United States v. Moore, Jr.: Broad Discretion in Upward Variances and the Limits of Generic Sentencing Statistics

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam opinion in United States v. Richard Eugene Moore, Jr., No. 25‑10433 (11th Cir. Dec. 18, 2025), affirming an above‑Guidelines sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment.

Although designated “Not for Publication” and decided on the non‑argument calendar, the opinion is a clear and detailed application of existing federal sentencing doctrine. It reinforces several important principles:

The broad discretion district courts enjoy in imposing upward variances from the Sentencing Guidelines when justified by the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.
The permissibility of relying on non‑conviction conduct—including conduct underlying prior arrests—to support an upward variance if that conduct is relevant to the defendant’s dangerousness, criminal history, and need for deterrence.
The limited probative value of generic statistical evidence to establish either:
- a lack of additional deterrent effect from longer sentences, or
- unwarranted sentencing disparities under § 3553(a)(6).

The case arises from Moore’s convictions for:

Possession with intent to distribute marijuana;
Possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug‑trafficking crime; and
Possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

The district court imposed a total sentence of 180 months—an upward variance of 49 months above the top of the advisory Guideline range. Moore appealed, arguing that the sentence was substantively unreasonable. The Eleventh Circuit rejected his arguments and affirmed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit held that Moore’s 180‑month sentence was not substantively unreasonable under the deferential abuse‑of‑discretion standard articulated in Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), and reaffirmed in United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc).

Key holdings include:

The district court properly considered the full range of § 3553(a) factors, even though it devoted most of its discussion to the nature and circumstances of the offense and Moore’s criminal history under § 3553(a)(1).
The court adequately addressed the extent of the upward variance and articulated a sufficiently compelling justification for the 49‑month increase above the top of the advisory Guideline range.
The district court could permissibly consider conduct underlying prior arrests—involving domestic violence and firearm threats—as part of Moore’s criminal history and dangerousness, consistent with United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022).
The court did not err in concluding that the Sentencing Guidelines, including the two‑level enhancement for reckless endangerment during flight under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2, did not fully capture the totality of Moore’s conduct, particularly because his flight actually caused harm rather than merely creating a risk.
The district court was not required to give the mitigating factors (acceptance of responsibility, difficult upbringing, trauma, and PTSD) the weight Moore preferred, as long as it considered them within the § 3553(a) framework.
Moore’s generic sentencing statistics, based on age, offense type, and sentence length, were insufficient to show:
- that his sentence was unnecessary for deterrence or protection of the public (§ 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C)), or
- that his sentence created unwarranted disparities (§ 3553(a)(6)), because such statistics do not provide an “apples‑to‑apples” comparison with similarly situated defendants.

Concluding that the district court acted well within its discretion given the “extreme danger” of Moore’s conduct and his “extensive criminal history,” the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 180‑month sentence.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Offense Conduct and Charges

The opinion itself provides only a high‑level description of the underlying conduct, but the key points are:

Moore possessed marijuana with intent to distribute.
He possessed a firearm in furtherance of this drug‑trafficking crime (a § 924(c) offense, carrying a mandatory consecutive term).
He possessed the firearm despite being a previously convicted felon (a § 922(g) offense).
In the course of fleeing law enforcement, Moore “recklessly create[d] a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person,” leading to a two‑level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. His conduct went beyond mere risk and “actually caused harm,” a fact the district court considered critical.

Additionally, the district court found that Moore’s criminal history included prior arrests involving domestic violence and shooting or threatening to shoot a firearm, which it viewed as powerful evidence of ongoing dangerousness.

B. Sentencing in the District Court

The key Guideline calculations and sentence are as follows:

Counts 1 & 3 (drug trafficking and felon‑in‑possession):
- Total offense level: 19
- Criminal History Category: V
- Advisory Guideline range: 57–71 months
Count 2 (firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking):
- Mandatory minimum term: 60 months, consecutive to the other counts

Thus, Moore’s total advisory range was:

Minimum: 57 + 60 = 117 months
Maximum: 71 + 60 = 131 months

The district court, however, concluded that the Guidelines understated the seriousness of Moore’s conduct and the danger he posed. Calling this a “very rare circumstance” in which an upward variance was warranted, the court imposed a total sentence of 180 months, i.e., 49 months above the top of the Guideline range.

C. The Appeal

On appeal, Moore did not challenge the procedural correctness of the sentence (e.g., Guideline calculations or the consideration of relevant information). Rather, he brought a substantive reasonableness challenge, contending that:

The district court overemphasized § 3553(a)(1) (nature of the offense and history/characteristics) and failed to adequately consider the other § 3553(a) factors.
The court failed to adequately consider and justify the extent of the upward variance from the Guidelines.
The court improperly relied on arrests that did not result in convictions.
The court effectively “double counted” his criminal conduct by varying upward for conduct already accounted for in the Guidelines, especially the § 3C1.2 enhancement.
The court undervalued mitigating evidence (acceptance of responsibility, difficult upbringing, trauma, PTSD).
The sentence was unnecessarily long for deterrence and protection of the public, and caused unwarranted disparities, as allegedly shown by statistical evidence comparing his sentence to national data.

The Eleventh Circuit addressed each contention and rejected all of them.

IV. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion is largely an application of well‑established sentencing precedent. The cited cases frame the analytical structure and provide the standards controlling appellate review.

A. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)

Gall is the foundational Supreme Court case establishing that sentences—whether inside or outside the Guideline range—are reviewed under a deferential abuse‑of‑discretion standard. The Eleventh Circuit quotes Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, for the proposition that appellate courts must examine the totality of the circumstances.

Gall also requires that when a court deviates from the Guidelines, it must:

Consider the extent of the deviation; and
Ensure that the justification is “sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.”

In Moore’s case, the Eleventh Circuit invoked this requirement when addressing his argument that the district court failed to adequately consider the extent of the upward variance. By pointing to the district court’s explicit acknowledgment—“The question is how far I vary up”—and its discussion of why Moore’s conduct warranted an upward variance, the panel concluded that Gall’s requirements were satisfied.

B. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)

Irey is the Eleventh Circuit’s leading en banc decision on substantive reasonableness review. It defines an abuse of discretion as occurring when a sentencing court:

Fails to give significant weight to a relevant factor that should have been accorded great weight;
Gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor; or
Commits a clear error of judgment in weighing the proper factors.

The Moore panel relies on Irey both:

To define what an abuse of discretion is; and
To emphasize that appellate courts will vacate a sentence only if they are left with a “definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors.”

This standard is central to the outcome. The panel essentially concludes that, at worst, reasonable minds might differ about the exact length of the sentence, but that is not enough to constitute an abuse of discretion under Irey.

C. United States v. Tome, 611 F.3d 1371 (11th Cir. 2010)

Tome is cited for the unremarkable but important point that the burden of showing unreasonableness rests on the party challenging the sentence—here, Moore. The appellate court does not re‑sentence; it evaluates whether the district court’s decision falls within a permissible “range of reasonable sentences” based on the facts.

D. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and Related Circuit Precedent

The opinion recites the key § 3553(a) factors, including:

The nature and circumstances of the offense;
The history and characteristics of the defendant;
The advisory Guideline range;
The need for the sentence imposed to:
- Reflect the seriousness of the offense;
- Promote respect for the law;
- Provide just punishment;
- Afford adequate deterrence;
- Protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
The need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among similarly situated defendants.

Several Eleventh Circuit cases flesh out how these factors are to be treated:

United States v. Rosales‑Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249 (11th Cir. 2015):
- Holds that district courts have discretion to give “great weight” to one factor over another.
- Supports the idea that the district court’s heavy focus on Moore’s dangerousness and criminal history under § 3553(a)(1) is permissible.
United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008):
- Warns that unjustified reliance on a single factor can signal unreasonableness.
- The Moore panel distinguishes this concern by emphasizing that the district court explicitly stated it considered “all” of the § 3553(a) factors and that they “each” applied.
United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823 (11th Cir. 2007):
- Holds that a district court need not explicitly discuss every factor as long as the record shows that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors.
- Also supports the principle that failure to explicitly discuss mitigating evidence does not automatically render a sentence unreasonable.
- In Moore, this undercuts his claim that his mitigating evidence (acceptance of responsibility, trauma, etc.) was ignored.

E. Sentencing Disparities and Statistics: Docampo and Mateo‑Espejo

Section 3553(a)(6) requires courts to consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct.”

The Eleventh Circuit invokes:

United States v. Docampo, 573 F.3d 1091 (11th Cir. 2009), which in turn cites
United States v. Mateo‑Espejo, 426 F.3d 508 (1st Cir. 2005).

The key formulation, repeated in Moore, is that a “well‑founded claim of disparity … assumes that apples are being compared to apples.” That is:

General, high‑level statistics about sentences in other cases or in national data sets, without individualized factual similarity, are insufficient to show unwarranted disparity.
The defendant must show that others are truly similarly situated—in offense conduct, criminal history, role, aggravating/mitigating circumstances, and so forth.

In Moore, this principle is used to reject his reliance on generic statistical data about defendants of similar age, offense type, and sentence length. Such statistics do not meaningfully identify “similarly situated” defendants.

F. Variances, Departures, and Criminal History: Rodriguez and Sanchez

The court notes that a district court has “wide discretion” to decide that the § 3553(a) factors justify a variance from the Guidelines. It cites:

United States v. Rodriguez, 628 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2010), abrogated on other grounds by Van Buren v. United States, 593 U.S. 374 (2021). Rodriguez confirms broad discretion to rely on § 3553(a) factors to vary upward or downward.
United States v. Sanchez, 586 F.3d 918 (11th Cir. 2009), which recognizes that a court may impose an upward variance if the Guideline range is insufficient in light of the defendant’s criminal history.

These precedents support the notion that Moore’s extensive criminal history—and particularly his pattern of violent, firearm‑related conduct—could justify a sentence above the advisory range.

G. Non‑Conviction Conduct: United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022)

Butler is critical to one of Moore’s core arguments. Butler holds that conduct which did not yield a conviction may nonetheless support an upward variance where it bears on:

The defendant’s history and characteristics;
The need to promote respect for the law;
The need for adequate deterrence; and
The need to protect the public.

Applying Butler, the panel finds it permissible for the district court to rely on conduct underlying Moore’s prior arrests—including domestic violence incidents and episodes involving the use or threatened use of a firearm—as evidence of his dangerousness and lack of respect for the law.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in Moore

The panel structures its analysis around Moore’s specific arguments. Each is rejected within the overarching framework of abuse‑of‑discretion review.

A. Alleged Overreliance on § 3553(a)(1)

Moore argued that the district court relied “almost exclusively” on § 3553(a)(1) (the nature and circumstances of the offense and his history and characteristics), and failed to meaningfully consider other factors such as deterrence, protection of the public, and avoidance of disparities.

The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, emphasizing:

The district court expressly stated that it had considered “all of the sentencing factors found at 18 U.S.C. Section 3553” and that “each one … applies and then some given the kind of conduct that we’re dealing with.”
The court explicitly referenced Moore’s “lack of respect for the law,” a consideration tied to § 3553(a)(2)(A) (need for the sentence to promote respect for the law).
Although the district court focused heavily on § 3553(a)(1), that is permissible under Rosales‑Bruno, which allows courts to attach “great weight” to some factors over others, especially where the defendant’s conduct and criminal history are particularly troubling.

The panel also implicitly distinguishes Pugh by concluding that the district court’s emphasis on § 3553(a)(1) was justified, not arbitrary or exclusive.

B. Consideration of the Extent of the Upward Variance

Moore contended that the district court failed to consider how far it was varying upward from the Guideline range, in violation of Gall’s requirement to ensure that the rationale is sufficiently compelling for the degree of deviation.

The panel points to several key aspects of the record:

The court identified the Guideline range (57–71 months on Counts 1 and 3, plus 60 months consecutive on Count 2).
The judge described this as a “very rare circumstance” in which an upward variance was warranted because the Guidelines did not “take into account sufficiently the nature of [Moore’s] overall conduct.”
The judge stated explicitly that “[t]he question is how far I vary up.”
After reviewing the Guidelines, the presentence report, the parties’ submissions, arguments of counsel, and the totality of the circumstances, the court selected a sentence of 180 months—a 49‑month upward variance from the top of the advisory range.

Based on this record, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court clearly understood the size of the variance and provided a reasoned justification for it. This satisfies Gall’s requirement that the extent of the deviation be consciously weighed and justified.

C. Reliance on Arrests Without Resulting Convictions

Moore argued that the district court improperly relied on prior arrests that did not result in convictions, asserting such reliance is inappropriate or unfair.

The panel’s response:

The district court did indeed consider Moore’s “extensive criminal history, including such arrests.”
However, it did so by focusing on the underlying conduct—domestic violence and shooting or threatening to shoot a firearm—which is highly relevant to:
- Moore’s dangerousness;
- His respect for the law;
- The need to protect the public; and
- The need for adequate deterrence.
Under Butler, such non‑conviction conduct can legitimately support an upward variance when tied to § 3553(a) considerations.

Thus, the panel held that consideration of these arrests was not erroneous.

D. Claim of Double Counting and the Role of U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2

Moore argued that the district court failed to recognize that the Guidelines already accounted for his dangerous behavior during flight through the two‑level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 (reckless endangerment during flight). In his view, the court’s additional reliance on that conduct to justify an upward variance amounted to “double counting.”

The Eleventh Circuit rejected this, noting:

The district court expressly recognized the existence of the § 3C1.2 enhancement.
However, it concluded that the enhancement did not “take into consideration that [Moore’s] conduct actually caused harm,” and thus did not “account for the totality of [his] conduct.”
Guideline enhancements are often designed to capture a category of conduct (here, reckless creation of substantial risk), but actual case facts can be more severe than typical instances anticipated by the enhancement.

On that reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit found it permissible for the district court to use the same underlying episode to:

Trigger a Guideline enhancement; and
Support a conclusion that even the enhanced Guideline range understates the seriousness of the conduct and the corresponding need for punishment and deterrence.

This is consistent with general sentencing practice: it is not “double counting” for a judge to consider the real‑world severity of conduct already reflected in the Guidelines when deciding whether to vary.

E. Treatment of Mitigating Factors

Moore also contended that the district court gave insufficient weight to several mitigating circumstances:

His acceptance of responsibility for his conduct;
The difficult circumstances of his upbringing;
His trauma; and
His untreated post‑traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

The Eleventh Circuit’s response, grounded in Amedeo and Rosales‑Bruno, is twofold:

First, the district court explicitly stated that it had considered all of the § 3553(a) factors. Under Amedeo, the judge is not required to recite, weigh, or discuss every item of mitigating evidence on the record, so long as the court indicates a general consideration of all relevant factors.
Second, even if the mitigating evidence was acknowledged, the court has broad discretion regarding how much weight to give it. Under Rosales‑Bruno, it is not an abuse of discretion for the judge to conclude that the mitigating factors are outweighed by the seriousness of the offense, the danger posed, and the defendant’s criminal history.

The panel therefore held that the district court’s decision to discount Moore’s mitigating circumstances did not constitute an abuse of discretion, particularly in light of what it described as “numerous aggravating circumstances.”

F. Statistical Evidence, Deterrence, and Disparity

Moore’s final argument relied on statistical evidence, which he offered for two different purposes:

To argue that his sentence was unnecessary to deter future criminal behavior or protect the public, under § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C); and
To argue that his sentence created gross sentencing disparities compared to other defendants, in violation of § 3553(a)(6).

The Eleventh Circuit rejected both uses of the statistics for two principal reasons:

1. Lack of “Apples‑to‑Apples” Comparability

Relying on Docampo and Mateo‑Espejo, the panel emphasized that:

The statistics Moore offered were generic, describing aggregate data for defendants of his age, offense type, and sentence length.
Such data does not account for the particularized facts of his case: his specific pattern of dangerous conduct, the circumstances of his flight, the actual harm he caused, and his prior history of violent and firearm‑related behavior.
Accordingly, the statistics were not comparing “apples to apples” and could not establish unwarranted disparities under § 3553(a)(6).

2. Judicial Discretion to Prioritize Other Factors

The panel added a second, more general point:

Even if Moore’s statistical evidence were persuasive in the abstract—e.g., even if it suggested that increasing sentence length beyond a certain point yields diminishing returns in terms of deterrence—the district court retains discretion to give more weight to other considerations (such as the seriousness of the offense, just punishment, or protection of the public).
Under Rosales‑Bruno, varying the relative weight of different § 3553(a) factors is at the heart of sentencing discretion.

Thus, the court concludes that Moore’s statistical arguments are “unavailing” both because they lack individualized comparability and because the district court was free to prioritize other considerations in imposing the sentence.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

The opinion uses several technical sentencing concepts. This section briefly explains them in more accessible terms.

A. Substantive vs. Procedural Reasonableness

Procedural reasonableness asks whether the sentencing process was fair and legally correct (e.g., correct Guideline calculations, consideration of the right factors, no reliance on clearly erroneous facts).
Substantive reasonableness asks whether the length of the sentence is reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances.

In Moore, the appeal focused on substantive reasonableness—the claim that the 180‑month sentence was too high to be justified under the law.

B. Abuse‑of‑Discretion Standard

Under the abuse‑of‑discretion standard:

An appellate court does not re‑sentence the defendant or substitute its own judgment for that of the district court.
The question is whether the sentence falls within a broad “range of reasonable sentences” based on the facts and § 3553(a) factors.
A sentence is reversed only when the appellate court has a “definite and firm conviction” that the district court made a clear error of judgment in weighing the relevant factors.

This is a highly deferential standard, which explains why substantive reasonableness challenges—especially to upward variances—are difficult to win.

C. The Sentencing Guidelines and Variances

The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide an advisory range of months of imprisonment based on:
- Offense level (reflecting seriousness of the crime and specific offense characteristics); and
- Criminal History Category (I–VI).
A departure is a deviation based on Guideline‑specific provisions.
A variance is a deviation based on the broader statutory factors in § 3553(a), independent of specific guideline departure provisions.

In Moore’s case, the court imposed an upward variance, concluding that the advisory range did not adequately reflect the seriousness of the offense and Moore’s dangerousness.

D. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 – Reckless Endangerment During Flight

This Guideline provides a two‑level increase in offense level if, during flight from a law enforcement officer, the defendant recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person.

The district court concluded that Moore’s conduct during flight was especially serious because it actually caused harm, and thus justified more than the typical two‑level increase. This was one reason cited for the upward variance.

E. Non‑Conviction Conduct

“Non‑conviction conduct” includes:

Arrests that never led to charges or convictions;
Charges that were dismissed; or
Uncharged conduct described in the presentence report.

Under federal sentencing law, a judge may consider such conduct at sentencing—if it is found by a preponderance of the evidence—especially for assessing:

Danger to the community;
Patterns of behavior;
Respect for the law; and
Need for deterrence.

In Moore, the court relied on the conduct underlying prior arrests (domestic violence, firearm use or threats) as evidence of his ongoing dangerousness, consistent with Butler.

F. Generic vs. Individualized Sentencing Statistics

Moore presented generic statistical data—national or broad data sets correlating age, offense type, sentence length, and recidivism or sentencing distributions.

The Eleventh Circuit held that such statistics:

Do not establish how defendants “similarly situated” to Moore are typically sentenced; and
Do not prove that a particular sentence is unnecessary for deterrence or protection of the public in his specific case.

To show unwarranted disparity or lack of necessity, a defendant would need individualized, case‑specific comparisons that align closely with his factual situation.

VII. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Reinforcement of Broad Sentencing Discretion

The opinion reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s consistent message: district courts have wide latitude to tailor sentences based on the § 3553(a) factors and the specific facts of each case. Appellate review is highly deferential.

For practitioners, this means:

Defense counsel should recognize that attacking an upward variance on substantive reasonableness grounds will be difficult unless:
- The district court ignored key factors;
- Relied on clearly improper considerations; or
- Imposed a sentence far outside any reasonable range without compelling justification.
Prosecutors can rely on Moore as further support for arguing that serious, dangerous conduct plus a robust criminal history can justify significant upward variances.

B. Use of Non‑Conviction Conduct in Sentencing

By endorsing the district court’s reliance on Moore’s prior arrests and underlying conduct, the opinion:

Confirms the Eleventh Circuit’s acceptance of non‑conviction conduct as a valid basis for upward variance, as long as it relates to § 3553(a) considerations.
Signals that defendants with prior arrests involving violence or firearms may face substantially higher sentences if judges find those events to be reliable indicators of dangerousness.

Defense counsel must therefore:

Be prepared to challenge the factual accuracy of the alleged underlying conduct where possible; and
Argue that unproven or contested allegations should be given little weight.

C. Limits on the Power of Generic Sentencing Statistics

A particularly important aspect of Moore is its treatment of statistical evidence. The opinion makes clear that:

Defendants cannot rely on high‑level, generic statistics to establish unwarranted disparities or the futility of longer sentences in deterring crime.
Sentencing is individualized; courts must focus on the defendant’s actual conduct, history, and risks, not merely on broad empirical averages.
Even when empirical data raises questions about the marginal deterrent effect of long prison terms, district courts may still reasonably emphasize other § 3553(a) goals such as retribution, incapacitation, and public safety.

This likely limits the practical impact of empirical policy arguments in substantive reasonableness appeals—at least in the Eleventh Circuit—unless those arguments are tightly tied to case‑specific comparisons and the Guidelines’ own empirical foundation.

D. Actual Harm vs. Risk in Guideline Enhancements

The district court’s observation that § 3C1.2 did not fully capture that Moore’s conduct “actually caused harm” is also notable. It suggests:

Even when the Guidelines increase the offense level for risk (e.g., reckless endangerment), a judge may view an actual resulting harm as an aggravating factor beyond the norm—supporting a variance.
District judges are encouraged to look beyond the formal Guideline enhancements and ask whether the real‑world consequences of the defendant’s conduct are more severe than what the Guidelines typically contemplate.

In practice, this can lead to higher sentences in cases where risky behavior actually injures or endangers identifiable victims.

E. Continuing Difficulty of Substantive Reasonableness Appeals

Finally, Moore illustrates the high bar faced by defendants challenging sentences as substantively unreasonable:

The district court openly acknowledged imposing a rare upward variance and discussed its rationale.
The Eleventh Circuit, applying deferential review, found no abuse of discretion even though the sentence substantially exceeded the top of the advisory range.

For defendants, this underscores the strategic importance of:

Building a strong mitigation record in the district court;
Objecting clearly and specifically to any alleged mischaracterizations of the facts; and
Ensuring that any empirical or disparity arguments are supported by individualized, factually comparable examples rather than broad statistical generalizations.

VIII. Conclusion

United States v. Moore, Jr. is not a radical departure from existing law, but it is a clear reaffirmation of several critical sentencing principles in the Eleventh Circuit:

District courts possess wide discretion to impose upward variances where the § 3553(a) factors—especially the nature of the offense and the defendant’s criminal history—warrant it.
Conduct underlying prior arrests and other non‑conviction events can legitimately inform sentencing decisions when they reliably indicate dangerousness, disrespect for the law, or the need for deterrence and protection of the public.
Generic statistical evidence about national sentencing practices or recidivism is of limited use in substantive reasonableness appeals, especially absent “apples‑to‑apples” comparators.
Appellate courts will seldom disturb a sentence as substantively unreasonable unless the district court’s weighing of the § 3553(a) factors is clearly outside the broad “range of reasonable sentences” permitted by the facts.

In short, Moore underscores that in the Eleventh Circuit, challenging an above‑Guidelines sentence on substantive reasonableness grounds requires more than disagreement with the district court’s judgment. It requires a showing that the court’s decision was outside the permissible bounds of reasoned sentencing discretion—a demanding standard that Moore failed to meet.