United States v. Hassan Jones (11th Cir. 2025): Plain Error in Prosecutorial Use of Unadmitted Evidence and Limits on Rap Evidence in § 924(c) Prosecutions

I. Introduction

United States v. Hassan Jones, No. 24-10938 (11th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025), is an important Eleventh Circuit decision at the intersection of:

• Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument, particularly the use of unadmitted evidence and its treatment under plain error review.
• The evidentiary limits on the government’s use of rap videos, images, and lyrics to prove drug and gun crimes under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403.
• The continuing constitutional prohibition under Doyle v. Ohio on using a defendant’s post-Miranda silence, and how such violations may be harmless in light of overwhelming evidence.
• The application of § 924(c) “in furtherance of” requirements to a machine gun enhancement and the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence.

The panel (Judge Newsom writing, joined by Judge Jordan and District Judge Corrigan, sitting by designation) vacated Jones’s conviction on the § 924(c) count (Count 3) and remanded for a new trial on that count, but affirmed the remaining counts. The opinion is especially notable for:

• Holding that the prosecutor’s reliance on an unadmitted Instagram exhibit in closing argument, and telling the jury it was “all you need to know” on Count 3, constituted plain error requiring reversal.
• Finding the government’s § 924(c) proof barely sufficient, but not strong, which sharpened the prejudice analysis and the decision to correct the plain error.
• Characterizing the admission of rap videos/lyrics as Rule 403 error (or at least highly problematic) but harmless, and reiterating skepticism about such evidence.
• Issuing a pointed warning to prosecutors about commenting on a defendant’s invocation of Miranda rights.

II. Background of the Case

A. Factual Setting

The case arises from a sequence of law enforcement encounters with Hassan Jones:

1. Traffic stop and initial arrest:
   • Jones was a passenger in a stopped vehicle.
   • Officers found: a loaded Glock handgun, marijuana, promethazine-hydrocodone syrup, and over $5,000 in cash.
   • Officers seized and searched Jones’s cellphone pursuant to his arrest, finding:
     • Videos of firearms and money,
     • Text messages about drug sales,
     • Photos of high-grade marijuana,
     • Notes and browser searches tied to drug dealing.
2. Search warrant at Jones’s residence (about two years later):
   • Jones lived with his girlfriend, her family, and his infant son.
   • In Jones’s bedroom, officers found:
     • A marijuana cigarette,
     • A loaded Glock handgun with an extended magazine in a dresser drawer,
     • A second Glock handgun with an extended magazine and a machine-gun conversion switch on a laundry hamper,
     • Two cellphones,
     • A prescription bottle of codeine syrup labeled with Jones’s name and address, plus an empty suspected codeine bottle.
   • In Jones’s girlfriend’s car, parked 60–80 feet from the apartment:
     • Officers located about four pounds of marijuana (a distribution quantity).

B. Charges and Trial Proceedings

The grand jury indicted Jones on five counts:

1. Count 1: Conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C. § 846).
2. Count 2: Possession with intent to distribute marijuana (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)).
3. Count 3: Possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, specifically a Glock 23 equipped with a machine-gun conversion switch (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii)).
4. Count 4: Felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
5. Count 5: Possession of an unregistered firearm (26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)).

At trial, the government introduced:

• Physical evidence from the traffic stop and apartment search,
• Digital evidence from multiple cellphones,
• Expert testimony on drug trafficking practices and the typical use of firearms by drug dealers,
• Rap music videos, images, and lyrics allegedly posted by Jones, depicting him with cash, marijuana, and weapons (including apparent machine-gun switches).

Several episodes at trial became central on appeal:

1. Miranda invocation testimony:
   • Corporal Hunter testified that, after being Mirandized, Jones invoked his right to an attorney and no interview was conducted.
   • The prosecutor later returned to this point, asking Hunter to confirm that Jones invoked his rights after being Mirandized.
   • Defense counsel did not object at trial.
2. Admission of rap-related evidence:
   • Over timely defense objections, the court admitted a 29-second rap video, screenshots from a music video, and lyrics stored in a note on Jones’s phone.
   • The materials showed Jones with firearms (some with apparent switches), marijuana, and cash.
   • At least one video carried a disclaimer: “For entertainment purposes only” and that the props and lyrics should not be taken seriously.
3. Closing argument and Exhibit 19Z:
   • The prosecutor directed the jury to “Government’s Exhibit 19Z,” a series of Instagram messages from Jones’s account.
   • He read messages involving a dispute over money from selling weed, ending with Jones allegedly saying:

     “I'm through talking. I'm going to smoke you if you don't have my money.”

   • The prosecutor told the jury:

     “All you need to know about the defendant's possession of firearms in furtherance of drug dealing in one message.”

   • Everyone later agreed that Exhibit 19Z had never been admitted into evidence. Nonetheless, the prosecutor invited the jury to rely on it.
   • Defense counsel did not object at the time.

The jury convicted Jones on all five counts. On Count 3, the jury specifically found that he used a Glock 23 with a machine-gun conversion switch “in furtherance of” the drug-trafficking crimes, triggering the 30-year mandatory minimum under § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii). The total sentence imposed was 45 years.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Decision

The Eleventh Circuit:

• Vacated the conviction on Count 3 (§ 924(c)) and remanded for a new trial on that count, holding:
  • The prosecutor engaged in misconduct by relying on unadmitted Exhibit 19Z in closing argument.
  • This misconduct constituted plain error that affected Jones’s substantial rights and seriously undermined the fairness and integrity of the proceeding, particularly given the thin evidence on the § 924(c) nexus and the 30-year mandatory sentence.
• Affirmed the convictions on Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5, holding:
  • The evidence was legally sufficient to support the § 924(c) count in general (i.e., no insufficiency-of-evidence error, even on plain error review), though the proof was weak.
  • The admission of the rap videos, images, and lyrics was at least erroneous or highly questionable under Rule 403 but ultimately harmless in light of other strong evidence of drug and gun possession.
  • Any violation of Doyle v. Ohio from commenting on Jones’s Miranda invocation was harmless, again given the strength of the government’s evidence on the affirmed counts.
  • There was no cumulative error warranting reversal of the remaining counts.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Sufficiency of the Evidence on § 924(c) (Count 3)

1. The statutory “in furtherance of” requirement

Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the government had to prove that Jones:

• Possessed a firearm (here, the Glock 23 with a machine-gun conversion switch), and
• Did so “in furtherance of” a drug-trafficking crime (the marijuana conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute).

The Eleventh Circuit has long held in United States v. Timmons, 283 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2002), that “in furtherance of” requires more than mere contemporaneous possession of a firearm during a drug crime. The government must show that the gun “helped, furthered, promoted, or advanced” the drug offense, creating a nexus between the weapon and the trafficking activity.

Timmons lists several non-exhaustive factors relevant to this nexus, including:

• Type of drug activity,
• Accessibility of the firearm,
• Type of weapon,
• Whether the weapon was stolen,
• Legitimacy or illegality of the possession,
• Whether the gun was loaded,
• Proximity to drugs or drug proceeds,
• Time and circumstances of the gun’s discovery.

2. Procedural twist: sufficiency raised differently on appeal

Jones’s sufficiency challenge on appeal was not the same as the argument he made in his Rule 29 motion at trial. In the district court, he focused on whether the government had sufficiently proved the existence of a controlled substance. On appeal, he shifted to the “in furtherance of” nexus between the machine gun and drug trafficking.

Because a defendant must preserve a specific sufficiency argument in the district court to obtain de novo review, the panel applied plain error review under United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651 (11th Cir. 2016). Under plain error and United States v. Hawkins, 934 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2019), Jones had to show:

1. There was an error.
2. The error was plain (clear or obvious under existing law).
3. The error affected his substantial rights (a reasonable probability of a different outcome but for the error).
4. The error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings (a discretionary step).

The court stopped at step one: it found no error because the evidence, though thin, was legally sufficient.

3. The government’s nexus evidence

To show that Jones possessed the machine gun in furtherance of drug trafficking, the government relied on:

• Expert testimony that drug dealers typically use guns to protect drugs and drug proceeds.
• Text messages:
  • An exchange where another individual described “clutching” an assault rifle while selling marijuana.
  • Jones responded: “I need my gun fool … I need my stick to fool.”
• A video showing Jones with a Glock switch in his hand and a bag of marijuana in his lap.

The physical evidence showed:

• Two loaded Glocks in his bedroom, one fitted with a conversion switch.
• Four pounds of marijuana located in his girlfriend’s car trunk, 60–80 feet away from the apartment.

Applying Timmons, the panel acknowledged:

• The firearms were loaded and illegally possessed—favoring the government.
• But they were not in immediate proximity to the large quantity of marijuana, which was locked in a trunk some distance away.
• The guns were in a dresser drawer and on a laundry hamper, not necessarily quickly accessible in a way that strongly signaled protection of a stash.

Still, construing all inferences in the government’s favor (as required on sufficiency review, see United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480 (11th Cir. 2011)), the court held a reasonable jury could infer a nexus based on expert testimony and the texts/videos tying guns to marijuana dealing.

4. “Sufficient but not strong”: implications

The court’s assessment is nuanced:

• On the one hand, the evidence meets the minimal sufficiency threshold even on plain error review—there is enough for a reasonable jury to convict.
• On the other hand, the panel repeatedly describes the government’s § 924(c) case as:
  • “Hardly overwhelming,”
  • “Sufficient-but-not-strong.”

This characterization is crucial later when the panel evaluates the prejudice from prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument. Because the § 924(c) case was barely over the line, improper reliance on extra-record evidence more readily tipped the scales toward finding a violation of substantial rights and correcting it under plain error review.

B. Prosecutorial Misconduct: Use of Unadmitted Exhibit 19Z in Closing Argument

1. The governing standard for prosecutorial misconduct

The court applies the standard from United States v. Reeves, 742 F.3d 487 (11th Cir. 2014):

1. The prosecutor’s remarks must be improper.
2. The remarks must prejudicially affect the substantial rights of the defendant.

Within that framework, for the prejudice prong, the court considers four factors (Reeves):

1. Whether the comments tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant.
2. Whether the comments were isolated or extensive.
3. Whether the comments were deliberate or accidental.
4. The strength of the properly admitted evidence of guilt.

Separately, there is a longstanding rule that a prosecutor’s closing argument must be confined to the evidence in the record:

• United States v. Iglesias, 915 F.2d 1524, 1529 (11th Cir. 1990) (“A prosecutor may not go beyond the evidence before the jury during closing argument.”).
• United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1030 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (binding precedent) (prohibiting convictions obtained by going beyond the evidence before the jury).
• United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748, 767 (11th Cir. 1985) (arguments must be limited to admissible evidence).
• United States v. Martinez, 96 F.3d 473, 476 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Lawyers know that argument to the jury must be based solely on the evidence admitted at trial.”).
• More recent reinforcement in Reeves, United States v. Bailey, United States v. Smith, United States v. Maradiaga, and United States v. Al Jaberi.

2. The misconduct: “All you need to know” from an unadmitted exhibit

During closing, the prosecutor:

• Explicitly directed jurors to look at “Government’s Exhibit 19Z,” an exhibit not admitted into evidence.
• Read from messages in Exhibit 19Z describing weed sales and a threat to “smoke” someone if they didn’t pay.
• Told jurors: this is “all you need to know about the defendant’s possession of firearms in furtherance of drug dealing in one message.”

This is not borderline commentary:

• The prosecutor did not merely reference a matter that might be in the record; he built the key part of his § 924(c) argument on a document the jury should never have seen or considered.
• He instructed the jury that this unadmitted exhibit was sufficient in itself (“all you need to know”) to convict on Count 3.

On the Reeves test:

• Impropriety: Clear. It is undisputed that Exhibit 19Z was never admitted; yet it was used as substantive proof in closing. This goes directly against the line of authority from Phillips, Cole, Martinez, Iglesias, and Reeves.
• Prejudice:
  • The comment tended to mislead the jury by inviting reliance on extra-record evidence and overstating its sufficiency.
  • The comment was not trivial: it was central to the government’s narrative on Count 3 and highlighted as “all you need to know.”
  • The use appeared deliberate, not accidental, given the emphasis placed on Exhibit 19Z.
  • The underlying § 924(c) evidence was weak, making the improper argument more likely to affect the verdict.

Thus, the panel had little difficulty finding prosecutorial misconduct.

3. Plain error analysis

Because defense counsel did not object at trial, the panel again used the four-part plain error test (Hawkins, Olano):

(a) Error

The court’s misconduct analysis supplied the answer: yes, the prosecutor’s conduct was improper and prejudicial. That satisfies the first plain-error prong.

(b) Plainness

An error is “plain” if it is “obvious or clear” under existing law (United States v. Laines, 69 F.4th 1221 (11th Cir. 2023); United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003)). The Eleventh Circuit’s case law could hardly be clearer:

• For decades, prosecutors have been told they cannot go beyond the record in closing argument (Phillips, Cole, Martinez, Iglesias, Reeves, Smith, Maradiaga, Al Jaberi).
• The opinion emphasizes that this prohibition is “as longstanding as it is clear.”

Here, the prosecutor did exactly what precedent forbids: urged conviction on extra-record evidence. The panel held the error was not just present but patent.

(c) Effect on substantial rights

For plain-error purposes, the third prong and the second Reeves prong overlap. The question: is there a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome would have been different?

Given:

• The government’s § 924(c) evidence was only marginally sufficient even without the error.
• The prosecutor labeled the unadmitted exhibit as decisive (“all you need to know”).
• The exhibit directly tied guns, threats of violence, and weed money together in a way more tightly connected than other evidence in the record.

The court concluded that Jones had shown the error affected the outcome on Count 3—i.e., it affected his substantial rights.

(d) Fairness, integrity, public reputation of the proceedings

The fourth prong is discretionary. Even if an error is plain and prejudicial, the court must decide whether leaving it uncorrected would undermine the legitimacy of the judicial process in the eyes of reasonable citizens.

Several features made this case “particularly troubling”:

• The § 924(c) evidence was not strong.
• The prosecutor centered his closing for that count on impermissible extra-record material.
• The count carried a 30-year mandatory minimum sentence entirely driven by the § 924(c)(1)(B)(ii) machine gun finding.

The court reasoned that affirming under these circumstances would leave “reasonable citizens” with a “rightly diminished view of the judicial process.” It therefore exercised its discretion to correct the plain error and vacate the conviction on Count 3.

4. Precedential significance

The opinion crystallizes and reinforces a key rule:

• When a prosecutor, in closing argument, invites the jury to rely on unadmitted evidence—especially while asserting that it is sufficient by itself to prove an element—and the underlying record evidence is weak, the Eleventh Circuit is prepared to treat this as plain error warranting reversal, even absent an objection.

In practical terms:

• Prosecutors must ensure that every exhibit they reference in closing has been admitted, and must not treat non-record material as evidence.
• Defense counsel should be alert both to object in real time and, on appeal, to argue plain error where trial counsel failed to object.
• District courts may wish to either instruct juries more concretely on disregarding non-admitted exhibits or more aggressively police closing arguments.

C. Admission of Rap Videos, Images, and Lyrics

1. Relevance under Rules 401/402

Jones challenged the admission of:

• A short rap video of himself wielding a gun,
• Screenshots from a music video showing him handling firearms, marijuana, and cash,
• A note on his phone containing violent-sounding rap lyrics.

He argued these were irrelevant because the government could not prove the depicted guns or drugs were real, and because the items were entertainment or artistic expression, not proof of actual conduct.

The Eleventh Circuit rejected the pure relevance challenge, noting the extremely low threshold of Rule 401: evidence that has “any tendency” to make a fact more or less probable and is of consequence in the action. The rap-related materials made it marginally more likely that:

• Jones possessed guns similar to those charged, and
• He was involved in marijuana distribution and the gun-drug lifestyle.

Thus, the evidence cleared the Rule 401/402 bar.

2. Rule 403 balancing and the Gamory analogy

Under Rule 403, however, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court expressed “skepticism” about the government’s position and drew an explicit comparison to United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480 (11th Cir. 2011):

• In Gamory, the Eleventh Circuit condemned similar rap-video evidence as heavily prejudicial, filled with profanity and violence, and suggestive of a “violent and unlawful lifestyle,” yet of low probative value regarding the specific firearms charges.
• Here, the rap evidence:
  • Also glorified violence and lawlessness,
  • Contained guns that the government could not establish were real or the same as the charged weapons,
  • Used disclaimers disavowing literal truth (“entertainment purposes only,” etc.), cutting further against probative value.

The government argued the videos and images were probative because they showed:

• Jones handling weapons similar to those found in his bedroom, and
• Jones with marijuana and cash, suggesting his participation in drug distribution.

The court essentially rejected the idea that this probative value was significant, emphasizing:

• The witness could not confirm whether the guns were real or props.
• The government did not dispute on appeal that the guns in the videos were not the same guns in the indictment.
• The presence of disclaimers further undercut any inference that the videos truthfully depicted real-world conduct.

Although the panel did not squarely hold that the district court necessarily abused its discretion under Rule 403, its language strongly indicates that admission was at least error or very close to it:

• The evidence was “heavily prejudicial,”
• Its probative value was “pretty low.”

3. Harmless error analysis

Even if admitting the rap evidence was an abuse of discretion, the court applied harmless error review (see United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2007)). Under the Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) standard, an evidentiary error is harmless if the appellate court can say “with fair assurance” that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.

Here, aside from the rap-related materials, the government’s case was robust:

• Two loaded Glocks were physically recovered from Jones’s bedroom,
• DNA tied him to the guns,
• Four pounds of marijuana were in his girlfriend’s car,
• Non-rap digital evidence (texts, photos, videos) depicted drugs, guns, and cash, and showed Jones discussing drug sales.

Jones effectively conceded as much in his own appellate briefing, noting that numerous non-rap exhibits tied him to guns, drugs, and cash, and that the charged firearms were found in his bedroom “with his DNA on them.”

As a result, the panel concluded:

• The rap evidence—however inflammatory—did not substantially sway the jury’s decision on the counts that remained (Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5).
• The error was therefore harmless as to those counts.

4. Practical takeaways on rap evidence

Although the court ultimately labeled the error harmless, the message is clear:

• Rap videos, lyrics, and similar artistic expressions are highly suspect under Rule 403 when offered mainly to suggest a violent or lawless character.
• Prosecutors should be cautious about relying on them, especially where:
  • There is no direct link between the images and the charged weapons or drugs,
  • The materials contain disclaimers of literal truth,
  • The primary effect is likely to be moral condemnation or stereotyping.
• Defense counsel should object early and often, citing Gamory, this case, and Rule 403, and seek limiting instructions or exclusion.

D. Doyle v. Ohio and Comments on Jones’s Invocation of Miranda Rights

1. The Doyle rule

In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Supreme Court held that once a defendant receives Miranda warnings, the prosecution may not use the defendant’s silence (or invocation of Miranda rights) against him at trial. Using post-Miranda silence for impeachment or as substantive evidence of guilt is “fundamentally unfair” and violates due process.

The Eleventh Circuit has repeated this rule in cases such as:

• United States v. Ruz-Salazar, 764 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1985).
• United States v. Miller, 255 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2001).

2. The challenged statements

Two moments in the trial implicated Doyle:

1. Corporal Hunter’s initial statement:

   “Mr. Jones was transported to Metro Jail before I could do any follow[-]up investigation. No interview was conducted with Mr. Jones as he invoked his right to an attorney after I advised him of Miranda rights.”

2. The prosecutor’s follow-up question:

   “You said that you attempted to interview him but he invoked his—or after Mirandizing him, he invoked his rights, correct?”

   Hunter responded: “That is correct.”

Defense counsel did not object, so plain error review again applied.

3. The court’s reaction: sharp rebuke but harmless error

The panel drew a distinction between:

• Hunter’s spontaneous reference to Jones’s invocation of counsel when describing the DNA collection process—arguably inadvertent, and not necessarily the prosecutor’s fault; and
• The prosecutor’s decision to return to the topic and affirmatively highlight the invocation of rights—conduct the court firmly condemned.

Judge Newsom wrote that the prosecutor “should not—not, not, not—have commented” on Jones’s invocation and reiterated, quoting Miller, that the government may not “call attention to” a defendant’s invocation of Miranda rights. He criticized prosecutors for “continu[ing] to indulge themselves in this way” and declared “enough is enough.”

Despite this admonition, the panel concluded any Doyle violation was harmless as to Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5:

• Only a single follow-up question referenced the invocation.
• There was no extended exploitation of the silence as evidence of guilt.
• Most importantly, the government’s evidence on those counts was overwhelming:
  • Physical recovery of guns and drugs from Jones’s immediate surroundings and associated locations,
  • Digital trails of drug dealing,
  • DNA linking him to the firearms.

Under Miller and United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1991), a “single reference” to post-Miranda silence can be harmless error in the context of overwhelming evidence. That is how the court treated it here.

Notably, the panel did not link the Doyle issue to the reversal on Count 3; the § 924(c) reversal rests solely on the Exhibit 19Z plain error and the relative weakness of the § 924(c) evidence.

E. Cumulative Error

Under the cumulative error doctrine, even if individual errors are harmless on their own, their combined effect may deprive a defendant of a fair trial. The Eleventh Circuit applies this doctrine in cases like:

• United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1995).
• United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 1997).
• United States v. Margarita Garcia, 906 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2018).

Here, because the court already vacated Count 3 on plain error grounds, the cumulative error analysis focused only on Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5.

The court examined:

• The possible Rule 403 error in admitting rap evidence,
• The potential Doyle violation,
• Other alleged missteps.

Reviewing the trial “as a whole,” the panel concluded:

• These errors, even in combination, did not render the trial fundamentally unfair as to the remaining counts.
• Jones’s “substantial rights” were not violated as to Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5.

Thus, there was no cumulative error basis to disturb those convictions.

V. Key Precedents and Their Roles in the Opinion

The opinion weaves together multiple strands of Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court precedent:

• United States v. Timmons, 283 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2002):
  Defines the “in furtherance of” nexus requirement under § 924(c) and provides the factor test used to evaluate the relationship between firearms and drug trafficking.
• United States v. Gamory, 635 F.3d 480 (11th Cir. 2011):
  Key comparator for the rap-evidence issue. It highlighted the prejudicial nature and low probative value of using violent rap videos and lyrics to show a defendant’s character or propensity rather than specific charged conduct.
• United States v. Reeves, 742 F.3d 487 (11th Cir. 2014):
  Provides the two-part test for prosecutorial misconduct and the four-factor prejudice analysis (misleading tendency, scope, deliberateness, and strength of other evidence). Applied to determine that the prosecutor’s use of Exhibit 19Z was misconduct and prejudicial.
• United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981); United States v. Cole, 755 F.2d 748 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Martinez, 96 F.3d 473 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Iglesias, 915 F.2d 1524 (11th Cir. 1990):
  Together form the line of authority holding that closing argument must be limited to admitted evidence. These cases make the Exhibit 19Z error “plain.”
• United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Hawkins, 934 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2019); United States v. Laines, 69 F.4th 1221 (11th Cir. 2023); United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003):
  Set the contours of plain error review, including preservation requirements for sufficiency challenges and what it means for an error to be “plain.”
• United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993):
  Supreme Court authority defining the “substantial rights” and “fairness/integrity” prongs of plain error review, applied here to the Exhibit 19Z misconduct.
• Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); United States v. Ruz-Salazar, 764 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v. Miller, 255 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Gonzalez, 921 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir. 1991):
  Provide the foundational rule that post-Miranda silence cannot be used as evidence against a defendant, but that single references may be harmless given overwhelming proof.
• Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946); United States v. Khanani, 502 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2007):
  Guide the harmless error inquiry for evidentiary errors—whether the jury’s verdict was substantially swayed by the error.
• United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v. Calderon, 127 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 1997); United States v. Margarita Garcia, 906 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2018):
  Frame the cumulative error test used to reject Jones’s claim that all the asserted errors, taken together, warranted reversal on the remaining counts.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Plain error review

Plain error applies when:

• A legal issue was not properly objected to or preserved in the district court.
• The appellate court will intervene only if four conditions are met:
  1. There is an error (a legal mistake).
  2. The error is plain (clear under existing precedent).
  3. The error affected the defendant’s substantial rights (likely changed the outcome).
  4. Not correcting the error would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings.

This is a high bar. Most unpreserved errors are not corrected. Jones’s case is notable because the Exhibit 19Z misconduct did clear all four hurdles.

2. “In furtherance of” under § 924(c)

For § 924(c), it’s not enough that a defendant possessed a gun and also committed a drug offense. The government must show that the gun advanced or helped the drug crime—for example:

• A gun kept to protect a stash house or drug proceeds.
• A weapon used to enforce drug debts.
• A firearm carried during drug transactions for security.

The Timmons factors (accessibility, proximity, illegality, being loaded, the nature of drug dealing, etc.) help courts and juries decide if this required nexus exists.

3. Relevance and unfair prejudice (Rules 401 and 403)

• Rule 401: Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more or less likely and the fact matters to the case. This is a very low threshold.
• Rule 403: Even if evidence is relevant, a court can exclude it if the risk of:
  • Unfair prejudice (inflaming the jury’s emotions or encouraging decision on improper grounds),
  • Confusing the issues,
  • Misleading the jury,
  • Undue delay or waste of time,

  substantially outweighs its probative value.

Rap videos and lyrics often raise intense Rule 403 concerns: they may be highly inflammatory while adding little to the specific questions the jury must answer.

4. Doyle violations and harmless error

A Doyle violation occurs when the prosecution uses a defendant’s post-Miranda silence or invocation of rights as evidence of guilt or to impeach him. This is unconstitutional, but not all such errors lead to reversal:

• If the comment is brief, isolated, and not exploited, and
• There is overwhelming independent evidence of guilt,

then the appellate court may find the error harmless, meaning the verdict would have been the same without it.

5. Cumulative error

Even if each individual error is harmless, the cumulative error doctrine asks whether all the errors together:

• So undermined the fairness of the trial,
• That the defendant’s substantial rights were violated.

In Jones, the court found the cumulative effect of the non-§ 924(c) errors still did not render the trial fundamentally unfair for Counts 1, 2, 4, and 5.

VII. Broader Impact and Practical Implications

A. For prosecutors

• Closing arguments must stay within the record. The case is a stark warning: referencing unadmitted exhibits, especially as decisive proof, can result in reversal—even under plain error review.
• Be cautious with “lifestyle” evidence. Rap videos, lyrics, and similar content carry a high risk of Rule 403 exclusion and later appellate skepticism. They should not be used simply to paint the defendant as violent or immoral.
• Do not comment on Miranda invocations. The panel’s tone shows growing impatience with such violations. Future cases with weaker evidence or more extensive comments may lead to reversals.
• Think about sentencing exposure. The draconian 30-year minimum for a § 924(c) machine gun count likely influenced the court’s willingness to step in under the fourth plain-error prong. Prosecutors should anticipate heightened scrutiny where mandatory minimums are extreme.

B. For defense counsel

• Preserve specific sufficiency challenges. Raise all plausible grounds for insufficiency in the Rule 29 motion. A different theory on appeal will trigger plain-error review, which is difficult to satisfy.
• Object promptly to improper closing argument. An immediate objection to a reference to unadmitted evidence can prevent reliance on plain error and may allow for curative instructions or, in serious cases, a mistrial.
• Challenge rap evidence aggressively. Use this opinion and Gamory to argue that such evidence is minimally probative and heavily prejudicial. Request limiting instructions if it is admitted.
• Vigorously protect Miranda rights. Object to any references to the invocation of counsel or silence. Even if appellate courts sometimes find the error harmless, such objections preserve stronger appellate arguments and may deter prosecutors in the moment.

C. For trial judges

• Strictly manage the admission of “cultural” or artistic content. Courts should apply Rule 403 with care when the government seeks to introduce expressive works, such as rap videos, that risk unfair stereotyping or character reasoning.
• Monitor closing arguments in real time. Judges should intervene if prosecutors begin to reference non-admitted exhibits or clearly stray outside the record.
• Consider specific jury instructions. Reminding jurors that:
  • Arguments of counsel are not evidence,
  • Only admitted exhibits and testimony count, and
  • They may not draw adverse inferences from a defendant’s decision not to speak,
  can mitigate risks of prejudice.

D. For future § 924(c) prosecutions

• “Typical” drug dealer patterns alone may not be enough. Expert testimony about how drug dealers “usually” use guns helps, but courts will continue to look for more concrete connections between a particular gun and particular drug activities.
• Spatial and functional nexus matters. Guns located far from the stash, not readily accessible, or without strong contextual evidence may only barely clear the sufficiency bar, leaving convictions vulnerable to additional trial error.
• Machine gun enhancements invite scrutiny. When a § 924(c) count carries a 30-year mandatory term, appellate courts are more sensitive to trial unfairness affecting that count. Prosecutors should build especially careful and robust records in such cases.

VIII. Conclusion

United States v. Jones is a significant Eleventh Circuit decision that:

• Affirms the government’s ability to rely on circumstantial evidence and expert testimony to satisfy § 924(c)’s “in furtherance of” requirement, albeit narrowly in this case.
• Establishes a clear, strong precedent that using unadmitted evidence in closing argument—particularly while telling the jury it is sufficient to convict—constitutes plain error when the underlying evidence is weak and the stakes (such as a 30-year mandatory minimum) are high.
• Continues the court’s skepticism toward the admission of rap videos, images, and lyrics, viewing them as highly prejudicial and often of marginal probative value.
• Reiterates that comments on a defendant’s invocation of Miranda rights remain forbidden under Doyle and will draw sharp criticism, even when held harmless.

The result—a partial affirmance with a targeted reversal and remand on the § 924(c) count—illustrates the Eleventh Circuit’s willingness to calibrate relief carefully: it will uphold convictions firmly supported by admissible evidence, while intervening where prosecutorial overreach and weak proof combine to threaten the fairness and integrity of the adjudicative process. For prosecutors and defense lawyers alike, Jones offers both cautionary lessons and strategic guidance for future federal criminal trials in the Eleventh Circuit.