United States v. Kimble: Categorical Disarmament of Drug-Trafficking Felons Survives Second-Amendment Scrutiny

1. Introduction

In United States v. Kimble, No. 23-50874 (5th Cir. June 30 2025), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit confronted yet another post-Bruen challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the federal statute that criminalises firearm possession by anyone previously convicted of “a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” The appellant, Sidney Donnell Kimble—twice convicted for drug-trafficking felonies—argued that imposing a life-long firearm ban on him violates the Second Amendment.

The most salient features of the case are:

Background facts – Kimble’s criminal history includes a 2012 Texas conviction for manufacture/delivery of a controlled substance and a 2015 federal conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. In 2021, officers found him discarding a pistol while fleeing on outstanding warrants and he was indicted under § 922(g)(1).
Key legal issue – Whether § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to a felon whose predicate convictions are for drug-trafficking, after the Supreme Court’s historical-tradition test announced in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).
Holding – The Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction, announcing a new, categorical rule: a drug-trafficking felony places its perpetrator within a historically “dangerous” class that legislatures may disarm permanently, without any further individualised showing of dangerousness.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Applying Bruen’s two-step framework, Judge J. E. Smith (joined by Judges Graves & Duncan) concluded:

The plain text of the Second Amendment covers Kimble’s conduct, so the government bears the burden of proving a historical analogue for permanently disarming him.
The Government’s first analogy—18th-century capital statutes for mail theft, horse theft, and counterfeiting—fails because it rests on an overly general reading of “illicit goods.”
The Government’s second theory—that drug trafficking is intrinsically violent and therefore historically disarmed—succeeds. English, colonial, and early-American sources reveal an enduring tradition of removing arms from classes deemed “dangerous to the peace,” a category that today plausibly includes drug-trafficking felons.
Consequently, § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to anyone with a felony drug-trafficking conviction, even after the offender has fully completed his sentence; an individualised court inquiry into personal dangerousness is unnecessary.

Judge Graves concurred in the judgment but criticised the majority for declining to require a case-specific assessment of the offender’s actual risk.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) – Recognised an individual right to keep arms but endorsed the “presumptive lawfulness” of felon-disarmament laws.
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022) – Introduced the history-and-tradition test and overruled two-step means–end scrutiny; triggered a wave of as-applied § 922(g) challenges.
United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024) – Clarified that an “analogical twin” is unnecessary; multiple imperfect analogues can suffice.
United States v. Diaz, 116 F.4th 458 (5th Cir. 2024) – First Fifth-Circuit case allowing § 922(g)(1) as-applied challenges; held that property-theft felons may be disarmed.
United States v. Schnur, 132 F.4th 863 (5th Cir. 2025) – Upheld disarmament of violent felons.
United States v. Giglio, 126 F.4th 1039 (5th Cir. 2025) – Allowed disarmament while felon is still under sentence (supervised release).
Several earlier “drugs-and-guns” Supreme Court and circuit cases (Smith, Muscarello, etc.) were marshalled to show the legislative perception that drug trafficking is violent.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

Step One – Coverage
Following Diaz, the court reiterates that felons remain part of “the people” protected by the Second Amendment; Kimble’s conduct is presumptively protected.
Step Two – Historical Analogue
a) Rejected analogues: 18th-century capital statutes for forgery, mail theft, and receipt of stolen horses share the same severity of punishment (death/forfeiture) but address a distinct “why”; they targeted property crimes, not public violence.
b) Accepted analogue: A broader tradition of disarming persons officially labelled “dangerous” (e.g., English Militia Act 1662; Revolutionary-era disarmament of Loyalists). The majority characterises modern drug-traffickers as an updated manifestation of that class because the drug trade is “inherently violent.”
c) Categorical, not individualised. Echoing Justice Barrett’s writings, the court deems Congress “entitled to make categorical judgments” about entire groups, so long as the group’s danger is historically comparable. Once so classified, every member of the group may be disarmed for life.
Divergence from Concurring Opinion
Judge Graves agreed that Kimble’s conviction survives but insisted that Bruen demands some individualised dangerousness inquiry. He relied on post-Bruen Sixth- and Third-Circuit cases (Williams, Pitsilides) that require opportunity for a felon to show personal non-dangerousness. The majority explicitly rejects this approach, creating a sharper inter- and intra-circuit rift.

3.3 Potential Impact

New categorical rule. Within the Fifth Circuit (Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi), any § 922(g)(1) defendant whose prior felony is a drug-trafficking offence now faces an uphill—likely futile—Second-Amendment defence.
Limitation on individualised assessments. By rejecting the Sixth and Third Circuits’ “dangerousness hearings,” the decision entrenches a circuit split, increasing prospects for eventual Supreme Court review.
Guidance for district courts. Trial judges may grant pre-trial motions to dismiss § 922(g)(1) indictments for drug traffickers much less frequently; they may also limit evidentiary hearings solely to verifying the nature of the predicate conviction.
Ripple across related statutes. The court’s characterisation of drug trafficking as “inherently violent” could influence sentencing enhancements, bail determinations, and other firearms-related statutes (e.g., § 924(c)).
Policy implications. Legislatures may feel emboldened to broaden categorical firearm prohibitions to additional felony classes (e.g., human-trafficking or large-scale fraud), invoking the “dangerousness” label.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

As-Applied Challenge: A constitutional objection claiming that, while a statute may be valid in general, its application to a particular person or set of facts is unconstitutional.
Historical Analogue: Under Bruen, modern gun restrictions must resemble— in purpose (why) and burden (how)—regulations that existed at or near the Founding (late-18th / 19th century).
Categorical Disarmament: A legislative choice to remove firearms from entire classes of persons (e.g., felons, domestic-violence respondents) without case-by-case hearings.
Dangerousness Standard: The idea that government may restrict a fundamental right if the targeted person or group poses a heightened threat to public safety.
Felon-in-Possession (§ 922(g)(1)): Federal crime punishing any felon found possessing, transporting, or receiving a firearm that has moved in interstate commerce.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Kimble adds a significant building block to post-Bruen Second-Amendment jurisprudence. The Fifth Circuit now recognises drug-trafficking felons as a per se “dangerous” class whose firearm disarmament is firmly rooted in historical tradition. Equally noteworthy, the court dispenses with any requirement for individualised dangerousness findings, distancing itself from sister circuits and inviting Supreme Court scrutiny. For practitioners, the case narrows viable defences to § 922(g)(1) indictments within the circuit and signals that categorical judgments—if historically resonant—can pass constitutional muster even under the rigorous Bruen test. Going forward, litigants should track how other circuits respond; any deepening split over the necessity of personalised hearings will likely determine the next phase of Second-Amendment litigation in the federal courts.