United States v. Mackroy: Clarifying Plain-Error Review and Sentencing Discretion in Bank Robbery Appeals

United States v. Mackroy: Clarifying Plain-Error Review and Sentencing Discretion in Bank Robbery Appeals

Introduction

In United States v. Latavis Deyonta Mackroy, 23-10404 (11th Cir. Jan. 21, 2025), the Eleventh Circuit addressed an appeal by Latavis Mackroy following his convictions for four bank‐robbery offenses and the district court’s subsequent sentence. Mackroy challenged multiple trial‐level rulings—primarily the admission of certain interview testimony, the sufficiency of evidence regarding federal deposit insurance, and the denial of his acquittal motion—as well as sentencing enhancements and the procedural handling of supervised‐release conditions. The panel, per curiam, affirmed, reaffirming and clarifying standards of plain‐error review, the admissibility of interview‐based evidence, the requirement for proof of federally insured status under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and the district court’s broad discretion in sentencing variances and pronouncing standard supervised‐release conditions.

Summary of the Judgment

Mackroy was indicted for the robberies of three banks and the attempted robbery of a fourth, all federally insured institutions. At trial, the government introduced teller testimony, fingerprint and cell-phone data, surveillance comparisons, and recordings from two post‐Miranda interviews at Mackroy’s halfway house. The district court admitted evidence over Mackroy’s objections, denied his Rule 29 acquittal motions, and after a presentence report with several enhancements—including a two-level increase for a death threat—imposed an upward variance to 240 months’ imprisonment per count. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit, applying a mix of de novo and plain-error review, rejected each challenge and affirmed both convictions and sentence.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

  • Fed. R. Evid. 403 & 404(b) – The panel reiterated that evidence inextricably intertwined with the charged offenses escapes Rule 404(b)’s exclusion and that exclusion under Rule 403 is an “extraordinary remedy.”
  • United States v. Cook (5th Cir. 1963) – Established the “nearly universal prevalence” standard for inferring federal deposit insurance from insurer‐status testimony at or near trial.
  • United States v. Perez (11th Cir. 2019) & Murphy (11th Cir. 2002) – Clarified the two-level threat‐of‐death enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F): the test is whether a reasonable person would fear death given the defendant’s conduct.
  • Gall v. United States (2007) – Confirmed the appellate reasonableness standard for sentences outside the Guidelines, requiring meaningful justifications for variances.
  • United States v. Hayden (11th Cir. 2024) – Held that unobjected‐to standard supervised-release conditions—if publicly available and matching the Guidelines—require only plain-error review.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court divided its opinion into five parts:

  1. Admission of Interview Testimony: Because Mackroy did not object at trial, the panel applied plain-error review. It concluded that agents’ testimony about his demeanor, his desire to cooperate, and references to fingerprint/DNA evidence were all relevant to show consciousness of guilt or explain the interview context. Intrinsic evidence of his halfway-house status and repeated offenses did not run afoul of Rule 404(b), and any marginal prejudice under Rule 403 did not rise to a plain error.
  2. Motion for Acquittal: On plain-error review, the court held that teller testimony—even if it proved only post-offense insurance status—plus the “nearly universal prevalence” of federally insured banks met the low threshold for 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Cook’s precedent allowed the jury to infer insurance at the robbery time.
  3. Threat Enhancement: The enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) requires a “threat of death.” Telling a teller “don’t try to protect what’s not yours,” referencing a “gun,” and keeping a hand hidden in a sweater — scaring the teller — was sufficient to show that a reasonable person would fear death.
  4. Upward Variance: The district court’s written and oral statements under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) covered Mackroy’s violent juvenile history, halfway-house infractions, in‐custody misconduct, and commission of multiple robberies while under supervision. These factors supported a variance above the 135–168-month Guideline range to 240 months. The panel stressed that sentencing courts may attach great weight to criminal history and recidivism risk, and an appellate court will not second-guess weight choices absent a clear error of judgment.
  5. Supervised-Release Conditions: By orally referring to the Middle District of Florida’s publicly posted standard conditions (which mirror U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c)) and giving Mackroy an opportunity to object, the district court satisfied Rule 32(i)(1)(E). Under Hayden’s plain-error standard, no defect occurred.

3. Impact on Future Cases

United States v. Mackroy reaffirms key trial and sentencing principles:

  • Plain-error review continues to apply to unpreserved evidentiary and sentencing challenges, demanding a showing of obvious error affecting substantial rights.
  • Evidence intrinsic to the charged offense — even if prejudicial — will not be excluded under Rule 404(b) or 403 absent extraordinary circumstances.
  • The “nearly universal prevalence” test remains the path for proving federal deposit insurance without contemporaneous documents.
  • Sentencing judges retain broad discretion to vary upward where recidivism risk and in-custody misconduct justify departures from the Guideline range.
  • Procedural notice for standard supervised-release conditions is met by public availability and plain reference at sentencing.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Plain-Error Review: A three-step test: (1) Was there an obvious legal mistake? (2) Did it affect the outcome? (3) Does it undermine the fairness of the trial? If a defendant never objected below, he must meet all three to prevail.
  • Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Evidence: Intrinsic evidence is part of the same criminal act or necessary context—e.g., showing the defendant’s prior halfway-house status is intrinsic when proving he left the facility to commit the robbery.
  • Threat Enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F)): A two-level Guideline increase if the robbery involved a threat of death. It hinges on what a reasonable person would fear, not just the victim’s subjective feeling.
  • Upward Variance: A sentence above the Guidelines. Judges must state why the recommended range underestimates the offense’s seriousness or the defendant’s dangerousness. Appellate courts respect those judgments unless clearly unreasonable.
  • Standard Supervised-Release Conditions: Routine post-prison rules (like drug testing, reporting requirements) that are publicly available and need not be recited one-by-one at sentencing so long as the court references them and invites objections.

Conclusion

United States v. Mackroy reaffirms the Eleventh Circuit’s deferential approach to unpreserved trial errors, clarifies the low bar for proving federally insured status in bank-robbery cases, and underscores the district court’s broad latitude in applying sentencing enhancements and variances. It further confirms that simply referencing publicly posted supervised-release conditions satisfies Rule 32’s notice requirements. Collectively, the decision strengthens existing precedent on plain-error review and sentencing discretion, providing trial and appellate courts with a clear blueprint for handling similar challenges in future bank-robbery and sentencing appeals.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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