United States v. Lesane: Reaffirming Probation Search Authority, § 924(c) Nexus Requirements, and the Constitutionality of § 922(g)(1)

I. Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in United States v. Lesane, Nos. 23‑7134‑cr, 23‑7136‑cr (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2025) (summary order), is not precedential under the court’s rules, but it is nonetheless an instructive application of several important doctrines:

the standards for probable cause and reasonable suspicion in the supervised‑release context,
the evidentiary requirements for proving that a firearm was possessed “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and
the continued constitutionality of the felon‑in‑possession statute, § 922(g)(1), in the wake of the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment decision in Bruen.

The case arises from tandem appeals by defendant‑appellant Eric Lesane, proceeding pro se from a federal prison in Pennsylvania, challenging:

a criminal judgment convicting him of (1) being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and (2) possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and
a separate judgment finding that he violated multiple conditions of supervised release imposed for a prior firearm conviction.

The panel (Chief Judge Livingston and Judges Parker and Kahn) rejected each of Lesane’s arguments. Although the order itself “does not have precedential effect,” it:

illustrates how federal courts assess probation and supervised‑release searches carried out under search conditions,
applies recently articulated factors (in Prawl) governing the “in furtherance” nexus under § 924(c), and
solidifies that, within the Second Circuit, facial and as‑applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) by felons are functionally foreclosed by prior circuit authority, specifically Bogle and Zherka v. Bondi.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Original Conviction and Supervised Release

In 2013, Lesane pled guilty in the Southern District of New York to being a felon in possession of a firearm with a defaced serial number. He was sentenced principally to 94 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. His supervised release term began in April 2021.

As is typical, the terms of supervised release included:

an obligation to truthfully answer his probation officer’s inquiries,
a requirement to notify Probation of any change of residence, and
a search condition authorizing Probation to search his residence or premises he controlled upon a showing of reasonable suspicion of a violation or contraband.

B. Alleged Violations and New Federal Charges

In February 2023, the U.S. Probation Office filed a violation of supervised release (“VOSR”) report charging Lesane with:

failing to truthfully answer inquiries about his address,
failing to notify his probation officer of a change in address,
committing a new federal crime: being a felon in possession of firearms, and
committing a new federal crime: possessing firearms in connection with a drug trafficking crime.

Separately, the U.S. Attorney’s Office indicted him for:

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) – felon in possession of a firearm; and
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) – possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.

Information from the New York Police Department (NYPD) indicated that Lesane was living at an apartment on Hering Avenue in the Bronx and that he possessed firearms there. Probation and law enforcement conducted surveillance and observed him repeatedly entering and exiting the Hering Avenue property. Lesane had not reported this address to Probation, despite having changed residences.

An arrest warrant for supervised‑release violations issued. Following his arrest, federal agents recovered a set of keys to the Hering Avenue apartment from Lesane. Probation then searched the apartment under the supervised‑release search condition. In his room, officers discovered:

marijuana packaged for distribution,
empty packaging materials,
a digital scale bearing apparent drug residue,
approximately $10,000 in cash, and
firearms, at least one of which was loaded.

A neighbor testified that Lesane had shown him a backpack full of pre‑packaged marijuana, provided a sample, and invited the neighbor to knock on Lesane’s door to purchase more — a description strongly supporting a marijuana distribution operation based out of the apartment.

C. District Court Proceedings

Lesane moved to suppress the evidence seized from his apartment, arguing that:

the supervised‑release arrest warrant lacked probable cause,
Probation exceeded the scope of that warrant by searching Hering Avenue, and
Probation officers made false or inconsistent statements amounting to perjury or deliberate misrepresentation in obtaining the warrant.

The district court (Liman, J.) denied the suppression motion. After a jury trial, Lesane was convicted on both federal firearm counts. Relying on the trial evidence, the court also found him guilty of the supervised‑release violations alleged in the VOSR report.

He was sentenced to a total of 123 months’ imprisonment:

123 months on the new federal firearm convictions, and
24 months on the supervised‑release violations, to run concurrently with the new sentence.

On appeal, proceeding pro se, Lesane renewed his suppression arguments, challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on the § 924(c) count, and raised a Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1) in light of New York State Rifle & Pistol Association Inc. v. Bruen.

III. Summary of the Second Circuit’s Decision

The Second Circuit affirmed both the criminal conviction and the supervised‑release violation judgment.

Motion to Suppress: The court held that:
- there was probable cause for the supervised‑release arrest warrant based on information from NYPD, surveillance, and Lesane’s failure to notify Probation of his residence change; and
- Probation had reasonable suspicion to search the Hering Avenue apartment under the search condition, particularly after finding keys to that apartment on Lesane at arrest.
The court also rejected Lesane’s claims that Probation officers misled the district court or committed perjury in the warrant application, finding no inconsistency sufficient to trigger suppression under Franks v. Delaware and United States v. Coreas.
Sufficiency of the Evidence on § 924(c): Applying a highly deferential standard of review, the court concluded that a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Lesane possessed the firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking operation. The presence of loaded firearms in close proximity to packaged marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and substantial cash, combined with a neighbor’s testimony about active distribution, satisfied the “nexus” requirement articulated in United States v. Willis and United States v. Prawl.
Constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) after Bruen: The panel held that Lesane’s Second Amendment attack on § 922(g)(1) was foreclosed by binding Second Circuit precedent. Specifically:
- United States v. Bogle (2013) upheld § 922(g)(1) as facially constitutional, and
- Zherka v. Bondi (2025) confirmed that Bogle “survives” Bruen and further held that the Second Amendment does not bar Congress from disarming felons, “regardless of whether the crime of conviction is nonviolent.”

The court also briefly noted, in a footnote, that it denied Lesane’s motion for a “judicial writ” as moot while granting his request to seal that motion.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. The Motion to Suppress

1. Probable Cause for the Supervised‑Release Arrest Warrant

The first component of Lesane’s suppression challenge was that his supervised‑release arrest warrant lacked probable cause and thus could not validly support any subsequent search.

The panel began by reciting settled law on probable cause:

Probable cause does not require a prima facie showing of criminal activity or that guilt be more likely than not. (United States v. Cruz, quoting United States v. Travisano.)
Rather, it exists where the known facts and reasonably trustworthy information would lead a “man of reasonable caution” to believe an offense has been or is being committed. (Brinegar v. United States.)
Probable cause is a “fluid concept,” evaluated based on probabilities in the particular factual context, not reducible to rigid rules. (Illinois v. Gates.)

Applying those principles, the panel held there was ample probable cause to believe that Lesane had violated the conditions of his supervised release by changing his residence without notifying Probation and by lying about his address. Specifically:

The NYPD had informed Probation that Lesane was residing at the Hering Avenue address.
Two days of surveillance showed Lesane repeatedly entering and exiting that property.
He had failed on multiple occasions to inform his probation officer that he had changed addresses.

These facts, taken together, were “sufficient for a reasonable person to believe that Lesane had changed his address and failed to inform his probation officer of this change,” which directly violated his release conditions.

Notably, the court added an important—if implicit—qualification: it assumed arguendo that the arrest warrant was a “necessary predicate” to the search of Lesane’s residence under his supervised‑release terms. In other words, the panel did not definitively decide whether a separate arrest warrant was strictly required for the search to be valid; instead, it held that even if such a warrant were required, this one was supported by probable cause.

2. Scope of Probation’s Search Authority and the Reasonable Suspicion Standard

Lesane next argued that Probation “strayed beyond the bounds” of the arrest warrant by searching 2551 Hering Avenue. The panel rejected this argument, emphasizing that the search was not justified by the warrant alone but rather by the supervised‑release search condition and the presence of reasonable suspicion.

Under that condition, Probation was authorized to search:

Lesane’s residence, or
any premises he controlled,

if probation officers had reasonable suspicion of a supervised‑release violation or the presence of contraband.

Drawing on United States v. Diaz, the court described reasonable suspicion as asking “whether a reasonable officer would suspect unlawful activity under the totality of the circumstances.” This is a lower threshold than probable cause and reflects the diminished expectation of privacy of individuals on supervised release or probation.

Here, the court found reasonable suspicion easily satisfied:

NYPD had reported that Lesane both resided at the Hering Avenue apartment and possessed firearms there—both violations of supervised‑release conditions.
After Lesane’s arrest, federal agents found a set of keys to that apartment in his possession, independently suggesting that he resided there or exercised control over the premises without informing Probation.

Taken together, these facts provided a sufficient basis to believe Lesane (1) was living at or controlling the Hering Avenue premises and (2) was violating his supervised‑release conditions—both by failing to report his address and by possessing firearms. Thus, under the search condition, Probation had authority to conduct a warrantless search of that apartment on reasonable suspicion alone.

The opinion therefore reinforces a key doctrinal point: searches conducted under a valid supervised‑release (or probation) search condition are analyzed primarily under the “reasonable suspicion” standard, not a full probable‑cause‑and‑warrant framework applicable to ordinary citizens, so long as the officers act within the terms of the condition and rely on specific, articulable facts.

3. Alleged Perjury and the Franks/Coreas Framework

Finally, Lesane claimed that two probation officers misled the district court and committed perjury because their trial testimony allegedly conflicted with statements in the arrest warrant petition. This is essentially an attempted Franks challenge—a claim that the warrant was based on deliberate or reckless falsehoods.

The panel invoked the controlling standard from Franks v. Delaware and United States v. Coreas:

The defendant must show that alleged inaccuracies in the warrant affidavit were the product of a government agent’s deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth, as opposed to mere mistake; and
After setting aside the falsehoods, the remaining content of the affidavit must be insufficient to establish probable cause.

Lesane failed to meet even the first prong. The court carefully parsed the trial testimony he cited:

Probation Officer Ji’vonne Gilmore:
- Lesane quoted a segment in which she stated she had not specifically asked whether he resided at 2551 Hering Avenue, asserting this contradicted the warrant petition.
- But the panel noted that Gilmore went on to explain that Lesane lied when she asked whether he had secured independent housing, which is consistent with the petition’s assertion that he had failed to respond truthfully.
- Thus, her trial testimony did not contradict the warrant petition and did not reveal any deliberate inaccuracy.
Probation Officer Shawnte Lorick:
- Lesane cited Lorick’s statement that the violation report was “an allegation that had to be proven in court” as evidence of doubt or inability to prove the violation.
- The panel observed that Lorick merely acknowledged the procedural reality that a violation report contains allegations that must be adjudicated; he did not testify that he could not substantiate the violation.

Because Lesane failed to show any inaccurate representations—let alone deliberately or recklessly false ones—the court held that there was no basis for suppression under Franks/Coreas. The panel therefore did not need to reach the second prong (materiality to probable cause).

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence on 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)

1. Governing Standards

Lesane challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.

The court first reiterated the highly deferential standard for sufficiency claims:

Appellate courts view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the Government.” (United States v. Aguilar.)
The conviction must be affirmed if “any rational trier of fact could have found” the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. (United States v. Hassan.)

To prove a § 924(c) “possession in furtherance” offense, the government must show:

possession of the firearm, and
that the possession occurred “in furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime. (United States v. Willis.)

As Willis and later United States v. Prawl, 149 F.4th 176 (2d Cir. 2025), explain, this requires a nexus between the firearm and the drug trafficking operation. The weapon must afford some actual or potential advantage to the drug activity—for example, by being readily accessible to protect drugs, proceeds, or the dealer himself.

Prawl identifies non‑exclusive factors relevant to whether the nexus exists:

the type of drug activity,
the accessibility of the firearm,
the type of weapon,
whether the weapon is stolen,
the status of the possession (legitimate or illegal),
whether the gun is loaded,
proximity to drugs or drug profits, and
the time and circumstances under which the gun is found.

These factors are meant to operationalize the “in furtherance” requirement; no single factor is dispositive, and courts look to the totality of the circumstances.

2. Application to Lesane’s Case

The court held that the government’s evidence at trial was more than sufficient for a rational juror to find the required nexus. Key facts included:

Evidence of a marijuana distribution operation:
- packaged marijuana,
- empty plastic packaging materials,
- a scale with drug residue, and
- about $10,000 in cash.
Testimonial evidence of active dealing:
- a neighbor testified that Lesane showed him a backpack full of pre‑packaged marijuana, gave him a “sample,” and invited him to knock on his door to buy more.
Location and condition of the firearms:
- the guns, drugs, and drug paraphernalia were all found within Lesane’s room in the Hering Avenue apartment,
- at least one firearm was loaded, and
- Lesane was a felon, making possession of any firearm illegal.

Viewed through the Prawl factors:

Type of drug activity: The evidence showed an ongoing distribution operation (packaging, scale, cash, and offers to sell), not merely personal use.
Accessibility: The firearms were located in the same room as the drugs and proceeds, making them readily accessible for protection of the operation.
Type, status, and condition of the weapons: At least one firearm was loaded, and all possession was illicit given Lesane’s felony status.
Proximity: The guns were in close physical proximity to drugs and cash, supporting an inference that they were strategically placed to protect them.
Time and circumstances: The guns were discovered in the course of investigating an active drug distribution operation at the very location where they were stored.

On these facts, a rational juror could easily infer that the firearms were not mere coincidental household items but tools to:

deter theft or robbery,
protect the dealer or the stash, or
coerce or control participants in transactions.

Thus, the panel concluded the § 924(c) “in furtherance” requirement was satisfied under the standards articulated in Willis and Prawl.

C. Second Amendment Challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

1. Post‑Bruen Landscape in the Second Circuit

Lesane also argued that § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment as interpreted in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).

Bruen rejected “means‑end” scrutiny for Second Amendment claims and established a historical‑tradition test: once the Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct, the government must justify its regulation by showing consistency with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

However, the Second Circuit emphasized that in this circuit, § 922(g)(1) has already been evaluated post‑Bruen:

In United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2013), the court held § 922(g)(1) was facially constitutional.
In Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2025), the Second Circuit explicitly confirmed that Bogle’s holding “survives Bruen.”
Zherka also rejected an as‑applied challenge brought by a nonviolent felon, holding that the Second Amendment does not bar Congress from disarming convicted felons “regardless of whether the crime of conviction is nonviolent.”

Therefore, within the Second Circuit, panel-level precedent squarely forecloses facial or as‑applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) by felons, including nonviolent ones.

2. Application to Lesane

The panel accordingly disposed of Lesane’s Second Amendment argument in straightforward fashion: because Zherka reaffirmed Bogle and specifically held that felon‑disarmament laws remain constitutional post‑Bruen for all felons, Lesane’s challenge “is foreclosed” by binding precedent.

In other words, a three‑judge panel may not disregard or overrule earlier panel decisions; that authority rests with the en banc court or the Supreme Court. Thus, however one might debate the merits of Bruen’s implications for § 922(g)(1) in the abstract, the Second Circuit has already answered the question in Zherka, and Lesane simply applies that answer.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. Fourth Amendment Probable Cause and Reasonable Suspicion Cases

United States v. Cruz, 834 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1987) & United States v. Travisano, 724 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1983):
Both decisions underscore that probable cause does not require certainty or a prima facie showing; it exists where facts and reasonably trustworthy information would lead a prudent person to believe an offense has occurred. These cases support the panel’s conclusion that the combination of NYPD information, surveillance, and Lesane’s failure to report his address sufficed for probable cause.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949):
A foundational Supreme Court case defining probable cause as what would “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief” that an offense has been committed. This language is directly quoted in the order and anchors the court’s analysis of the arrest warrant.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983):
Gates articulated the “totality of the circumstances” test for probable cause and described it as a “fluid concept.” The panel cites Gates to emphasize that rigid formulae are inappropriate; instead, all available information is considered in context.
United States v. Diaz, 802 F.3d 234 (2d Cir. 2015):
Diaz is central to the reasonable‑suspicion analysis in supervised‑release searches. The case frames reasonable suspicion as a totality‑of‑the‑circumstances inquiry and recognizes that supervised individuals have diminished privacy interests, enabling searches under less than probable cause where search conditions are in place. Lesane applies Diaz to uphold the warrantless search of the Hering Avenue apartment.
United States v. Coreas, 419 F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2005) & Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978):
These cases establish the two‑prong test for suppressing evidence where a warrant affidavit contains false statements. Coreas applies Franks within the Second Circuit, requiring proof of deliberate or reckless falsehoods and materiality to probable cause. Lesane relies on this framework to reject the defendant’s claim that probation officers misled the court.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence and § 924(c) Nexus Cases

United States v. Hassan, 578 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2008) & United States v. Aguilar, 585 F.3d 652 (2d Cir. 2009):
These cases emphasize the “exceedingly deferential” standard of review for sufficiency challenges: the evidence is viewed in the government’s favor, and the conviction stands if any rational juror could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. They frame the lens through which the panel evaluates the § 924(c) evidence in Lesane.
United States v. Willis, 14 F.4th 170 (2d Cir. 2021):
Willis articulates that § 924(c) requires not just possession during drug trafficking, but possession in furtherance of it, and requires proof of a nexus between the firearm and the drug operation. It provides examples, such as weapons that are readily accessible to protect drugs or proceeds. Lesane applies this nexus requirement, finding it satisfied by proximity, accessibility, and context.
United States v. Prawl, 149 F.4th 176 (2d Cir. 2025):
Although decided after the knowledge cutoff for this commentary, the summary order quotes Prawl as identifying eight factors relevant to whether a firearm is possessed in furtherance of drug trafficking. Lesane illustrates how these factors are operationalized in practice, particularly with respect to accessibility, proximity, type and status of the weapon, and the circumstances under which it is found.

C. Second Amendment and Felon‑in‑Possession Cases

United States v. Bogle, 717 F.3d 281 (2d Cir. 2013):
Pre‑Bruen, Bogle held that § 922(g)(1) is facially constitutional. It remains binding unless overruled by the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit en banc.
Zherka v. Bondi, 140 F.4th 68 (2d Cir. 2025):
As described in Lesane, Zherka confirms that Bogle “survives Bruen” and holds that Congress may disarm convicted felons regardless of whether their crimes were violent. This is the critical precedent foreclosing Lesane’s Second Amendment challenge.
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022):
Bruen reshaped Second Amendment jurisprudence by emphasizing historical tradition over means‑end balancing. While defendants have relied on Bruen to challenge § 922(g)(1), the Second Circuit, through Zherka, has held that felon‑disarmament laws remain constitutionally permissible.

VI. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

A. Probable Cause vs. Reasonable Suspicion

Probable Cause:
A higher standard used for arrests and search warrants. It means that, based on facts and reasonably reliable information, it is reasonable to believe that a crime has been committed or that evidence will be found in a particular place. It does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even that guilt is more likely than not; it’s a practical, common‑sense judgment.
Reasonable Suspicion:
A lower standard requiring specific, articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot or a violation has occurred. It justifies brief stops and, in the supervised‑release context, can justify searches under a search condition. Probationers and supervised‑releasees have reduced privacy expectations, so the Constitution tolerates more intrusive actions on less than probable cause.

B. Supervised Release and Search Conditions

Supervised release is a period of court‑ordered monitoring after a defendant completes a prison term. Conditions often include:

regular reporting to a probation officer,
restrictions on travel, employment, and association,
obligations to answer questions truthfully and report address changes, and
search conditions, granting probation officers authority to search the defendant’s person, residence, or other premises under specified standards (often reasonable suspicion).

Because supervised‑releasees have agreed to these conditions (as part of their sentence) and because they remain under criminal justice supervision, courts treat their privacy expectations as diminished. That is why Probation could search Lesane’s apartment based on reasonable suspicion rather than obtaining a traditional search warrant supported by probable cause.

C. Franks Challenges (False Statements in Warrant Affidavits)

Under Franks v. Delaware, a defendant can seek suppression of evidence obtained under a warrant if:

the warrant affidavit contained statements that were deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for the truth (not mere mistakes), and
if those false statements are removed, the remaining facts in the affidavit no longer establish probable cause.

This is a demanding standard. In Lesane, the court held that the alleged inconsistencies in probation officers’ testimony did not show any actual falsehoods in the warrant application, so the challenge failed at the first step.

D. “In Furtherance of” a Drug Trafficking Crime – § 924(c)

Section 924(c) punishes not just carrying a gun during a drug crime, but possessing it “in furtherance of” that crime. This means:

The gun must be connected to the offense in a way that advances or helps the crime.
Mere coincidental presence of a gun near drugs is usually insufficient; there must be a logical link—such as protecting drugs or money, intimidating rivals or buyers, or safeguarding the dealer.

Courts use factors like those listed in Prawl (type of drug activity, accessibility, proximity, whether the gun is loaded and illegally possessed, etc.) to determine whether this link exists.

E. Felon‑in‑Possession Statute – 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

Section 922(g)(1) makes it a federal crime for anyone convicted of a felony to possess a firearm or ammunition affecting interstate commerce. Historically, courts have upheld this statute on the theory that legislatures can disarm those deemed dangerous or untrustworthy. In the Second Circuit:

Bogle upheld § 922(g)(1) against a facial challenge.
Zherka held that this remains true after Bruen and that felons (including nonviolent ones) may constitutionally be disarmed.

VII. Impact and Future Implications

A. Probation and Supervised‑Release Practice

Though non‑precedential, Lesane is a practical illustration for district courts and probation officers of how existing law applies to supervised‑release searches:

It confirms that information from local law enforcement (like NYPD reports) can be a key component of both probable cause and reasonable suspicion.
Short‑term surveillance corroborating residency can be enough to support a finding that a supervisee has changed address without reporting it.
Discovery of apartment keys on the defendant can independently supply reasonable suspicion that he resides at or controls a premises, justifying a search under a release condition.
Courts will read alleged inconsistencies in officers’ statements in context, making Franks‑type challenges difficult absent clear and material falsehoods.

Supervised‑releasees should understand that:

failing to report address changes and lying to Probation are not minor technicalities—they can supply probable cause for arrest and justify home searches, and
conditions authorizing searches on reasonable suspicion significantly reduce the level of suspicion the government must show.

B. Drug‑Firearm Nexus and § 924(c) Prosecutions

The decision reinforces that:

Courts will look at the totality of circumstances in determining whether a firearm is possessed in furtherance of drug trafficking.
Evidence such as packaged drugs, a scale with residue, significant cash, and testimony about active sales, combined with loaded firearms in close proximity, is generally more than enough to satisfy the nexus requirement.
Even in the context of marijuana—where state laws increasingly diverge from federal law—federal courts continue to treat distribution of marijuana as a qualifying “drug trafficking crime” for § 924(c) purposes so long as federal law criminalizes the conduct.

Prosecutors can draw on Lesane as persuasive authority (especially within SDNY and EDNY) to argue that such fact patterns meet the “in furtherance” standard, while defense counsel can see how difficult it is, on appeal, to overturn a conviction once a jury has credited such evidence.

C. Second Amendment Challenges to § 922(g)(1) in the Second Circuit

Lesane essentially closes the door, at the panel level, on further Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1) by felons within the Second Circuit:

Zherka is treated as dispositive post‑Bruen authority upholding felon‑disarmament laws.
District judges can rely on Zherka and Bogle to summarily reject constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1) brought by convicted felons, whether their prior crimes were violent or nonviolent.
For litigants seeking a different result, the appropriate venue is either a petition for rehearing en banc in a suitable case or a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, not panel litigation in the Second Circuit.

In short, Lesane confirms that, in this circuit, § 922(g)(1) remains firmly intact despite Bruen.

D. Role of Summary Orders as Persuasive Authority

Although by rule this summary order has no precedential effect, it remains:

citable under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, and
persuasive authority, particularly on how existing precedents (like Diaz, Willis, Prawl, Bogle, and Zherka) operate in concrete factual settings.

For practitioners, Lesane offers a roadmap of how the Second Circuit is likely to treat:

supervised‑release search conditions and the reasonable‑suspicion threshold,
Franks‑type challenges to probation officers’ affidavits,
§ 924(c) “in furtherance” fact patterns involving home‑based drug distribution, and
post‑Bruen challenges to § 922(g)(1).

VIII. Conclusion

United States v. Lesane does not break new doctrinal ground, and by its own terms it is not precedential. Yet it meaningfully illustrates the application of several important and evolving strands of federal criminal law:

It confirms that probable cause to arrest a supervised‑releasee can be based on a combination of law‑enforcement reports, brief surveillance, and unreported address changes, and that reasonable suspicion under a search condition is a comparatively low bar.
It shows that the Second Circuit will enforce Franks/Coreas standards strictly, requiring clear proof of deliberate or reckless falsehoods and materiality before suppressing evidence tied to alleged misstatements in warrant applications.
It applies Willis and Prawl to uphold a § 924(c) conviction where loaded firearms are located in close proximity to drugs, packaging, scales, and cash in a dealer’s room—an archetypal “in furtherance” scenario.
Most significantly for constitutional law, it reinforces that, in this circuit, the felon‑in‑possession statute, § 922(g)(1), remains constitutional after Bruen, both facially and as applied to nonviolent felons, by virtue of Bogle and Zherka.

For courts, counsel, probation officers, and supervised‑releasees, Lesane serves as a detailed, concrete example of how existing Second Circuit precedents govern the intersection of supervised release, the Fourth Amendment, firearms offenses, and the Second Amendment in contemporary federal practice.