United States v. Pancholi: Sixth Circuit Declares Bad-Faith Is NOT Required to Exclude Surprise Defense Witnesses

Introduction

In United States v. Yogesh K. Pancholi, No. 24-1127 (Aug. 5, 2025), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the scope of a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to present witnesses in his favor when he violates a pre-trial discovery order. The case arose from a multimillion-dollar Medicare fraud scheme perpetrated by defendant-appellant Yogesh Pancholi, who was convicted after a contentious two-week jury trial in the Eastern District of Michigan. On appeal, Pancholi raised three constitutional claims:

Exclusion of a surprise, unindicted co-conspirator (Leena Shah) as a defense witness violated the Sixth Amendment Compulsory Process Clause.
Denial of lead counsel’s mid-trial motion to withdraw violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.
Exclusion of the defendant from an in-chambers conference violated his due-process right to be present at critical stages.

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the convictions, but—significantly—clarified an unsettled question under Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988): a district court may preclude a defense witness as a sanction for discovery violations even absent a finding that the violation was “willful” or in “bad faith,” provided the court engages in the Taylor balancing of interests.

Summary of the Judgment

Compulsory-Process Claim: The panel held that the district court’s exclusion of Shah’s testimony was constitutionally permissible. Borrowing from Taylor and its own precedents (Hamilton, Ferensic, Hardy), the court concluded that (i) Pancholi could easily have disclosed Shah; (ii) her late appearance would have caused significant delay; (iii) the government would be prejudiced; and (iv) Pancholi never proffered what exculpatory evidence Shah would supply. Importantly, the court expressly rejected the notion—embraced by some circuits—that a “willful” discovery violation is a prerequisite to excluding a defense witness.
Counsel-of-Choice Claim: Denial of defense counsel Anjali Prasad’s withdrawal motion was within the district court’s discretion because no total breakdown in communication occurred, the motion came late in trial, and withdrawal would have imperiled the court’s calendar.
Right-to-Presence Claim: Pancholi forfeited any complaint about being excluded from an in-chambers conference; under at least plain-error review he could not show prejudice.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) – Key Supreme Court precedent allowing exclusion of undisclosed defense witnesses as a sanction. Sixth Circuit extends Taylor by holding that bad faith is not a constitutional prerequisite to exclusion.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) – Establish the fundamental right to present a defense.
Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991) – Confirms that discovery sanctions can limit defense evidence.
Sixth Circuit trilogy: United States v. Hamilton, 128 F.3d 996 (1997); Ferensic v. Birkett, 501 F.3d 469 (2007); United States v. Hardy, 586 F.3d 1040 (2009) – Apply Taylor balancing; Pancholi synthesizes and clarifies these opinions.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006); Wheat, 486 U.S. 153 (1988) – Frame counsel-of-choice analysis.
Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730 (1987) – Defines the defendant’s right to be present.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s opinion follows a structured, issue-by-issue approach:

Compulsory Process. Applying Taylor’s “balancing” framework, the panel highlighted five factors: easy compliance opportunity, delay, presumption of suspicion surrounding 11th-hour witnesses, prejudice to prosecution, and indeterminate value of testimony. By emphasizing that willfulness is an important factor but not a prerequisite, the court sided with the D.C., Tenth, and Eighth Circuits against the Second and Ninth. Additionally, citing Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982), it underscored that a defendant must at least articulate how excluded testimony is material and favorable.
Counsel of Choice. Evaluating the mid-trial withdrawal request under factors from Mack and Trevino, the court found no abuse of discretion: motion untimely, inquiry sufficient, no total communication breakdown, and potential delay outweighed defendant’s preference.
Right to Be Present. Because defense counsel consented to Pancholi’s absence and no objection was lodged, any challenge was forfeited; under plain-error analysis the defendant could not show prejudice.

Impact on Future Litigation

Discovery Enforcement in the Sixth Circuit. Trial judges can confidently use witness-exclusion sanctions without first finding that defense counsel acted in bad faith, so long as they conduct a Taylor-type balancing.
Strategic Considerations for Defense Counsel. Failure to list even a “maybe” witness now carries heightened risk; counsel should file broad, protective witness lists or seek leave to amend early.
Government & Judicial Efficiency. Prosecutors gain leverage to oppose late-breaking defense witnesses; courts may rely on Pancholi to protect dockets and jurors from avoidable delays.
Potential for Supreme Court Review. By aligning with one side of an acknowledged circuit split, Pancholi increases the likelihood of eventual Supreme Court clarification of Taylor.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Compulsory Process Clause: Part of the Sixth Amendment guaranteeing a defendant’s right to obtain and present witnesses. It is powerful but not absolute; courts may limit it through reasonable evidentiary or procedural rules.
Discovery Orders: Pre-trial directives requiring each side to disclose certain evidence or witness lists. Violations can be sanctioned by exclusion of evidence or witnesses.
Willfulness vs. Bad Faith: “Willful” means the party intentionally violated the rule; “bad faith” implies a motive to gain unfair tactical advantage. Pancholi holds that even negligent or inadvertent violations can justify exclusion if Taylor factors weigh in favor.
Structural Error vs. Plain Error: Structural errors always require reversal; plain errors are unobjected-to mistakes that an appellate court corrects only if they are obvious and affect substantial rights. Pancholi clarifies that right-to-presence violations, while serious, are not automatically structural.
Counsel-of-Choice vs. Effective Assistance: A rich defendant ordinarily may hire whomever he wants, but courts can deny substitution requests that derail proceedings. This is distinct from the Sixth Amendment guarantee that appointed or retained counsel perform effectively.

Conclusion

United States v. Pancholi fortifies trial-court discretion within the Sixth Circuit by confirming that bad faith is not a constitutional prerequisite for excluding undisclosed defense witnesses. The ruling harmonizes (and resolves tension among) earlier Sixth Circuit panels and squarely positions the Circuit on one side of an existing national split. Beyond its precedential value on the Compulsory Process Clause, the opinion reiterates pragmatic principles governing attorney withdrawal and defendant presence—underscoring that timing, courtroom efficiency, and tactical fairness remain central to criminal procedure. Practitioners must heed the decision’s warning: late-stage surprises come with real peril. Ultimately, Pancholi underscores the judiciary’s commitment to balancing defendants’ fundamental rights against the imperatives of orderly, truthful, and efficient trials.