United States v. Medina: First Circuit Clarifies Permissible Use of Generic Interstate Commerce Examples in Jury Instructions and Affirms Narrow Application of the Excited Utterance Exception

Introduction

In United States v. Medina, No. 24-1609 (1st Cir. Sept. 9, 2025), the First Circuit affirmed convictions for attempted sex trafficking of a child (18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1594(a)) and attempted coercion and enticement of a child to engage in prostitution (18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)) arising from a federal undercover sting. The appeal raised three principal issues:

Whether the district court abused its discretion by excluding the defendant’s post-arrest interview statements under the hearsay “excited utterance” exception (Fed. R. Evid. 803(2)).
Whether an interstate commerce jury instruction that listed generic examples (e.g., “telephone,” “internet,” “entity that serviced interstate or foreign travelers,” and “purchase of items manufactured outside Massachusetts”) impermissibly intruded on the jury’s fact-finding role under the Sixth Amendment.
Whether a jury instruction distinguishing “motive” from “intent” confused the jury or lowered the government’s burden of proof in violation of due process.

Judge Rikelman, writing for a panel that included Circuit Judge Aframe and District Judge Elliott (sitting by designation), rejected each challenge and affirmed. The decision provides practical guidance on the boundaries of Rule 803(2), the permissible contours of jury instructions that reference broad categories of evidence tied to the commerce element, and the proper role of motive in mens rea instructions.

Summary of the Opinion

The First Circuit held:

The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the defendant’s Spanish-language post-arrest interview statements denying intent to have sex with a minor. Although the court admitted the defendant’s immediate booking reaction as an excited utterance, the later, four-minute interview conducted roughly thirty minutes after booking—following Miranda warnings and in response to officer questioning—fell outside Rule 803(2).
The interstate commerce instruction did not violate the Sixth Amendment. By using generic categories (telephone, internet, entity serving interstate travelers, out-of-state-manufactured items) and “may consider” language without directing findings or singling out record-specific facts, the charge neither usurped the jury’s function nor favored the government’s evidence. Stipulations independently supported the element.
The motive-versus-intent instruction accurately stated the law, was apt given the defense theory, and did not diminish the government’s burden to prove knowledge of age beyond a reasonable doubt. Read as a whole, the instructions correctly framed the required mens rea for both counts.
With no individual error, the cumulative error doctrine did not apply. A pro se “outrageous government conduct”/entrapment contention failed for lack of preservation and on the merits.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Irizarry-Sisco, 87 F.4th 38 (1st Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1083 (2024): Provided the abuse-of-discretion framework for evidentiary rulings; articulated the multi-factor test for excited utterances (timing, nature of the event, subject matter, declarant’s condition, self-interest, and whether volunteered or elicited) and reiterated the reliability rationale behind Rule 803(2).
United States v. Taveras, 380 F.3d 532 (1st Cir. 2004): Quoted for the premise that excitement suspends reflection and fabrication—the core justification for the exception.
United States v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 22 (1st Cir. 1998): Defendant’s reliance on Cruz (admitting statements made four hours after a domestic assault) was distinguished; Cruz emphasized fact-dependent analysis and unique circumstances (continuing stress and lack of escape) not present here.
Murphy Auto Parts Co. v. Ball, 249 F.2d 508 (D.C. Cir. 1957): Cited to underscore trial court primacy in evaluating whether a declarant remained under the stress of excitement.
United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3 (1st Cir. 2009) and United States v. Taylor, 848 F.3d 476 (1st Cir. 2017): Framed prejudice and abuse-of-discretion standards for evidentiary error.
United States v. Coleman, ___ F.4th ___, 2025 WL 2027851 (1st Cir. July 21, 2025) and United States v. Rodríguez, 162 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1998): Set the standards for reviewing jury instructions and constitutional challenges.
United States v. Rivera-Santiago, 107 F.3d 960 (1st Cir. 1997) and United States v. Argentine, 814 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1987): Established that courts may not direct findings on contested facts; anchor Sixth Amendment analysis.
United States v. Moffett, 53 F.4th 679 (1st Cir. 2022) and United States v. Almonte, 594 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1979): Cautioned against instructions that place undue weight on government evidence or functionally direct verdicts.
United States v. Smoot, 690 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 2012): Quoted for the uncontroversial proposition that accurate statements of law in jury instructions are not flawed.
United States v. Royal, 100 F.3d 1019 (1st Cir. 1996) and United States v. González-Perez, 778 F.3d 3 (1st Cir. 2015): Emphasized that instructions are reviewed as a whole and juries are presumed to follow them.
United States v. Stokes, 124 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 1997): No cumulative error without underlying error.
United States v. Muñoz-Franco, 487 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2007) and United States v. Díaz-Maldonado, 727 F.3d 130 (1st Cir. 2013): Affirmed that affirmative defenses like entrapment must be preserved; sting operations are generally legitimate absent additional government overreach.
United States v. Soto-Sanchez, 138 F.4th 81 (1st Cir. 2025) and United States v. Velazquez-Fontanez, 6 F.4th 205 (1st Cir. 2021): Cited for presenting facts in a balanced manner when sufficiency is not challenged.

Legal Reasoning

1) Hearsay: The Excited Utterance Exception and Post-Booking Statements

Rule 803(2) admits hearsay “relating to a startling event or condition” made while the declarant is “under the stress of excitement” caused by it. The district court sensibly bifurcated the defendant’s out-of-court statements:

Admitted: The immediate booking response upon being told he was charged with paying for sex with a minor (“never, never spoke to any minor”). The court recognized the “startling event” and admitted this spontaneous reaction as an excited utterance.
Excluded: Statements made roughly thirty minutes later during a four-minute, Spanish-language post-arrest interview after Miranda warnings, in which the defendant insisted he believed he had arranged sex with an adult and would not have gone if he knew a minor was involved.

The First Circuit found no abuse of discretion, stressing:

Timing is important but not dispositive; thirty minutes is not a bright-line cutoff. However, the elapsed time coupled with intervening Miranda warnings and the structured, officer-led questioning weighed against spontaneity and in favor of reflective self-interest.
Two Rule 803(2) factors—self-interest and responsiveness to interrogation—cut strongly against admissibility.
Cruz did not compel admission; that case turned on dramatically different facts indicating prolonged, unrelieved stress.
Rule 803(2)’s reliability rationale would be undermined by allowing post-warning, question-responsive, self-exculpatory statements after a cooling period; the possibility of fabrication rises with time and prompting.

Bottom line: Booking-room blurts may qualify; later, post-warning, interview-based denials generally will not. The ruling is firmly rooted in Irizarry-Sisco’s factor-based approach and the foundational anti-fabrication purpose of Rule 803(2).

2) Sixth Amendment: “Means or Facility of Interstate Commerce” Instruction

On the attempted sex trafficking count, the court instructed that jurors, in assessing whether the conduct was “in or affecting” interstate or foreign commerce, “may consider” use of a means or facility of commerce “such as a telephone or the internet, an entity that serviced interstate or foreign travelers, or the purchase of items that were manufactured outside of Massachusetts.”

The defense argued this “culled the government’s proof” by echoing the evidence (phone, internet, hotel, condoms) and thus directed fact finding in violation of the Sixth Amendment.

The First Circuit rejected that contention because:

The instruction used generic categories rather than record-specific facts, and employed permissive “may consider” language.
The charge neither directed a finding nor elevated particular government evidence over the defense theory. There was no “undue weight” or functional directed verdict.
Stipulations—e.g., that Verizon, the Courtyard by Marriott, and the “Dwight & Church” (Church & Dwight) condom manufacturer engage in interstate commerce—substantially narrowed what remained contested. The judge scrupulously avoided referencing the stipulations in the instruction itself.
As a matter of law, the instruction accurately described permissible commerce-nexus considerations.

Together, these features kept the instruction comfortably within Sixth Amendment limits articulated by Rivera-Santiago, Moffett, and Argentine.

3) Motive Versus Intent: Clarifying Mens Rea Without Lowering the Burden

The district court instructed that motive (why someone acts) is distinct from intent or knowledge (the mental state with which the act is done), and that the government need not prove motive, although motive evidence may inform intent.

Given the defense theory—an asserted language-based misunderstanding and a claim of intending sex with an adult—the instruction was appropriate. The government did not have to prove the defendant was motivated by a sexual interest in minors; it needed to prove he acted intentionally with knowledge of the child’s age (under 14 for § 1591 attempt; under 18 for § 2422(b) attempt).

The First Circuit underscored that the instructions, read as a whole (Royal), repeatedly told jurors the government bore the burden of proving knowledge-of-age beyond a reasonable doubt for both counts, and jurors are presumed to follow those instructions (González-Perez). The motive/intent instruction did not blur or reduce that burden.

Impact

Doctrinal Clarifications

Excited Utterances in Custodial Settings: Courts may admit immediate, spontaneous booking reactions to being charged as excited utterances, but post-warning, interrogation-driven denials made after even a relatively short interval (here, about 30 minutes) face steep admissibility hurdles. Factors of time, questioning, and self-interest will loom large.
Jury Instructions and the Sixth Amendment: Trial judges can safely use generic, non-case-specific examples to illustrate what may satisfy the interstate commerce element—particularly when phrased in permissive terms and decoupled from any directive to find facts. The presence of stipulations further reduces Sixth Amendment concerns.
Motive Instructions in Mens Rea Cases: Clarifying that motive is not an element is both accurate and useful where a defendant concedes the act but contests the mental state (e.g., knowledge of the victim’s age). Such instructions do not dilute the burden when the elements are otherwise clearly stated.

Practical Guidance for Trial Courts and Counsel

Rule 803(2): When defendants seek to admit self-exculpatory statements, the closer in time to the startling event, the better—and the less structured the setting, the more likely the statement is admissible. Miranda warnings and Q&A formats tend to defeat spontaneity. Prosecutors and defense counsel should build clear records on timing, demeanor, questioning, and intervening events.
Drafting Commerce Instructions: Favor broad, familiar categories (telephone, internet, traveler-serving entities, out-of-state goods) and permissive phrasing (“may consider”). Avoid naming parties, exhibits, or stipulations in the charge; let the evidence do that work.
Motive vs. Intent: In cases hinging on knowledge-of-age (as in § 1591 and § 2422(b)), a motive instruction can help jurors distinguish between a defendant’s reasons for acting and the requisite mental state the government must prove. Ensure the elements instructions repeatedly tie intent/knowledge to the age requirements and the reasonable doubt standard.
Preservation: Medina tried to “renew” prior objections in a second trial en masse. Counsel should restate objections with specificity at retrial to avoid preservation disputes and to sharpen appellate review.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Hearsay and Excited Utterance (Rule 803(2)): Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for its truth. The “excited utterance” exception allows such a statement if made while the speaker was still under the stress of a shocking event, before there was time to think up a story. Key indicators include immediacy, spontaneity, lack of prompting, and absence of self-serving motive.
Miranda Warnings: Advisements of the right to remain silent and to counsel following arrest. Their presence often signals a structured interview environment, which tends to undercut claims that later statements are still spontaneous and unreflective.
Sixth Amendment Limits on Jury Instructions: Judges may explain the law and give non-specific examples, but they may not direct jurors to find particular facts or spotlight government evidence in a way that effectively tells the jury how to decide contested issues.
Interstate Commerce Element: Many federal crimes require a nexus to interstate or foreign commerce. Use of phones/internet, transacting at a business serving interstate travelers (like a hotel), or purchasing items manufactured out of state can be ways to show that nexus.
Motive vs. Intent: Motive is the reason why someone acts (e.g., money, desire). Intent/knowledge is the mental state tied to the prohibited act (e.g., knowing the person was under 18). The government typically must prove intent/knowledge, not motive, unless a statute expressly makes motive an element.
Standards of Review: Abuse of discretion is deferential toward trial court judgments on evidentiary and instructional matters; de novo review applies to pure questions of law and constitutional issues. Plain error (if claims are unpreserved) is even more demanding for appellants.
Stipulation: An agreement between parties to accept certain facts as true, removing them from dispute and often streamlining trial and jury instructions.

Conclusion

United States v. Medina is a carefully calibrated affirmation of trial-court discretion over evidence and instructions. On hearsay, the decision underscores that Rule 803(2) is not a backdoor for admitting self-exculpatory, post-warning interview statements—even if the startling event was significant—when time, prompting, and self-interest erode reliability. On jury instructions, the panel clarifies that generic, permissive examples tied to the interstate commerce element do not intrude on the jury’s constitutional role, particularly where stipulations narrow factual disputes. And on mens rea, it confirms that motive is distinct from—and not a required proxy for—intent or knowledge in age-based sex offenses.

The opinion offers concrete drafting cues for instructions and evidentiary gatekeeping in digital-age stings, while preserving the jury’s central function. Its practical lesson is straightforward: spontaneity truly matters for excited utterances, precision and neutrality matter for jury instructions, and clarity about motive versus intent helps jurors focus on the legally relevant questions.