United States v. Marc Anthony: Third Circuit clarifies that mental impairment and low Miranda-comprehension testing do not, without police coercion, invalidate a Miranda waiver; “knowing and intelligent” appeal carveouts construed to encompass voluntariness

Introduction

In this non-precedential decision, the Third Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress a custodial statement by Marc Anthony (also known as Nasir Johnson and Marc Anthony Minott). The case centers on whether Anthony’s waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, as required under longstanding Supreme Court and Third Circuit doctrine. Anthony—an adult with documented learning disorders and a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder (ASD)—argued that the totality of circumstances rendered his waiver invalid. The panel (Judges Krause, Phipps, and Roth) rejected that contention and upheld the District Court’s ruling.

Two features of the opinion stand out. First, the court reaffirms that mental impairment alone is insufficient to invalidate a Miranda waiver absent evidence of police coercion or exploitation of a known or apparent disability. Second, the panel explicitly highlights a drafting issue common in plea agreements: when a plea preserves an appeal only as to whether a waiver was “knowing and intelligent,” courts may construe that phrase to include voluntariness, and the United States Attorney’s Office may wish to clarify its language going forward.

Summary of the Opinion

Applying the totality-of-the-circumstances test and allocating to the Government the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence, the Third Circuit held:

Voluntariness: There was no coercive police conduct sufficient to overbear Anthony’s will. A 40-minute interview with two officers, coupled with Anthony’s responsiveness, prior juvenile justice exposure, and progress through the eleventh grade, supported voluntariness. The officers’ use of deception (falsely stating that a housemate had confessed and implicated Anthony) did not render the waiver involuntary.
Knowing and intelligent: The Government proved Anthony understood his rights and the consequences of abandoning them. Evidence included expert testimony that ASD typically affects social comfort, not basic comprehension of rights; Anthony’s status as a native English speaker and adult; his completion of the eleventh grade; a signed written waiver; and prior arrests and sentencing experience. Poor performance on post hoc Miranda Rights Comprehension Instruments (MRCI) was properly accorded little weight.
Plea carveout construction: Although Anthony’s plea agreement preserved only a challenge to whether the waiver was “knowing and intelligent,” the court treated that language as encompassing voluntariness, consistent with Third Circuit usage that often treats the phrase as shorthand for “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” The opinion invites prosecutors to revisit plea language for clarity.

The court concluded that the detectives did not exploit a known or apparent disability, aligning the outcome with Miranda’s core purpose of preventing constitutionally impermissible interrogation practices.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986): The cornerstone for voluntariness, Connelly holds that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding a confession involuntary. The panel leans on Connelly’s key insight: while mental impairment may heighten susceptibility to coercion, mental condition alone cannot render a waiver involuntary absent police overreach. This principle frames the entire voluntariness analysis and forecloses relief where the record lacks coercion.
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000): Dickerson underscored Miranda’s constitutional status and reaffirmed the voluntariness inquiry’s focus on both the suspect’s characteristics and the interrogation’s details. The panel uses Dickerson via Third Circuit cases to structure its two-pronged assessment.
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987): Cited for two propositions: (1) voluntariness requires a free and deliberate choice, free from intimidation, coercion, or deception; and (2) a waiver is knowing and intelligent if the suspect is aware of the nature of the right and the basic consequences of abandoning it—not every downstream legal consequence. This helps the court discount arguments tied to generalized cognitive limitations where core Miranda comprehension is still shown.
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985): The Court has refused to deem confessions involuntary merely because officers lied that a codefendant confessed. The Third Circuit deploys Elstad to neutralize the defense’s reliance on the detectives’ deception regarding a housemate’s supposed confession.
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979): Fare instructs courts to consider age, experience, education, background, and intelligence in assessing a waiver. The panel analogizes Anthony’s case to Fare, highlighting prior justice system experience and age as supporting valid waiver despite cognitive challenges.
United States v. Rought, 11 F.4th 178 (3d Cir. 2021): Rought supplies the Third Circuit’s articulation of Miranda standards and confirms both the Government’s burden and the totality assessment. The panel also uses Rought to justify construing “knowing and intelligent” to include voluntariness in appellate waiver carveouts.
Lam v. Kelchner, 304 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2002) and United States v. Jacobs, 431 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2005): These cases guide the voluntariness inquiry’s focus on personal characteristics (maturity, mental health, education) and interrogation features (length, location, continuity), plus the role of prior interactions with the criminal system.
Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919 (10th Cir. 2004) and Hall v. Thomas, 611 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2010): Out-of-circuit authorities cited to confirm that low cognitive functioning or youth does not automatically negate a valid waiver, especially where the interrogation record shows comprehension and the process lacks coercion. The panel uses these to buttress its skepticism of overreliance on standardized comprehension testing like the MRCI, particularly when administered long after the interrogation.
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984): Used to anchor the decision in Miranda’s animating purpose—guarding against impermissible interrogation practices—underscoring that police did not exploit a known or apparent disability here.

Legal Reasoning

The court applies the classic three-part Miranda waiver framework—voluntary, knowing, and intelligent—evaluated under the totality of the circumstances, with the Government bearing the burden by a preponderance of the evidence. It also honors the standard of review: clear error for factual findings and plenary review for legal applications.

1) Voluntariness

Voluntariness turns on the presence of coercion. The panel first surveys interrogation features: a brief 40-minute session, only two officers, and a responsive suspect. Deception—the false statement that a housemate confessed and implicated Anthony—is not per se coercion under Elstad. Next, it considers Anthony’s characteristics: eleventh-grade education with periods of success and meaningful prior interactions with the juvenile justice system. Against this backdrop, and with no indicia of intimidation or undue pressure, the court finds no coercion that could have overborne Anthony’s will under Connelly.

2) Knowing and Intelligent

The ultimate question is whether Anthony understood he could remain silent, request a lawyer, and stop questioning at any time, and that speaking could have consequences. The court emphasizes:

Expert evidence: The Government’s expert opined that Anthony’s ASD did not impair his ability to listen, comprehend, and respond appropriately in the context of legal rights advisements, and that ASD typically presents as social discomfort rather than a comprehension deficit. The defense expert acknowledged Anthony’s high-functioning ASD and that MRCI results do not reliably describe understanding at the time of interrogation.
Mixed clinical history: Two prior assessments had ruled out ASD; regardless, the record here did not demonstrate a comprehension deficit concerning Miranda warnings.
Personal attributes and experience: Anthony is a native English speaker, an adult, completed the eleventh grade, signed a written waiver, had prior arrests (albeit as a juvenile), and had previously participated in sentencing proceedings. These facts mirror those courts have relied upon to find adequate comprehension in cases like Fare and Rought.
Academic struggles explained: The Government elicited evidence that absenteeism and substance use may explain academic underperformance, weakening the inference that poor grades equate to Miranda incapacity.

The court also addresses the MRCI. The District Court had discounted the MRCI’s probative value because it (a) measures understanding at the time of testing and requires extrapolation to the earlier interrogation; (b) is not a pass/fail instrument; and (c) uses vocabulary not found on the actual waiver form. Although the District Court misstated the interval between interrogation and testing (eleven months rather than “several years”), the error was immaterial because even the defense expert admitted the MRCI does not reliably describe understanding eleven months earlier. The Third Circuit affirms the District Court’s decision to give the MRCI little weight.

3) Plea Agreement Carveout: Construing “Knowing and Intelligent” to Include Voluntariness

Anthony’s plea preserved only an appeal arguing his waiver was “knowing and intelligent.” Citing its own practice, the panel treated this as encompassing voluntariness, noting that the phrase is often used as shorthand for “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.” The opinion expressly suggests that the U.S. Attorney’s Office consider clarifying its standard plea language to avoid ambiguity in future appellate carveouts. While the disposition is non-precedential, this admonition is a practical takeaway for plea drafting.

Impact

Although not binding precedent under the Third Circuit’s I.O.P. 5.7, the opinion has meaningful practical implications:

Defense strategy in Miranda challenges involving ASD and learning disorders: This decision underscores the centrality of demonstrating police coercion or exploitation of a known or apparent disability. Impairment alone—even supported by post hoc testing—will rarely suffice. Defense counsel should focus on concrete indicators of confusion on the recording, the exact wording and delivery of the warnings, the suspect’s contemporaneous questions or hesitations, and any evidence that officers perceived and leveraged cognitive vulnerabilities.
Weight of MRCI and similar instruments: Courts may discount MRCI results when used retrospectively, particularly where the tool does not map onto the exact warnings administered and lacks a binary validity metric. Parties should be prepared to explain methodology, timing, and vocabulary alignment to bolster or attack probative value.
Police practices: This opinion signals that brief, non-threatening interviews; clear, documented Miranda advisements; and a signed waiver are robust best practices. While certain deception is not per se coercive, officers should avoid leveraging known or apparent disabilities, as such exploitation would move the case toward suppression.
Plea agreement drafting: Prosecutors in the Third Circuit may wish to draft appellate carveouts that expressly enumerate “voluntary, knowing, and intelligent” to avoid litigation over the carveout’s scope. Defense counsel, for their part, should seek clarity to preserve all three dimensions of the Miranda inquiry.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Miranda rights: Before custodial questioning, police must advise a suspect of the right to remain silent, that statements can be used against the suspect, the right to an attorney, and that an attorney will be provided if the suspect cannot afford one.
Miranda waiver (voluntary, knowing, intelligent): A valid waiver requires (a) voluntariness—no coercion or overbearing tactics; (b) knowledge—the suspect understands the rights; and (c) intelligence—an appreciation of the basic consequences of giving up those rights (e.g., speaking without counsel).
Totality of the circumstances: Courts look at all the facts—suspect’s age, education, mental health, prior experience, and details of the interrogation—rather than any single factor.
Police coercion (Connelly): There must be coercive police conduct to invalidate a confession or waiver; mental impairments alone do not suffice.
Permissible deception: Not all police deception is coercion. Telling a suspect a codefendant confessed, without more, does not automatically make a confession involuntary.
Preponderance of the evidence: The Government must prove the validity of a waiver is more likely than not.
Standard of review: Appellate courts defer to the trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous, but review legal conclusions anew (plenary).
MRCI (Miranda Rights Comprehension Instruments): A psychological assessment tool gauging understanding of Miranda concepts. Courts may discount its value if administered long after the interrogation, if it doesn’t mirror the language used in the waiver, or if it lacks a clear validity threshold.
ASD and Miranda: ASD can affect social interaction and communication, but it does not automatically indicate an inability to understand Miranda rights. The inquiry is individualized and evidence-driven.

Conclusion

United States v. Marc Anthony reaffirms core Miranda doctrine in a modern context involving ASD and learning disorders. The Third Circuit held that:

Absent coercive police conduct or exploitation of a known or apparent disability, mental impairments alone do not invalidate a Miranda waiver.
A waiver is knowing and intelligent if the suspect understands the nature of the rights and the basic consequences of abandoning them, not every legal nuance.
Post hoc Miranda-comprehension instruments like the MRCI may carry limited probative weight, particularly when administered months later, not aligned with the actual warnings given, and lacking pass/fail results.
Appellate carveouts preserving challenges to “knowing and intelligent” waivers may be construed to include voluntariness; clearer plea drafting is advisable.

While not precedential, the opinion provides practical guidance for law enforcement, prosecutors, and defense counsel on litigating Miranda waivers involving cognitive and developmental conditions, and it underscores the continued centrality of police conduct—and the absence of coercion—in the voluntariness calculus. In short, the decision aligns with Miranda’s protective aims while maintaining a rigorous, evidence-based framework for evaluating waivers under the totality of the circumstances.