United States v. Marcle: Standards for Imposing Post-Revocation Supervised Release

Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Jerry William Marcle (No. 25-10362, decided April 28, 2025) clarifies the district court’s discretion in revoking supervised release and imposing a new term of supervision. Marcle pleaded guilty in 2019 to conspiracy to distribute and possess methamphetamine. After serving a custodial sentence, he began a three-year term of supervised release. During that term he tested positive multiple times for cocaine and marijuana, admitted relapses, and failed to participate consistently in court-mandated substance-abuse treatment. The District Court revoked his supervised release, sentenced him to seven months’ imprisonment, and re-imposed 29 months of supervision. On appeal, Marcle contended the term of supervised release was an unreasonable upward variance. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

Summary of the Judgment

The District Court found Marcle violated five conditions of his supervised release: multiple uses of cocaine and marijuana and failure to participate in treatment.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), the court revoked release, imposed seven months’ imprisonment (within the 3–9-month advisory guideline range), and then imposed 29 months of supervised release.
Marcle argued the supervision term was substantively unreasonable—an upward variance with no guiding basis. The Eleventh Circuit applied the “abuse of discretion” standard and refused to disturb the sentence.
The Court held that the District Court adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors—nature of violations, Marcle’s history, the need for treatment, deterrence, and protection of the public—and provided a sufficient justification for the new term of supervision.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The Eleventh Circuit relied on established authority to review supervised-release revocations:

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (revocation, modification, and extension of supervised release).
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (factors to be considered in imposing sentence or revoking release).
United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349, 1354–55 (11th Cir. 2022) and Velasquez Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248, 1252 (11th Cir. 2008): District courts review revocation sentences for abuse of discretion.
United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010, en banc): Clarifies “substantive reasonableness” and the “definite and firm conviction” standard.
United States v. Early, 686 F.3d 1219 (11th Cir. 2012): Requirements for justifying upward variances.
United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2016): Deference to district courts on weighing § 3553(a) factors.
United States v. Boone, 97 F.4th 1331 (11th Cir. 2024): Burden of proof for substantive unreasonableness.
United States v. Fox, 926 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2019): District court need not defer to parties’ sentencing agreements.

Legal Reasoning

To revoke supervised release and impose additional punishment, a district court must:

Find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated release conditions.
Consider the relevant 3553(a) factors: offense seriousness, defendant’s history and characteristics, the need for deterrence, protection of the public, and appropriate rehabilitation measures.
Determine the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range. Under U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, Marcle’s Grade A/B controlled-substance violations and his criminal history yielded a 3–9 month guideline range for incarceration and no mandatory supervision term.
Exercise discretion to select a sentence “sufficient but not greater than necessary” to meet statutory goals.

Here, the court imposed seven months’ imprisonment (mid-range) and 29 months of new supervised release. It explained that ongoing supervision and treatment were necessary given Marcle’s repeated relapses, limited truthfulness, and history of trauma that had fueled his addiction. The court emphasized that Marcle’s recovery would require sustained support beyond incarceration.

Impact

This decision underscores that:

District courts have broad discretion to impose post-revocation supervised release terms—even if advisory guidelines suggest none—when warranted by the § 3553(a) factors.
Court-mandated treatment and supervision remain key tools to address chronic substance‐abuse disorders.
Appellate courts will not substitute their judgment for the district court’s reasoned balancing absent a clear abuse of discretion.

Lower courts should ensure that their revocation sentences—especially upward variances—are supported by explicit findings on the need for continued supervision and rehabilitation.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised Release vs. Probation: Supervised release follows imprisonment and allows courts to monitor and assist defendants reentering society. Probation replaces imprisonment altogether.
§ 3553(a) Factors: Statutory criteria guiding sentencing decisions, including the nature of the offense, the defendant’s background, public safety, and the need for rehabilitation.
Grade A/B/C Violations (U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1):
- Grade A: New crimes punishable by >1 year or firearm offenses.
- Grade B: Other offenses punishable by >1 year.
- Grade C: Offenses punishable by ≤1 year or other conditions-of-release violations.
Advisory Guidelines Range: A nonbinding range of months that courts consider when revoking release.
Substantive Reasonableness: Whether the length or conditions of a sentence fall within a reasonable application of § 3553(a). Appellate courts defer heavily to district courts’ judgments.
Upward Variance: When a court imposes a sentence above the advisory range. It must articulate compelling reasons for the variance.

Conclusion

United States v. Marcle reaffirms district courts’ authority under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3583(e) & 3553(a) to tailor supervised-release revocation sentences, including added supervision terms when necessary for public protection and rehabilitation. The Eleventh Circuit’s refusal to disturb the seven-month custody term plus 29 months of supervision highlights that appellate review will uphold a reasoned, well-justified exercise of discretion even when it deviates from the parties’ expectations or the advisory guidelines.