United States v. Monte Brannan: Seventh Circuit Signals Zero-Tolerance for Circuit Rule 30 Non-Compliance

Introduction

United States v. Monte Brannan (consolidated with United States v. Gary E. Matthews, Nos. 24-1668 & 24-1677, decided 17 June 2025) arose from an intricate fraud scheme involving the redevelopment of the historic Pere Marquette Hotel in Peoria, Illinois. Gary Matthews and Monte Brannan, co-managers of GEM Hospitality LLC, siphoned project revenue intended for lenders and used the funds for personal gain. After a jury convicted both men of mail fraud and money-laundering offenses (and Brannan of conspiracy to commit money laundering), each filed separate appeals in the Seventh Circuit.

While the panel (Judges Easterbrook, Brennan, and Scudder) swiftly affirmed the convictions on the merits, the decision is most noteworthy for its blistering rebuke of defense counsel for violating Circuit Rule 30 and other briefing rules. The Court ordered counsel to show cause why they should not each be sanctioned $2,000, underscoring a new, uncompromising approach to rule-compliance in appellate practice.

Summary of the Judgment

1. Convictions Affirmed. – Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the Court held that overwhelming proof supported all counts. The appellants’ sufficiency-of-the-evidence attacks either lacked substance or re-hashed arguments rejected by the jury. Additional claims (juror inattentiveness, misjoinder, evidentiary and instructional errors) were deemed waived or undeveloped.
2. Procedural Rebuke. – Both appellate briefs flagrantly violated Circuit Rule 30(b)(1) by omitting every relevant district-court ruling from their appendices despite certifying compliance. Matthews’ brief also violated Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(6) by omitting a statement of the case.
3. Sanctions Threatened. – Counsel must show cause within 14 days why monetary sanctions should not be imposed for false certification and non-compliance.
4. Important Caveat. – The Court emphasized that, notwithstanding counsel’s failures, the defendants’ rights were safeguarded; the judges themselves combed the record to ensure proper review.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) – Established the deferential standard for sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges (any rational trier of fact). The panel applied Jackson to characterize appellants’ burden as a “nearly insurmountable hurdle”.
United States v. Johnson, 874 F.3d 990 (7th Cir. 2017) – Quoted for that “nearly insurmountable” language, framing defendants’ uphill climb.
Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954), and Seventh-Circuit progeny (Dooley, 578 F.3d 582) – Clarified that a defendant “causes” the mails to be used if use is reasonably foreseeable.
United States v. Turner, 400 F.3d 491 (7th Cir. 2005) – Set out elements of money laundering: knowledge of illicit proceeds and intent to conceal.
Hill v. Porter Memorial Hospital, 90 F.3d 220 (7th Cir. 1996) and United States v. Boliaux, 915 F.3d 493 (7th Cir. 2019) – Warned that failure to supply required documents impedes review and may warrant dismissal or summary affirmance; invoked to justify sanctions.
Additional waiver authorities: United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2019); United States v. States, 652 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 2011).

These precedents served dual roles: confirming the substantive correctness of the convictions and bolstering the Court’s intolerance for procedural default.

Legal Reasoning

1. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
The panel delineated the well-entrenched Jackson standard, emphasizing that appellate courts do not re-weigh evidence or re-assess credibility. The record—replete with redirected checks, false memo lines, and employee testimony—easily supported findings of fraudulent intent, foreseeability of mailings, and concealment of funds.

2. Waiver and Underdevelopment.
Because Matthews and Brannan failed to object to juror inattentiveness or misjoinder before or during trial, those claims were deemed waived. The Court referenced its own waiver jurisprudence and stressed that strategic silence cannot be remedied on appeal.

3. Procedural Violations and Sanction Power.
• Circuit Rule 30(b)(1) mandates inclusion of “all opinions, orders, or oral rulings” relevant to issues raised. The panel found zero compliance, noting that counsel merely attached the docket sheet.
• Rule 30(d) requires a truthful certification; counsels’ false certifications triggered potential sanctions.
• By shouldering the burden of locating over 100 pages of missing rulings, the Court underscored the prejudice to judicial economy and highlighted why Rule 30 is indispensable.

4. Exercising Discretion.
The Court chose not to dismiss the criminal appeal—cognizant of the defendants’ liberty interests—but elected to issue a show-cause order. This reflects a balancing: safeguarding defendants’ rights while disciplining counsel.

Impact on Future Litigation

Procedural Vigilance. The Seventh Circuit signals that laxity toward Rule 30 is over. Expect stricter screening of appendices and more frequent monetary sanctions or even dismissal—particularly where liberty is not at stake (civil appeals).
Criminal Defense Practice. Appointed or retained defense counsel must now treat appellate rule-compliance as an ethical imperative. Failure may yield personal financial consequences and reputational harm without necessarily benefiting the client.
Judicial Economy. The decision may prompt practitioners to invest more time in curating appendices, thereby reducing burdens on already strained appellate dockets.
Substantive Fraud Jurisprudence. Although overshadowed by the procedural ruling, the decision reinforces the breadth of federal mail-fraud jurisdiction: foreseeability of mail use suffices, and circumstantial evidence can prove intent.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Circuit Rule 30. A Seventh-Circuit rule requiring appellants to attach to their brief an appendix containing every trial-court order or oral ruling relevant to the issues on appeal. Think of it as a “portable record packet” for the judges.
Mail Fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341). A crime that criminalizes schemes to defraud that foreseeably use the postal system. One need not personally mail the item; it is enough that mailing is a predictable step in the scheme.
Money Laundering (18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957). Conducting financial transactions with proceeds of unlawful activity while knowing the funds are illicit and intending to disguise their source.
Waiver vs. Forfeiture. “Waiver” is the intentional relinquishment of a known right (cannot later be reviewed); “forfeiture” is the passive failure to assert a right (may sometimes be reviewed for plain error). The Court found waiver here.
Show-Cause Order. A court directive requiring a party (or counsel) to explain, within a set time, why a proposed sanction should not be imposed.

Conclusion

United States v. Monte Brannan delivers a two-fold message: first, the substantive evidence needed to sustain fraud and money-laundering convictions remains robust under long-standing standards; second—and more consequential going forward—the Seventh Circuit will no longer tolerate cavalier disregard of Circuit Rule 30 or related briefing requirements. By threatening personal financial sanctions, the Court transforms what some practitioners viewed as “technical” rules into enforceable obligations. The ruling therefore stands as a modern cautionary tale: effective appellate advocacy is as much about procedural precision as it is about persuasive argumentation. Counsel who neglect either facet risk not only losing the appeal but also incurring direct professional penalties.