United States v. Perez: The Fourth Circuit Re-draws the Fact–Law Line for “Special Territorial Jurisdiction”

1. Introduction

United States v. Jesse Fernando Perez, No. 24-4039 (4th Cir. Aug. 12 2025), is the first published federal appellate decision squarely holding that the status of a place as falling within the “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” (18 U.S.C. § 7) is a pure question of law for the court, informed by legislative rather than adjudicative facts, while the locus of the crime itself remains a question for the fact-finder.

The ruling resolves a long-smoldering split among district courts (and a budding split among circuits) over who must decide the federal territorial predicate that appears in many criminal statutes such as §§ 7, 1111(b), 2111, 924(c), 1466A, and the Major Crimes Act. The panel (Quattlebaum, Wynn, Harris, JJ.) vacated a child-pornography conviction obtained in a bench trial and remanded because the district court employed the wrong legal standard when it took judicial notice of the prison’s jurisdictional status.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding 1 – Allocation of Roles:
  • The fact-finder (jury or judge in a bench trial) decides “where” the defendant acted.
  • The court decides “what” that place means in jurisdictional terms—i.e., whether it is within the federal “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction.”
• Holding 2 – Correct Test: The district court must apply the three-part test of § 7(3)—federal acquisition, state consent/cession, and federal acceptance—not the “practical dominion” gloss from United States v. Erdos.
• Disposition: Conviction vacated; case remanded for the district court to reassess FCI Petersburg’s status under the proper legal standard with the power to take judicial notice of relevant legislative facts.
• Concurrences/Dissent:
  • Judge Wynn concurred, stressing that the ruling is tenable only because the trial was to the court; a jury trial might raise Sixth-Amendment concerns.
  • Judge Harris concurred in part/dissented in part, arguing that facts showing territorial jurisdiction are adjudicative and must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; she would reverse outright.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Taylor v. United States, 579 U.S. 301 (2016) – distinguished between the meaning of the Hobbs-Act commerce element (law) and the facts showing an impact on commerce (jury). The majority analogised the “special territorial jurisdiction” element to Taylor’s commerce element.
2. Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890) – early recognition that courts may notice the extent of federal territorial jurisdiction from public acts of government.
3. United States v. Beyle, 782 F.3d 159 (4th Cir. 2015) – court treated whether waters were “high seas” as a legal question; provides intra-circuit support for bifurcation.
4. United States v. Lovely, 319 F.2d 673 (4th Cir. 1963) – court noticed deeds and cession statutes to decide jurisdiction as matter of law.
5. United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2013); Love (8th Cir. 2021); Silvers (6th Cir. 2025) – sister-circuit cases adopting the same legislative-fact approach.
6. United States v. Bello, 194 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 1999) – opposite view; relied on by Judge Harris.
7. United States v. Erdos, 474 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1973) – “practical usage and dominion” test; held insufficient here.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textual & Structural Analysis – § 1466A expressly requires one of five jurisdictional “circumstances.” The panel disentangled the circumstance in § (d)(5) and held that it incorporates the statutory definition in § 7(3).
2. Constitutional Framework – After Apprendi and Torres, every element must be found beyond a reasonable doubt, but the element may itself embed a legal sub-question. The panel analogised to Taylor.
3. Legislative vs. Adjudicative Facts – Drawing on Fed. R. Evid. 201 and scholarship, the majority characterised deeds, condemnation orders, state-cession statutes, etc. as universally-applicable “legislative facts” that courts may notice even in criminal cases.
4. Standard Misapplied Below – The district court used Erdos’ efficiency-based test and thereby bypassed the acceptance-of-jurisdiction prong codified in 40 U.S.C. § 3112; that analytical misstep required vacatur.
5. Remedial Choice – Rather than notice hundreds of new documents on appeal, the panel remanded for the district court to decide, preserving the defendant’s opportunity to respond.

3.3 Likely Impact

• Trial Practice – Prosecutors in the Fourth Circuit may now forego live proof of § 7(3) facts, instead submitting certified deeds, state-cession statutes, etc. with a judicial-notice motion. Defense counsel must be prepared to attack noticeability and insist on completeness of the § 7(3) record.
• Bench vs. Jury Trials – Judge Wynn’s concurrence foreshadows possible limits: In jury trials, sequencing concerns may require the judge to decide territorial status before the jury retires.
• National Split Deepens – By siding with the 2d/6th/8th Circuits and against the 1st, the decision sharpens an intercircuit division that may attract Supreme Court review, especially because the issue intersects with Apprendi/Torres.
• Substantive Reach – Scores of federal statutes hinge on § 7(3) jurisdiction (crimes committed on military bases, VA hospitals, National Parks, etc.). The case provides a blueprint for litigating (or relitigating) jurisdictional challenges in those contexts.
• Administrative Guidance – Judge Wynn urged the Executive Branch to confirm or cure potential lapses in land-cession documentation for all federal prisons; agencies may embark on title-clean-up projects.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

5. Conclusion

Perez sets a new analytical template for federal criminal cases implicating territorial jurisdiction. By classifying the jurisdictional status of a location as a legal question and the attendant historical facts as legislative, the Fourth Circuit:

• aligns itself with several sister circuits and against the First Circuit’s Bello approach,
• clarifies that § 7(3), not the looser Erdos doctrine, governs domestic land-status inquiries, and
• signals to trial courts that the safest sequencing is to decide territorial status before submitting the case to a jury.

Whether the Supreme Court will take up the split—and whether Congress or the Executive will act to shore up jurisdictional records for federal enclaves—remains to be seen. For now, United States v. Perez will shape indictments and trial strategy wherever a crime scene’s federal character is open to challenge.