United States v. Lehew: Appeal Waivers and Implicit Indigency Analysis Under the JVTA Special Assessment

United States v. Lehew: Appeal Waivers and Implicit Indigency Analysis Under the JVTA Special Assessment

Introduction

United States v. Lehew (5th Cir. 2025) addresses whether a defendant’s appeal waiver bars a challenge to a $5,000 special assessment imposed under the Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act (JVTA), 18 U.S.C. § 3014(a), on indigency grounds. Trevor Dylan Lehew pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual abuse of a child, agreed to waive most appellate rights in his plea agreement, and received concurrent and consecutive sentences in federal and state custody. At sentencing, the district court imposed both a $100 “normal” assessment and the $5,000 JVTA assessment. Lehew, who claimed indigency, appealed despite his waiver, arguing that the assessment exceeded the statutory maximum for indigent defendants (zero dollars) and that the waiver should not apply.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that:

  • Lehew’s written plea agreement contained a clear and knowing waiver of “any challenges to the determination of any period of confinement, monetary penalty or obligation.”
  • The $5,000 JVTA assessment is a “monetary penalty” within the scope of the waiver.
  • The “statutory maximum” exception to appeal waivers applies only when a court fails “to conduct the requisite analysis altogether” on an issue (here, indigency), not when the appellant disputes how that analysis was performed or its outcome.
  • By adopting the Presentence Report (PSR)—which detailed Lehew’s income history, liabilities, vocational skills, and future earning potential—the district court implicitly found that Lehew was not indigent, satisfying its analytical obligation.
  • Accordingly, the appeal waiver barred Lehew’s challenge, and his sentence, including the JVTA assessment, was affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Winchel (5th Cir. 2018): Held that a restitution award under 18 U.S.C. § 2259 that lacks any proximate-cause analysis exceeds the statutory maximum and is appealable despite a waiver.
  • United States v. Leal (5th Cir. 2019): Applied Winchel’s “no analysis” rule to § 2259 restitution waivers.
  • United States v. Graves (5th Cir. 2018): Suggested—without deciding—that a JVTA assessment might be challenged under the same “statutory maximum” principle if no indigency determination was made.
  • United States v. Madrid (5th Cir. 2020): Distinguished AVAA assessments under § 2259A (which do not require victim identification or loss proof) from restitution under § 2259, holding both are distinct from JVTA assessments.
  • United States v. Alfred (5th Cir. 2023): Clarified that the “statutory maximum” exception only saves appeals where the district court completely omits the required analysis, not where the appellant merely disputes its result.
  • United States v. Meredith (5th Cir. 2022): Emphasized that the exception is not a “free-floating escape hatch” to bypass waivers whenever a defendant questions sentencing methodology.

Legal Reasoning

1. Appeal Waiver Enforceability
The court applied a two-step inquiry: (a) Was the waiver knowing and voluntary? (b) Does its plain language cover this challenge? Lehew’s agreement unambiguously waived appeals of any “monetary penalty or obligation,” including the JVTA special assessment.

2. “Statutory Maximum” Exception
Lehew invoked the exception, arguing that an indigent defendant cannot be assessed $5,000, so the court exceeded the statutory maximum. The Fifth Circuit held that this exception applies only if the district court “failed to conduct the requisite [indigency] analysis altogether,” per Alfred. It does not cover disputes over the correctness of an implicit or explicit analysis.

3. Implicit Indigency Determination via PSR Adoption
The district court adopted the PSR in its Statement of Reasons. That report contained extensive factual data—past earnings, liabilities, skills, and prospective Bureau of Prisons financial programs—that allowed the court to determine Lehew’s non-indigence. Under Fifth Circuit precedent, adopting a PSR suffices to make implicit factual findings, including on indigency and future earning potential.

4. Waiver Bars the Appeal
Because the court conducted the requisite analysis (explicit or implicit), Lehew’s challenge to the JVTA assessment was barred by his own unambiguous appeal waiver.

Impact

United States v. Lehew clarifies and reinforces the scope of appeal waivers in plea agreements with regard to JVTA assessments:

  • Pleas will not be undone by indigency claims where the record—often via the PSR—reflects a court’s consideration of a defendant’s financial circumstances.
  • Defendants must object at sentencing if they believe the court fails to conduct the necessary indigency analysis; failure to do so forecloses appellate review.
  • The decision narrows the “statutory maximum” exception, confining it to cases of complete omission of statutorily required analyses.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Appeal Waiver: A contractual agreement in a plea deal where a defendant gives up the right to appeal certain aspects of conviction or sentence.
  • JVTA Special Assessment (18 U.S.C. § 3014): A mandatory $5,000 fee imposed on non-indigent defendants convicted of specified sex offenses, paid into the Crime Victims Fund.
  • Statutory Maximum Exception: A narrow rule allowing appeals of waivers when a sentence “exceeds the statutory maximum” because the court completely omitted a required legal or factual analysis.
  • Presentence Report (PSR): A probation-prepared report detailing a defendant’s background, offense conduct, and financial status. Adoption of the PSR by the court can create implicit factual findings.
  • Implicit Findings: Conclusions a court makes by adopting or relying on a document (like the PSR) without explicitly restating every factual point on the record.

Conclusion

United States v. Lehew underscores the finality of plea-agreement appeal waivers and clarifies that a district court’s adoption of a detailed PSR satisfies any obligation to determine a defendant’s indigency before imposing a JVTA special assessment. By confining the “statutory maximum” exception to outright analytical omissions, the Fifth Circuit strengthens plea-deal certainty, streamlines sentencing procedures, and limits collateral challenges in future JVTA assessment cases.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

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