United States v. McGuire: Tightening Rule 1006 Summary Evidence and Drawing a Sharp Line Between Promotion and Concealment Money Laundering

I. Introduction

United States v. McGuire is a significant Fifth Circuit decision revisiting a sprawling, multi-defendant marijuana-trafficking and money-laundering case. On panel rehearing, the court withdraws its prior opinion (151 F.4th 307 (5th Cir. 2025)) and issues a substitute that:

• Sharply restricts the use of Rule 1006 summary charts when they contain speculative or mathematically unsound extrapolations—especially where they supply critical proof of drug quantity.
• Clarifies the distinction between promotional and concealment money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 in the context of a cash-based drug distribution business.
• Addresses pleading requirements for a Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) indictment under 21 U.S.C. § 848 after Richardson v. United States, holding the indictment deficient but the error harmless in this case.
• Applies Apprendi/Alleyne principles to a § 924(c) firearm sentencing enhancement involving a short-barreled rifle.
• Polices the reliability of PSR-based sentencing factfinding where the PSR simply adopts flawed summary charts.

The case arises from a Texas-based distribution network that bought marijuana in legalized states (principally California and Oregon) and shipped it in bulk—often by van—into over twenty other states. Five defendants (Roberts, McGuire, Sargent, Ragle, and Lala) went to trial in the Eastern District of Texas and were convicted of conspiracy to distribute marijuana and conspiracy to commit money laundering, with additional counts for Roberts (CCE and § 924(c)) and for McGuire (a separate § 924(c) charge on which he was acquitted).

On appeal, the court issues a mixed ruling: it largely affirms the convictions, but vacates certain sentences and statutory drug-quantity findings, narrows the money-laundering theory, orders correction of clerical errors, and remands for tailored resentencing.

II. Background of the Case

A. The Marijuana and Cash-Delivery Scheme

The core conspiracy revolved around Eric Roberts and Nicholas Simonds. After a failed medical marijuana venture in California, Simonds moved to Texas and partnered with Roberts. Discovering that CBD was not profitable and that Texas was unlikely to legalize THC, they built a multi-state operation:

• Marijuana and THC products (cartridges, edibles, pre-rolled joints) were purchased in legal markets, principally California and Oregon.
• Product was transported by van (registered to Roberts’s “Roberts Elite Group”) to destinations across 21 states.
• Drivers—including appellants McGuire, Sargent, Ragle, and Lala—were paid per driving day, and used Signal (an encrypted, auto-deleting messaging app) to coordinate trips using code words (“units”/“bags” for pounds; “paper/paperwork” for cash).
• Cash proceeds were vacuum-sealed, kept out of financial institutions, and delivered to Roberts in Dallas at residences and a warehouse, then used to fund future trips and split profits between Roberts and Simonds.

Law enforcement joined the dots through:

• Local narcotics investigations and search warrants (e.g., large seizures of marijuana, THC products, cash, and firearms in Mesquite and Dallas).
• Highway interdictions (New Mexico and Kansas) of vans loaded with marijuana and cash, linked via documentation to Roberts Elite Group and the defendants.
• Searches of Roberts’s homes and warehouse, revealing large quantities of narcotics, extensive cash reserves, firearms, silencers, drug ledgers, and vacuum sealers.
• Analysis of Roberts’s seized phones, leading Detective Offutt to prepare a Rule 1006 summary spreadsheet (Exhibit 190) purporting to quantify the total drug weight moved in the conspiracy and to allocate individual quantities to each driver.

B. Charges and Trial

A superseding indictment charged:

• Count 1: 21 U.S.C. § 846 – conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana (all appellants).
• Count 2: 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) – Continuing Criminal Enterprise (Roberts).
• Count 3: 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) – conspiracy to commit money laundering, referencing four substantive theories:
  • Domestic promotional: § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i);
  • Domestic concealment: § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i);
  • International promotional: § 1956(a)(2)(A);
  • International concealment: § 1956(a)(2)(B)(i).
• Count 4: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) – firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime (McGuire – acquitted).
• Count 6: 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) – firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime (Roberts – convicted).

After an eight-day trial with extensive testimony from cooperating co-defendants, the jury:

• Convicted all five appellants on Count 1 and Count 3.
• Found that the conspiracy involved 1,000 kg or more of marijuana and that each defendant was individually responsible for, or could reasonably foresee, that quantity.
• Convicted Roberts of CCE (Count 2) and the § 924(c) firearm count (Count 6).

Sentences ranged from 48 months (Lala) to 240+120 months (concurrent and consecutive terms for Roberts), with the district court using Exhibit 190 and the Presentence Reports (PSRs) to assign large marijuana-equivalent quantities for Guideline purposes.

III. Summary of the Fifth Circuit’s Opinion

The Fifth Circuit’s substituted opinion (Judge Douglas writing) does the following:

• Rule 1006 Summary Chart (Exhibit 190)
  • Holds that Exhibit 190 was improperly admitted under Rule 1006 because its drug-quantity extrapolations were mathematically unreliable and speculative.
  • Finds the error to be plain and affecting substantial rights as to the statutory 1,000 kg finding, but not the fact of guilt.
  • Affirms McGuire’s and Sargent’s drug conspiracy convictions but vacates their statutory-quantity sentences and remands for resentencing under the default penalty provision, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D).
• Sentencing / PSR-Based Drug Quantities
  • Holds that simply adopting PSR quantities that copy Exhibit 190, without an adequate evidentiary basis, is clear error for McGuire and Sargent.
  • Vacates and remands their sentences on both the drug and money-laundering counts (because the money-laundering Guideline level was tied to the drug offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a)(1)).
  • Finds any drug-quantity error as to Lala’s sentence harmless because the district court explicitly stated it would impose the same sentence regardless.
• CCE Indictment and Constructive Amendment (Roberts)
  • Concludes the CCE count was formally deficient because it failed to specify the three predicate Controlled Substances Act violations required as “continuing series” elements after Richardson v. United States.
  • Nevertheless holds the defect harmless since Roberts had sufficient practical notice and a rational grand jury would unquestionably have charged the missing elements given the trial evidence.
  • Rejects a constructive amendment claim based on the jury instructions’ identification of predicate offenses; finds no conviction on a “different crime” from that charged.
  • Affirms the CCE conviction (Count 2).
• Money Laundering Conspiracy (Count 3)
  • Holds that there was insufficient evidence of domestic concealment money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i): the use of cash and avoidance of banks showed how money moved, not that the purpose of the transactions was to conceal.
  • Holds there was sufficient evidence of domestic promotional money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i): moving cash proceeds to pay suppliers and drivers and to buy more marijuana promoted the unlawful activity.
  • Because the jury was instructed on both domestic theories, and promotional money laundering is fully supported by the evidence, the conspiracy convictions stand, but must be recharacterized as promotional-only.
• Firearm Sentencing (Roberts – Count 6)
  • Applies Alleyne v. United States: any fact increasing a mandatory minimum (here, whether the firearm was a short-barreled rifle) is an element requiring a jury finding.
  • The indictment and instructions did not submit the short-barrel feature to the jury; the Government concedes error.
  • The § 924(c) sentence is vacated and remanded for resentencing without that unproven enhancement.
• Clerical Errors in Judgments and PSRs
  • Notes that the judgments and PSRs for Roberts, McGuire, Sargent, and Ragle erroneously describe the Count 3 conviction as involving § 1956(a)(2) (international money laundering) rather than the domestic § 1956(a)(1) theories actually submitted to the jury.
  • Orders correction under Rule 36, clarifying that each is convicted only of conspiracy to commit domestic promotional money laundering.
• Venue (Roberts)
  • Rejects a preserved challenge to venue as foreclosed by Fifth Circuit precedent holding that acts by co-conspirators in the district suffice for conspiracy venue, even if the defendant never entered that district.

The court ultimately: affirms in part, vacates in part, and remands, with individualized dispositions for each defendant.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Rule 1006 Summary Charts and Drug Quantity

1. The Role of Exhibit 190

Exhibit 190, prepared by Detective Offutt, was central to both the trial and sentencing:

• It purported to summarize voluminous Signal messages between Roberts and drivers regarding trips, drug weights, and proceeds.
• It listed, for each driver, a limited number of trips with known weights (from seizures or explicit messages) and a much larger number of trips annotated with “unk” (unknown) weight.
• Offutt then computed a single “average trip weight” of 506 lbs. from the “complete” data set and multiplied that average by each driver’s total number of trips, thereby attributing to each defendant an enormous quantity of marijuana—often well above 5,000 kg—although the overwhelming majority of trips had no measured weight.

This chart was admitted as a Rule 1006 summary exhibit and used:

• By the prosecution to argue that each defendant was individually responsible for more than 1,000 kg.
• By the probation office, which directly incorporated its quantities into the PSRs.
• By the sentencing court, which adopted the PSR findings to set Guidelines ranges.

2. Preservation and Standard of Review

The court’s first major step is clarifying preservation doctrine for evidentiary objections, especially in multi-defendant cases.

• Under United States v. Portillo and United States v. Love, a single co-defendant’s objection can preserve an issue for all, but only to the extent the specific grounds are the same.
• Roberts objected at trial under Rule 1006, but his focus was:
  • That Offutt did not review the entire 80,000-page phone extraction report; and
  • Thus, that the chart was not “representative” of all the messages.
• On appeal, McGuire and Sargent instead argued that Exhibit 190’s mathematics and methodology were inaccurate and speculative.

Citing Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1), Puckett v. United States, and other authorities, the panel holds:

• An objection must state, or make apparent from context, the specific ground, not merely the rule number.
• Roberts’s objection did not put the district court on notice that the arithmetical validity of the chart was at issue.
• Thus, the admission of Exhibit 190’s flawed extrapolations is reviewed only for plain error as to McGuire and Sargent.

3. Rule 1006 Requirements and Precedents

Rule 1006 allows a party to “use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings” that “cannot be conveniently examined in court.” The Fifth Circuit’s longstanding test (from United States v. Bishop and United States v. Spalding) requires:

1. The chart must be based on competent evidence already before the jury.
2. The underlying evidence must be available to the opposing party.
3. The preparer must be subject to cross-examination.
4. The jury must receive an appropriate limiting instruction.

But the court emphasizes a further, often under-enforced requirement drawn from cases like United States v. Scales (6th Cir.) and Fifth Circuit decisions such as Smyth, Hart, and Taylor:

• A Rule 1006 chart must be accurate and non-argumentative.
• The government may not use a “summary” chart “to assume that which it was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt as operative facts of the alleged offense.” (Hart and Taylor).
• Summaries cannot be used to manufacture evidence that does not already exist in the record.

Thus, while Rule 1006 raises summaries to the status of evidence, courts must be “cautious” and ensure that charts do not embed speculative or argumentative inferences as though they were raw facts.

4. Why Exhibit 190 Was Erroneous

The panel undertakes an unusually detailed deconstruction of Exhibit 190’s mathematics and logic:

• Across all drivers, the 33 trips with known weights total about 4,079 lbs, which would yield an average of only about 124 lbs per trip—far from 506 lbs.
• In a separate section (“conversations with sources”), Offutt grouped certain deliveries into “trips” and recalculated weights, but:
  • He made at least seven arithmetic errors in summing delivery weights.
  • He omitted several known-weight deliveries from the calculation entirely, for no explained reason.
  • Including the omitted values would drop the mean to about 417 lbs and the median to about 196 lbs, again far from 506 lbs.
  • The data set exhibits a very high standard deviation (~990 lbs), highlighting that an “average” is a weak proxy for any given trip.
• Offutt labeled many trip weights “unk” (unknown), but nevertheless treated them as if each weighed exactly 506 lbs, and replaced known weights with the average in some instances.
• He never explained how he arrived at the number of “trips” per driver or how he assigned particular trips to particular drivers in the grouped data.
• He himself described his extrapolated quantities as “guesstimates” that were not double-checked.

The court concludes that Exhibit 190 did not merely summarize the evidence; it created new, speculative “evidence” of drug quantity:

“Supplanting known drug quantities with an average value and then extrapolating that number—without any competent explanation regarding the calculation—manufactures evidence of unproven facts.”

That violates Rule 1006’s core premise that a summary must “prove the content” of voluminous underlying materials, not generate new facts.

5. Plain Error and Its Consequences

Under the four-part plain-error test (Olano and Puckett):

1. Error: Admission of Exhibit 190 as a Rule 1006 summary was error because it lacked a reliable factual and mathematical predicate.
2. Clear or obvious: The error was obvious—no reasonable dispute—after close examination of the spreadsheet; summary charts cannot fairly be based on admitted “guesstimates.”
3. Affecting substantial rights: The chart was a “focal point” of the government’s drug-quantity proof. Without it, there is a “reasonable probability” that the jury would have assigned a lower quantity to McGuire and Sargent, changing their statutory penalty range. The court emphasizes that while jurors may draw their own reasonable inferences, the government cannot use a defective summary to prove a statutory threshold (1,000 kg) that it has not otherwise established beyond a reasonable doubt.
4. Seriously affecting fairness, integrity, or public reputation: Attributing “hypothetical quantities of drugs masquerading as hard evidence” undermines the legitimacy of criminal adjudication. The court stresses that verdicts must be “superior to all suspicion” (quoting Blackstone via Ramos v. Louisiana).

However, the remedy is carefully limited:

• The error goes to quantity, not to the existence of the conspiracy or each defendant’s knowing participation. The record still amply supports the convictions themselves.
• Thus, the court:
  • Affirms McGuire’s and Sargent’s convictions on Count 1.
  • Vacates only the statutory 1,000 kg finding and related sentences, and remands for resentencing under § 841(b)(1)(D), which is the default marijuana penalty provision without a quantity-driven mandatory minimum.

6. Lala’s Distinct Sufficiency Challenge

Lala attacked Exhibit 190’s reliability too—but framed it as a sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, not as a Rule 1006 admissibility challenge. That distinction is crucial:

• On sufficiency review, the appellate court must consider all the evidence as admitted at trial, even if some should have been excluded, and then ask whether a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Reliability critiques and impeachment of Offutt went to the weight and credibility of Exhibit 190, which the jury was entitled to assess.
• Given the chart was in evidence and the jury heard thorough cross-examination about its limitations, the court concludes a rational jury could still find Lala responsible (or foreseeably responsible) for over 1,000 kg.

Accordingly, Lala’s drug conspiracy conviction and quantity finding are affirmed, and his sentence—already below the Guidelines and anchored in an explicit variance rationale—is left undisturbed.

B. Sentencing: PSR Reliability and Approximation of Drug Quantities

Separate from trial admissibility, the panel scrutinizes how the district court used Exhibit 190 at sentencing:

• The PSRs for McGuire, Sargent, and Lala incorporated wholesale Offutt’s extrapolated quantities (e.g., 5,060 kg for McGuire; 2,530 kg for Lala), and the court adopted those findings.
• Under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.5, courts may approximate drug quantity when seizures do not reflect the scale of the offense, but such approximations must still rest on evidence with “sufficient indicia of reliability” (Alford; Rudolph; Melendez).

As to McGuire and Sargent:

• Both filed specific objections to the PSR’s quantity calculations, pointing to Exhibit 190’s known inaccuracies and its unsound averaging method.
• The sentencing court overruled the objections largely by reference to the PSR and its own recollection of trial, without independently addressing the reliability of the underlying methodology.
• The Fifth Circuit holds this to be clear error:
  • A PSR is not self-validating; its facts must have an “adequate evidentiary basis.”
  • Here, that basis (Exhibit 190) had already been shown to be deeply flawed.
  • Adopting those quantities without further analysis fails the “sufficient indicia of reliability” standard.
• The court vacates McGuire’s and Sargent’s sentences on both Count 1 and Count 3, because the money-laundering base offense level (U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a)(1)) was pegged to the drug offense level for Count 1.

As to Lala, however:

• The court assumes arguendo that his quantity finding may suffer from similar issues but applies the Fifth Circuit’s two-prong harmless-error test (Halverson; Ibarra-Luna): the government must show (1) the district court would have imposed the same sentence regardless; and (2) for the same reasons.
• The sentencing judge explicitly stated that “irrespective if [it was] wrong on the drug amounts, this still [was] the sentence that [the court] would impose”, in light of Lala’s criminal history, safety-valve eligibility, role, remorse, behavior on bond, military service, and avoidance of disparity.
• This satisfies both prongs. Error, if any, was harmless, and Lala’s sentence is affirmed.

C. CCE Indictment, Richardson, and Constructive Amendment (Roberts)

1. Indictment Sufficiency After Richardson

Roberts was charged under 21 U.S.C. § 848(a), which defines a “continuing criminal enterprise” as involving a “continuing series of violations” of the Controlled Substances Act committed in concert with five or more persons over whom the defendant occupies a managerial role, from which he derives substantial income or resources.

In Richardson v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the “continuing series of violations” consists of separate predicate offenses that are themselves elements of the CCE charge; the jury must unanimously agree on which specific violations constitute the series.

Thus, under Russell v. United States and later Fifth Circuit cases (e.g., Davis), an indictment must:

• “Fully, directly, and expressly” set forth each element of the offense; and
• Provide sufficient factual detail to inform the accused of the specific charge and to permit a double-jeopardy plea in bar of future prosecutions.

The CCE count here alleged that Roberts:

• Violated § 846 (the conspiracy charged in Count 1), which was “part of a continuing series of violations of the Controlled Substances Act,” undertaken with at least five other persons, from which he derived substantial income/resources.

But it only concretely identified the conspiracy in Count 1 as a predicate violation and then generically referenced a “continuing series” of other unspecified violations.

The panel holds:

• After Richardson, the “violations” forming the “continuing series” are independent elements and thus must be specifically charged in the indictment.
• Count 2 is therefore formally deficient: a single conspiracy cannot be repackaged as three separate predicate CSA violations.
• The government appropriately concedes this deficiency and shifts to a harmless-error argument under Dentler and Robinson.

2. Harmless Error: Notice and Grand Jury Function

Under Dentler, the court examines:

1. Whether the defendant had sufficient notice of the missing element; and
2. Whether the defendant was harmed by losing the grand jury’s screening function on that element—i.e., whether any rational grand jury would have found probable cause to charge it given the evidence.

As to notice:

• Roberts emphasizes that the indictment’s wording suggested that Count 1 was the only specific predicate.
• The record, however, shows that throughout trial the government:
  • Consistently treated Roberts’s numerous substantive CSA violations (e.g., possession with intent to distribute marijuana, use of communication facilities in drug trafficking) as the building blocks of CCE.
  • Explicitly proposed in the charge conference using:
    • A substantive § 841 drug-trafficking violation, and
    • A § 843(b) “use of a communication facility” violation
    as the other two predicates, in addition to the conspiracy.
• Roberts does not show how his defense would have differed if these predicate offenses had been listed in the indictment from the start.
• Unlike Adams (a tax case where the defective indictment misdirected the nature of the alleged false statement and thus likely changed the defense strategy), here the same conduct and evidence (Roberts’s role directing large-scale marijuana trafficking) underlies both the conspiracy count and the substantive predicates.

As to the grand jury’s function:

• The court looks, per Suarez and Robinson, to whether “any rational grand jury” viewing the evidence would have found probable cause to charge the missing elements.
• Given the voluminous trial evidence of Roberts’s direct involvement in repeated marijuana transactions and use of communication devices, the answer is clearly yes.

Accordingly, the CCE-indictment defect, though real, is deemed harmless, and the CCE conviction stands.

3. Constructive Amendment Claim

Roberts separately argues that the jury instructions constructively amended the indictment by specifying predicate offenses not listed in Count 2, risking conviction on an unindicted offense. Under Stirone and Fifth Circuit cases (e.g., Gonzales, Dentler), a constructive amendment occurs when:

• The court’s or prosecutor’s actions allow conviction based on a different set of essential facts or a materially different theory than that charged; and
• The defendant is effectively convicted of a “separate crime” from the one in the indictment.

Applying plain error review (because the objection below went to wording, not amendment), the panel:

• Distinguishes decisions like Hoover, Chambers, and the earlier Adams, where the government proved and the jury was instructed on factual theories (e.g., different false statements, different interstate commerce path) not charged in the indictment.
• Emphasizes that here, the core crime—CCE based on CSA violations involving marijuana—is unchanged.
• The addition of specific substantive § 841 and § 843(b) predicates via instructions did not transform the nature of the charge; rather, it supplied the elements that the indictment had in overly generic terms.

Because Roberts cannot show conviction on a separate crime or specific prejudice from the variance between the indictment and the instructions, the constructive-amendment claim fails, and the CCE conviction is affirmed.

D. Money Laundering Conspiracy: Promotion vs. Concealment

1. Statutory Framework and Theories Charged

Count 3 charged conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) to violate multiple substantive theories:

• Domestic promotional money laundering (§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i));
• Domestic concealment money laundering (§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i));
• International promotional and concealment theories under § 1956(a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(B)(i).

At trial, the court narrowed the charge and jury instructions to the two domestic theories only, excluding the international prongs. The judgments and PSRs mistakenly recited the international subsections, a clerical error later corrected under Rule 36.

2. Concealment Money Laundering: Cuellar and Brown Applied

Under § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), the government must prove that:

1. The defendant conducted a financial transaction with proceeds of specified unlawful activity; and
2. The transaction was “designed in whole or in part” to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds.

In Cuellar v. United States, the Supreme Court held that:

• Mere physical concealment or secretive transport of cash (e.g., hidden compartments) is not enough.
• The statute focuses on the design or purpose of the transaction (the “why”), not just the manner (the “how”).
• If the purpose of moving the money is simply to pay co-conspirators or return proceeds, and concealment is only incidental to moving it safely, § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) is not satisfied.

The Fifth Circuit adopted this approach in United States v. Brown, requiring proof that the defendants intended to make it more difficult for the government to trace or demonstrate the nature of funds as proceeds of illegal activity—e.g., by structuring deposits, cycling funds through accounts, or otherwise disguising their origins.

In McGuire, the government’s concealment theory relied heavily on:

• Use of cash (no banks, no electronic transfers);
• Vacuum-sealing currency, hiding it in vans, avoiding “drug corridors,” and leaving no documentation; and
• The general aim to “avoid detection” and not “get caught.”

The panel finds this inadequate under Cuellar and Brown:

• These facts speak to how the money was moved, not to a distinct purpose to disguise its nature, source, or ownership.
• The evident purpose of moving the money was to pay for marijuana and compensate participants in the trafficking scheme—classic “paying the bills” of the illegal enterprise—not to create a false paper trail or integration layer.
• Unlike Brown, there was no evidence of bank deposits, structuring, or layering of funds to obscure their criminal origin.

Therefore, as a matter of insufficient evidence, the conspiracy to commit domestic concealment money laundering cannot be sustained.

3. Promotional Money Laundering: A Broader, Satisfied Standard

By contrast, § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (promotional money laundering) requires that:

1. The defendant conducted or attempted a financial transaction;
2. Knowing it involved proceeds of unlawful activity; and
3. With the intent to promote the carrying on of that unlawful activity.

Important precedents:

• Puig-Infante: Merely driving cash around is not, by itself, a “financial transaction” unless there is some “disposition”—a giving over into the care or possession of another, or use of a financial institution.
• Lozano: Delivering drug proceeds to a co-conspirator for continued activity is a “financial transaction.”
• Wilson and Brown: Using proceeds to pay co-conspirators or buy more drugs clearly promotes the unlawful activity.
• Trejo and Stanford: Evidence that the defendant understands the scheme’s inner workings and is extensively involved can support the inference that he intended to further it by moving proceeds.

The Fifth Circuit emphasizes that:

• The statute does not require a sophisticated laundering operation or reinvestment in legitimate fronts; it is enough that the proceeds be used in ways that keep the underlying crime going.
• Paying drivers, reimbursing expenses, compensating growers, and purchasing more marijuana all qualify as “promotion.”

Applying these principles, the panel concludes that for each appellant (except Lala, who did not appeal Count 3) the evidence sufficed:

• McGuire:
  • Identified as a regular driver.
  • Found with $13,000 in cash along with 112 kg of marijuana and THC products.
  • Text messages using code (“paperwork”) and photo evidence of vacuum-sealed cash.
  • Testimony that he, like other drivers, delivered proceeds to Roberts, knowing they were drug receipts used to fund the enterprise.
• Roberts:
  • Received large amounts of cash at his residences and warehouse.
  • Admitted the cash was drug proceeds.
  • Distributed funds to drivers and used them to buy more marijuana.
  • Such conduct directly “promoted” the continuing conspiracy.
• Ragle:
  • Admitted to delivering marijuana and accepting cash for it.
  • Recruited another driver and knew how proceeds were cycled back to Dallas.
  • His role in the financial side of trips shows an agreement to move and deliver proceeds, promoting the ongoing operation.
• Sargent:
  • One of the first drivers; present when Clark was recruited and reassured him about the nature of the trip: taking marijuana to Buffalo and bringing back proceeds.
  • Thus aware that the mission included delivering cash proceeds to Roberts.

Given this evidence, the panel holds that each appellant (other than Lala) conspired to commit promotional money laundering: they joined an agreement under which drug proceeds would be transported and delivered to Roberts, with knowledge that these funds would be used to keep the trafficking business running.

4. Multi-Object Conspiracy and the Effect of an Unsupported Theory

Critically, Count 3 charged a multi-object conspiracy (promotion and concealment). The jury returned a general verdict of guilty, without specifying which object(s) it agreed on.

Under Griffin v. United States, when a conspiracy or general verdict count rests on multiple factual theories, a conviction is sustainable so long as one factual theory is supported by sufficient evidence, even if another is factually unsupported (as opposed to legally invalid). Here:

• Concealment money laundering is factually unsupported but not legally invalid.
• Promotional money laundering is both legally valid and factually supported.

Accordingly, the conspiracy convictions stand on the promotional money-laundering object alone. The court therefore:

• Affirms all Count 3 convictions as conspiracies to commit promotional money laundering.
• Orders that the judgments and PSRs be amended to reflect only domestic promotional money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) as the underlying substantive theory.

E. Firearm Sentencing and Alleyne (Roberts – Count 6)

Roberts was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The government and district court treated the firearm as a short-barreled rifle, which carries a higher mandatory minimum.

In Alleyne v. United States, the Supreme Court held that any fact that increases a statutory mandatory minimum is an element of the offense and must therefore be:

• Charged in the indictment;
• Submitted to the jury; and
• Proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Fifth Circuit (citing its own Curry decision) notes:

• The short-barrel characteristic was neither alleged nor found by the jury.
• Yet it was used to increase Roberts’s mandatory minimum under § 924(c).
• The government concedes this is error under Alleyne.

Thus, the § 924(c) sentence is vacated and remanded for resentencing without that unproven enhancement. The underlying firearm conviction itself remains intact.

F. Clerical Errors in Judgments and PSRs (Rule 36)

The indictment’s Count 3 referenced both domestic and international money-laundering theories. But the district court explicitly narrowed the jury instructions to domestic theories under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(1)(B)(i), and the jury convicted on that narrower instruction.

Nevertheless, for Roberts, McGuire, Sargent, and Ragle:

• The written judgments and PSRs erroneously described the conviction as involving § 1956(a)(2)(A) and (a)(2)(B)(i)—the international subsections.

Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 (as interpreted in Mackay, Buendia-Rangel, and Steen), the court may correct clerical errors—cases where “the court intended one thing but by merely clerical mistake or oversight did another.”

The Fifth Circuit holds:

• This is a classic Rule 36 situation: the oral instructions and verdict clearly concerned only domestic theories.
• On remand, the district court must amend the judgments and PSRs to:
  • Substitute § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) (promotional) for § 1956(a)(2)(A);
  • Remove concealment and international references; and
  • Reflect that the convictions rest solely on conspiracy to commit domestic promotional money laundering.

G. Venue (Roberts)

Roberts preserved a challenge to venue in the Eastern District of Texas, arguing that the government failed to show that any part of the offenses occurred there.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) and Fifth Circuit precedent (Romans, Thomas, Caldwell, Garcia Mendoza):

• Venue for conspiracy offenses is proper in any district where an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurred.
• Acts by any co-conspirator can establish venue for all members of the conspiracy, even if a particular defendant never personally entered that district.

Because co-conspirators engaged in distribution and related acts in the Eastern District of Texas, venue was plainly proper. Roberts acknowledges that his argument is foreclosed by controlling case law but raises it to preserve the issue for potential further review. The court affirms the venue determination.

V. Key Precedents and How They Shaped the Decision

The opinion integrates a wide range of precedent. Some of the most influential strands are:

• Rule 1006 and evidentiary gatekeeping:
  • Spalding; Bishop; Smyth; Ocampo-Vergara; Hart; Taylor; Scales – establishing the accuracy, non-argumentative character, and non-substitutive role of summary evidence.
  • Puckett; Olano; Fed. R. Evid. 103 – setting rigorous standards for preservation and plain error review.
• Sentencing reliability:
  • Alford; Sanders; Rudolph; Melendez; Harris – requiring that PSR facts have adequate evidentiary support and that objections can trigger deeper reliability scrutiny.
  • Halverson; Ibarra-Luna – articulating the two-part harmless-error test for Guidelines miscalculations.
• CCE and indictment sufficiency:
  • Richardson – treating each predicate CSA violation in a CCE as a separate element requiring unanimity.
  • Russell; Davis; Dentler; Robinson; Suarez; Adams; Soto-Beniquez – defining when missing elements constitute reversible indictment error versus harmless defects.
• Money laundering:
  • Cuellar; Brown – drawing a sharp line between concealment as a purpose versus mere secretive transport.
  • Puig-Infante; Lozano; Wilson; Trejo; Stanford – clarifying “financial transaction,” “disposition,” and “intent to promote.”
  • Griffin (implicitly) – permitting general verdicts to stand when at least one factual theory is supported by sufficient evidence.
• Apprendi/Alleyne and firearm sentencing:
  • Alleyne; Curry – making firearm-specific characteristics that alter mandatory minimums a jury issue.
• Clerical corrections:
  • Mackay; Buendia-Rangel; Steen – recognizing PSRs and judgments as correctable under Rule 36 when they misstate what the court actually decided.
• Venue:
  • Romans; Thomas; Caldwell; Garcia Mendoza – applying broad conspiracy-venue principles to multi-district drug cases.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

The opinion uses several technical doctrines. In simplified terms:

• Rule 1006 summary chart: A way to present complicated or voluminous records (like thousands of text messages) as a single chart or spreadsheet. It is allowed only if:
  • The underlying data is available;
  • The chart accurately reflects the data; and
  • The chart does not sneak in speculation or advocacy under the label of “summary.”
• Plain error: An appellate rule used when no specific objection was made in the trial court. The appellant must show:
  1. There was an error;
  2. It was clear or obvious;
  3. It affected substantial rights (usually changed the outcome); and
  4. It seriously affected the fairness or integrity of the proceedings.
• Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE): A special federal charge for drug kingpins (21 U.S.C. § 848) that requires proof that:
  • The defendant committed a felony drug offense;
  • That offense is part of a “continuing series” of at least three drug violations;
  • He acted in concert with at least five others, in a leadership role; and
  • He obtained substantial income or resources from it.
  • Each of the “continuing series” violations is itself an element the grand jury must charge and the jury must unanimously find.
• Promotional vs. concealment money laundering:
  • Promotional: Using criminal proceeds to keep the crime going—for example, paying couriers or buying more drugs. Simple payments can qualify.
  • Concealment: Structuring or handling proceeds to hide their criminal origin—for example, layering accounts, disguising the recipient, or creating fake businesses. Merely using cash and avoiding banks, by itself, is generally not enough.
• PSR (Presentence Investigation Report): A report prepared by probation before sentencing, summarizing:
  • Offense conduct;
  • Criminal history;
  • Guidelines calculations (including drug quantity); and
  • Any other sentencing factors.
  • Courts may rely on PSRs, but only if their factual content has a reliable evidentiary basis.
• Default penalty provision for marijuana (21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D)):
  • If the government and jury do not establish a specific, higher statutory threshold quantity (like 1,000 kg), the offense is punished under a default penalty range with a lower maximum and no quantity-driven mandatory minimum.
• Multi-object conspiracy:
  • A single conspiracy count can include more than one illegal objective (e.g., promote and conceal). The jury can convict even if not every object is proven, so long as at least one object is supported by sufficient evidence and is legally valid.

VII. Practical and Doctrinal Impact

A. Rule 1006 Charts and Drug Quantity Proof

McGuire is a cautionary tale for prosecutors and trial courts:

• Summary charts that extrapolate beyond known data—especially across unknown values labeled “unk”—are dangerous if the methodology is not clearly explained and mathematically sound.
• In large drug cases, where statutory thresholds (e.g., 1,000 kg) drive mandatory minimums, the government cannot rely on “guesstimates” dressed up as Rule 1006 summaries to prove drug quantity beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Defense counsel should:
  • Object specifically to the methodology and arithmetic of summary charts, not just to their completeness;
  • Use cross-examination to expose flaws; and
  • Renew objections at sentencing if PSRs adopt those flawed charts.
• District courts must perform gatekeeping:
  • Ensure summary charts accurately mirror the underlying data;
  • Exclude or limit charts that combine raw data with speculative inferences; and
  • Make independent findings at sentencing rather than simply adopting PSRs anchored in questionable summaries.

B. Sentencing Factfinding and PSR Reliance

On sentencing, McGuire reinforces that:

• Approximations of drug quantity are permitted, but the approximating method must itself be supported by evidence.
• A PSR does not cure the unreliability of its sources. “[M]ere inclusion in the PSR does not convert facts lacking an adequate evidentiary basis with sufficient indicia of reliability into facts a district court may rely upon.”
• Defense objections that point to concrete flaws (rather than mere disagreement) are sufficient to require the court to look beyond the PSR and assess reliability directly.

C. Tightening Concealment Money Laundering in Cash Drug Businesses

The opinion also solidifies—and makes more visible in the Fifth Circuit—the practical boundary between:

• Merely doing a drug business in cash (however secretively); and
• Engaging in concealment money laundering aimed at disguising the criminal nature of the funds.

For drug cases where:

• Participants avoid banks;
• Use vacuum-sealed currency; and
• Transport large amounts of cash in vehicles,

the opinion makes clear that such facts, standing alone, will generally not support a § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) conviction. Prosecutors who want concealment-theory charges must:

• Identify purposeful steps to disguise ownership, origin, or nature (e.g., sham invoices, shell companies, commingling schemes, structured deposits); and
• Provide evidence—direct or circumstantial—that such concealment was a purpose of the transactions, not a side effect of moving cash.

D. Promotional Money Laundering Remains Broad

On the other hand, the bar for promotional money laundering is relatively low:

• Any arrangement in which participants handle proceeds with the understanding that the money will be used to continue the crime or to compensate participants for their role can fit.
• Simple cash deliveries to the leader of a drug ring, reimbursement of expenses, and continuing purchase of contraband are all fertile ground for § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) charges.

Thus, McGuire simultaneously:

• Narrows concealment money laundering by enforcing Cuellar and Brown in a cash-only context; and
• Confirms the breadth of promotional money laundering as a tool for prosecuting financial aspects of drug conspiracies.

E. CCE Pleading “Best Practices” After McGuire

The CCE portion of the opinion sends a warning to indicting authorities:

• After Richardson, prudence dictates that a CCE count should:
  • Either explicitly list each of the three (or more) predicate CSA violations in the text of the count; or
  • Clearly incorporate by reference specific substantive counts in the indictment as the predicates.
• Relying only on generic “continuing series” language, plus one identified conspiracy predicate, risks future challenges, especially if:
  • The trial evidence or instructions bring in unindicted predicate offenses; or
  • The defense can articulate how its trial strategy would have changed had the elements been explicitly pleaded.

While McGuire ultimately deems the defect harmless for Roberts, the analysis is fact-specific and not a free pass. Future cases may well see CCE charges dismissed where notice or grand jury prejudice is clearer.

F. Apprendi/Alleyne Vigilance for Firearm Enhancements

The vacatur of Roberts’s § 924(c) sentence underscores an increasingly unforgiving environment for sentencing enhancements enforced without jury findings:

• Any firearm characteristic (e.g., short barrel, silencer) that changes the mandatory minimum or statutory range is an element, not a mere sentencing factor.
• Charging instruments and verdict forms should be drafted with this in mind to avoid remands and resentencings.

G. Multi-Defendant Trials and Coordinated Objections

Finally, the opinion has a practical lesson for defense teams:

• While one defendant’s objection can, in principle, preserve issues for all, the objection must be framed with enough specificity to alert the court to the precise error.
• Simply invoking an evidentiary rule (e.g., “Rule 1006”) without identifying which aspect is problematic (completeness, foundation, mathematical accuracy, hearsay) may leave important grounds unpreserved.
• Co-defendants should coordinate to ensure that all relevant grounds are articulated, especially where a single exhibit (like Exhibit 190) is central to multiple defendants’ fates.

VIII. Conclusion

United States v. McGuire is a dense, multi-issue opinion, but three overarching themes emerge:

1. Accuracy and transparency in summary evidence:
   • The decision meaningfully tightens the reins on Rule 1006 charts, signaling that courts must scrutinize their mathematical and logical underpinnings when they drive core elements like drug quantity.
   • Speculation, “guesstimates,” and unexplained extrapolations cannot be smuggled in under the rubric of “summary” and then treated as hard evidence.
2. Careful differentiation within money-laundering theories:
   • The court faithfully applies Cuellar and Brown to reject concealment money laundering that is based merely on using cash and avoiding financial institutions.
   • At the same time, it confirms a broad, durable role for promotional money laundering where proceeds finance the continuation of the underlying crime.
3. Guarding procedural fairness without overturning meritorious convictions:
   • CCE pleading defects, PSR-based Guideline errors, and firearm sentencing missteps are corrected through targeted remedies: resentencing, corrections of judgments, and remand instructions—while still affirming convictions that are strongly supported by the trial record.

In the broader legal landscape, McGuire stands as a prominent Fifth Circuit precedent on:

• How far Rule 1006 summary evidence may go in reconstructing drug quantities;
• How strictly courts will apply the “why, not how” distinction for concealment money laundering in cash-heavy drug operations; and
• How to balance technical pleading and sentencing errors against the practical realities of notice, fairness, and evidentiary strength.

For practitioners in federal criminal law—especially in narcotics and financial crime prosecutions—this opinion offers both a warning and a roadmap: a warning against overreliance on questionable summary techniques and generalized money-laundering theories, and a roadmap for structuring evidence, indictments, and sentencing records that will endure on appellate review.