United States v. Kahook (6th Cir. 2025): Sixth Circuit Affirms Authority to Require Supervised-Release Payments Toward Prior Restitution and Upholds Significant Upward Variances for Recidivism and Unaccounted Conduct

Introduction

In this non-precedential, consolidated decision, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentences of six defendants swept up in a large-scale methamphetamine and fentanyl distribution conspiracy centered in Akron, Ohio. The panel (Judges Batchelder, Clay, and Bloomekatz) addressed a range of recurring federal sentencing issues, including upward variances based on recidivism and uncounted conduct, the scope of plea agreements and appeal waivers, the evidentiary threshold for the fentanyl “misrepresentation” enhancement, and whether a district court may require, as a condition of supervised release, payments toward a restitution obligation from an earlier case.

The most notable doctrinal development—though issued “Not Recommended for Publication”—is the court’s clear endorsement that a district court may require a defendant, as a special condition of supervised release, to make monthly payments on a previously imposed restitution order, so long as the condition is reasonably related to the § 3553(a) factors and does not impose a new restitution obligation. This aligns Sixth Circuit practice with persuasive authority from other circuits and extends the logic of earlier Sixth Circuit decisions addressing payments of pre-existing legal debts during supervision.

The appeals arose from the following defendants and issues:

Ronnie Radovic (No. 24-3308): Substantive reasonableness of an above-Guidelines sentence grounded in violent and persistent prior conduct and recidivism.
Corey Wright (No. 24-3309): Procedural challenges regarding notice of an upward variance and the effect of plea stipulations, plus substantive reasonableness.
Algyn Kerney (No. 24-3364): Application of USSG § 2D1.1(b)(13) for knowingly marketing fentanyl as another substance (“fake percs”).
Idris Jackson (No. 24-3389): Procedural notice claim and substantive reasonableness where the upward variance was tied to a “uniquely problematic” criminal history (DUIs, child support nonpayment, prior drug conviction).
Alfred Sanders (No. 24-3400): Validity of plea agreement and application of a four-level leadership enhancement (USSG § 3B1.1(a)) despite joint defense–government request not to apply it; effect of appellate waiver.
Nasser Kahook (No. 24-3438): Substantive reasonableness of an upward variance; and permissibility of a supervised-release condition requiring payments toward an earlier federal restitution order.

Summary of the Opinion

Across the board, the panel affirmed each sentence.
Upward variances were sustained where the district court provided a “sufficiently compelling” justification grounded in § 3553(a), especially recidivism, violent histories, and unaccounted conduct undermining the adequacy of the advisory range.
Plea stipulations did not bind the district court; rejection of a recommended range or a non-variance clause did not “eviscerate” a plea agreement, particularly where the Rule 11 colloquy made this clear.
For Kerney, the court upheld the four-level fentanyl “misrepresentation” enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(13) based on circumstantial evidence (e.g., “fake percs,” M-30 stamp, admissions of cutting fentanyl), finding a sufficient preponderance to show he marketed fentanyl as Percocet.
For Sanders, the court enforced the appellate waiver as to an agreed drug-premises enhancement, but reviewed and affirmed a four-level leadership enhancement on the merits.
For Kahook, the court approved a supervised-release condition requiring him to make monthly payments toward a prior federal restitution judgment, holding the condition was reasonably related to deterrence and protection of the public and imposed no new restitution obligation.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited and How They Shaped the Outcomes

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): No presumption of unreasonableness for outside-Guidelines sentences; require a sufficiently compelling justification for variances; appellate review is abuse-of-discretion. This is the backbone for sustaining all upward variances.
Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109 (2007): “Heartland” concept—when case-specific features take an offense outside the mine-run contemplated by the Guidelines, a variance may be appropriate. The panel repeatedly invoked this in upholding variance rationales where criminal histories and circumstances were atypically dangerous.
United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748, 754 (6th Cir. 2020): Outside-range sentences require a “sufficiently compelling” justification and merit “closer review,” but this does not amount to de novo reweighing. Used to scrutinize, but ultimately uphold, the variances.
United States v. Lee, 974 F.3d 670, 677–81 (6th Cir. 2020): “Double counting” a defendant’s criminal history in the variance analysis is not prohibited and can be appropriate, especially where prior sentences failed to deter or where history has a meaningful relationship to the instant offense. This neutralized defense arguments that prior convictions were already “baked into” the Guidelines.
United States v. Boucher, 937 F.3d 702, 709 (6th Cir. 2019): Greater deference (“greatest respect”) when a district court persuasively explains why a case is outside the Guidelines’ heartland. Underpinned affirmances where courts found atypical recidivism/danger.
United States v. Coppenger, 775 F.3d 799, 803–04 (6th Cir. 2015); and United States v. Hinton, 2021 WL 5505498 (6th Cir. Nov. 24, 2021): No advance notice is required for upward variances; the key is whether the defendant had a fair chance to address the facts—especially when they appear in the PSR. These cases defeated notice-based procedural challenges.
United States v. Robbins, 240 F. App’x 684, 692 (6th Cir. 2007): Plea stipulations do not bind sentencing courts; cautionary statements during Rule 11 about typical practices are not binding promises. This undercut arguments that the court “negated” the plea by varying or that it implicitly promised leniency.
United States v. Taylor, 85 F.4th 386 (6th Cir. 2023); United States v. Terry, 83 F.4th 1039 (6th Cir. 2023); United States v. House, 872 F.3d 748 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Stubblefield, 682 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2012): Standards governing review of Guidelines enhancements—legal conclusions de novo; factfinding for clear error; preponderance of the evidence burden on government. These framed the Kerney and Sanders enhancement rulings.
United States v. Allen, 2022 WL 7980905 (6th Cir. Oct. 14, 2022): Circumstantial evidence can prove the mens rea for the fentanyl “misrepresentation” enhancement. Guided the affirmance in Kerney.
United States v. Castilla-Lugo, 699 F.3d 454, 460 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Shanklin, 924 F.3d 905, 919 (6th Cir. 2019): Role enhancement under § 3B1.1 does not require every factor; appellate review accords “due deference.” These validated the § 3B1.1 leadership enhancement imposed on Sanders.
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); United States v. Mitchell, 135 F.4th 507, 510 (6th Cir. 2025): Pleas must be knowing, intelligent, voluntary; Rule 11 colloquy ensures understanding of rights and consequences. Undercut Sanders’s plea-withdrawal contention.
United States v. Barcus, 892 F.3d 228, 235 (6th Cir. 2018); United States v. Carter, 463 F.3d 526, 528 (6th Cir. 2006): Review of supervised-release conditions—abuse of discretion, with both procedural and substantive dimensions. Provided the analytic structure for evaluating the special condition imposed on Kahook.
United States v. May, 568 F.3d 597, 608–09 (6th Cir. 2009): Approving a supervised-release condition requiring payment on an existing legal debt to the Ohio Attorney General, emphasizing probation’s twin goals: protecting the public and discouraging recidivism. Paved the way for approving the prior-restitution payment condition here.
United States v. Church, 731 F.3d 530 (6th Cir. 2013): Addressed third-party payors in restitution—not an impediment to requiring a defendant to pay on his own prior restitution judgment as a supervision condition. Distinguished in approving the condition for Kahook.
United States v. Gill, 523 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam); United States v. Love, 431 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mitchell, 429 F.3d 952 (10th Cir. 2005): External circuit authority approving supervised-release conditions that require payments toward prior restitution orders, provided no new restitution is imposed. The Sixth Circuit aligned with this persuasive authority.

Legal Reasoning, By Issue and Defendant

Global Sentencing Framework

For the variance issues, the court proceeded in the familiar order: (1) verify the correctly calculated advisory Guidelines range; (2) assess the district court’s explanation under § 3553(a); (3) apply abuse-of-discretion review, with no presumption for or against outside-range sentences. The panel repeatedly emphasized that a district court may place greater weight on certain § 3553(a) factors (e.g., deterrence, protection of the public) and that an appellate court will not reweigh those factors when the record demonstrates a reasoned decision.

The court also reaffirmed that:

Upward variances require “sufficiently compelling” reasons, especially where the defendant’s criminal history or offense circumstances are atypically dangerous or inadequately captured by the advisory range (Gall; Perez-Rodriguez; Kimbrough).
“Double counting” a criminal history—i.e., considering it both in the Guidelines calculation and in variance analysis—is not per se improper (Lee), particularly where prior sentences demonstrably failed to deter.
When a case falls outside the Guidelines heartland, a well-explained variance “attracts greatest respect” on appeal (Boucher).

Radovic: Upward Variance to Address Violent Recidivism and Uncounted Conduct

With a Guidelines range of 30–37 months (offense level 13; CHC V), the district court imposed 57 months. The court justified the variance by citing:

A violent and persistent criminal history, including offenses not reflected in the criminal history score;
Participation in the conspiracy while on state-supervised release, signaling inability to comply with legal obligations;
The need for specific and general deterrence, and protection of the public under § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C).

The panel held this was a reasoned, non-arbitrary application of § 3553(a), and that any “double counting” of history was permissible under Sixth Circuit law (Lee). It rejected the argument that his violent history lacked a meaningful relationship to the drug offense, noting multiple prior drug convictions and his overall recidivism profile.

Wright: Notice of Variance Not Required; Plea Stipulations Do Not Bind the Court

Wright’s Guidelines range was 30–37 months (offense level 15; CHC IV). The court denied a minor-participant reduction and varied upward to 57 months, citing a violent history beginning at age 17 (a homicide) and the failure of prior sentences to deter. On appeal, he raised:

Procedural notice: Under Sixth Circuit law (Coppenger), advance notice of an upward variance is not required; the key is that there is no “surprise” about the facts relied upon. Because the PSR contained the relevant facts and Wright addressed them at sentencing, there was no procedural error. Review was for plain error, and none was shown (Simpson).
Plea “negation”: The court reiterated that neither a recommended range nor a non-variance clause binds the district court (Robbins). The Rule 11 colloquy ensured Wright understood that the court retained discretion, defeating any claim of an implicit promise.
Substantive reasonableness: The district court was permitted to give heavy weight to criminal history and the need for deterrence (Gates). The panel declined to reweigh those factors (Houston).

Kerney: Upholding § 2D1.1(b)(13) Fentanyl “Misrepresentation” Enhancement

Kerney pleaded to multiple drug and firearms counts. The district court applied a four-level enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(13) for “knowingly misrepresenting or marketing as another substance a mixture or substance containing fentanyl,” based on:

Kerney’s admission that he knew the pills contained fentanyl and that he cut them with powdered sugar to achieve the “Percocet” appearance;
The pills were stamped “M-30,” a hallmark of legitimate Percocet tablets;
Kerney referred to them as “fake percs” and admitted he was selling them.

Even without direct sale proof of these particular pills, the district court reasonably inferred, by a preponderance, that he marketed them as Percocet. The Sixth Circuit endorsed reliance on circumstantial evidence for mens rea (Allen) and found no clear error in the enhancement’s application. Kerney’s total sentence—151 months (drug/firearm counts) plus the mandatory consecutive 60 months for § 924(c)—was affirmed as procedurally sound.

Jackson: Small Upward Variance Justified by Unique Danger from Recidivism

With a properly calculated range of 37–46 months (offense level 19; CHC IV; including safety-valve and acceptance reductions), the court varied upward to 51 months. Reasons included:

A troubling pattern of DUI-related offenses, including a hit-and-run shortly after a prior DUI arrest;
Failure to pay child support (three convictions);
A 2022 drug conviction and significant juvenile history.

Jackson’s notice claim was undeveloped and thus waived (Hensel; Doe). On the merits, the district court’s explanation adequately placed the case outside the heartland, justifying a one-level upward variance (Kimbrough; Boucher) and satisfying closer scrutiny (Perez-Rodriguez). The court also relied on Lee to address any supposed disconnect between his history and the instant offense.

Sanders: Valid Plea; Appellate Waiver Enforced; Leadership Enhancement Affirmed

Sanders pleaded to seven counts, plus a § 924(c). The plea agreement contemplated a drug-premises enhancement (§ 2D1.1(b)(12)) but not a leadership enhancement (§ 3B1.1(a)), and it included an appellate waiver. The PSR recommended both enhancements. Although both sides asked the district court not to apply the leadership enhancement, the court did so and ultimately sentenced Sanders to 168 months on Counts 1–7 plus a consecutive 60 months on Count 8, after acceptance and substantial-assistance reductions.

On appeal:

Plea validity: The panel found no Rule 11 error or misunderstanding about withdrawal rights (Brady; Mitchell). Sanders could not withdraw his plea based on disagreement with later sentencing outcomes.
Appellate waiver: It barred review of the drug-premises enhancement, which the plea contemplated (Smith). It did not bar review of the leadership enhancement, which the plea did not address.
Leadership enhancement: The record supported § 3B1.1(a) based on Sanders’s decision-making authority, tracking of debts, direction of co-conspirators (referred to as his “soldiers”), and use of his residence as the conspiracy’s “office.” The court noted that not every factor is required (Castilla-Lugo), and it owed “due deference” to the district court’s role assessment (Shanklin). No clear error occurred.

Kahook: Upward Variance for Chronic Noncompliance; Supervised-Release Payment Toward Prior Restitution Approved

With an advisory range of 46–57 months (offense level 21; CHC III), the district court imposed 78 months based on:

Two prior within-Guidelines federal sentences (46 and 51 months) that failed to deter, coupled with numerous state convictions;
Persistent failure to satisfy more than $300,000 in restitution from a prior federal case;
Uncounted criminal conduct reflecting elevated recidivism risk.

The panel affirmed the upward variance as “sufficiently compelling” under § 3553(a) and consistent with Gall, Perez-Rodriguez, Kimbrough, Lee, and Houston.

The court then addressed the novel aspect: a special condition of supervised release requiring monthly minimum payments (10% of gross monthly income) toward the outstanding restitution from his earlier conviction. Emphasizing the two-step supervised-release framework (Barcus; Carter) and the statutory criteria in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), the court held:

The condition was reasonably related to deterrence and protection of the public (§ 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C));
It imposed no greater deprivation of liberty than necessary (the payments were proportionate and tied to income);
It was consistent with pertinent Sentencing Commission policy statements and with Sixth Circuit precedent allowing payment of existing legal obligations during supervision (May).

Distinguishing Church (third-party restitution payors), the panel aligned Sixth Circuit practice with the Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits (Gill, Love, Mitchell) in holding that a district court may require payment on a prior restitution judgment as a supervision condition, so long as it does not create a new restitution obligation in the new case.

Impact and Practical Implications

1) Upward Variances Centered on Recidivism and Uncounted Conduct

Expect sustained deference to well-reasoned upward variances where defendants have extensive criminal histories, violent pasts, or demonstrated failures of prior sentences to deter—especially when some conduct is unscored or unique in nature.
Defense counsel should directly confront recidivism narratives with concrete rehabilitation evidence and address any uncounted or stale incidents in the PSR. Because variances require no advance notice, silence in the face of PSR facts is risky.
Appellate challenges premised on “double counting” will face the Lee line of cases, which permits courts to consider criminal history in both the Guidelines score and the § 3553(a) variance analysis.

2) Plea Agreements and Sentencing Stipulations

Stipulated offense levels or non-variance clauses do not bind the district court. Rule 11 colloquies that make this explicit will defeat later claims that the plea was “negated” by a variance or that there was an implicit promise of leniency.
Appellate waivers will be enforced with respect to enhancements contemplated by the plea. If an enhancement was not addressed or the parties objected below, review may be preserved—but the factual record must be robust to overcome the deference to district courts’ role determinations.

3) Fentanyl “Misrepresentation” Enhancement (§ 2D1.1(b)(13))

Circumstantial evidence—such as stamping (“M-30”), admissions about cutting fentanyl to mimic Percocet, and the defendant’s own references to “fake percs”—can suffice by a preponderance to establish that the defendant knowingly marketed fentanyl as another substance.
Practitioners should develop or challenge record evidence tied to marketing, branding, and the chemistry/appearance of seized pills. Short admissions captured on audio may be outcome-determinative.

4) Leadership Enhancements (§ 3B1.1)

Courts may impose role enhancements even when both parties urge otherwise, provided the record shows decision-making authority, control over others, or coordination activities. Not all § 3B1.1 factors are required.
Practically, wiretap evidence, ledgers, instructions to co-conspirators, and the use of a premises as an operational hub (“the office”) will strongly support organizer/leader findings.

5) Supervised-Release Conditions Requiring Payment Toward Prior Restitution

This decision confirms within the Sixth Circuit’s jurisprudential orbit (albeit in an unpublished opinion) that a district court may require payments toward an earlier restitution judgment as a condition of supervised release, so long as the condition is reasonably related to § 3553(a), imposes no greater deprivation than necessary, and does not create a new restitution obligation in the new case.
The ruling harmonizes Sixth Circuit practice with the Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits, and builds on the Sixth Circuit’s approval in May of conditions requiring payment of existing legal debts during supervision.
For defendants with substantial unpaid restitution, expect courts to use supervision conditions to promote accountability, deterrence, and public protection. Parties should address ability to pay and propose proportional mechanisms (e.g., income-based payments) early.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Guidelines “heartland” or “mine-run”: The Sentencing Guidelines are designed for typical cases. When a defendant’s circumstances are atypical (e.g., unusually dangerous recidivism), courts may vary from the range.
Variance vs. departure: A “departure” applies a Guideline rule to move the advisory range; a “variance” is a discretionary adjustment based on § 3553(a) factors after the range is calculated. This case involves variances.
“Double counting” criminal history: Not inherently improper. Courts may consider criminal history’s qualitative aspects (e.g., violence, failure of prior sentences to deter) in the § 3553(a) analysis even if it also affected the Guidelines score.
Notice of upward variance: District courts need not give advance notice that they are considering a variance. Due process is satisfied if the facts supporting the variance are in the PSR and the defendant has a fair chance to respond at sentencing.
§ 2D1.1(b)(13) fentanyl “misrepresentation”: Adds four offense levels if the defendant knowingly marketed or represented fentanyl as another substance (e.g., sold as “Percocet”). Proof can be circumstantial and established by a preponderance of the evidence.
§ 3B1.1 leadership enhancement: Adds up to four levels if a defendant organized/led criminal activity involving five or more participants or that was otherwise extensive. Courts look to decision-making, control, planning, and scope—not every factor is required.
Supervised-release conditions: Special conditions must be reasonably related to certain sentencing goals, impose no greater deprivation of liberty than necessary, and be consistent with Sentencing Commission policy. Courts may require payment toward prior, valid debts (including restitution) if these criteria are met.
Standards of review:
- Variance reasonableness: abuse of discretion.
- Enhancement facts: clear error; legal interpretations de novo.
- Unpreserved procedural errors: plain error.
- Supervised-release conditions: abuse of discretion (considering substantive and procedural dimensions).

Conclusion

Although unpublished, United States v. Kahook and its consolidated companions provide a comprehensive snapshot of the Sixth Circuit’s current sentencing posture:

District courts retain broad discretion to impose upward variances when the record convincingly shows atypical recidivism, violent tendencies, or other features inadequately captured by the advisory range; appellate courts will not reweigh a reasoned § 3553(a) analysis.
Plea stipulations do not bind sentencing courts; appellate waivers will be enforced to the extent of their terms; and efforts to leverage supposed implicit promises made during plea colloquies will fail absent clear, binding undertakings.
For fentanyl cases, the “misrepresentation” enhancement can be sustained on robust circumstantial evidence, including pill appearance, markings, and defendants’ own admissions.
Leadership enhancements may be imposed notwithstanding joint party recommendations to the contrary when the record shows organizing authority and control.
Importantly, the court confirmed that, as a condition of supervised release, a defendant may be required to make payments toward a prior restitution judgment, provided the condition is properly tethered to § 3553(a), imposes no new restitution obligation, and respects proportionality—bringing Sixth Circuit practice into alignment with persuasive authority from other circuits and extending the rationale of May.

The decision’s practical takeaway is twofold: first, defendants with substantial, unaddressed criminal histories or unpaid legal obligations should anticipate that courts may use both variances and supervision conditions to promote deterrence and accountability; and second, defense counsel must meet PSR-driven narratives head-on at sentencing, preserving objections and developing mitigating records that will fare better under deferential appellate review.