that the District Court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing relevant factors, quoting Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 146 (3d Cir. 2000).

The panel further emphasizes a specific subset of abuse‑of‑discretion doctrine in sentencing contexts: a district court abuses its discretion when it bases a fact‑driven sentencing decision on clearly erroneous factual conclusions, citing United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2012), and United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2008).

The court also frames the context of compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A):

The defendant must show “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a sentence reduction.
The court must then evaluate whether a reduction is warranted under the § 3553(a) factors.
Per Pawlowski, the amount of the sentence already served—and the amount remaining—can be a relevant § 3553(a) consideration.

Layered on top of that is the post‑Concepcion obligation: district courts must demonstrate that they have considered parties’ “nonfrivolous arguments,” even in sentence‑modification contexts.

B. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327 (3d Cir. 2020)

Pawlowski is the Third Circuit’s leading compassionate‑release case. It establishes:

Abuse‑of‑discretion review for § 3582(c)(1)(A) decisions;
The centrality of § 3553(a) factors in any compassionate‑release determination;
That the remaining portion of the sentence is a legitimate factor in deciding whether release would “undermine” the original sentencing rationale.

The Piaquadio panel relies on Pawlowski to:

Confirm the standard of review; and
Stress that any balancing of § 3553(a) requires a “weighing of the relevant factors” based on accurate information.

2. Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2000)

Oddi is a civil products‑liability case, but its articulation of abuse‑of‑discretion principles is widely used:

“[W]e will not disturb the District Court's decision 'unless there is a definite and firm conviction that [it] committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors.'”

That phrasing is imported into the criminal sentencing context here to emphasize:

Appellate deference, but
The requirement that all relevant factors actually be weighed and not distorted by factual error.

3. United States v. Richards, 674 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2012) and United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207 (3d Cir. 2008)

Both cases address sentencing decisions grounded on incorrect facts. They stand for the proposition that:

A sentencing court abuses its discretion when it relies on “clearly erroneous factual conclusions” in making fact‑driven determinations;
This is true both at original sentencing and, by extension, in sentence modifications such as compassionate release, where § 3553(a) factors are re‑assessed.

In Piaquadio, this doctrine squarely applies to the District Court’s mistaken finding that Piaquadio had served “less than five years,” when he in fact had served nearly ten.

4. United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Raia, 993 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2021)

These cases define the Third Circuit’s harmless‑error standard in non‑constitutional sentencing errors:

Non‑constitutional error is harmless if it is “highly probable” the error did not prejudice the defendant (Zabielski, quoting Langford).
“High probability” means a “sure conviction” that the same sentence would have been imposed absent the error; it cannot rest on speculation or conjecture (Raia, quoting Langford).
Importantly, in Raia, the court underscores that the burden of proving harmlessness lies with the party seeking to maintain the sentence—typically, the government.

The majority in Piaquadio:

Notes that the government did not argue harmless error; and
Concludes in any event that the record does not permit a “sure conviction” that the denial would be the same with the correct time‑served figure and with consideration of post‑sentencing mitigation.

By contrast, Judge Phipps relies on this same line of cases, in conjunction with TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, to assert that the court may apply harmless‑error principles sua sponte and that he is “highly probable” the error did not matter.

5. Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022)

Concepcion holds that when deciding whether to reduce a sentence under the First Step Act, district courts:

Have broad discretion to consider all relevant information, including intervening changes in law and fact; but
Carry a “standard obligation” to demonstrate that they have considered the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments.

Piaquadio extends this principle to the compassionate‑release context: the Third Circuit expects district courts to acknowledge and, at least briefly, address nonfrivolous mitigation and rehabilitation arguments, not silently ignore them.

6. Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011)

Pepper is central to the importance of post‑sentencing conduct. It holds that:

When resentencing after remand, courts must be allowed to consider post‑sentencing rehabilitation;
Post‑sentencing rehabilitation may be “highly relevant” to several § 3553(a) factors, including:
- the defendant’s “history and characteristics,” and
- the need for a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”

Piaquadio draws directly on this principle: his vocational courses, work record, BOP risk assessment, and release plan are all quintessential Pepper‑type evidence. The majority faults the District Court for failing even to say that it considered this mitigation in its § 3553(a) analysis.

7. Chavez‑Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 109 (2018)

Chavez‑Meza addresses the sufficiency of a sentencing judge’s explanation when modifying a sentence (there, under § 3582(c)(2)). It holds that:

A minimal but reasoned explanation can be sufficient in some straightforward cases;
But if the explanation is inadequate in a particular case, appellate courts may remand for a more complete explanation.

The panel cites Chavez‑Meza to justify remanding where the District Court’s very brief order fails to:

Correctly state time served; or
Indicate any consideration of rehabilitation evidence.

8. United States v. Shields, 48 F.4th 183 (3d Cir. 2022)

Shields addresses First Step Act resentencing and emphasizes:

District courts must consider post‑sentencing mitigation evidence raised by the parties;
Appellate courts cannot simply presume that a judge “remembers” a defendant’s case from years earlier, especially given judicial caseloads.

Piaquadio uses Shields in two important ways:

To reject the government’s suggestion that the District Court “really meant” ten years when it wrote five—Shields warns against presuming a judge’s memory or silently corrected reasoning.
To reinforce the duty to consider and at least implicitly address post‑sentencing mitigation evidence.

9. TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2019)

Cited in Judge Phipps’s separate statement, TD Bank stands for the familiar principle that an appellate court may affirm on any ground supported by the record, even if different from the District Court’s rationale.

Judge Phipps invokes this to justify affirming based on the seriousness of the offense and public‑safety concerns alone, treating the time‑served error as harmless under Zabielski.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Erroneous “Time Served” as a Critical Factual Error

A central pillar of the opinion is the conclusion that the District Court’s reliance on “less than five years” served, instead of nearly ten, was not a trivial mistake. It infected one of the three expressly stated grounds for denial and could reasonably have influenced the others.

Key points:

The District Court’s order explicitly stated:
“the immediate reduction of the twenty-year prison sentence Piaquadio began serving less than five years ago ... is unwarranted at this time under the circumstances.”
The government argued on appeal that the District Court’s wording should be read instead as referencing the fact that sentencing occurred five years earlier (2020 vs. 2025), not the length of time actually served.
The panel rejects this as incompatible with the “plain meaning of the District Court’s order.” The language clearly concerns the commencement of the prison term, not just the date of sentencing.

The majority further emphasizes, via Shields, that appellate courts should not suppose that the district judge’s unexpressed recollection corrects the text:

Judges sentence “over a hundred defendants each year,”
Five years had elapsed between the original sentencing and the denial of compassionate release,
There is no indication that Judge Conner was relying on his memory rather than the mistaken “less than five years” figure.

Because the erroneous assumption about time served was one of only three stated justifications, the majority views it as material. This transforms what might look like mere sloppiness into a clear abuse of discretion under Richards and Wise.

2. Failure to Consider Post‑Sentencing Mitigation Evidence

The second major defect identified is the District Court’s silence regarding Piaquadio’s mitigation and rehabilitation evidence, despite:

Detailed briefing by the defendant, and
Supreme Court and Third Circuit authority (Pepper, Concepcion, Shields) requiring courts to consider such evidence when raised.

The majority emphasizes:

Post‑sentencing rehabilitation is “highly relevant” to § 3553(a)(1) (history and characteristics of the defendant) and § 3553(a)’s parsimony principle (sentence not greater than necessary);
While courts have broad discretion as to how much weight to give mitigation evidence, they cannot simply ignore nonfrivolous arguments.

Here, the District Court’s order:

Touched on the medical evidence in the context of “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” citing defendant’s filings there; but
Did not mention—or even allude to—rehabilitation, reduced recidivism risk, work history, or release planning within its § 3553(a) discussion.

The majority distinguishes between:

A permissible choice to give mitigation little weight (which is not ordinarily reviewable); and
An impermissible failure to consider relevant mitigation at all (which is error under Concepcion, Pepper, and Shields).

Because the record suggests the latter, the court again finds abuse of discretion: the District Court did not engage in a true “weighing of the relevant factors.”

3. Harmless Error: Why the Majority Refuses to Uphold the Denial

Despite clear error, an appellate court must still affirm if the error is harmless. The majority’s harmless‑error analysis proceeds as follows:

Burden. Under Raia, the party seeking to maintain the sentence—in this context, the government—bears the burden of demonstrating harmlessness.
Government’s position. The opinion specifically notes that the government did not argue that harmless error applies.
Record analysis. Even assuming harmless error could be raised sua sponte, the panel finds no “sure conviction” that the District Court would have denied compassionate release had it:
- Used the correct ten‑year figure; and
- Considered, and stated that it considered, rehabilitation and BOP assessments.
Substantial influence. One of only three reasons given for denial rests on the erroneous time‑served assumption. That factor might also have colored the court’s perception of punishment sufficiency and ongoing public‑safety risk.

The majority thus concludes:

They cannot say with “high probability” that the same decision would have been reached absent the errors; and
The District Court lacked a sufficiently “reasoned basis” in light of both the factual mistake and the omission of mitigation evidence.

Remand is therefore required under Chavez‑Meza for a corrected, fuller explanation.

D. Judge Phipps’s Separate View on Harmless Error

Judge Phipps’s statement (footnote 3) reflects a narrower approach to the impact of the errors:

He agrees the District Court “erred by misstating the amount of the sentence that Piaquadio had already served.”
He nonetheless applies the “rule of harmless error,” stating it “need not be affirmatively raised by the Government,” citing:
- Zabielski for the “highly probable” standard, and
- TD Bank for the power to affirm on any ground supported by the record.

In his view:

The other two rationales given by the District Court—the seriousness of the offense and the need to protect the public—are sufficiently powerful and independent to sustain the denial, even if ten years (not five) have been served.
He emphasizes that:
- During the “peak of the opioid epidemic,” Piaquadio was selling “hundreds of prescription opioids and fentanyl patches per month,” contributing to an overdose; and
- He continued selling to buy heroin even at age 58, indicating ongoing risk.
On this record, he is “confident that it is ‘highly probable the error did not prejudice’” the defendant and would therefore affirm.

This contrast within the panel is instructive:

The majority demands a clearer textual basis, plus some indication that rehabilitation was considered, before it can find harmlessness.
Judge Phipps is more willing to infer that the seriousness and public‑safety concerns, as established in the trial/sentencing record, still dominate the calculus even after ten years and mitigation efforts.

For practitioners, this underscores that harmless‑error disputes in compassionate‑release cases can turn on:

How heavily the original record weighs in favor of public safety and punishment; and
How fully the mitigation record is developed and argued on appeal.

E. Impact and Practical Implications

1. Reinforcing Accurate Factual Foundations in § 3553(a) Analyses

Even though this opinion is not precedential, it reinforces a basic yet sometimes overlooked rule: a court cannot meaningfully weigh § 3553(a) factors if it is mistaken about fundamental facts such as:

How much time the defendant has served;
The extent of rehabilitation or disciplinary history within prison; or
The defendant’s current age and medical condition.

For district courts, this opinion is a cautionary signal:

Verify time‑served figures against BOP records before issuing orders;
Ensure that any written explanation accurately reflects those figures.

2. Mandatory Consideration (but Not Adoption) of Post‑Sentencing Mitigation

The opinion underscores a theme seen in Pepper, Concepcion, and Shields:

Courts have discretion about the weight to give rehabilitation and mitigation;
They do not have discretion to ignore such evidence when it is nonfrivolously presented.

In practice:

Defense counsel should:
- Develop a robust mitigation record (programs completed, BOP risk tools, letters of support, release plans);
- Explicitly link that evidence to specific § 3553(a) factors (history and characteristics; need for deterrence; protection of the public; rehabilitation).
District judges, even in brief orders, should:
- At least refer in general terms to having considered rehabilitation and post‑sentencing conduct;
- Explain, if necessary, why such mitigation is insufficient in light of offense seriousness or public‑safety risks.

3. Clarifying the Role of Harmless Error in Compassionate Release Appeals

The split between the majority and Judge Phipps illustrates an emerging tension:

How aggressively should appellate courts apply harmless‑error review in compassionate‑release denials where the record is sparse?
When the government does not argue harmlessness, should courts nonetheless invoke it sua sponte?

While the majority does not hold that harmless error cannot be raised sua sponte, it effectively treats:

Government silence as a practical obstacle; and
The lack of a detailed record as fatal to any “sure conviction” that the same outcome would follow absent error.

For government counsel, the implication is:

If defending a compassionate‑release denial with any arguable procedural defect, harmless‑error arguments should be developed explicitly and grounded in the record.

4. Interaction with the “Extraordinary and Compelling” Prong

The panel pointedly reserves judgment on whether Piaquadio’s medical conditions amount to “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” The District Court had only assumed, not definitively held, that they did.

On remand:

The District Court is free to:
- Maintain that assumption and focus on § 3553(a), or
- Re‑examine whether the medical conditions satisfy the statute and any applicable policy statements.

Still, by not disturbing the assumption for present purposes, the panel tacitly acknowledges that:

Terminal illness and severe chronic conditions in elderly prisoners regularly qualify as “extraordinary and compelling,”
Leaving § 3553(a) as the typical decisive battleground in such motions.

IV. Key Legal Concepts Explained

A. Compassionate Release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)

Compassionate release permits a court to reduce a lawfully imposed sentence if:

Extraordinary and compelling reasons. The defendant shows extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a reduction (e.g., serious illness, extreme age‑related decline, family circumstances, or other extraordinary hardships); and
§ 3553(a) factors support reduction. The court determines that a reduction is consistent with the purposes of sentencing—punishment, deterrence, public safety, and rehabilitation—and that the resulting sentence is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary.”

After the First Step Act, defendants may file motions directly (after exhausting administrative remedies), rather than relying solely on the BOP.

B. The § 3553(a) Sentencing Factors

Key § 3553(a) factors implicated in this case include:

§ 3553(a)(1): Nature and circumstances of the offense; history and characteristics of the defendant.
§ 3553(a)(2): The need for the sentence imposed to:
- Reflect the seriousness of the offense;
- Promote respect for the law;
- Provide just punishment;
- Afford adequate deterrence;
- Protect the public from further crimes;
- Provide the defendant with needed training, medical care, or other correctional treatment.
§ 3553(a)’s parsimony principle: The sentence must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve these purposes.

In compassionate release, courts essentially re‑examine these factors in light of:

Time already served;
Post‑sentencing conduct (good or bad);
Current risk to the public.

C. Abuse of Discretion

A court abuses its discretion when:

It misapplies the law;
Bases its decision on clearly erroneous facts; or
Fails to consider relevant factors (or considers tangential, improper ones).

In this case, abuse of discretion was found because:

The District Court relied on a materially incorrect “time served” figure; and
Omitted consideration (or acknowledgment) of important rehabilitation evidence.

D. Harmless Error

Harmless error doctrine recognizes that not every mistake requires reversal. For non‑constitutional errors in sentencing:

The error is harmless if it is “highly probable” it did not affect the outcome;
The appellate court must have a “sure conviction” that the same decision would have been reached absent the error.

The burden rests with the party defending the judgment (typically the government) to show harmlessness. In close cases where the record is thin or ambiguous—as here—the error will not be treated as harmless.

E. Post‑Sentencing Rehabilitation

Post‑sentencing rehabilitation refers to efforts by the defendant after sentencing to:

Improve education or job skills;
Address substance abuse or mental health issues;
Maintain a clean disciplinary record;
Develop positive institutional relationships and community ties;
Plan for successful reentry.

Pepper and later cases establish that such evidence:

Is not just “nice to have,” but often “highly relevant” under § 3553(a);
Can justify reduced sentences or earlier release where public‑safety risks diminish and rehabilitation is genuinely demonstrated.

V. Conclusion: Significance of United States v. Piaquadio

Although designated non‑precedential, United States v. Piaquadio adds important texture to the Third Circuit’s compassionate‑release jurisprudence. It clarifies that:

Accuracy is mandatory in time‑served assessments. A district court’s § 3553(a) analysis cannot rest on a fundamental misstatement of how much of a sentence has been served. Doing so is an abuse of discretion, not a harmless technicality.
Post‑sentencing mitigation must be confronted. When a defendant marshals substantial evidence of rehabilitation, reduced risk, and a coherent release plan, the court must at least acknowledge and consider it. Silence on such evidence, in the face of clear Supreme Court and Third Circuit guidance, is error.
Harmless error has real limits in sparse records. The panel’s refusal to deem the errors harmless—paired with Judge Phipps’s more forgiving view—illustrates that appellate outcomes may hinge on how fully a district court explains its reasoning and how thoroughly the record connects mitigation (or risks) to the § 3553(a) factors.
§ 3553(a) remains the central battlefield in compassionate release. Even when “extraordinary and compelling reasons” may exist, release is not automatic. The District Court on remand must decide whether ten years of imprisonment, coupled with serious health issues and rehabilitation, is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” in light of the seriousness of opioid‑related offending and public‑safety concerns.

Going forward, this opinion serves as a detailed reminder to district judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel that compassionate‑release decisions are not mere administrative adjustments. They demand:

Accurate factual grounding,
Transparent weighing of all relevant § 3553(a) factors, and
Serious engagement with the defendant’s post‑sentencing trajectory.

On remand, the District Court will have to confront these requirements directly, providing a fuller and factually correct explanation of whether continued incarceration for Piaquadio remains necessary to serve the purposes of federal sentencing law.