Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Second Circuit’s summary order in United States v. Langhorne, affirming five convictions for distribution and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(C). The case arises from four controlled purchases conducted by confidential informants in December 2019 and January 2020, and a January 16, 2020 search of the defendant’s home in which officers recovered a bag of crack cocaine from a wastewater pipe located directly beneath an upstairs toilet.

On appeal, the defendant, Torrance Langhorne, challenged: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence on all counts; (2) admission of a detective’s testimony that a basement bathroom’s pump would have shredded any bag flushed from that location (an alleged FRE 702 issue); (3) limits imposed on cross-examination under the Confrontation Clause; (4) the effectiveness of trial counsel under Strickland; and (5) the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. The Second Circuit affirmed in all respects and dismissed the sentencing challenge as moot in light of Langhorne’s release following a presidential commutation that left supervised release intact.

Procedurally, Langhorne had early pro se participation at trial, was later represented by counsel through verdict and sentencing, and ultimately proceeded pro se on appeal after two counseled opening briefs had been filed. The court decided the appeal on those briefs when Langhorne did not respond to an order regarding his pro se intentions.

Summary of the Opinion

• Sufficiency of the evidence: The court held that overwhelming evidence supported all five counts, including informants’ testimony, video and audio recordings of controlled buys, corroborating lab reports, and physical evidence from the home search coupled with an admission to a friend.
• Unpreserved evidentiary challenge (Rule 702): Even assuming error in allowing testimony regarding how a basement pump would have affected a flushed bag, any error was harmless given independent evidence (including the defendant’s admission, the condition of the upstairs bathroom, and common-sense inferences about gravity).
• Confrontation Clause: Limiting cross-examination of a detective regarding the defendant’s civil complaints did not violate the Sixth Amendment because the lines of inquiry were marginally relevant and the detective neither had charging authority nor was the officer who found the narcotics.
• Ineffective assistance of counsel: The court rejected all Strickland claims for lack of prejudice in light of the overwhelming record, including alleged failures to object, to focus summation argument on the seized bag, to investigate a purported “Silver” nickname, and a misstep that elicited an incorrect date for a prior conviction.
• Sentencing challenge: The attack on the term of imprisonment was moot after the defendant’s release; he did not challenge the term or conditions of supervised release.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

• United States v. Osuba, 67 F.4th 56 (2d Cir. 2023): Reaffirmed the demanding standard for sufficiency challenges on appeal—review is de novo but all permissible inferences and credibility determinations favor the verdict. The court cited Osuba’s “heavy burden” formulation to emphasize why the record compelled affirmance.
• United States v. Simels, 654 F.3d 161 (2d Cir. 2011): Established that unpreserved evidentiary objections are reviewed for plain error under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Langhorne did not object to the pump testimony at trial, triggering this standard.
• United States v. Hamilton, 538 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 2008): Approved harmless-error disposition where any expert-testimony error by a law-enforcement witness would not have affected substantial rights. The court relied on Hamilton to avoid resolving whether the pump testimony met Rule 702, finding any error harmless.
• Alvarez v. Ercole, 763 F.3d 223 (2d Cir. 2014): Clarified that the Confrontation Clause protects a meaningful, not unfettered, right to cross-examination, and trial courts may limit questioning that is confusing or marginally relevant. This anchored the court’s approval of the district court’s restrictions on cross-exam of Detective McDermott.
• Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984): The controlling test for ineffective assistance, requiring deficient performance and resulting prejudice. The court resolved Langhorne’s IAC claims on the prejudice prong.
• United States v. Melhuish, 6 F.4th 380 (2d Cir. 2021): Confirmed de novo review of ineffective-assistance claims on direct appeal; cited for the articulation of Strickland’s two-prong framework.
• United States v. Simmons, 150 F.4th 126 (2d Cir. 2025): Addressed mootness of sentencing challenges after release and clarified that challenges to supervised release may sometimes remain live. The court applied Simmons to dismiss the challenge to the term of incarceration as moot.
• Governing Rules: Fed. R. Evid. 702 (expert testimony), Fed. R. Evid. 609 (impeachment by prior conviction), and Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (plain error).

Legal Reasoning: How the Court Reached Its Decision

1) Sufficiency of the Evidence

The panel conducted de novo review but, consistent with Osuba, applied the deferential sufficiency standard that draws all permissible inferences for the government and defers to the jury’s credibility assessments. For the four distribution counts based on controlled buys, the government offered:

• Testimony from confidential informants Anthony Miller and George Filla describing purchases from Langhorne on specific dates.
• Detective testimony confirming the informants returned from controlled purchases with crack cocaine.
• Audio and video recordings of the transactions.
• Laboratory reports confirming the substances were cocaine base.

For the possession-with-intent count tied to the January 16 search, the government presented:

• Testimony that a detective physically cut open the waste pipe directly below the upstairs toilet and recovered a bag of crack cocaine.
• Observations of the upstairs bathroom consistent with hurried flushing (water splashed around the base, low water level, a toppled brush).
• Testimony from a friend that Langhorne admitted flushing crack during the search.
• Testimony that Langhorne cooked and sold crack out of his home.
• A lab report confirming cocaine base in the recovered bag.

Aggregating this record, the panel concluded a rational jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on all counts.

2) Unpreserved Challenge to “Pump” Testimony under Rule 702

At trial, the defense suggested the seized bag might have originated from a basement bathroom used by a guest. The government elicited testimony that a basement toilet’s pump would have shredded any flushed bag, undermining that alternative-source theory. On appeal, Langhorne argued this was expert-style testimony that failed Rule 702’s reliability and qualification requirements.

Because no trial objection was made, the court reviewed for plain error (Simels; Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)). Without deciding whether Rule 702 was implicated, the panel held any error was harmless (Hamilton). Independent proof—Langhorne’s admission, the physical scene in the upstairs bathroom, and ordinary inferences about gravity—supplied a substantial basis to conclude the bag came from upstairs, not the basement. In other words, even if the testimony should have been excluded, it did not affect Langhorne’s substantial rights given the strength of the remaining evidence.

3) Confrontation Clause Limits on Cross-Examination

Langhorne contended the district court violated the Sixth Amendment by barring cross-examination of Detective McDermott using two civil claims Langhorne had filed regarding property damage from the search (an Internal Affairs Bureau complaint and a Notice of Claim). The defense theory was that such questioning would show McDermott’s retaliatory motive and that no drugs were truly found.

Applying Alvarez v. Ercole, the panel held the Confrontation Clause ensures a meaningful opportunity for cross-examination, not an unfettered one, and trial courts may limit marginally relevant lines of inquiry to avoid confusion. McDermott was not the officer who found the bag (Detective Gang was) and had no authority to initiate charges. Any resentment or bias inferred from property-damage claims would not meaningfully bear on whether other officers discovered cocaine base during the search. The limitations therefore fell within the trial court’s broad discretion and did not deny a meaningful opportunity to confront.

4) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Langhorne raised several Strickland claims. The court resolved each on the prejudice prong, underscoring that the trial record was robust.

• Failure to object to “pump” testimony and failure to argue the seized bag in summation: Given the independent evidence that the bag was flushed upstairs—including the defendant’s admission and the physical condition of the bathroom—there was no reasonable probability of a different outcome.
• Failure to investigate reports that a person known as “Silver” sold crack from the address: Even assuming counsel inadequately investigated, the record did not show what exculpatory facts would have been uncovered or that “Silver” was someone other than Langhorne, much less that informants transacted with a different person.
• Eliciting an erroneous prior conviction date during direct examination: Defense counsel mistakenly asked about a supposed 2008 drug conviction; in fact, the relevant prior was a 2011 conviction allowed for impeachment under Rule 609 (and the earlier prior was in 2005). Although the misstep effectively informed the jury of two drug-related priors instead of one, the panel held there was no reasonable likelihood this affected the verdict in light of the overwhelming proof.

5) Sentencing Challenge and Mootness

After President Biden commuted Langhorne’s prison term (leaving supervised release intact), the panel applied Simmons to hold that the challenge to imprisonment was moot. While supervised release challenges can remain live post-release, Langhorne did not contest the term or conditions of supervision.

Impact and Practical Implications

Although this is a non-precedential summary order, it offers several practical reminders likely to influence litigation strategy:

• Preserve Rule 702 objections. Unpreserved expert challenges face the high bar of plain-error review. Where other evidence is strong, courts may dispose of the issue on harmless error without deciding admissibility. Defense counsel should contemporaneously object and, where appropriate, request a Rule 702/Daubert hearing to build a record.
• “Common-sense” inferences matter. The court’s reliance on the condition of the upstairs bathroom and ordinary inferences about gravity highlights the probative force of circumstantial facts aligned with basic physical principles.
• Confrontation Clause scope. Cross-examination can be limited when proposed lines are tangential, confusing, or of low probative value to the issues in dispute, especially where the targeted witness is not the one who performed the critical acts or lacks relevant authority (e.g., charging decisions).
• Strickland prejudice is often outcome-determinative. In cases with overwhelming evidence, even notable defense missteps (such as inadvertently introducing prior-conviction evidence) may not support reversal absent a plausible showing of a different verdict.
• Supervised release and mootness. Appellants released from custody should focus any surviving challenges on supervised release terms or conditions. Attacks on a completed term of imprisonment will generally be moot.
• Prosecutorial proof-building. The government’s use of audio/video of controlled buys, laboratory confirmation, chain-of-custody, corroborating officers, and admissions created a layered evidentiary record resilient to appellate challenges.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Sufficiency of the evidence: On appeal, the court asks whether a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Credibility judgments belong to the jury.
• Plain error vs. harmless error:
  • Plain error (Rule 52(b)) applies when no trial objection was made. The appellant must show an error that is clear, affected substantial rights, and seriously affected the proceedings’ fairness or integrity.
  • Harmless error asks whether any assumed error likely affected the outcome. If the result would be the same due to other strong evidence, the conviction stands.
• Rule 702 (expert testimony): Expert opinions must be reliable and helpful, and the witness must be qualified. Law enforcement officers may testify to specialized matters if they meet Rule 702; but if a party fails to object, the issue is reviewed only for plain error.
• Confrontation Clause: Guarantees the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, but trial courts may limit questioning that is repetitive, confusing, or only marginally relevant. The key is whether the defendant had a meaningful opportunity to impeach the witness.
• Strickland ineffective assistance: Requires showing (1) deficient performance and (2) prejudice—a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different but for counsel’s errors. Courts often resolve on the prejudice prong alone.
• Rule 609 (impeachment by prior conviction): Allows use of certain prior convictions to impeach a testifying defendant, subject to balancing. Courts may limit the number and detail of priors admitted to avoid undue prejudice.
• Mootness after release: Appeals become moot if the court can no longer grant effective relief. A challenge to an already-completed prison term is typically moot, but challenges to ongoing supervised release may remain live.

Conclusion

United States v. Langhorne exemplifies a straightforward application of well-settled principles to a factually strong narcotics prosecution. The Second Circuit affirmed across the board, emphasizing:

• The stringent sufficiency standard and the impact of cumulative corroboration (CI testimony, recordings, lab reports, admissions, and physical indicia).
• The utility of resolving unpreserved expert challenges via harmless-error analysis where independent proof amply supports the verdict.
• The permissible scope of limits on cross-examination when proposed bias evidence is tangential and the witness’s role is indirect.
• The centrality of Strickland’s prejudice requirement in rejecting ineffective-assistance claims amid overwhelming evidence.
• The mootness of sentencing challenges post-release absent a live controversy over supervised release.

While this summary order lacks precedential effect, it is a clear, citable illustration of how the Second Circuit handles common appellate issues in drug cases: insisting on preservation for evidentiary objections, relying on common-sense inferences supported by the trial record, and demanding a concrete showing of prejudice for both Confrontation Clause and Strickland claims. For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of contemporaneous objections, narrow and relevant cross-examination, careful handling of impeachment by prior convictions, and thoughtful issue selection on appeal, especially when the evidentiary record is robust.