United States v. McFarlane: Post-Esteras Deference to District-Court Discretion in Upward Variances on Supervised-Release Revocations

Introduction

In United States v. Yackeem McFarlane, No. 24-11512 (11th Cir. June 30 2025) (non-published, non-argument calendar), the Eleventh Circuit addressed whether an 18-month term of imprisonment—double the top of the advisory policy-statement range—imposed after revocation of supervised release was “substantively unreasonable.” The panel (Jordan, Branch, and Kidd, JJ., per curiam) affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in upwardly varying nine months above the range because the sentence was grounded in permissible 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) considerations, properly weighed, and consistent with the deferential standard of review for revocation sentences.

Although designated “Do Not Publish,” the opinion is notable for two reasons. First, it applies the Supreme Court’s fresh decision in Esteras v. United States, __ U.S.__, 2025 WL 1716137 (June 20 2025), which clarified that only eight of the ten § 3553(a) factors are cross-referenced in § 3583(e). Second, it reinforces an expansive conception of district-court discretion after Esteras, especially when addressing repeated, deceit-laden violations viewed as a “breach of trust.”

Summary of the Judgment

Background. McFarlane was serving five years of supervised release after a 2013 narcotics conviction. In 2024, a petition alleged eleven Grade C violations, including unauthorized travel, employment failures, electronic monitoring violations, missed appointments, and lying to the probation officer.
Guideline Range. Under Chapter 7 policy statements, his range was 3–9 months.
District Court. Adopting the U.S. Probation Office’s recommendation, the court imposed 18 months’ imprisonment with no further supervision.
Issue on Appeal. Whether the 18-month sentence is “substantively unreasonable” because the court allegedly over-weighted the violations and under-weighted mitigating evidence, thereby misapplying the § 3553(a) factors.
Holding. The Eleventh Circuit, applying an abuse-of-discretion standard, affirmed. The panel declined to find the sentence outside the universe of “reasonable” sentences in light of McFarlane’s repeated and deceptive conduct.

Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Esteras v. United States, 2025 (U.S.)
- Clarified that § 3583(e) expressly omits two sentencing goals—“just punishment” and “respect for the law.”
- The McFarlane panel references Esteras to underscore that the district court relied only on the eight permissible factors. This reference signals an emerging doctrinal guardrail against using § 3553(a)(2)(A) rationales (“retribution”) in revocation cases.
United States v. King, 57 F.4th 1334 (11th Cir. 2023)
Reaffirmed the deferential abuse-of-discretion review for substantive reasonableness in revocation contexts.
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
Provided the three-part test for abuse of discretion—failure to consider a relevant factor, consideration of an improper factor, or clear error in weighing factors.
United States v. Gomez, 955 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2020)
Outlined the statutory cross-reference structure between § 3583(e) and § 3553(a).
United States v. Woodson, 30 F.4th 1295 (11th Cir. 2022) and companions (Riley, Clay, Amedeo, Sweeting)
Each confirmed that (i) weight accorded to any factor lies within district-court discretion, and (ii) a sentence above but within statutory maximum rarely triggers reversal absent irrational balancing.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

The panel framed its analysis through the “totality of the circumstances.” Key reasoning threads included:

Proper Factors Considered. The district court expressly noted: (1) nature and circumstances of the breach, (2) defendant’s personal/family characteristics, (3) deterrence and public protection, and (4) sentencing-range guidance. By referencing only the eight § 3553(a) factors authorized under § 3583(e), the court satisfied Esteras.
Weight Allocation. Emphasis on breach-of-trust principle: 11 violations, deception (“lying to the probation officer”), and prior leniency (home detention and community service modifications) justified enhanced punishment.
Proportionality and Statutory Ceiling. The 18-month term was far below the five-year maximum available, reinforcing reasonableness.
Mitigation Addressed. While acknowledging family hardship and minimal criminal history, the district court exercised its prerogative to give those items less weight; Eleventh Circuit precedent does not obligate equal treatment (Clay).

C. Anticipated Impact of the Decision

Because the opinion is “unpublished,” it is not binding within the Eleventh Circuit. Nevertheless, its functional guidance—especially its overt reliance on Esteras—will likely:

Solidify Post-Esteras Sentencing Protocols. District courts may treat the eight explicitly referenced § 3553(a) factors as both necessary and sufficient, while consciously avoiding just-punishment rationales.
Encourage Upward Variances When Repeated Deception Exists. The panel’s acceptance of a variance that doubled the advisory range signals that similar deviations survive review when supported by a documented pattern of non-compliance.
Guide Practitioners on Appeal Strategy. Defense counsel now face a higher bar; absent procedural error or truly egregious variance, substantive unreasonableness arguments will rarely succeed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Substantive Reasonableness. Focuses on what sentence was imposed, not how the court got there. A sentence is substantively unreasonable only if it is shockingly high or low in view of permissible factors.
Upward Variance vs. Departure. An upward variance relies on § 3553(a) factors to impose a sentence above the guideline range; a departure relies on provisions within the Guidelines themselves. Here, the variance came from policy statements, not a formal departure.
Grade C Violation. Under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1, a Grade C violation encompasses conduct constituting a federal, state, or local offense punishable by imprisonment of one year or less, or violating another condition of supervision. It produces a modest range (here, 3–9 months).
Abuse-of-Discretion Standard. A highly deferential appellate lens; the panel will overturn only if the lower court ignored a major factor, relied on an impermissible factor, or made a clear judgment error.
Breach of Trust Principle. Chapter 7 policy statements emphasize that revocation sentences primarily punish the violator’s failure to honor the court’s trust, not the gravity of the underlying offense.

Conclusion

United States v. McFarlane reinforces the post-Esteras landscape: district courts retain broad discretion to impose substantial upward variances upon revoking supervised release, provided they confine themselves to the eight permissible § 3553(a) factors and articulate a rational nexus between repeated violations and sentencing objectives. For practitioners, the case underscores that mere disagreement with the district court’s weighting—especially in the face of a documented pattern of dishonesty— is unlikely to carry the day on appeal. In the broader scheme, the opinion signals that the Eleventh Circuit will continue to afford considerable latitude to revocation judges, cementing a “trust-centric” philosophy in dealing with supervised-release violations.