United States v. Morrissette: Reaffirming the Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) After Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi

I. Introduction

United States v. Morrissette, No. 24-10353 (11th Cir. Dec. 3, 2025) (unpublished, per curiam), is a short but legally significant opinion in the continuing evolution of Second Amendment jurisprudence after District of Columbia v. Heller, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, and United States v. Rahimi. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit was instructed to reconsider its earlier affirmance of Raheem Morrissette’s felon-in-possession conviction in light of Rahimi. The panel ultimately reaffirmed Morrissette’s conviction and, more importantly, reaffirmed that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—the federal felon-in-possession statute—remains constitutional both on its face and as applied, at least within the Eleventh Circuit.

The opinion does not undertake an independent historical analysis under Bruen; instead, it relies heavily on the Eleventh Circuit’s prior published decisions—United States v. Rozier and the Dubois line of cases—and on the circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule. It also clarifies that a guilty plea does not bar a defendant from raising a pure constitutional challenge to the statute of conviction on appeal, following the Supreme Court’s decision in Class v. United States.

II. Background and Procedural History

A. Factual Background

The case arises from a routine traffic stop in the Southern District of Alabama:

A police officer observed Morrissette commit a traffic infraction and initiated a stop.
During the encounter, the officer smelled marijuana emanating from the vehicle.
A search of the vehicle uncovered marijuana and a pistol.
Morrissette had prior felony convictions, making him a prohibited person under federal law.

Based on these facts, Morrissette was charged with a single count of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

B. District Court Proceedings

Morrissette initially pleaded not guilty and filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. The centerpiece of his motion was a Second Amendment challenge:

He argued that § 922(g)(1)’s blanket prohibition on firearm possession by felons is unconstitutional on its face.
He also contended that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to him in particular.

The district court denied the motion to dismiss, rejecting his constitutional arguments. After losing that motion, Morrissette entered a guilty plea. The district court imposed a 57-month term of imprisonment.

C. Appeal and Supreme Court Remand

Morrissette appealed, pressing his facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges. The Eleventh Circuit initially affirmed his conviction in an unpublished decision. After the Supreme Court decided United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)—which addressed another subsection of § 922 (namely § 922(g)(8), the domestic-violence restraining-order provision)—the Supreme Court:

Vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s earlier judgment in Morrissette, and
Remanded the case “for further consideration in light of Rahimi.”

On remand, the Eleventh Circuit revisited the case, but concluded that neither Bruen nor Rahimi undermines its binding precedent upholding § 922(g)(1). The panel therefore once again affirmed Morrissette’s conviction.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

The panel’s reasoning can be succinctly summarized as follows:

Guilty plea did not waive the constitutional challenge. Although a guilty plea generally waives non-jurisdictional defects, under Class v. United States Morrissette’s plea did not waive a pure constitutional challenge to the statute of conviction. His Second Amendment arguments are therefore properly before the court.
Standard of review. The constitutionality of a federal statute is reviewed de novo (i.e., without deference).
Continued validity of § 922(g)(1). The panel holds that Morrissette’s facial and as-applied challenges to § 922(g)(1) fail under binding Eleventh Circuit precedent:
- United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010), held that § 922(g)(1) is a constitutional means of disarming felons, relying on Heller’s description of felon-in-possession bans as “presumptively lawful.”
- United States v. Dubois (Dubois III), 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025), held that neither Bruen nor Rahimi abrogated Rozier.
Prior-panel-precedent rule controls. Under United States v. White, a later panel of the Eleventh Circuit is bound by earlier published decisions unless overruled en banc or by the Supreme Court. Because Rozier and Dubois III remain intact, the panel is required to uphold § 922(g)(1).
Result. Morrissette’s conviction is affirmed; § 922(g)(1) remains valid within the circuit against both facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges grounded on Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi.

IV. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

A. District of Columbia v. Heller

Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), is the cornerstone of modern Second Amendment doctrine. The Court in Heller:

Recognized that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to keep and bear arms, unrelated to militia service.
Invalidated a District of Columbia ban on handgun possession in the home.
At the same time, emphasized that the right is “not unlimited” and expressly noted that “nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” labeling such restrictions “presumptively lawful regulatory measures.” (554 U.S. at 626–27 & n.26.)

The Eleventh Circuit, in Rozier and now in Morrissette, treats this “presumptively lawful” language as a strong endorsement of the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). The key move in Rozier—and reaffirmed here—is:

The Second Amendment right of a convicted felon “is not weighed in the same manner as that of a law-abiding citizen,” and statutes disqualifying felons from possessing firearms “under any and all circumstances do not offend the Second Amendment.”

B. N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen

In Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), the Supreme Court invalidated New York’s “proper cause” regime for obtaining a public carry license and articulated a new test for firearms regulations:

Courts first ask whether the conduct at issue falls within the text of the Second Amendment (e.g., keeping or bearing arms for self-defense).
If it does, the burden shifts to the government to show that its regulation is consistent with the “historical tradition that delimits the outer bounds” of that right.

Bruen rejected “means-end” scrutiny (like intermediate scrutiny) and insisted on a text-and-history approach. Still, the Court repeatedly described the right as belonging to “law-abiding, responsible citizens.”

In Dubois I, the Eleventh Circuit held that Bruen did not abrogate Rozier because:

Bruen did not purport to reconsider, limit, or reject Heller’s “presumptively lawful” language regarding felon disarmament; and
The Supreme Court continued to frame the Second Amendment right as belonging to “law-abiding” citizens.

Morrissette incorporates that reasoning implicitly by reaffirming that Dubois III, which in turn reaffirmed Rozier after Bruen, is still binding.

C. United States v. Rahimi

Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), reviewed § 922(g)(8), which bars firearm possession by persons subject to certain domestic-violence restraining orders. The Court:

Applied the Bruen text-and-history framework to determine whether historical tradition supports disarming individuals found by a court to pose a “credible threat” to an intimate partner or child.
Upheld § 922(g)(8) as constitutional, concluding that the government may disarm individuals who are adjudged dangerous in this way.
Significantly for current purposes, reaffirmed Heller’s description of “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill” as “presumptively lawful.” (602 U.S. at 699.)

After Rahimi, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded several cases, including Dubois I and Morrissette’s own appeal, prompting the Eleventh Circuit to reconsider whether its existing felon-in-possession doctrine remained sound.

In Dubois III, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that Rahimi “reinforced—not undermined—Rozier” because the only mention of felons in Rahimi was to repeat Heller’s “presumptively lawful” characterization. The Morrissette panel directly quotes that conclusion and follows it.

D. Eleventh Circuit Precedent: Rozier and Dubois

1. United States v. Rozier

In United States v. Rozier, 598 F.3d 768 (11th Cir. 2010), the Eleventh Circuit:

Read Heller to limit the Second Amendment to “law-abiding and qualified” individuals.
Treated felons as categorically excluded from that protection due to Heller’s “presumptively lawful” language.
Concluded that § 922(g)(1) is a “constitutional avenue to restrict the Second Amendment right of certain classes of people,” including convicted felons.

2. United States v. Dubois I–III

The Dubois saga is central to understanding Morrissette:

Dubois I, 94 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2024), held that a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) was controlled by Rozier, and that Bruen did not overrule or undermine Rozier.
The Supreme Court then vacated Dubois I and remanded after deciding Rahimi (Dubois II).
On remand, Dubois III, 139 F.4th 887 (11th Cir. 2025), concluded that Rahimi did not abrogate Rozier; rather, Rahimi reinforced the legitimacy of felon-in-possession bans.

Morrissette relies squarely on Rozier and Dubois III and invokes the prior-panel-precedent rule to treat those cases as binding.

E. Other Precedents: Brown, Class, Gruezo, and White

1. Guilty Pleas and Constitutional Challenges

United States v. Brown, 752 F.3d 1344 (11th Cir. 2014), stands for the usual rule that a valid guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings.
Class v. United States, 583 U.S. 174 (2018), creates an important exception: a guilty plea does not waive a defendant’s right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute of conviction on direct appeal, so long as the challenge does not contradict the terms of the indictment or the plea agreement.

The panel applies Class to hold that Morrissette’s guilty plea did not foreclose his Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1).

2. Standard of Review and Prior-Panel Precedent

United States v. Gruezo, 66 F.4th 1284 (11th Cir. 2023), is cited for the standard of review: the constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo.
United States v. White, 837 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 2016), states the prior-panel-precedent rule: a published panel decision is binding on all subsequent panels unless:
- overruled by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc, or
- abrogated by a “clearly on point” Supreme Court decision.

This rule is dispositive in Morrissette: because Rozier and Dubois III are binding and have not been clearly overruled or abrogated, the panel must—and does—follow them.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Issue Framing: Facial and As-Applied Challenges to § 922(g)(1)

Morrissette brings both:

A facial challenge, asserting that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional in all its applications (or at least in a substantial number of its applications relative to its legitimate sweep); and
An as-applied challenge, contending that the Second Amendment forbids applying § 922(g)(1) to him personally.

The panel does not analyze these two theories separately in depth. Instead, it treats them both as foreclosed by the broad reading of Rozier and Dubois III: felon-in-possession bans of the § 922(g)(1) sort are categorically constitutional under the binding interpretation of Heller.

B. The Role of the Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule

The linchpin of the opinion is the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule. The panel expressly invokes White, emphasizing:

“Our prior-panel-precedent rule requires us to follow Rozier and Dubois III because they have not been overruled by this Court sitting en banc or abrogated by the Supreme Court.”

That rule has two key features:

A later panel may not declare an earlier published panel decision “wrong” and refuse to follow it; intra-circuit vertical stare decisis is strict.
Even intervening Supreme Court decisions do not automatically free later panels from earlier circuit precedent unless the Supreme Court decision is “clearly inconsistent” or “clearly on point” such that it effectively abrogates the earlier circuit case.

Applying this framework, the panel notes:

Rozier squarely held that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional under the Second Amendment.
Dubois III specifically examined Bruen and Rahimi and concluded they did not abrogate Rozier.
Rahimi itself repeated the “presumptively lawful” description of felon-in-possession bans.

Hence, there is no basis—under the circuit’s own rules—to revisit the core holding that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to felons.

C. Treatment of Heller, Bruen, and Rahimi

The opinion reinforces a line of reading that has become characteristic in the Eleventh Circuit:

Heller is read not only as recognizing an individual right, but also as categorically excluding felons from the heartland of that right by describing bans on felons as “presumptively lawful.”
Bruen is viewed as:
- Setting out a text-and-history test for evaluating gun regulations within the Second Amendment’s scope; yet
- Retaining the notion that the protected right belongs to “law-abiding, responsible citizens,” which the Eleventh Circuit equates with the same limitation recognized in Heller.
Rahimi is interpreted as:
- Confirming that historically grounded disarmament of “dangerous” individuals is consistent with the Second Amendment; and
- Reaffirming Heller’s “presumptively lawful” statement about felon disarmament, thereby supporting—not undermining—Rozier.

The panel therefore does not re-engage in a fresh historical analysis under Bruen; it treats that work as already done and resolved at the circuit level by Rozier and Dubois III.

D. Resolution of Facial and As-Applied Challenges

The panel’s conclusion is brief but sweeping:

“We conclude that Morrissette’s facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) fail.”

The opinion’s logic implies:

Facial challenge: Since Rozier and Dubois III confirm that felons can be disarmed under § 922(g)(1) “under any and all circumstances” without violating the Second Amendment, a facial challenge is untenable within the Eleventh Circuit.
As-applied challenge: The panel treats Morrissette’s individual as-applied claim as foreclosed by the same categorical reasoning. In other words, once a defendant is a felon, there is no room within this circuit’s doctrine for arguing that he is a “non-dangerous” or “rehabilitated” felon whose individual circumstances make § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Facial vs. As-Applied Constitutional Challenges

Facial challenge:

Attacks the statute “on its face,” arguing that it is unconstitutional in all or most of its applications.
If successful, it can invalidate the statute broadly, not just for the particular defendant.

As-applied challenge:

Concedes that the statute may be valid in general, but claims that its application to this particular person or set of circumstances is unconstitutional.
If successful, the relief is usually limited to the specific individual or context.

In Morrissette, both types of challenges fail because existing Eleventh Circuit law treats § 922(g)(1) as valid in its core application to any person with a felony conviction.

B. “Presumptively Lawful” Regulations

When Heller described felon-in-possession laws as “presumptively lawful,” it left some theoretical room:

“Presumptively” suggests that in some hypothetical scenario a defendant might rebut the presumption and show unconstitutionality.
However, lower courts have differed in how much weight to give that word “presumptively.”

The Eleventh Circuit has taken a relatively strong view: it treats Heller’s language, reinforced by Rahimi, as effectively placing felon-in-possession bans outside the ambit of serious Second Amendment doubt, at least where the person has already been lawfully convicted of a felony. That is why Rozier could say that disqualifying felons “under any and all circumstances” does not offend the Second Amendment—a statement reaffirmed in substance by Morrissette.

C. The Prior-Panel-Precedent Rule

In many federal circuits, including the Eleventh, lower panels must follow earlier published decisions of the same circuit. This is an internal form of stare decisis. The rule means:

If Panel A decides a question of federal law in a published opinion, Panel B, coming later, is bound by that holding, even if Panel B thinks Panel A was mistaken.
Only the en banc court (all active judges sitting together) or the Supreme Court can effectively overturn that precedent.

This mechanism ensures stability and consistency in the circuit’s law, but it also means that even significant shifts in Supreme Court doctrine—like the movement from Heller to Bruen to Rahimi—do not automatically change circuit law unless the Supreme Court’s new rulings directly and clearly conflict with the circuit’s earlier decisions.

D. GVR (Grant–Vacate–Remand) and Its Limited Scope

The Supreme Court’s decision to:

Grant certiorari,
Vacate a lower court’s judgment, and
Remand for further consideration in light of a new decision

does not necessarily mean that the lower court must change its result. Instead, a GVR:

Requires the lower court to re-evaluate its prior decision in light of the new Supreme Court precedent.
Allows the lower court to reaffirm its decision if, after reconsideration, it concludes the result is still correct.

That is exactly what happens in Morrissette: the Eleventh Circuit reconsiders the case in light of Rahimi, but, referencing Dubois III, determines that Rahimi does not abrogate Rozier, and therefore the same result—affirmance—follows.

E. Guilty Pleas and Statutory Constitutionality (Class v. United States)

Traditionally, a defendant’s unconditional guilty plea waives most objections to the earlier stages of the case (e.g., suppression issues, defects in the indictment). Class carves out a critical exception:

A defendant can still argue that the statute under which he was convicted is itself unconstitutional.
This is possible because such a claim does not contradict the factual admissions in the plea, but instead challenges whether those admitted facts can legally result in a conviction at all.

In Morrissette, this allows the Eleventh Circuit to reach the Second Amendment issue even though Morrissette did not go to trial and did not enter a conditional plea reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.

VII. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Practical Impact in the Eleventh Circuit

For defendants in Alabama, Florida, and Georgia (the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdiction), Morrissette sends a clear message:

Facial challenges to § 922(g)(1) based on Bruen or Rahimi are foreclosed by binding circuit precedent.
As-applied challenges by felons—including those arguing non-violent history, long-ago convictions, or rehabilitation—face extremely long odds, as the circuit treats felons as a class that can be disarmed “under any and all circumstances.”
District courts within the circuit are obligated to follow Rozier, Dubois III, and now the reasoning in Morrissette when confronted with similar Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1).

B. Relationship to National Second Amendment Trends

At the national level, there is a developing debate over:

Whether felon-in-possession bans are categorically valid; or
Whether the Second Amendment permits at least some as-applied exceptions, especially for non-violent or long-ago felonies.

Some other circuits have entertained more nuanced, as-applied challenges under the Bruen framework, particularly focusing on whether there is a historical tradition of disarming persons based on dangerousness as opposed to felony status in the abstract. By contrast, the Eleventh Circuit is on the more categorical side:

It relies heavily on Heller’s “presumptively lawful” language, now re-endorsed in Rahimi.
It reads “law-abiding, responsible citizens” as a meaningful limitation that excludes all felons from the core of the right.
It emphasizes continuity and stability through its strict prior-panel-precedent rule.

C. Guidance for Defense and Government Counsel

For defense counsel:

Raising Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) in the Eleventh Circuit is largely a matter of issue preservation for potential Supreme Court review, not a likely path to relief in the lower courts.
Counsel should be aware that even a guilty plea will not bar them from preserving a pure constitutional argument under Class, as Morrissette did.

For prosecutors and district courts:

Morrissette confirms that Rozier and Dubois III remain the controlling law; references to Bruen and Rahimi will not require new historical-analogy hearings in § 922(g)(1) cases in this circuit.
The government need not litigate a full-blown Bruen historical record in every felon-in-possession case; reliance on existing precedent will suffice unless and until the Supreme Court directly revisits felon-in-possession bans.

D. Institutional Significance: Lower Court Fidelity to Supreme Court Dicta

Morrissette also illustrates how lower courts treat Supreme Court dicta and characterization of regulations as “presumptively lawful”:

Even though Heller did not directly adjudicate § 922(g)(1), its statement about felon-in-possession bans has been given near-dispositive weight in the Eleventh Circuit.
Rahimi’s repeat of that description further cements the lower court’s confidence that Supreme Court precedent is aligned with its approach.

The opinion is therefore a textbook example of hierarchical judicial restraint: the Eleventh Circuit does not view itself as free to explore new doctrinal territory regarding felons and firearms unless and until the Supreme Court speaks more directly to the issue.

VIII. Conclusion

United States v. Morrissette is a concise but consequential decision in the Eleventh Circuit’s Second Amendment landscape. On remand from the Supreme Court after Rahimi, the court:

Confirms that a defendant’s guilty plea does not waive a pure Second Amendment challenge to the statute of conviction under Class.
Reaffirms that § 922(g)(1), the federal felon-in-possession statute, is constitutional both on its face and as applied, relying on the binding authority of Rozier and Dubois III.
Holds that Bruen and Rahimi do not abrogate those precedents; indeed, Rahimi reinforces the “presumptively lawful” status of felon disarmament set out in Heller.
Demonstrates the power of the Eleventh Circuit’s prior-panel-precedent rule in stabilizing the law of the circuit, even amid significant national shifts in Second Amendment doctrine.

In the broader legal context, Morrissette underscores that, at least within the Eleventh Circuit, felon-in-possession prosecutions remain firmly on constitutional footing notwithstanding evolving debates about the scope of the Second Amendment. Any major shift in this area will almost certainly need to come from the Supreme Court itself or from an en banc reconsideration of Rozier.