United States v. Mighty: Reinforcing District Court Discretion Under § 3553(a) in Compassionate Release Motions

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

Case: United States v. Edward Mighty, No. 24-3043-cr

Date of Summary Order: December 2, 2025

Disposition: Order denying sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) affirmed

Note: This is a summary order and, under Second Circuit Local Rule 32.1.1, it has no precedential effect, though it may be cited as persuasive authority.

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Second Circuit’s summary order in United States v. Mighty, affirming the denial of a federal prisoner’s second motion for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (commonly referred to as “compassionate release” or “sentence reduction”). The decision is important not because it announces a new binding rule—indeed, it expressly lacks precedential effect—but because it provides a clear and concrete application of existing principles governing:

the scope of district court discretion when ruling on compassionate release motions;
the central role of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, even after changes in law;
the limited role of co-defendant sentencing comparisons under § 3553(a)(6); and
how appellate courts review such discretionary denials.

The case involves defendant-appellant Edward Mighty, proceeding pro se, who sought a reduction of his 300-month sentence. He relied on asserted changes in law affecting his mandatory minimum, the harshness of COVID-19 confinement conditions, and an alleged sentencing disparity between himself and his co-defendants. The district court (Judge Frank Paul Geraci, Jr., W.D.N.Y.) denied the motion. The Second Circuit affirmed, emphasizing that even if “extraordinary and compelling” reasons were assumed, the § 3553(a) factors supported leaving the original sentence in place.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Original Conviction and Sentencing

In 2015, Mighty pleaded guilty to two serious federal offenses:

Drug Conspiracy: Conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute at least 5 kilograms of cocaine and at least 280 grams of cocaine base, in violation of:
- 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1);
- 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (penalty provision); and
- 21 U.S.C. § 846 (conspiracy).
Firearms Offense: Possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of:
- 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and
- 18 U.S.C. § 2 (aiding and abetting).

At sentencing in 2017, the district court imposed a total sentence of 300 months (25 years) imprisonment, reflecting:

240 months on the drug conspiracy count (then the enhanced mandatory minimum due in part to a prior state conviction); and
a mandatory consecutive 60-month term for the § 924(c) firearms offense.

The 240-month term for the drug count also fell within the then-applicable Guideline range of 210–262 months. The combined sentence thus tracked both the statutory mandatory minimums and the Guidelines.

B. First Compassionate Release Motion (2020)

In 2020, during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, Mighty filed a pro se motion for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A), relying mainly on:

his medical conditions; and
the heightened risk from COVID-19 in prison.

The district court denied the motion. That denial is not directly at issue here but is significant because the district court, in ruling on the second motion, referred back to its prior § 3553(a) analysis from the original sentencing and the first motion.

C. Second Sentence Reduction Motion (2024)

In May 2024, Mighty filed a second pro se motion for a sentence reduction. This time, his arguments were broader and focused primarily on:

Changes in Law and Alleged Sentence Disparity
He argued that subsequent changes in the law meant that:
- his prior state conviction would no longer trigger the 20-year (240-month) enhanced mandatory minimum on the drug count;
- instead, the minimum would now be 10 years (120 months); and
- as a result, he was now serving an “unusually long” and “grossly disparate” sentence compared with what would likely be imposed today.
Harsh Conditions During COVID-19
He asserted that the punitive prison conditions and lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic amounted to extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying a reduction.
§ 3553(a) Factors Favoring Reduction
He contended that the statutory sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) now supported reducing his sentence to either:
- time served; or
- 180 months (15 years).

The district court denied the motion, concluding:

Mighty had not shown “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for a reduction, particularly in light of the Guidelines and the continuing mandatory five-year consecutive § 924(c) term; and
in the alternative, even if extraordinary and compelling reasons were assumed, the § 3553(a) factors still weighed against any reduction.

Mighty appealed to the Second Circuit, challenging both the district court’s “extraordinary and compelling” analysis and its application of § 3553(a), especially the disparity factor under § 3553(a)(6).

III. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Order

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Mighty's second motion for a sentence reduction.

Key points of the order include:

Standard of Review: The court reviewed the denial of a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of discretion, and any underlying legal interpretation de novo, consistent with United States v. Moore and United States v. Keitt.
Two-Pronged Requirement of § 3582(c)(1)(A): A sentence reduction requires:
1. “Extraordinary and compelling” reasons warranting a reduction; and
2. support from the § 3553(a) factors.
The absence of either is enough to deny a motion.
Assumption (Without Deciding) of Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons: The Second Circuit assumed, arguendo, that Mighty's asserted reasons might satisfy the “extraordinary and compelling” threshold, but held that the § 3553(a) factors independently justified denial.
§ 3553(a) Analysis: The appellate court held that the district court:
- reasonably emphasized the seriousness of Mighty’s conduct;
- properly considered his role as a leader in a large-scale Rochester drug trafficking organization;
- appropriately weighed his criminal history; and
- acted within the permissible range of discretion in concluding that the original 300-month sentence remained appropriate.
No Error in Treatment of Sentencing Disparities:
- The court reiterated that § 3553(a)(6) requires consideration of nationwide sentencing disparities, not disparities among co-defendants.
- Even if co-defendant comparisons were considered, the district court provided reasonable, case-specific explanations for the differences: Mighty's leadership role and lack of cooperation.
Presumption of Proper Consideration of § 3553(a) Factors: The Second Circuit invoked the presumption that a district court considers all relevant § 3553(a) factors absent evidence to the contrary, and rejected Mighty's argument that the district court’s explanation was too sparse.

Concluding that the district court’s decision fell well within the “range of permissible decisions,” the Second Circuit held that there was no abuse of discretion and affirmed.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Statutory and Legal Framework

1. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A): Sentence Reduction (“Compassionate Release”)

Section 3582(c)(1)(A) allows a federal court to reduce a previously imposed term of imprisonment if:

Extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a reduction; and
The reduction is consistent with the sentencing factors in § 3553(a).

Since the First Step Act, defendants may file such motions directly after exhausting administrative remedies. The statute confers broad discretion on district courts: a court “may reduce” a sentence; it is never required to do so.

2. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): Sentencing Factors

Section 3553(a) lists the factors a court must consider when imposing—or reconsidering—a sentence, including:

the nature and circumstances of the offense;
the history and characteristics of the defendant;
the need for the sentence to:
- reflect the seriousness of the offense;
- promote respect for the law;
- provide just punishment;
- afford adequate deterrence;
- protect the public; and
- provide correctional treatment;
the kinds of sentences available;
the advisory Sentencing Guidelines and policy statements;
§ 3553(a)(6): the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among similarly situated defendants; and
the need to provide restitution to victims.

These factors apply not only at initial sentencing but also when a court considers whether to reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A).

B. Standard of Review and Appellate Posture

The Second Circuit reaffirmed the standard articulated in United States v. Moore, 975 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2020), and United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67 (2d Cir. 2021):

The denial of a discretionary sentence reduction is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
Any underlying questions of law (e.g., statutory interpretation) are reviewed de novo.

Under Keitt, a district court abuses its discretion only if it:

applies an erroneous view of the law;
makes a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence; or
issues a decision outside the range of permissible choices.

The Second Circuit repeatedly stresses that the “weight” assigned to each § 3553(a) factor is “firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge.” (Verkhoglyad).

C. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. United States v. Moore, 975 F.3d 84 (2d Cir. 2020)

Moore clarified certain procedural aspects of compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) and confirmed that appellate review of denials is for abuse of discretion, while questions of law are reviewed de novo.

In Mighty, Moore anchors the standard of review, underscoring that the appellate court’s role is not to reweigh the § 3553(a) factors but to ensure the district court acted within legal bounds and did not clearly err in its factual assessments.

2. United States v. Keitt, 21 F.4th 67 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam)

Keitt is a key compassionate release precedent. It holds that, under § 3582(c)(1)(A):

a motion must fail if either:
- no “extraordinary and compelling” reasons exist; or
- the § 3553(a) factors do not support reduction;
consequently, if a district court finds that the § 3553(a) factors weigh against release, it may deny the motion without deciding whether the circumstances are “extraordinary and compelling.”

The Second Circuit in Mighty explicitly applies this framework. It states that because both prongs must be satisfied, the absence of either is sufficient to affirm. Here, the court affirms on the second prong (§ 3553(a)) and therefore does not need to fully resolve the “extraordinary and compelling” question.

3. United States v. Ghailani, 733 F.3d 29 (2d Cir. 2013)

Ghailani is a leading case on § 3553(a)(6). It emphasizes that:

§ 3553(a)(6) requires courts to consider nationwide sentencing disparities, not merely disparities among co-defendants in the same case.
Co-defendant disparities can be relevant but are not the focus or a legal requirement.

In Mighty, the Second Circuit invokes Ghailani to reject Mighty's claim that § 3553(a)(6) was misapplied because he received a higher sentence than his co-defendants. The court reiterates that:

“we have repeatedly made clear that § 3553(a)(6) requires a district court to consider nationwide sentence disparities, but does not require a district court to consider disparities between co-defendants.”

4. United States v. Ebbers, 458 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006)

Ebbers concerned sentencing disparities among co-defendants and held that:

differences in culpability and cooperation can rationally justify sentencing disparities; and
such explanations undercut claims that disparities are “unwarranted.”

In Mighty, the Second Circuit relies on Ebbers to validate the district court’s explanation that:

Mighty’s leadership role in the conspiracy; and
his lack of cooperation with the government

were reasonable bases for imposing a longer sentence than his co-defendants.

5. United States v. Halvon, 26 F.4th 566 (2d Cir. 2022) (per curiam)

Halvon is another significant compassionate release case. It establishes two principles that the Second Circuit invokes here:

Weight of Factors: The fact that a district court assigns greater weight to unchanged § 3553(a) factors than to changed circumstances (such as new law or rehabilitation) does not mean that it failed to consider the latter.
Presumption of Consideration: “A district court is presumed to have considered all relevant § 3553(a) factors and arguments unless the record suggests otherwise.”

In Mighty, the court uses Halvon to dismiss Mighty's argument that the district court:

overlooked certain factors or arguments; or
needed to address each § 3553(a) factor explicitly.

The court underscores that Mighty's “mere disagreement” with how the factors were weighed is not a basis to find an abuse of discretion.

6. United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2008)

Verkhoglyad reinforces the principle that:

“the weight to be afforded any § 3553(a) factor is a matter firmly committed to the discretion of the sentencing judge.”

In Mighty, the Second Circuit quotes this language to reaffirm that it will not second-guess a reasonable balancing of § 3553(a) factors, even where the defendant presents non-frivolous arguments for a reduction.

D. The Court’s Legal Reasoning in United States v. Mighty

1. Structure of the Analysis

The Second Circuit’s reasoning follows a clear structure:

Identify the standard of review (abuse of discretion).
Reiterate that a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion requires both:
- extraordinary and compelling reasons; and
- favorable § 3553(a) balancing.
Assume, without deciding, that Mighty might satisfy the “extraordinary and compelling” prong.
Affirm based solely on the district court’s reasonable § 3553(a) analysis.

2. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons (Assumed but Not Decided)

Although the district court had concluded that Mighty did not show “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances, the Second Circuit chose not to rest its decision on that point. Instead, it:

assumed arguendo that Mighty's asserted reasons—changes in law, harsh COVID conditions, and the length of his sentence—might qualify; and
proceeded directly to the § 3553(a) analysis.

This approach aligns with Keitt, which allows courts to deny compassionate release motions based solely on § 3553(a) even if the “extraordinary and compelling” issue is unresolved. It also preserves flexibility going forward on how non-retroactive changes in law and COVID-related conditions may factor into the “extraordinary and compelling” inquiry.

3. Application of the § 3553(a) Factors

The Second Circuit found that the district court:

considered the § 3553(a) factors at:
- the original 2017 sentencing;
- Mighty’s 2020 motion; and
- the 2024 motion under review;
reasonably reaffirmed that the same core considerations still justified the original 300-month sentence.

Specifically, the district court emphasized:

the seriousness of the offense:
- Mighty was “one of the leaders” of a large-scale Rochester drug distribution operation;
- the operation involved kilogram quantities of cocaine brought into the community;
- the court characterized these drugs as “a poison that destroys individuals and families and communities.”
Criminal history: Mighty had several prior convictions, supporting the need for:
- deterrence;
- protection of the public; and
- respect for the law.
The sentence continued to align with the Guidelines range for the drug count (240 months within 210–262 months), plus the mandatory consecutive 60 months for the firearms count.

On this record, the Second Circuit concluded that the decision that the 300-month sentence “remains appropriate” was “located within the range of permissible decisions” under Keitt.

4. Treatment of Co-Defendant Sentencing Disparities

Mighty argued that § 3553(a)(6)—the need to avoid unwarranted disparities among similarly situated defendants—favored a reduction because his co-defendants received lower sentences.

The Second Circuit responded in two steps:

Legal Principle (Ghailani)
The court first underscored the governing principle:
- § 3553(a)(6) is concerned primarily with nationwide sentencing disparities;
- district courts are not required to equalize co-defendant sentences.
Case-Specific Explanation (Ebbers)
Even assuming co-defendant comparisons were relevant, the district court gave reasonable explanations:
- Mighty was a leader of the conspiracy; and
- he did not cooperate with the government.
The Second Circuit, citing Ebbers, recognized those as valid reasons for different sentences among co-defendants with “varying degrees of culpability and cooperation.”

Thus, the court held that the district court did not overlook § 3553(a)(6), nor did it err in its application.

5. Presumption of Consideration and Sufficiency of Explanation

Mighty also contended that the district court’s analysis was insufficient because it did not explicitly march through each § 3553(a) factor.

The Second Circuit rejected this argument, relying on Halvon:

District courts are presumed to have considered all relevant § 3553(a) factors unless the record indicates otherwise.
There is no requirement that a judge:
- recite every factor; or
- assign each factor explicit weight in writing.

The court concluded that “nothing in the record suggests a failure” to consider relevant factors, and Mighty's dissatisfaction was essentially a disagreement with how the court weighed them—an inadequate basis to overturn a discretionary decision.

E. Treatment of Specific Arguments Raised by Mighty

1. Changes in Law and the Alleged “Gross Disparity” in Sentence

Mighty argued that changes in law meant his prior state conviction would no longer trigger the 20-year enhanced mandatory minimum under § 841(b)(1)(A). According to his argument:

His current 240-month term for the drug count reflects an outdated mandatory minimum; and
Under current law, he would face only a 10-year (120-month) mandatory minimum on that count, plus the 5-year (60-month) § 924(c) consecutive term—totaling 180 months—making his 300-month sentence “grossly disparate.”

The district court, however, focused on:

the Guidelines range, noting that 240 months still lies within the applicable range of 210–262 months; and
the ongoing mandatory five-year consecutive sentence for the § 924(c) conviction.

It concluded there was not a “gross disparity” between the sentence being served and the sentence likely to be imposed today. The Second Circuit, while not deciding the “extraordinary and compelling” issue, accepted the district court’s reasoning as sensible in the context of its § 3553(a) assessment.

This handling implicitly signals that:

Non-retroactive changes in law that reduce statutory minimums may be considered in compassionate release; but
They do not automatically compel a sentence reduction where the original sentence still:
- falls within the Guidelines range; and
- remains consistent with the § 3553(a) factors.

2. Harsh COVID-19 Conditions as Extraordinary and Compelling

Mighty highlighted the punitive conditions of confinement during the COVID-19 pandemic as an additional extraordinary and compelling factor.

The district court had rejected this argument outright as inadequate by itself to justify release. The Second Circuit did not squarely resolve the status of such claims but, consistent with its approach, assumed arguendo that these conditions could contribute to “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances and nonetheless affirmed on § 3553(a) grounds.

Practically, this signals that:

COVID-related hardships may still be raised, but
they will rarely overcome strong § 3553(a) considerations in serious drug/firearms cases, particularly for leaders of large conspiracies with significant criminal histories.

3. Length of Sentence and Rehabilitation

Mighty implicitly argued that the length of his sentence—especially relative to what might be imposed today—and any progress he may have made in custody justified a reduction.

The Second Circuit, following Halvon, effectively held that:

The district court was entitled to give greater weight to the unchanged seriousness of the offense and Mighty's leadership role than to:
- any changes in statutory minimums; or
- other changed circumstances.
There is no requirement that the passage of time, by itself, erode the justification for the original sentence.

V. Impact and Implications

A. Reinforcement of District Court Discretion in Compassionate Release

Though non-precedential, United States v. Mighty reinforces a now-familiar theme in the Second Circuit’s compassionate release jurisprudence:

District courts possess broad discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors; and
Appellate courts will rarely disturb such decisions absent clear error or a misapprehension of law.

For future litigants, this underscores that:

Even compelling evidence of changed circumstances—or arguably “extraordinary and compelling” conditions—will not suffice if the district court reasonably finds that deterrence, public safety, and the seriousness of the offense still justify the original sentence.
Arguments on appeal are unlikely to succeed if they merely challenge the weight assigned to various § 3553(a) factors, rather than pointing to legal errors or glaring factual mistakes.

B. Limited Role of Co-Defendant Disparities Under § 3553(a)(6)

By reiterating Ghailani, the order confirms that:

§ 3553(a)(6) primarily targets national disparities; and
there is no right to sentencing parity with co-defendants.

Where defendants raise compassionate release arguments based on co-defendant sentences, courts may:

discount those comparisons altogether, or
consider them only to the extent they highlight unwarranted disparities not justified by differences in role, culpability, or cooperation.

C. Changes in Law and Non-Retroactive Reductions in Mandatory Minimums

Mighty sits within a broader trend of cases exploring whether non-retroactive changes in sentencing law can contribute to “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for § 3582(c)(1)(A) relief.

While the Second Circuit here did not definitively resolve that question, the opinion suggests:

Such changes may be relevant but are not dispositive.
Courts may look at:
- whether the original sentence still falls within the Guidelines range;
- the magnitude of the difference between the old and new statutory schemes; and
- the continued force of the § 3553(a) factors, particularly seriousness of the offense and public safety.

Defendants should therefore not assume that a post-sentencing legal change affecting mandatory minimums automatically warrants a reduction; it is, at most, one factor within a holistic analysis.

D. COVID-19 and Carceral Conditions

While COVID-based compassionate release motions have been common, Mighty reflects the current, more restrained posture of appellate courts:

The acute emergency phase of the pandemic has passed.

Where the underlying offense is serious, and the prisoner has a leadership role and criminal history, COVID-related hardships generally will not outweigh the original sentencing rationale.

E. Practical Takeaways for Practitioners and Defendants

Framing the Motion:
- Arguments should integrate both prongs: “extraordinary and compelling” reasons and § 3553(a).
- Simply showing hardship or legal change is insufficient without a persuasive § 3553(a) narrative.
Evidence and Record-Building:
- To survive deferential appellate review, defendants must create a detailed record explaining why, in light of § 3553(a), the original justifications for the sentence have significantly eroded.
Appeals Strategy:
- On appeal, focus on clear legal or factual errors—e.g., misapplication of a statutory provision—rather than a mere disagreement with the sentencing judge’s weighing of the factors.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

1. “Compassionate Release” / Sentence Reduction Under § 3582(c)(1)(A)

Despite the common shorthand “compassionate release,” § 3582(c)(1)(A) does not guarantee release; instead, it allows a court to reconsider and potentially reduce an already imposed sentence if:

unusual, serious, or changed circumstances exist (extraordinary and compelling reasons); and
the reduction is consistent with the broader sentencing goals in § 3553(a).

2. “Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons”

This phrase is not fully defined in the statute. Historically, it included severe medical conditions, advanced age with lengthy time served, or dire family circumstances. Post–First Step Act case law has expanded the inquiry to include:

changes in sentencing law;
extraordinary rehabilitation; and
exceptionally harsh conditions of confinement (e.g., extreme COVID lockdowns).

However, even if such reasons exist, a court can still deny relief if the § 3553(a) factors do not support reduction.

3. § 3553(a) Factors

These factors guide sentencing and re-sentencing. They are designed to ensure that a sentence is:

fair;
proportionate to the seriousness of the crime;
deterrent to future crime; and
protective of the public.

Courts have discretion in how to apply and weigh each factor, and that weighing is rarely disturbed on appeal.

4. § 3553(a)(6): Sentencing Disparities

This particular factor targets unwarranted sentence disparities among similarly situated defendants nationwide. It does not require that co-defendants receive identical or near-identical sentences. Differences in:

role (e.g., leader vs. minor participant);
cooperation with authorities; and
criminal history

often justify different sentences in the same case.

5. Abuse of Discretion

This is a deferential standard of review. An appellate court will overturn a district court’s decision only if:

the court applied the wrong legal standard;
relied on clearly incorrect facts; or
chose an outcome that no reasonable judge could have chosen on the same facts.

Disagreement with a judge’s balancing of competing considerations is not enough.

6. Summary Orders and Non-Precedential Status

In the Second Circuit:

Summary orders, like the one in United States v. Mighty, do not have precedential effect under Local Rule 32.1.1.
Parties may cite them (subject to certain citation rules), and courts may consider them as persuasive but not binding authority.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Mighty does not break new doctrinal ground, but it serves as a clear and instructive illustration of several entrenched principles in federal sentencing and compassionate release:

A defendant seeking a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A) must satisfy both prongs of the statute: “extraordinary and compelling” reasons and favorable § 3553(a) balancing.
Even assuming extraordinary and compelling reasons, a motion may be—and often is—denied when the § 3553(a) factors, particularly the seriousness of the offense, leadership role, and criminal history, continue to justify the original sentence.
Section 3553(a)(6) focuses on nationwide disparities, not co-defendant parity, and differences in culpability and cooperation readily justify co-defendant sentencing differences.
Appellate courts accord substantial deference to district courts’ application and weighing of § 3553(a) factors and will not overturn such decisions merely because a defendant disagrees with the outcome.

For practitioners and defendants, Mighty is a reminder that compassionate release is a narrow and highly discretionary remedy. Changes in law, difficult prison conditions, and rehabilitation can be important—but they operate within a framework that continues to place substantial weight on the original reasons for imposing a lengthy sentence. In that respect, the decision reinforces the stability of final criminal judgments absent clear error or dramatic shifts in the § 3553(a) calculus.