United States v. Joyner: Plain-Error Limits on Vagueness Challenges to Gang Non‑Association Conditions of Supervised Release

I. Introduction

The Second Circuit’s summary order in United States v. Joyner, No. 24‑1806 (2d Cir. Dec. 17, 2025) (summary order), addresses a recurring conflict in federal sentencing: how far courts may go in restricting a defendant’s future associations—particularly with gangs—through supervised release conditions, and how clearly such conditions must be drafted to satisfy due process.

Hoover Joyner pleaded guilty in the Southern District of New York to unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district court (Judge Cathy Seibel) sentenced him to 70 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. The appeal focuses exclusively on a special supervised release condition that prohibits Joyner from:

“associat[ing] with or interact[ing] in any way, including through social media websites, with any gang members or associates, particularly members and associates of any Bloods gang, or frequent[ing] neighborhoods (or ‘turf’) known to be controlled by any Bloods gang.” (App’x at 89)

Joyner argued that this “non‑association condition” is:

Unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause; and
Imposed without the required individualized assessment on the record.

Because Joyner did not object to the condition in the district court—even though it appeared in the Presentence Report (PSR) and the court orally pronounced it at sentencing—the Second Circuit reviewed his challenge only for plain error and ultimately affirmed.

While this is a summary order with no precedential effect in the formal sense, it is citable under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and reflects the Second Circuit’s continuing approach to:

Vagueness challenges to gang-related conditions of supervised release;
The interaction between plain-error review and constitutional challenges; and
The “individualized assessment” requirement for special supervised release conditions.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Procedural Posture

Joyner pleaded guilty to one count of unlawful possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). The district court imposed:

70 months’ imprisonment; and
3 years of supervised release, including the contested gang non‑association condition.

The PSR included this condition, and the court pronounced it at sentencing. Joyner did not object. On appeal, he challenged only this condition; he did not contest the conviction or term of imprisonment.

B. Standard of Review

Normally, the imposition of supervised release conditions is reviewed for abuse of discretion (United States v. Arguedas, 134 F.4th 54, 68 (2d Cir. 2025)). However, because Joyner had notice of the condition (via the PSR and oral pronouncement) and failed to object, he conceded that plain‑error review applied, citing United States v. Lewis, 125 F.4th 69, 75 (2d Cir. 2025).

Under plain-error review, a defendant must show:

An error;
That is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute”;
That affected substantial rights, typically meaning it affected the outcome; and
That “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

The court emphasized that reversal for plain error should be used sparingly, quoting United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 2007).

C. Vagueness Challenge to the Gang Non‑Association Condition

The Second Circuit rejected Joyner’s claim that the condition is unconstitutionally vague.

Drawing on United States v. MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71, 76 (2d Cir. 2008), the court reiterated that due process requires supervised release conditions to be “sufficiently clear to inform [the defendant] of what conduct will result in his being returned to prison.” A condition is unconstitutional only if it is so vague that people “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”

Applying this standard, the court held there was no “clear or obvious” error in imposing a condition that:

Specifically references the Bloods gang and territories known to be controlled by the Bloods; and
Is understood, under existing Second Circuit case law, to bar only knowing association with gang members and to exclude incidental contact.

The court relied on a line of cases upholding very similar, and in some respects broader, conditions, including:

United States v. Green, 618 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (upholding a condition restricting association with a “criminal street gang”);
United States v. Marshall, 808 F. App’x 11 (2d Cir. 2020) (upholding a condition “not to associate with any member, associate[,] or prospect of any criminal gang, club[,] or organization”);
United States v. Rakhmatov, No. 21‑151, 2022 WL 16984536 (2d Cir. Nov. 17, 2022) (upholding a condition barring association with “any individual with an affiliation to any . . . gangs”); and
Recent decisions such as United States v. Acosta, No. 24‑965, 2025 WL 1872833 (2d Cir. July 8, 2025), and United States v. Jones, No. 22‑265, 2025 WL 3455750 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2025).

The court noted that it has “never held that a term is impermissibly vague simply because it lacks a statutory definition” (Marshall, 808 F. App’x at 12–13) and that it typically does not find plain error in the absence of binding precedent from the Supreme Court or the Second Circuit directly to the contrary (United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 2004)).

D. Individualized Assessment

Joyner also argued that the district court plainly erred by failing to provide an on‑the‑record individualized assessment justifying the non‑association condition.

The Second Circuit acknowledged that under United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018), a district court:

Must make an individualized assessment before imposing a special supervised release condition; and
Should state on the record the reasons for imposing it.

However, Betts also holds that an appellate court may uphold a condition even without an explicit explanation if the district court’s reasoning is “self‑evident from the record.” The Second Circuit found that test satisfied here, pointing to the PSR and record materials showing:

Joyner grew up regularly witnessing “crimes, gang violence, and substance use” in his neighborhood;
He joined the Bloods street gang and did not dispute that affiliation;
He himself emphasized that “associating with the wrong crowd” contributed to his criminal behavior; and
He received two prison disciplinary sanctions related to gang activity.

On these facts, the Second Circuit concluded that the rationale for imposing the gang non‑association condition was “patently obvious” and that the district court did not err, much less plainly err, in imposing it.

E. Tailoring and Delegation Arguments

In a footnote, the court briefly addressed Joyner’s arguments that:

The condition was insufficiently tailored; and
It improperly delegated sentencing authority to the Probation Office.

Because those arguments were premised entirely on the vagueness challenge, they “necessarily fail[ed] as well.” The court added that:

It reads the condition as prohibiting only knowing association, making it narrowly tailored given Joyner’s history of Bloods affiliation, cf. Green, 618 F.3d at 123; and
The condition “delegates no authority whatsoever to the Probation Office.”

The court affirmed the judgment of the district court in full.

III. Analysis of the Opinion

A. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Court’s Reasoning

1. United States v. Lewis, 125 F.4th 69 (2d Cir. 2025)

Lewis is cited for two key propositions:

District courts retain “wide latitude” in imposing supervised release conditions; and
“Traditional plain‑error review” applies when a defendant had notice of a condition (e.g., in the PSR, and via oral pronouncement) but failed to object.

Joyner relies on Lewis to:

Frame the baseline of substantial deference to district judges on conditions; and
Lock Joyner into the demanding plain‑error standard because he did not preserve his objection at sentencing.

2. United States v. Arguedas, 134 F.4th 54 (2d Cir. 2025)

Arguedas provides the standard articulation of:

The ordinary abuse‑of‑discretion review of supervised release conditions; and
The four‑part plain‑error test, quoted nearly verbatim in Joyner.

By invoking Arguedas, the court situates this case in the broader framework of recent Second Circuit sentencing jurisprudence, underscoring that plain error requires a “clear or obvious” error and a showing that the error affected substantial rights and the integrity of proceedings.

3. United States v. MacMillen, 544 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2008)

MacMillen supplies the core due‑process standard for vagueness challenges to supervised release conditions:

Conditions must be “sufficiently clear to inform [the defendant] of what conduct will result in his being returned to prison”; and
A condition is unconstitutional if people of common intelligence must “guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.”

MacMillen also cautions that due process does not require conditions to be drafted in “letters six feet high,” or to catalogue “every possible permutation” of prohibited conduct. Joyner leverages this to reject the notion that every possible edge case must be spelled out to survive a vagueness challenge.

4. United States v. Green, 618 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2010)

Green is the pivotal gang‑condition precedent. There, the Second Circuit upheld a condition prohibiting association with a “criminal street gang” and gave guidance on drafting such conditions:

They are permissible so long as they are “sufficiently clear to permit [the supervisee] to comply”;
Courts may add clarity by naming specific gangs or using examples;
Conditions should generally be understood to apply only to gang members known to the defendant; and
They should exclude “incidental contacts.”

Joyner follows Green in two key ways:

The condition is narrowed by explicitly referring to the Bloods and “neighborhoods . . . known to be controlled by any Bloods gang,” thus using a concrete gang reference to avoid overbreadth.
The Second Circuit reiterates Green’s interpretive gloss: conditions like this “only limit[] association with gang members known to the probationer, and exclude[] incidental contacts.”

This interpretive gloss is crucial: it means that even if the written condition seems broad, the appellate court reads into it a knowledge requirement and an exception for incidental encounters, mitigating vagueness and First Amendment concerns.

5. United States v. Marshall, 808 F. App’x 11 (2d Cir. 2020)

Marshall involved a condition stating that the defendant must “not associate with any member, associate[,] or prospect of any criminal gang, club[,] or organization.” The Second Circuit upheld it and observed that:

The absence of a statutory definition for “gang” (or related terms) does not automatically make a condition vague; and
Common‑sense meanings and context can suffice.

In Joyner, this case is used to blunt Joyner’s argument that because “criminal street gang” is statutorily defined in 18 U.S.C. § 521(a), the district court’s use of the more general term “gang” (without explicit statutory definition) is impermissibly vague. The panel makes clear that it has “never held that a term is impermissibly vague simply because it lacks a statutory definition.”

6. United States v. Rakhmatov, No. 21‑151, 2022 WL 16984536 (2d Cir. Nov. 17, 2022)

Rakhmatov upheld a similarly broad condition barring association with:

“any individual with an affiliation to any . . . gangs.” (internal quotation marks omitted)

Cited alongside Marshall, Rakhmatov confirms a trend within the Circuit: conditions targeting gang association—even when phrased in general terms—are routinely sustained, especially where the defendant has a documented gang connection.

7. United States v. Acosta, No. 24‑965, 2025 WL 1872833 (2d Cir. July 8, 2025); United States v. Jones, No. 22‑265, 2025 WL 3455750 (2d Cir. Dec. 2, 2025)

While the details of Acosta and Jones are not fully recounted in the order, they are cited as additional examples of the Second Circuit upholding gang‑related non‑association conditions. Their inclusion underscores that, by late 2025, such conditions—if reasonably framed—are part of a well‑established pattern in the Circuit’s supervised release jurisprudence.

8. United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2018)

Betts provides the rule that:

District courts must make an individualized assessment when deciding whether to impose a special condition of supervised release; and
They must “state on the record” the reason for imposing it.

Yet Betts also holds that an appellate court can uphold a condition even if the district court did not articulate reasons, so long as the justification is “self‑evident” from the record. Joyner leans on this flexibility, finding the justification obvious from Joyner’s gang history and his own statements linking gang association to criminal behavior.

9. United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2007)

Villafuerte is quoted for the principle that reversal for plain error should be:

“used sparingly, solely in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result.”

This underscores how high the bar is for a defendant like Joyner who did not object at sentencing: even arguable ambiguity will not suffice to show “clear or obvious” error.

10. United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2004)

Whab is cited to make an important plain‑error point:

“[W]e typically will not find plain error where ‘there is no binding precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court’ to the contrary.”

In context, this means that because there is no controlling authority holding that the term “gang” is unconstitutionally vague in supervised release conditions, and several decisions uphold similar conditions, Joyner’s challenge cannot meet the “clear or obvious error” threshold.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The Significance of Plain-Error Review

The opinion’s structure and outcome are dominated by the chosen standard of review. Because Joyner did not object at sentencing—even though he had notice from the PSR and the oral pronouncement—he forfeited ordinary abuse‑of‑discretion review and faced the more demanding plain‑error standard.

Under that standard, the Second Circuit focuses heavily on whether any error would have been “clear or obvious” at the time. Given the:

Existing line of cases upholding very similar “gang” restrictions; and
Absence of any contrary binding precedent on the particular language used here,

the court concludes that no such error could be “clear or obvious.” This approach effectively converts the prior decisions in Green, Marshall, Rakhmatov, and related cases into a shield against plain‑error reversal.

As a practical matter, this means:

Defendants must raise vagueness or overbreadth concerns at sentencing if they hope to obtain more searching appellate review; and
Where similar conditions have previously been upheld, late‑raised vagueness challenges will almost always fail under plain-error review.

2. Vagueness and the Interpretation of “Gang” Conditions

Joyner’s vagueness argument had two main components:

That the term “gang” is itself undefined and therefore impermissibly vague, especially when compared to the statutory definition of “criminal street gang” in 18 U.S.C. § 521(a); and
That the condition’s reach—encompassing gang “members or associates,” including via social media, and “turf” controlled by the Bloods—leaves substantial uncertainty about what conduct is prohibited.

The Second Circuit’s response proceeds in three steps:

a. Common-Language Understanding and Prior Case Law

First, the court rejects the premise that a term must be statutorily defined to avoid vagueness. Relying on Marshall, it states that the absence of a statutory definition does not itself render a term unconstitutional.

The court further bolsters this point by citing its own decisions upholding conditions prohibiting association with:

“a criminal street gang” (Green);
“any member, associate[,] or prospect of any criminal gang, club[,] or organization” (Marshall); and
“any individual with an affiliation to any . . . gangs” (Rakhmatov).

Against that backdrop, the court views the word “gang” as having a sufficiently well‑understood, commonsense meaning, particularly when combined with the specific reference to the Bloods.

b. Narrowing Construction: Known Members and Non‑Incidental Contact

Second, the court applies the interpretive gloss from Green: non‑association conditions are read to:

Apply only to gang members “known to the probationer”; and
Exclude “incidental contacts.”

In other words, the court builds into the condition an implied knowledge requirement (the defendant must know the person is a gang member or associate) and a practical carve‑out for casual or unavoidable contacts. The panel reinforces this gloss in the footnote, explicitly stating that it reads the non‑association condition to prohibit only “knowing association.”

This interpretive move significantly reduces potential vagueness: it answers questions like “What if I unknowingly encounter a gang member at a store?” by assuring that such incidental, unwitting contact does not violate the condition.

c. Specificity: Bloods and Known “Turf”

Third, the condition is not a generalized anti‑gang restriction; it specifically references:

“Bloods gang” members and associates; and
Neighborhoods or “turf” known to be controlled by the Bloods.

This tailoring closely tracks the guidance in Green, which approved naming a specific gang as a way to lend clarity. By anchoring the condition in a well‑known, specific gang with which Joyner was actually affiliated, the court finds that a person of ordinary intelligence in Joyner’s position would understand what to avoid.

The court therefore concludes that the condition is not “so vague” that people of common intelligence must guess at its meaning, as required for a successful due‑process vagueness challenge under MacMillen.

3. Individualized Assessment and “Self‑Evident” Reasoning

The appellate court acknowledges that the district judge did not recite a separate, detailed explanation for the gang non‑association condition on the record, as Betts ideally contemplates. But it finds the district court’s reasoning “self‑evident” for several reasons:

Joyner’s self‑reported childhood involved pervasive gang violence and crime in his neighborhood;
He joined the Bloods gang; the PSR and record show he did not dispute this affiliation;
He himself tied his criminal behavior to “associating with the wrong crowd,” aligning the condition with his own narrative of causation; and
He received gang‑related disciplinary sanctions while incarcerated.

Given these facts, the appellate court sees an obvious nexus between Joyner’s gang involvement and both:

The offense conduct; and
The risk of future criminal activity during supervised release.

This satisfies the individualized‑assessment requirement in a practical sense: the condition is not a boilerplate anti‑gang term imposed randomly, but a targeted restriction directed at a demonstrably criminogenic influence in this defendant’s life.

Under plain-error review, the absence of a fuller on‑the‑record explanation does not rise to the level of a “clear or obvious” error—especially when the record so clearly supports the restriction.

4. Tailoring and Non‑Delegation

Finally, the court disposes of Joyner’s arguments that:

The condition is not narrowly tailored; and
It unconstitutionally delegates power to the Probation Office.

Because these were framed as consequences of vagueness, the court holds that once the vagueness claim fails, the derivative arguments fail as well.

Nevertheless, the court adds two independent points:

Narrow tailoring: The court specifically notes that it reads the condition as prohibiting only knowing association, and finds it “narrowly tailored given Joyner’s history of gang affiliation,” citing Green by analogy. The condition is also focused on a particular gang (the Bloods), rather than gangs in general.
No delegation to probation: The condition, as written and as interpreted by the court, does not give the Probation Office discretion to define “gang” or to decide unilaterally which people are off‑limits. It is a direct judicial command, not a framework that probation fills in.

This is important for the non‑delegation principle in supervised release: sentencing authority must remain with the court, and here, the court finds that it did.

C. Impact and Significance

1. On Future Vagueness Challenges to Gang Conditions

Even as a non‑precedential summary order, Joyner is likely to be cited as persuasive authority, under FRAP 32.1, in future disputes over gang‑related conditions. It reflects several important propositions:

Gang non‑association conditions that:
- Target a specific gang (e.g., the Bloods),
- Are understood to apply only to known members/associates, and
- Exclude incidental contacts,
will generally be upheld against vagueness challenges, especially where the defendant has a documented history with that gang.
The word “gang,” even without a statutory definition, is not inherently too vague for supervised release purposes when used in context and narrowed by facts like specific gang references.
Courts are willing to adopt narrowing constructions—like a knowledge requirement and exclusion of incidental contact—to save conditions from vagueness problems.

2. On Defense and Sentencing Practice

The opinion sends clear signals for practitioners:

Defense counsel must object at sentencing. If a defendant believes a gang‑related condition is vague or overbroad, the time to raise it is when the PSR is reviewed or at the sentencing hearing. Failure to do so will likely doom later constitutional challenges under plain-error review.
Requests for clarification are important. Counsel can and should ask the court to:
- Clarify that the condition applies only to knowing association;
- Define or list particular gangs if the PSR references gang ties; and
- Exclude incidental or unavoidable contacts explicitly.
Record-building matters. On the government side, prosecutors and probation officers will likely continue to rely on PSR narratives of gang involvement and disciplinary records to show the “self‑evident” nexus required by Betts.

3. On District Court Sentencing Practices

For district judges, Joyner confirms that:

Gang non‑association conditions are permissible and often appropriate where a defendant has documented gang involvement tied to criminal behavior.
Naming specific gangs, and linking the condition to the defendant’s personal history, are best practices that help withstand vagueness and individualized‑assessment challenges.
Although Betts allows an appellate court to infer the rationale from the record, it is still prudent to make brief, explicit findings on the record to avoid unnecessary appellate disputes—especially in closer cases or where the nexus is less obvious than here.

4. Social Media and Modern Modes of Association

The explicit reference to “social media websites” in the condition highlights the adaptation of traditional non‑association restrictions to the digital era. While the order does not elaborate on social media, the same interpretive principles presumably apply:

The ban covers knowing, intentional online interaction with known gang members or associates (e.g., messaging, coordinated online activity);
Truly incidental or algorithm‑driven contacts (e.g., an automatically suggested “friend” or a passive follow by an unknown gang member) are unlikely to be viewed as violations under the Green/Joyner gloss.

This has practical importance, as supervised release increasingly intersects with online behavior and digital communities.

5. The Non‑Precedential Yet Influential Nature of Summary Orders

The order begins with the standard Second Circuit caution: summary orders do not have precedential effect. Nonetheless:

They may be cited in filings (with a “summary order” notation), and
They often reflect the court’s current thinking and are persuasive to lower courts and litigants.

Here, Joyner illustrates the court’s consistent approach to gang non‑association conditions, reinforcing and extending the logic of earlier precedential opinions like Green and MacMillen.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Supervised Release and Special Conditions

Supervised release is a period of community supervision that follows a federal prison sentence. During this time, the defendant must comply with:

Mandatory conditions (imposed by statute, such as not committing another crime); and
Special conditions (tailored by the court to the defendant, such as treatment, search conditions, or non‑association with certain people).

Violating a condition can result in revocation and a return to prison.

2. Plain-Error Review

If a party does not object in the trial court (for example, to a condition in the PSR or at sentencing), the appellate court usually reviews for plain error only. Under this standard, the defendant must show:

An error;
That is clear or obvious (not reasonably debatable);
That affects substantial rights (typically affecting the outcome); and
That seriously affects the fairness or integrity of judicial proceedings.

This is significantly harder to satisfy than ordinary abuse‑of‑discretion review and is designed to encourage parties to raise issues promptly in the trial court.

3. Vagueness in Supervised Release Conditions

A condition is unconstitutionally vague if it is so unclear that:

A person of common intelligence must guess at what it prohibits; and
Different people could reasonably disagree about when it applies.

Due process requires fair notice of what conduct is prohibited, but it does not require micromanaging every possible scenario. Courts often rely on:

Ordinary language meaning;
The defendant’s circumstances; and
Narrowing interpretations (like knowledge requirements and exceptions for incidental contact).

4. Individualized Assessment and “Self-Evident” Reasoning

Under Second Circuit law, a judge must:

Consider the defendant’s particular history and characteristics; and
Explain why a special supervised release condition is appropriate.

Ideally, this explanation is given on the record at sentencing. However, the appellate court can sometimes infer the rationale from the record if the connection is obvious—this is what is meant by the reasoning being “self‑evident.”

5. Gang Non‑Association Conditions: Knowing Association vs. Incidental Contact

A gang non‑association condition typically bars the defendant from:

Knowing association or interaction with gang members or associates; and
Being present in locations controlled by a gang (often called “turf”).

In the Second Circuit, such conditions are generally interpreted to:

Apply only when the defendant knows the person is a gang member or associate; and
Exclude incidental or unavoidable contacts (e.g., passing someone on the street or encountering someone in a public place without prior arrangement).

This interpretation helps make the condition workable and reduces vagueness.

6. Delegation to the Probation Office

Sentencing authority rests with the court, not the Probation Office. A condition improperly delegates sentencing authority if it leaves fundamental decisions (e.g., whether the defendant must undergo treatment or what category of persons is off‑limits) entirely to probation.

In Joyner, the court holds that the non‑association condition does not delegate such authority: it directly specifies the prohibited associations and locations and does not tell probation to fill in key terms.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Joyner reaffirms the Second Circuit’s deference to district courts’ imposition of gang non‑association conditions of supervised release, particularly when:

The defendant has a documented gang affiliation tied to criminal behavior;
The condition is anchored to a specific gang (here, the Bloods) and its known “turf”; and
The condition is interpreted to prohibit only knowing association and to exclude incidental contact.

The decision underscores the centrality of plain-error review: because Joyner did not object at sentencing, he had to show not just error, but a “clear or obvious” one, in an area where the Second Circuit had repeatedly upheld similar conditions. He could not do so.

The opinion also illustrates how courts apply the individualized‑assessment requirement flexibly, sometimes inferring justification from the PSR and record when the link between the condition and the defendant’s history is “self‑evident.”

Although a non‑precedential summary order, Joyner will likely function as persuasive authority reinforcing that:

Vagueness challenges to gang non‑association conditions face an uphill battle, especially under plain-error review; and
The Second Circuit will continue to read such conditions narrowly—requiring knowledge and excluding incidental contact—to harmonize them with due process and practical realities of life on supervised release.

Note: This commentary is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.