United States v. Owens – Post-Esteras Limits on § 3553(a)(2)(A) in Supervised-Release Revocations and the Boundaries of Plain-Error Review

Introduction

United States v. Retsyn Deshawn Owens, No. 24-3675 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 2025), marks the Sixth Circuit’s first published (albeit “not recommended for publication”) opinion applying the Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Esteras v. United States. The case explores whether a district court’s pre-Esteras consideration of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) when revoking supervised release constitutes reversible plain error.

Mr. Owens, a repeat drug-trafficking offender, challenged (1) the procedural reasonableness of a twelve-month, below-Guidelines federal sentence that runs consecutively to a four-to-six-year Ohio sentence, and (2) its substantive reasonableness. The Sixth Circuit, per Judge Bloomekatz, affirmed, holding that any reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A) was plain but did not affect substantial rights, and that a consecutive, below-Guidelines term was not substantively unreasonable.

Summary of the Judgment

• Procedural challenge: Owens alleged that the district court impermissibly weighed the “seriousness / respect-for-law / just-punishment” factor of § 3553(a)(2)(A) at his revocation hearing, contrary to Esteras, which excludes that factor under § 3583(e)(3).
• Plain-error framework applied: The panel assumed the error, found it “plain” post-Esteras, but concluded it did not affect Owens’s substantial rights because deterrence, not punishment, drove the sentence.
• Substantive challenge: Owens contended the district court gave no adequate reason for making the federal term consecutive. The court disagreed, citing the judge’s stated deterrence concerns, the defendant’s extensive criminal history, and the modest (half-Guidelines) length of the federal sentence.
• Holding: Sentence affirmed; no procedural or substantive unreasonableness.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

1. Esteras v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2031 (2025)
   The Supreme Court held that § 3583(c) deliberately omits § 3553(a)(2)(A) from the factors governing revocation, so district courts “cannot consider” it. Owens is the first Sixth Circuit case to apply this rule to a pre-Esteras sentencing.
2. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)
   The foundational plain-error test: error, plainness, effect on substantial rights, and the discretion to remedy.
3. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1997)
   Clarified that an error can be “plain” at the time of appeal even if not plain at sentencing, extending to changes in law.
4. Sixth Circuit Sentencing Cases: United States v. Price, 901 F.3d 746 (2018) (revocation sentences reviewed like initial sentences); United States v. Sears, 32 F.4th 569 (2022) (need for rationale for consecutive terms); United States v. Robinson, 778 F.3d 515 (2015) (substantive reasonableness standard).
5. Recently vacated circuit precedent: United States v. Esteras, 88 F.4th 1163 (6th Cir. 2023), which had permitted consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A) until the Supreme Court overturned it. Owens demonstrates how vacated circuit authority is displaced immediately.

2. Court’s Legal Reasoning

• Step 1 – Identify (Assumed) Error: The panel accepted, arguendo, that the district judge touched on § 3553(a)(2)(A).
• Step 2 – Plainness: Because Esteras is controlling law as of the appeal, the error is “plain” under Johnson.
• Step 3 – Substantial-Rights Inquiry: The record showed deterrence motives (permissible § 3553(a)(2)(B)&(C)), not punishment motives. Hence, Owens failed to show that the error increased his sentence.
• Step 4 – Discretionary Prong (not reached): Lacking prejudice, the court declined to correct.
• Substantive Review: The panel applied the abuse-of-discretion standard. Emphasis on deterrence, criminal history, and a 50% downward variance justified consecutiveness. The rationale was “generally clear” under Sears.

3. Impact of the Judgment

Although unpublished, Owens is instructive on several fronts:

• Immediate post-Esteras landscape: District courts must excise § 3553(a)(2)(A) from revocation calculus. Owens confirms that appellate courts will treat any contrary reliance as “plain error.”
• Substantial-rights bar is high: Defendants must affirmatively show that inclusion of § 3553(a)(2)(A) caused a longer term. Mere mention will not suffice.
• Consecutive vs. concurrent sentences: Owens underscores that deterrence and criminal history constitute valid reasons for consecutiveness, especially when the federal term is below Guidelines.
• Litigation strategy: Defense counsel should (i) object contemporaneously if the court cites § 3553(a)(2)(A) and (ii) build a record linking any mention directly to the length of sentence to satisfy Olano’s third prong.
• Judicial practice: Judges sentencing on revocation should create clear records distinguishing deterrence/public-protection considerations from punishment considerations to avoid reversible error.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Conclusion

United States v. Owens crystallizes the Sixth Circuit’s approach to revocation sentencing after the Supreme Court’s watershed decision in Esteras. The panel held that while considering § 3553(a)(2)(A) is now clearly forbidden, reversal requires a demonstration that such consideration actually harmed the defendant. Owens thus establishes two complementary propositions:

1. Post-Esteras, any reference to punishment-focused § 3553(a)(2)(A) at a revocation hearing is a plain error.
2. That error will not warrant reversal absent proof that it lengthened the sentence, reinforcing a stringent application of Olano’s substantial-rights prong.

Practitioners must remain vigilant: district courts should carefully articulate deterrence-based justifications, and defense counsel must build records to show prejudice if impermissible factors surface. Owens therefore serves as an essential guidepost in navigating the post-Esteras sentencing terrain and delineates the outer limits of appellate relief under plain-error review.