United States v. Myrick: When a Hearing Does NOT End Speedy-Trial Tolling under § 3161(h)(1)(D)–(H)

Introduction

United States v. Melvin Leon Myrick, No. 23-4768 (4th Cir. Aug. 13, 2025), offers the Fourth Circuit’s most detailed discussion in more than two decades of the interaction between pre-trial motion practice and the Speedy Trial Act (“STA”), 18 U.S.C. § 3161. The appeal arose from a high-speed chase in Colonial Heights, Virginia, that ended with the abandonment of a rental car containing large quantities of methamphetamine, cocaine, paraphernalia, and three loaded firearms.

The district court (Hudson, S.D.J.) denied a day-of-trial motion to dismiss based on alleged STA violations; convicted Myrick was then sentenced to 270 months. On appeal Myrick challenged:

The STA ruling;
Two Guideline determinations (reckless-endangerment enhancement and criminal-history points for state contempt convictions);
The treatment of “actual” methamphetamine at sentencing; and
The sufficiency of the evidence on the § 924(c) firearms count.

Judge Niemeyer, writing for a unanimous panel (Agee & Thacker, JJ.), affirmed across the board. The precedential value of the opinion lies primarily in its clarification that statements from the bench indicating an intended ruling do not constitute a “disposition” that restarts the STA clock; the clock remains tolled until the court either (i) formally rules in open court or (ii) issues its written order—and the court may still exclude up to 30 additional “under-advisement” days under § 3161(h)(1)(H).

Summary of the Judgment

Speedy Trial Act. The district court correctly excluded 62 days—the entire period from the filing of Myrick’s two suppression motions (Dec. 9, 2022) until the written order denying them (Feb. 9, 2023)—because the motions remained “under advisement.” Consequently only 69 non-excludable days elapsed before trial, well inside the 70-day limit. A superseding indictment did not reset the clock for the original drug charge, but it did start a new 70-day period for the two newly added firearms charges, which were tried barely one month later.
Sentencing. The panel upheld (1) a § 3C1.2 reckless-endangerment enhancement based on a 100-mph police chase in a 35-mph zone; (2) two criminal-history points for six months of “time served” on Virginia contempt convictions; and (3) use of the “actual methamphetamine” guideline table. The court also rejected Myrick’s policy variance request challenging the 10-to-1 purity differential.
Firearms Sufficiency. Evidence of three loaded, easily accessible guns in close proximity to $5,000 of narcotics and scales was adequate for a rational jury to find possession “in furtherance” of drug trafficking under § 924(c).

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006) – re-affirmed that STA serves both defendant and public interests and cannot be prospectively waived. Zedner underpins the panel’s refusal to credit any implicit waiver by defense counsel at trial.
United States v. Tinklenberg, 563 U.S. 647 (2011) – referenced for the rule that filing any pre-trial motion stops the clock “irrespective of whether it actually causes delay.” Myrick uses Tinklenberg to justify tolling from filing to written order.
United States v. Parker, 30 F.3d 542 (4th Cir. 1994) & United States v. Stoudenmire, 74 F.3d 60 (4th Cir. 1996) – provide the Circuit’s earlier framework: time is excluded “through the conclusion of the hearing or other prompt disposition,” plus up to 30 days under advisement. Myrick clarifies the meaning of “other prompt disposition.”
United States v. Young, 528 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2008); Sylvester v. United States, 868 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Lattany, 982 F.2d 866 (3d Cir. 1992) – employed to hold that a superseding indictment does not restart the STA clock for previously charged offenses but does for genuinely new counts.
United States v. Burnley, 988 F.3d 184 (4th Cir. 2021) & United States v. Shivers, 56 F.4th 320 (4th Cir. 2022) – relied on in affirming the reckless-endangerment enhancement.
United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701 (4th Cir. 2002) & United States v. Moore, 769 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2014) – provide the “nexus” factors for § 924(c) firearms findings.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Speedy-Trial Calculation.

Start date: Oct. 14, 2022 (initial appearance).
Total calendar days to trial: 159.
Excludable blocks:
- Substitution/continuance motions (Nov. 7–28) – 21 days.
- Suppression motions (Dec. 9 – Feb. 9) – 62 days:
  - No “final disposition” at the Jan. 24 hearing; judge expressly “took under advisement.”
  - Written order issued within the automatic 30-day advisory window (Stoudenmire).
- Motions in limine (Mar. 10–17) – 7 days.
159 − (21 + 62 + 7) = 69 non-excluded days ⇒ no STA violation.

b. Superseding Indictment. The panel analogized § 3161(h)(5) (which governs dismissals/re-filings) to superseding indictments, adopting the unanimous view of other circuits: the clock continues for original counts, but new counts receive their own 70-day period. This maintains statutory symmetry and precludes tactical resetting by prosecutors.

c. Sentencing Issues.

§ 3C1.2 Reckless Endangerment: 100-mph chase in a 35-mph zone, nighttime, residential setting, and eventual crash created a “substantial risk.” The court distinguished Burnley’s concern with ordinary car chases by emphasizing additional aggravating facts.
Criminal History (Contempt): State “time-served” sentence of 170+ days exceeds § 4A1.2 threshold (“at least 30 days”), even if concurrent with other holds; thus two points appropriate.
“Actual” Methamphetamine: Trial chemist testified to ≥100 g of pure meth; therefore base level 30 (§ 2D1.1(c)(5)) was mandatory. Panel also endorsed district court’s refusal to vary downward from the 10:1 purity ratio, noting the judge’s policy disagreement with defense counsel (“one is more lethal than the other”).

3. Impact of the Decision

The opinion will likely be cited in three contexts:

STA Motions Based on Suppression-Hearing Dynamics. Litigants may no longer rely on ambiguous bench comments to argue that a motion was “decided.” Unless the court expressly rules on the record or dockets a ruling, the “under-advisement” tolling survives—subject to the 30-day cap.
Superseding Indictments Strategy. Prosecutors in the Fourth Circuit now have binding authority that new counts reset the clock only for those new counts. Defense counsel, in turn, must parse separate clocks when filing STA motions.
Reckless-Endangerment & Contempt Calculations. The panel’s factual analysis provides a template for applying § 3C1.2 to high-speed chases and for counting state contempt convictions that result in “time served.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Other Prompt Disposition” (STA § 3161(h)(1)(D)). The clock restarts only when the court actually decides the motion—either orally (“Motion denied.”) or by written order. Expressing skepticism, “telegraphing,” or indicating a likely outcome is not enough.
30-Day “Under-Advisement” Period (§ 3161(h)(1)(H)). After arguments conclude, the judge may take up to 30 additional days to think and write before the clock resumes.
“Actual” Methamphetamine vs. Mixture. “Actual” refers to chemical purity. Because Guidelines rise steeply with purity, a small weight of pure meth can equal a much larger weight of a diluted mixture.
§ 3C1.2 Enhancement. Added when the defendant’s flight recklessly creates risk. Factors: speed, location, traffic conditions, crash, and officer/third-party safety.
Counting Contempt Convictions. Under § 4A1.2(c)(1), contempt normally doesn’t count toward criminal history unless (a) probation > 1 year, (b) incarceration ≥30 days, or (c) similar to the instant offense. “Time served” sentences meet the incarceration test if they exceed 30 days.

Conclusion

United States v. Myrick sharpens the Fourth Circuit’s Speedy Trial Act jurisprudence by drawing a bright line between judicial musings at a hearing and an actual ruling that stops tolling. The decision also harmonizes the Circuit with national consensus on superseding indictments and provides practical guidance on several Guideline issues. Going forward:

District judges should make explicit, on-the-record rulings—or clearly state that a matter is “under advisement”—to avoid STA ambiguity.
Counsel must calculate multiple STA clocks when superseding indictments add new charges.
High-speed chases in residential areas will almost invariably justify § 3C1.2 enhancements, and “time-served” sentences on contempt convictions will count toward criminal history when they exceed 30 days.

In sum, Myrick reinforces procedural clarity and offers a meticulous blueprint for STA computations—an area where a mere day’s miscalculation can collapse an entire prosecution.