United States v. Luciano: Seventh Circuit Reaffirms Boundaries of Anders Review and Common Trial/Sentencing Claims in a Nonprecedential Disposition

Introduction

This commentary examines the Seventh Circuit’s nonprecedential order in United States v. Eduardo Luciano (No. 24-1251, Sept. 30, 2025), a case arising from a violent gang-related conspiracy culminating in two murders. A jury convicted Luciano—described as a leader of the Latin Counts in Hammond, Indiana—of racketeering conspiracy (RICO), drug-conspiracy, and two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 924 involving murder, and the district court imposed a life sentence. On appeal, Luciano’s appointed counsel filed an Anders motion to withdraw, asserting the appeal would be frivolous. The panel (Judges Scudder, St. Eve, and Maldonado) granted the motion and dismissed the appeal, denying Luciano’s request for new counsel.

Although nonprecedential, the order is a compact survey of recurring appellate issues in criminal cases: the impropriety of defining “reasonable doubt” for jurors, management of juror concerns (including a sleeping juror and a juror with a tangential connection to the prosecutor’s family), sufficiency of the evidence where co-conspirator testimony plays a central role, the admissibility of co-conspirator statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), waiver of challenges to jury instructions, Apprendi-compliant verdict forms, the proper forum for ineffective-assistance claims, and the reasonableness of a within-Guidelines life sentence for murder-based racketeering. The court also issues a noteworthy caution to litigants about inaccurate citations that may stem from transcription errors or use of generative AI.

Summary of the Opinion

• Anders framework: Finding counsel’s submission thorough, the court limited its review to the issues counsel identified and those raised by Luciano in his pro se response under Circuit Rule 51(b). It granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal.
• Pretrial ruling: The district court correctly barred counsel from defining “beyond a reasonable doubt” for jurors, consistent with circuit admonitions.
• Juror issues: No abuse of discretion in removing a repeatedly sleeping alternate juror; and no basis for a for-cause strike regarding a juror who once cleaned the home of the prosecutor’s mother—she assured impartiality.
• Sufficiency of the evidence: The record supported all counts. Co-conspirator testimony—even uncorroborated—may sustain a conviction; here, multiple co-conspirators corroborated Luciano’s role in planning, despite his absence at the actual shooting.
• Credibility and co-conspirator statements: Credibility assessments are for the jury unless testimony is physically impossible. Co-conspirator statements were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and the Santiago framework; Luciano did not object at trial.
• Jury instructions: Luciano waived challenge to a “mere presence” instruction by agreeing to the final language, which clarified presence at planning (not the shooting) was at issue.
• Verdict form and Apprendi: No unsubmitted fact increased the statutory maximum; no Apprendi problem.
• Ineffective assistance: Reserved for collateral review under Massaro.
• Sentencing: Statutory maxima not exceeded; Guidelines properly calculated with a base offense level of 43 for murder-based racketeering, plus enhancements (role, multiple groups), but capped at 43. Zero-point offender reduction inapplicable due to a criminal history point and resulting death. The within-Guidelines life sentence was substantively reasonable and did not create an unwarranted disparity.
• Supervised release: Three-year concurrent terms affirmed; any challenge to conditions was waived by express non-objection at sentencing.
• Admonition on citations: The court noted it could not locate some cases in Luciano’s pro se submission, encouraging parties to carefully review filings and avoid errors potentially arising from generative AI.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): Establishes procedures for counsel who concludes an appeal would be frivolous, requiring a brief identifying potential issues. The Luciano panel applied Anders to grant withdrawal after conducting its own limited review.
• United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774 (7th Cir. 2014): Authorizes limiting review to the issues flagged by counsel and the appellant’s Rule 51(b) response; the court followed Bey to cabin its review.
• United States v. Alt, 58 F.4th 910 (7th Cir. 2023): Reiterates that counsel should not define “reasonable doubt” to jurors. Alt controlled the in limine ruling here.
• United States v. Freitag, 230 F.3d 1019 (7th Cir. 2000): Confers broad discretion on district courts to manage sleeping jurors; it supported removal of the dozing alternate.
• United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2011): Sets the standard for post-voir dire juror challenges—requiring dishonesty in response to a material voir dire question and that a truthful answer would warrant a for-cause strike. The juror here assured impartiality, undercutting any for-cause claim.
• United States v. Taylor, 777 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 2015): Emphasizes deference to jurors’ assurances of impartiality absent contrary evidence; the panel relied on Taylor to uphold retaining the juror.
• Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989): An example of “structural error.” The panel referenced Gomez only to explain that no error occurred here, so structural-error analysis was unnecessary.
• United States v. Johnson, 874 F.3d 990 (7th Cir. 2017): States the stringent sufficiency standard—reversal only if no rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; used to reject Luciano’s sufficiency challenge.
• United States v. Ofcky, 237 F.3d 904 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Henderson, 58 F.3d 1145 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Byerley, 999 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1993): Confirm that a conviction may rest on uncorroborated co-conspirator testimony; these cases foreclosed Luciano’s attack on reliance on accomplice testimony.
• United States v. Nieto, 29 F.4th 859 (7th Cir. 2022): Instructs that appellate courts do not reweigh credibility unless testimony violates physical possibility or the laws of nature. The panel found no such impossibility.
• FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E); United States v. Davis, 845 F.3d 282 (7th Cir. 2016); United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128 (7th Cir. 1978): Provide the foundation and procedure for admitting co-conspirator statements; the government provided notice and Luciano did not object.
• United States v. LeBeau, 949 F.3d 334 (7th Cir. 2020): Holds that agreement to an instruction waives appellate review; dispositive of Luciano’s instruction claim.
• Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000): Requires that facts increasing a statutory maximum be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found no Apprendi defect in the verdict form.
• Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003): Directs that ineffective-assistance claims are best raised on collateral review to allow factual development; the panel followed Massaro.
• Sentencing authorities:
  • 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(d), 1963(a), 924(j)(1); 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(C): Statutory maxima permitting life sentences for RICO conspiracy and § 924(j) murder counts, and 20 years for the drug conspiracy count.
  • U.S.S.G. §§ 2A1.1(a), 2E1.1(a)(2): Base offense level 43 for murder as underlying racketeering activity.
  • U.S.S.G. §§ 3B1.1(a) (organizer/leader +4); 3D1.4 (multiple count adjustment +2); § 5A cmt. n.2 (cap at offense level 43).
  • U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a)(1), (4): Zero-point offender reduction unavailable where defendant has a criminal history point or the offense resulted in death.
  • United States v. King, 910 F.3d 320 (7th Cir. 2018): Notes that a within-Guidelines sentence reflects consistency among similarly situated offenders.
  • United States v. Jones, 56 F.4th 455 (7th Cir. 2022): Affirms a presumption of reasonableness for within-Guidelines sentences.
  • United States v. Cook, 108 F.4th 574 (7th Cir. 2024): Addresses adequacy of sentencing explanations under § 3553(a); cited in upholding the life sentence here.
  • United States v. Bloch, 825 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2016): On justifying supervised release in light of the imprisonment rationale.
  • United States v. Flores, 929 F.3d 443 (7th Cir. 2019): Recognizes waiver where a defendant affirmatively declines to object to supervised-release conditions.

Legal Reasoning

1. Scope of Anders Review and Rule 51(b)

Finding counsel’s Anders brief “thorough,” the panel followed United States v. Bey to limit its review to matters identified by counsel and those Luciano himself raised in his Seventh Circuit Rule 51(b) response. It granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismissed the appeal, while denying Luciano’s request to appoint new counsel. This application of Anders underscores that, where counsel conscientiously canvasses potential issues and explains their frivolity, the court will not independently scour the record beyond the flagged subjects (though it retains discretion to do so).

2. Pretrial: Defining “Reasonable Doubt” is Improper

The district court barred counsel from defining “reasonable doubt” for the jury. The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly admonished trial lawyers not to attempt such definitions, as they risk confusing or diluting the standard. United States v. Alt was dispositive; any challenge to the in limine ruling would be frivolous. This reinforces a longstanding practice in the circuit: argue the facts and the law, but do not attempt to coin a definition of the burden of proof.

3. Juror Issues: Sleeping Juror and Tangential Connection to the Prosecution

The panel rejected two potential juror-related claims:

• Sleeping alternate juror: Removal lies within the court’s broad discretion. Citing Freitag, the panel found no abuse where the juror repeatedly slept during testimony.
• Juror who once cleaned the prosecutor’s mother’s home: Under Benabe and Taylor, to obtain relief a defendant must show dishonesty during voir dire and that a truthful answer would warrant a strike for cause. The juror candidly disclosed the connection when she recognized it during trial and assured impartiality. The court credited the assurance; thus, there was no error. Luciano’s contention that non-removal constituted structural error (citing Gomez) failed because there was no error at all to analyze for harmlessness.

4. Sufficiency of the Evidence and the Role of Co-Conspirator Testimony

Under Johnson, sufficiency is assessed deferentially. The government’s proof easily cleared that bar:

• RICO conspiracy: The parties stipulated that the Latin Counts were an enterprise. Testimony from law enforcement, Latin Counts, and rival Latin Kings established Luciano’s leadership in violent and drug-trafficking activities.
• Drug conspiracy: Two Latin Counts testified to the conspiracy and Luciano’s own involvement.
• Firearm/murder counts under § 924(j): Although Luciano was not physically present at the shooting, the government proved he actively planned the attack and that co-conspirators executed the plan—supporting liability under aiding-and-abetting principles and conspiracy law.

Luciano argued that reliance on an uncorroborated co-conspirator who initially faced charges as the conspiracy’s leader was improper. The Seventh Circuit’s line of cases—Ofcky, Henderson, Byerley—forecloses that argument; uncorroborated accomplice testimony can sustain conviction. In any event, multiple co-conspirators corroborated Luciano’s planning role. The claim was therefore not just weak but foreclosed by settled law.

5. Credibility Challenges Are for the Jury

The panel refused to re-weigh credibility. Under Nieto, appellate courts intervene only when testimony describes something that is physically impossible or contrary to the laws of nature. No such impossibility existed. Discrepancies or self-serving motives were for the jury to weigh, a task they plainly performed in returning guilty verdicts.

6. Co-Conspirator Statements: Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and Santiago

Co-conspirator statements made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy are non-hearsay when offered against a defendant. The government gave notice under Santiago of its intent to introduce such statements, and Luciano did not object. Admissibility under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and Davis’s framework was therefore sound, and any appellate challenge was both waived and meritless.

7. Jury Instructions: “Mere Presence” and Waiver

Because Luciano was not present at the shooting, a “mere presence at the scene” instruction did not fit. Defense counsel asked to refocus the instruction on presence at the planning meeting. The parties agreed to a final instruction clarifying that the government had to prove presence at the planning stage but not at the shooting itself. Under LeBeau, that agreement waived appellate complaint. The government had also objected that “mere presence” is generally inapt for aiding-and-abetting charges, where the issue is intentional facilitation, not presence. In any event, the agreed text foreclosed appellate relief.

8. Verdict Form and Apprendi

Luciano raised a generalized Apprendi claim about the verdict form, but pointed to no specific fact that increased the statutory maximum without jury findings beyond a reasonable doubt. The panel’s independent review revealed none, making the issue frivolous.

9. Ineffective Assistance: Properly Reserved for § 2255

Consistent with Massaro, the court declined to entertain ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal. Such claims typically require evidentiary development—e.g., counsel’s reasons for strategy—that are best explored in a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.

10. Sentencing: Statutory Maxima, Guidelines, Disparity, Reasonableness, and Supervised Release

• Statutory maxima: The life sentence did not exceed the statutory maximums for the RICO conspiracy and the § 924(j) counts; the drug conspiracy carried a 20-year maximum.
• Guidelines calculation: The base offense level was 43 because murder was the underlying racketeering activity (U.S.S.G. §§ 2A1.1(a), 2E1.1(a)(2)). Enhancements were added for leadership role (+4, § 3B1.1(a)) and multiple groups (+2, § 3D1.4), but offense level 43 is the ceiling. Luciano also did not qualify for the “zero-point offender” reduction (§ 4C1.1) because he had a criminal-history point and the offense resulted in death.
• Unwarranted disparity: The court distinguished Luciano’s more serious conduct and lack of acceptance of responsibility from his co-conspirators and imposed a within-Guidelines life term. Under King, a within-Guidelines sentence generally reflects national consistency; the disparity claim was therefore frivolous.
• Substantive reasonableness: Applying the presumption from Jones and citing Cook, the panel held the district court adequately justified the life sentence under § 3553(a), balancing Luciano’s background with the “shockingly violent” nature and callousness of the offense.
• Supervised release: Three-year concurrent terms were justified by the same reasons supporting the imprisonment term (Bloch). Any challenge to specific conditions was waived when defense counsel expressly stated no objections (Flores).

11. Caution on Generative AI and Citation Accuracy

The panel closed with a cautionary note: it could not locate some cases cited in Luciano’s pro se Rule 51(b) filings and urged litigants to carefully review submissions “whether these errors were the result of mistaken transcription or the use of generative AI.” While not a holding, this is a pointed reminder that parties bear responsibility for verifying authorities and that AI-assisted drafting does not excuse cite-checking failures.

Impact

Because the order is nonprecedential, it does not establish binding law. Nonetheless, it carries practical guidance for criminal practitioners in the Seventh Circuit:

• Anders practice: A thorough Anders brief narrows appellate review to identified issues and the defendant’s Rule 51(b) response. Counsel should anticipate common trial and sentencing challenges and explain their frivolity with record citations.
• Trial advocacy:
  • Do not define “reasonable doubt” for juries—expect motions in limine barring such definitions to be granted and affirmed.
  • Sleeping jurors: Trial courts have wide latitude to remove them. Counsel should build a clear record if contesting such decisions.
  • Juror connections: Trivial or attenuated ties, especially when a juror candidly discloses them and assures impartiality, are unlikely to warrant removal.
  • Co-conspirator testimony: Convictions may rest on uncorroborated accomplice testimony; attacking such testimony goes to credibility, typically for the jury.
  • Co-conspirator statements: Expect admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) where the government follows the Santiago protocol; contemporaneous objections are essential to preserve issues.
  • Jury instructions: Agreeing to language at the charge conference likely waives later challenge. “Mere presence” instructions can be ill-fitted in aiding-and-abetting contexts; tailor requests carefully.
• Sentencing:
  • For murder-based racketeering, offense level 43 often drives a life-range sentence; additional enhancements may be academic due to the cap at 43.
  • Zero-point offender reduction (§ 4C1.1) is unavailable if there is any criminal history point or if the offense caused death.
  • Within-Guidelines sentences remain strongly presumed reasonable; disparity arguments must account for differences in role, acceptance of responsibility, cooperation, and other § 3553(a) factors.
• Litigation integrity: The court’s admonition on citation accuracy—especially in the era of generative AI—signals heightened scrutiny of unsupported or unverifiable authorities. Parties should rigorously verify citations and quotations.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Anders procedure: When court-appointed counsel concludes an appeal lacks any nonfrivolous issues, counsel may move to withdraw under Anders, filing a brief identifying potential issues and explaining why they lack merit. The defendant may respond (in the Seventh Circuit, via Rule 51(b)). The appellate court then independently reviews the flagged issues to confirm frivolity.
• Nonprecedential disposition and FRAP 32.1: A decision labeled nonprecedential does not bind future panels, though it can be cited in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. Its persuasive value depends on reasoning and factual similarity.
• RICO conspiracy (18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)): Requires an agreement to conduct or participate in an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity; no overt act is required. Stipulating the existence of an enterprise can streamline the government’s proof.
• Aiding and abetting (18 U.S.C. § 2): A defendant need not be present at the crime scene. Liability attaches if the person intentionally assists or encourages the commission of the offense with the requisite mens rea.
• 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and § 924(j): § 924(c) penalizes using/carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking offense. § 924(j) enhances penalties, including life imprisonment, when the firearm use causes death (e.g., murder).
• “Mere presence” instruction: Tells jurors that simply being present at a crime scene is insufficient to establish guilt. It is often inapposite where the theory of liability is aiding and abetting or conspiracy, which hinge on agreement and intentional facilitation rather than mere presence.
• Structural error vs. harmless error: Structural errors (e.g., total denial of counsel) require automatic reversal; most trial errors are reviewed for harmlessness. A threshold showing of error is required before reaching either analysis.
• Co-conspirator statements (Rule 801(d)(2)(E)) and the Santiago procedure: Statements by a co-conspirator during and in furtherance of a conspiracy are non-hearsay when offered against a party. In the Seventh Circuit, the government may make a “Santiago proffer” to admit such statements, subject to the court’s later finding of a conspiracy by a preponderance of evidence.
• Sufficiency of the evidence: On appeal, the question is whether any rational juror could find the elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence most favorably to the government. Credibility determinations are for the jury unless testimony is physically impossible.
• Apprendi: Any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the statutory maximum penalty must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Many sentencing facts that affect the advisory Guidelines do not trigger Apprendi concerns so long as the sentence stays within the statutory maximum.
• Guidelines offense level 43 and grouping: Murder-based offenses typically yield a base offense level of 43, the top of the Sentencing Table. Multiple-count adjustments and role enhancements can apply, but the total offense level cannot exceed 43. Grouping rules (e.g., § 3D1.4) adjust offense levels where there are multiple counts of conviction.
• Zero-point offender reduction (§ 4C1.1): A two-level reduction for defendants with zero criminal history points who meet several criteria. It is unavailable if the offense resulted in death or if the defendant has any criminal history points, among other exclusions.
• Within-Guidelines presumption of reasonableness: Appellate courts presume a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range is reasonable; defendants can rebut the presumption by showing the sentence is greater than necessary in light of the § 3553(a) factors.

Conclusion

United States v. Luciano confirms, in a concise nonprecedential order, several settled criminal appellate principles in the Seventh Circuit. Trial counsel may not define “reasonable doubt”; district courts have broad discretion to manage juror irregularities; uncorroborated co-conspirator testimony can support conviction; co-conspirator statements are routinely admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) via the Santiago procedure; agreed-upon instructions are generally unreviewable on appeal; and Apprendi challenges fail absent an unsubmitted fact increasing the statutory maximum. On sentencing, murder-based racketeering typically produces a life-range Guidelines calculation capped at offense level 43, and within-Guidelines sentences remain presumptively reasonable—even where co-defendants receive lesser terms—when the district court differentiates roles and acceptance of responsibility.

Procedurally, the opinion is a primer on Anders practice in the Seventh Circuit: a thorough Anders brief frames the court’s limited review, and ineffective-assistance claims belong in collateral proceedings under Massaro. Finally, the panel’s admonition about inaccurate citations, potentially stemming from generative AI, serves as a timely reminder that the duty to verify authorities remains squarely with litigants. While not establishing new precedent, Luciano offers practical guidance on issues likely to recur in gang-related conspiracy prosecutions and beyond.