United States v. Lagary Williams: Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms No-Notice Rule for Upward Variances and Permits Use of Uncharged Overdose Death Under § 3553(a)

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Non-Argument Calendar, Per Curiam, Not for Publication)

Date: November 7, 2025

Docket No.: 24-12734

Introduction

This appeal arises from a significant upward variance imposed on Lagary “Frog” Williams after he pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, cocaine base, fentanyl, and methamphetamine in the Atlanta area. The district court sentenced Williams to 340 months’ imprisonment—well above the advisory Sentencing Guidelines range of 210–262 months—based on two aggravating features: (1) Williams’s extensive and persistent drug-and-firearm criminal history, and (2) evidence that fentanyl he supplied caused a fatal overdose.

On appeal, Williams raised three core challenges: (1) the district court violated due process by failing to give advance notice of an above-Guidelines sentence; (2) the court clearly erred in finding that his fentanyl caused the overdose; and (3) the 340-month sentence was substantively unreasonable under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on all grounds.

Although unpublished and not precedential, the opinion consolidates and applies several important sentencing principles: the distinction between departures and variances (and the associated notice requirements), reliance on undisputed Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) facts and reliable evidence at sentencing, and the breadth of district court discretion in selecting sentences under § 3553(a)—including weight given to overdose deaths even when not charged as an element or specific enhancement.

Summary of the Opinion

Due Process/Notice: No advance notice was required because the district court imposed a variance, not a Guidelines “departure.” The court anchored its decision in § 3553(a) factors and did not cite a departure provision. A sentencing hearing sufficed for due process, and the PSR itself flagged the potential basis for an upward variance.
Overdose Death Finding: The district court did not clearly err in finding that Williams’s fentanyl caused the overdose. Williams expressly declined to object to the PSR, which stated that his fentanyl caused the death. In any event, the government proved the fact by a preponderance of reliable evidence through DEA testimony and an intercepted call in which Williams acknowledged the fatality.
Substantive Reasonableness: The 340-month sentence—below the statutory maximum of life under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)—was substantively reasonable. The district court reasonably weighed Williams’s entrenched recidivism and the overdose death in finding the advisory range inadequate to promote respect for the law, deter, and protect the public.

Case Background

Williams distributed fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine from his Atlanta apartment. Court-authorized wiretaps captured Williams discussing an overdose death: one dealer told him an addict had died from fentanyl the dealer had supplied from Williams; Williams later remarked that his fentanyl was too potent and advised a dealer to change phones to avoid law enforcement rather than halt sales. A search of his apartment yielded substantial quantities of fentanyl (2,417 grams), methamphetamine (1,023 grams), cocaine (1,757 grams), cocaine base (60 grams), and two firearms. Williams fled by jumping from a second-story balcony when agents arrived.

Williams pleaded guilty to drug conspiracy. The PSR calculated a Guidelines range of 210–262 months, but recommended an upward variance citing (1) the high risk of recidivism based on Williams’s long pattern of drug and firearm offenses, and (2) the overdose death. At sentencing, Williams did not object to the PSR. Over defense objection, the district court allowed the government to present testimony from a DEA agent and to play the intercepted call; the court expressly found sufficient evidence connecting Williams to the overdose and imposed a 340-month sentence.

Standards of Review

Constitutional challenges: De novo.
Factual findings at sentencing: Clear error.
Substantive reasonableness: Abuse of discretion, assessing § 3553(a) under the totality of the circumstances.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008): The Supreme Court held that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(h) requires advance notice only for Guidelines departures, not for variances grounded in § 3553(a). Sentencing is “fluid,” and courts may not finalize their reasoning until the hearing’s end. The panel relied on Irizarry to reject the due process notice claim.
United States v. Hall, 965 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2020): Hall clarifies how to determine whether a sentence is a departure or a variance—courts look to the reasoning. If the court cites § 3553(a) and finds the range inadequate, it is a variance. The panel used Hall’s framework to classify the sentence as a variance, not a departure.
United States v. Plasencia, 886 F.3d 1336 (11th Cir. 2018): Due process at sentencing requires notice and an opportunity to contest facts, but not the full rigors of trial; the touchstone is ensuring an informed exercise of sentencing discretion. The panel reasoned the hearing provided adequate process.
United States v. Aguilar-Ibarra, 740 F.3d 587 (11th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832 (11th Cir. 2009): When a defendant fails to object to PSR facts “with specificity and clarity,” those facts are deemed admitted and may be relied upon at sentencing. The panel used these cases to conclude Williams admitted the overdose causation by not objecting to the PSR.
United States v. Cenephat, 115 F.4th 1359 (11th Cir. 2024): If a defendant contests a PSR fact, the government must prove it by a preponderance of reliable evidence. The panel found that standard met even aside from the PSR admission, via DEA testimony and the recorded call.
United States v. Grushko, 50 F.4th 1 (11th Cir. 2022) and United States v. Cordero, 7 F.4th 1058 (11th Cir. 2021): Set the framework for substantive reasonableness review under the totality of the circumstances and the § 3553(a) factors.
United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2020) and United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc): Emphasize the district court’s broad discretion in weighing § 3553(a) factors and define abuse of discretion in this context.
United States v. Stanley, 739 F.3d 633 (11th Cir. 2014): A sentence well below the statutory maximum is an indicator of reasonableness. The panel cited this principle in affirming the 340-month term, which is below the life maximum under § 841(b)(1)(A).

Legal Reasoning

1) Due Process and Notice

Williams framed the sentence as an upward “departure” imposed without the notice required by Rule 32(h). The Eleventh Circuit disagreed. Looking to the district court’s reasoning, the panel found the court explicitly based its sentence on § 3553(a), stating that a Guidelines-range sentence was “insufficient to meet the sentencing factors.” Under Irizarry and Hall, this is a classic variance, not a departure, and no advance notice is required. Due process was satisfied by holding a sentencing hearing at which Williams could present evidence and argument; moreover, the PSR itself alerted Williams that an upward variance was possible based on the overdose and recidivism.

2) Overdose Death as a Sentencing Fact

The panel affirmed the district court’s factual finding that Williams’s fentanyl caused the overdose, emphasizing two independent bases:

PSR admission: Williams “told the district court that he had no objections to the presentence investigation report,” which stated that his fentanyl caused an overdose death. Under Aguilar‑Ibarra and Beckles, unobjected PSR facts are admitted.
Preponderance of reliable evidence: Even if not admitted, the government met its burden through the DEA agent’s testimony (cause of death: acute fentanyl poisoning) and the recorded call in which Williams acknowledged that a customer had recently died from his fentanyl. The recorded admission corroborated the agent’s testimony.

Significantly, the court did not apply a statutory “death results” enhancement; rather, it considered the overdose as part of the § 3553(a) sentencing calculus. Accordingly, the preponderance-of-evidence standard applied, not the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, and the stringent causation standard associated with elements or mandatory enhancements was not required at this stage.

3) Substantive Reasonableness

Affirming the 340-month sentence, the panel held that the district court sensibly weighed the § 3553(a) factors. Key factors included:

Nature and circumstances of the offense: High-volume fentanyl distribution with an overdose fatality; firearms presence; attempts to evade detection (phone changes).
History and characteristics: A documented, two-decade pattern of drug trafficking and firearm offenses (multiple prior convictions).
Needs for deterrence and protection of the public: The district court found the advisory range inadequate to accomplish these goals.
Guidelines and statutory context: While above the advisory range, the sentence remained below the statutory maximum (life), which the Eleventh Circuit treats as an indicator of reasonableness (Stanley).

Given this record, the panel found no abuse of discretion and no improper factor driving the sentence, nor a failure to weigh a required factor.

Impact and Practical Implications

Variances versus departures—practice clarity: The opinion is a reminder to district courts and counsel to clearly frame upward sentences as variances when they rest on § 3553(a), avoiding Rule 32(h) notice problems. Defense counsel should be prepared to argue § 3553(a) considerations at the hearing without expecting advance notice for variances.
Overdose deaths as § 3553(a) factors: Even when the government does not charge (or cannot prove) a “death results” enhancement, an overdose can support an upward variance if proven by a preponderance of reliable evidence. This will be especially salient in fentanyl cases, where potency and public-safety concerns loom large.
PSR objections are critical: The case illustrates the high consequence of not objecting to the PSR. Unobjected facts—even facts as weighty as an overdose—are deemed admitted and can serve as major aggravators.
Reliability at sentencing: Recorded admissions and agent testimony—corroborated by investigatory materials—will typically satisfy the preponderance standard. Defense counsel should be ready to challenge reliability with specificity and to request evidentiary rulings where appropriate.
Substantive reasonableness review remains deferential: The Eleventh Circuit continues to give district courts substantial latitude in weighing § 3553(a) factors, particularly where the sentence is below the statutory maximum and the judge articulates a reasoned basis tied to deterrence, respect for law, and public protection.
Unpublished but aligned with binding precedent: Although not precedential, the decision hews closely to binding authorities like Irizarry, Hall, and Irey, and thus will likely be persuasive in similar cases within the Circuit.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Departure vs. Variance: A “departure” uses a specific Guidelines provision to move off the advisory range; a “variance” is a non-Guidelines sentence based on the general sentencing factors in § 3553(a). Advance notice (Rule 32(h)) is required for departures in some circumstances, not for variances.
PSR (Presentence Investigation Report): A report prepared by probation summarizing offense conduct, criminal history, victim impact, and Guidelines calculations. If a defendant does not object to a PSR fact clearly and specifically, courts may treat it as admitted.
Preponderance of the Evidence: The standard for most sentencing fact-finding. It requires showing a fact is more likely true than not—significantly lower than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Clear Error Review: Appellate courts will not disturb a district court’s factual finding unless left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Abuse of Discretion / Substantive Reasonableness: A sentence is overturned only if the judge ignored important factors, relied on improper ones, or made a clear error of judgment in balancing proper considerations.
Statutory Maximum: The highest sentence allowed by statute for the offense. Sentences far below the maximum often signal reasonableness on appeal.

Conclusion

United States v. Lagary Williams reinforces three practical rules of federal sentencing in the Eleventh Circuit: (1) no advance notice is required for upward variances grounded in § 3553(a); (2) uncharged conduct—here, a fentanyl overdose death—may be considered at sentencing when admitted via the PSR or established by a preponderance of reliable evidence; and (3) a well-explained upward variance, particularly one below the statutory maximum, will typically withstand substantive reasonableness review.

For practitioners, the case underscores the necessity of timely, specific PSR objections; the importance of building (or contesting) a reliable factual record for any aggravating considerations; and the continuing breadth of district court discretion in tailoring sentences to the § 3553(a) purposes, especially in fentanyl distribution cases involving significant recidivism and public-safety harms.

Note: This opinion is unpublished and therefore not binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. It is, however, consistent with binding authorities such as Irizarry and Hall and is likely to be persuasive in analogous cases.