United States v. Morgan: Patane Meets Abandonment – When Miranda-Defective Statements Can Extinguish Fourth-Amendment Privacy

Introduction

United States v. Steven George Morgan, No. 23-11114 (11th Cir. July 11, 2025), is a wide–ranging opinion that confronts the perennial intersection between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The court (Judge Newsom, joined by Judges Rosenbaum and Marcus; Judge Rosenbaum dissenting in part) affirmed Morgan’s convictions for cocaine smuggling and firearm possession after officers obtained incriminating data from a warrantless search of his LG cellphone. The pivotal appellate issue was whether Morgan’s disclaimer of ownership—elicited after he had invoked his Miranda rights—could be used to show that he “abandoned” the phone, thereby nullifying his expectation of privacy and rendering the warrantless search reasonable.

The panel held (1) a suspect’s voluntary statement—even if extracted in technical violation of Miranda—may still be used to prove Fourth-Amendment abandonment because Patane precludes suppression of physical fruits derived from such statements, and (2) the record showed no Fifth- or Fourth-Amendment error in admitting the phone’s contents. Judge Rosenbaum’s dissent castigates the majority for stretching Patane and casting aside long-standing rules against “flattery-of-hope” promises that undermine the Fifth Amendment.

Summary of the Judgment

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) – foundational warnings; violation conceded.
• United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) – plurality plus concurrence held that physical evidence deriving from unwarned but voluntary statements is admissible. Morgan extends Patane to statements obtained after invocation.
• California v. Ciraolo; Riley v. California – baseline on privacy in effects and cellphones.
• United States v. Ross (en banc, 11th Cir. 2020) & United States v. Green – “abandonment” doctrine framework.
• Harris v. New York, et al. – impeachment & public safety exceptions; illustrate non-testimonial uses of Miranda-defective statements.
• United States v. Lall; Beale; Hart – prior Eleventh-Circuit cases finding deception about consequences vitiates voluntariness; majority distinguishes, dissent relies.
• Simmons v. United States – invoked by dissent to avoid Fifth-Fourth Amendment “Catch-22”.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Objective Abandonment
   • A person relinquishes Fourth-Amendment protection when he “voluntarily discards, leaves behind, or explicitly disclaims” property. • Morgan twice told Agent Gaviria “only the iPhone is mine.” Under Hastamorir and Colbert, verbal disclaimers alone can establish abandonment.
   • Prior inconsistent claim (earlier saying both phones were his) did not render district court’s finding “clear error,” especially when Morgan explained initial claim as shock.
2. Using a Miranda-Defective Statement for Abandonment
   • The statement was indisputably elicited after Morgan had invoked his right to silence—hence a Miranda violation.
   • However, Patane teaches that Miranda is prophylactic; the Fifth Amendment itself is implicated only when statements are coerced.
   • Because Morgan’s disclaimer was “voluntary and uncoerced,” the government could rely on it for a non-testimonial, evidentiary purpose (establishing lack of privacy) even though it would be barred in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.
   • Routine-booking exception failed, but voluntariness saved the day.
3. Voluntariness Analysis
   • Gaviria’s assurance that she was not “asking questions about the case” was, at most, a misrepresentation of fact, not law; did not equate to promises of immunity.
   • No threats, promises of leniency, or misstatements of legal rights → statement voluntary under Farley and Castaneda.
4. Patane Applied
   • Physical fruits (cell-phone contents) derived from the voluntary statement are admissible.
   • Majority extends Patane beyond pre-warning contexts to post-invocation contexts.
5. Dissent’s Counter-Reasoning
   • Cites Bram-era “flattery of hope” doctrine and Eleventh-Circuit cases (Lall, Beale), arguing Gaviria’s implied promise that answer would not be used equals coercion.
   • Warns the majority’s rule forces suspects into a Simmons-style dilemma: claim property → incriminate; stay silent → lose privacy.

C. Practical Impact and Forward-Looking Consequences

• Broader Patane Footprint: Law-enforcement officers in the Eleventh Circuit can now use voluntary statements obtained even after a Miranda invocation to establish abandonment or other Fourth-Amendment doctrines (e.g., consent) so long as statements are not coerced.
• Investigative Strategy: Expect more “ownership” or “property claim” questions post-arrest; agencies must still avoid coercive tactics or promises that could render statements involuntary under Lall.
• Cell-Phone Searches: While Riley requires warrants for seized phones, Morgan illustrates an exception: if the suspect disclaims ownership, investigators may proceed without a warrant.
• Training Materials: Departments will likely update Miranda advisories and interrogation checklists, emphasizing the line between mere questioning and coercion.
• Litigation Forecast: Future defendants may challenge voluntariness with greater vigor; circuit splits may deepen over how far Patane stretches, teeing up potential Supreme Court review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Miranda Violation vs. Fifth-Amendment Violation: Miranda warnings are a judge-made “prophylactic” rule. Violating them bars use of the statement in the government’s case-in-chief, but not necessarily the physical evidence derived, unless the statement itself was coerced.
• Voluntary Statement: A statement is “voluntary” when the suspect’s will is not overborne—no threats, force, or promises of immunity.
• Fourth-Amendment Abandonment: If you tell police an item isn’t yours—or leave it in circumstances showing you don’t intend to reclaim it—you relinquish any expectation of privacy in it. Police then need no warrant to search it.
• Routine-Booking Exception: Basic biographical questions at intake (name, address) are exempt from Miranda. The majority refused to stretch this exception to second-round ownership questions.
• Patane Doctrine: Physical evidence obtained from voluntary but Miranda-defective statements generally admissible.
• Plain-Error Review: On appeal, unpreserved objections succeed only if (1) an error is obvious, (2) affects substantial rights, and (3) seriously impugns fairness of proceedings.

Conclusion

United States v. Morgan crystallises a significant doctrinal development: the Eleventh Circuit squarely holds that a voluntary but Miranda-defective statement may extinguish a defendant’s Fourth-Amendment privacy interest by proving abandonment, and the resulting physical evidence is fully admissible. The majority’s synthesis of Patane, abandonment precedent, and voluntariness analysis provides law-enforcement officers a clearer path (and defendants a new battleground) for searches without warrants when ownership is disclaimed.

The passionate dissent reminds practitioners that courts remain divided on when assurances cross the line into coercion, and it flags the peril of forcing defendants to choose between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Whether higher courts will refine or restrict Morgan’s extension of Patane remains to be seen, but for now, the decision marks a potent precedent in the Eleventh Circuit’s constitutional landscape.