United States v. Ninsawat: Internet as a Facility of Interstate Commerce in Federal Child Exploitation Statutes

Introduction

United States v. Nopphadon Ninsawat (6th Cir. Apr. 28, 2025) addresses the scope of federal power to prosecute online sexual exploitation and child pornography. Ninsawat, a 31-year-old Michigan resident, exchanged sexually explicit messages and images with a 15-year-old girl (“MV-1”) over Snapchat and Instagram. Charged with multiple counts under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251(a)/(e), 2422(b) and 2252A(a)(2)/(b)(1), he challenged:

Whether his conduct sufficiently implicated interstate commerce for federal jurisdiction;
The denial of a Franks hearing to attack the warrant affidavit;
The sufficiency of evidence to prove “entice,” “persuade,” or “coerce” a minor;
The constitutionality of a 180-month mandatory minimum sentence under the Eighth Amendment.

The Sixth Circuit rejected each argument, affirming the convictions and clarifying key legal principles concerning the use of the internet as a “means or facility of interstate commerce” and the interpretation of solicitation verbs in child exploitation statutes.

Summary of the Judgment

A jury found Ninsawat guilty on eight counts: three counts each of sexual exploitation of a child (§ 2251(a)) and coercion/enticement (§ 2422(b)), plus two counts of receipt of child pornography (§ 2252A(a)(2)), and charges for attempted violations. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit held:

The use of Instagram and Snapchat—both Internet-based platforms—satisfied the “interstate commerce” element;
Citing Lopez and Allen, criminalizing online child exploitation via internet channels and instrumentalities falls within Congress’s Commerce Clause power;
No Franks hearing was required because the affidavit’s statements about retained images and “Vanish Mode” were neither false nor materially omitted;
Sufficient evidence supported convictions under §§ 2251(a) and 2422(b): repeated requests for sexually explicit photos of MV-1 constituted “enticement” within statutory meaning;
The 180-month mandatory minimum did not violate the Eighth Amendment.

Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of pretrial motions and Ninsawat’s sentence.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995): Established the “channels” test for Commerce Clause authority.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005): Confirmed Congress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
United States v. Allen, 86 F.4th 295 (6th Cir. 2023): Held that phones and internet services are “instrumentalities” of interstate commerce.
United States v. Clark, 24 F.4th 565 (6th Cir. 2022) & Napier, 787 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2015): Recognized the internet as a “means or facility” of interstate commerce in child-pornography cases.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978): Set the standard for challenging a warrant affidavit based on false statements or omissions.
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979): Defined the de novo sufficiency‐of‐evidence review.
United States v. Streett, 83 F.4th 842 (10th Cir. 2023): Construed “persuade” under § 2251(a), though the Sixth Circuit noted other solicitation verbs (“entice,” “use”) do not require overcoming a minor’s will.
United States v. Hart, 635 F.3d 850 (6th Cir. 2011): Upheld the 180-month mandatory minimum under § 2251(e) against Eighth Amendment challenge.

2. Legal Reasoning

A. Interstate Commerce Element
The court applied a twofold Commerce Clause analysis. First, it held that the Internet is a “channel” of interstate commerce under Lopez; second, it reaffirmed that the Internet and telephones are “instrumentalities” under Allen. Relying on Clark and Napier, identical statutory language (“means or facility of interstate commerce”) is consistently interpreted to include online platforms. Therefore, sending and receiving images via Snapchat and Instagram satisfied the interstate‐commerce requirement of §§ 2251(a), 2422(b), and 2252A(a)(2).

B. Franks Hearing
Franks requires a defendant to make a substantial preliminary showing that an affidavit contains materially false statements or omissions made knowingly or recklessly, and that the error was necessary to the probable cause finding. Ninsawat argued that “Vanish Mode” precluded the existence of stored images. The court found that: (1) the affidavit accurately recited witness testimony and Instagram messages demonstrating at least 48 saved images; (2) the agent’s belief in recoverable deleted files is supported by experience; (3) quoting “Disappearing Message” alerts a magistrate to Vanish Mode. No hearing was required.

C. Sufficiency of Evidence under §§ 2251(a) & 2422(b)
To sustain convictions for “sexual exploitation” (§ 2251(a)) or “coercion and enticement” (§ 2422(b)), the government must prove that the defendant “employed, used, persuaded, induced, enticed, or coerced” a minor to produce sexually explicit imagery. While the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that some verbs (e.g., “coerce”) may require overcoming a will, other verbs—“entice” and “use”—do not. Soliciting or inviting a minor to create images suffices. Trial evidence showed repeated graphic requests for photos and videos of MV-1 masturbating and exposing herself. MV-1 resisted at times but ultimately complied. A rational juror could infer solicitation/enticement and complete § 2251(a) and § 2422(b) elements.

D. Eighth Amendment Challenge
Mandatory minimum sentences—even severe ones—are not “unusual.” Harmelin v. Michigan upholds historically employed strict penalties. Hart foreclosed an Eighth Amendment challenge to § 2251(e)’s 180-month floor. Ninsawat’s sentence remains constitutional.

3. Impact

Reaffirms that Internet‐based social media are within federal child exploitation statutes’ interstate commerce nexus.
Confirms that a Franks hearing will be denied absent a strong preliminary showing of intentional or reckless falsehoods or omissions.
Clarifies that “entice” and “use” in §§ 2251(a), 2422(b) cover mere solicitations of minors without proof of coercion.
Strengthens federal prosecutorial tools against online sexual predators who exploit “disappearing message” features.
Authorizes enforceable 180‐month mandatory minimums under § 2251(e) without Eighth Amendment infirmities.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Commerce Clause: Empowers Congress to regulate channels (e.g., highways, Internet) and instrumentalities (e.g., phones) of interstate commerce.
Franks Hearing: A post‐search proceeding to challenge warrant affidavits for false statements or omissions.
Probable Cause: A reasonable ground for believing a search will yield evidence of a crime.
“Vanish Mode”: An Instagram feature where messages disappear after viewing, but metadata or screenshots can persist.
Solicitation Verbs: “Entice” or “use” a minor to produce sexual images requires only a request or invitation—not necessarily physical force.
Mandatory Minimum: A legislatively prescribed minimum prison term that a judge must impose when statutory criteria are met.

Conclusion

United States v. Ninsawat firmly establishes that online platforms are valid “means or facilities of interstate commerce” for federal child exploitation laws. It limits the scope of Franks challenges, confirms that mere solicitations of minors suffice for §§ 2251(a) and 2422(b), and upholds stringent mandatory minimum sentences. This decision strengthens federal authority to prosecute online sexual predators and clarifies critical interpretive questions for future cases involving digital child exploitation.