United States v. Johnson: Romantic Partner Presence Alone Does Not Justify a Michigan v. Long Vehicle Protective Sweep

1. Introduction

In United States v. Johnson (5th Cir. Jan. 7, 2026), the Fifth Circuit reviewed a firearm conviction arising from a warrantless, post-arrest sweep of a vehicle’s passenger compartment. Federal marshals and Lubbock Police arrested Tony Lee Johnson on a warrant for supervised-release violations. After Johnson was secured, Detective/Task Force Officer Todd Pringle conducted a brief search of the driver’s area and center console and found a loaded handgun.

The government defended the search as a vehicle “protective sweep” under Michigan v. Long, arguing that Johnson’s romantic partner, Beatrice Simmons—removed from the passenger seat, temporarily detained, and expected to regain access to the car—created an officer-safety risk. The key issue was whether officers had reasonable suspicion that Simmons was “potentially dangerous” such that a Long search was permissible even though Johnson (the arrestee) could not return to the vehicle.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit reversed the denial of Johnson’s motion to suppress, vacated the conviction and sentence, and held that the Long search was unconstitutional. Although it was reasonable to suspect a weapon might be in the car, the court concluded the government failed to show reasonable suspicion that Simmons herself was dangerous. Her mere presence at her boyfriend’s arrest, her relationship to him, and vague/unspecified information about a felony history did not suffice absent some fact contemporaneous with (or arising out of) the encounter indicating she posed a threat.

Judge Haynes dissented, arguing the totality of circumstances (including the romantic relationship, Simmons’s felon status, Johnson’s dangerousness, and the dynamics of an arrest) reasonably justified a limited protective search and warning against restricting officer safety decisions.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983): The central doctrine. Authorizes a limited search of a vehicle’s passenger compartment (only places a weapon may be hidden) when officers reasonably believe a suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons. The majority applied Long through the lens of access and dangerousness: once Johnson was under arrest, his access was gone; the government therefore needed individualized reasonable suspicion that Simmons was dangerous and could access a weapon.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968): The foundational “stop-and-frisk” standard requiring “specific and articulable facts,” not a hunch. The majority treated Terry as inherently focused on “on-the-spot observations” and “necessarily swift action,” using that framing to support its insistence that officer-safety searches must be anchored, at least in part, in encounter-linked facts indicating danger.
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979): Rejects “guilt-by-association” as a basis to frisk/search absent individualized suspicion. The majority used Ybarra as a conceptual boundary: relationship to a suspect, without more, cannot substitute for individualized suspicion. The dissent viewed the relationship and circumstances as enough under a totality approach.
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (per curiam): Emphasizes that Fourth Amendment analysis turns on reasonableness. The majority invoked Mimms to ground the inquiry but still required objective facts supporting danger.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011): Confirm the Fourth Amendment’s objective reasonableness standard; an officer’s subjective motivation is not controlling. The majority used these to reject Johnson’s argument that Pringle’s report mislabeling the search as “incident to arrest” should invalidate an otherwise objectively justified search (but ultimately found the search not objectively justified).
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) and INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984): Cited for general Fourth Amendment principles and the “minimal level of objective justification” formulation for reasonable suspicion.
Fifth Circuit vehicle/frisk and reasonable-suspicion cases used as comparators:
- United States v. Rodriguez, 33 F.4th 807 (5th Cir. 2022): Recognizes that a Long search is improper once a suspect is arrested (because access is removed). The majority relied on Rodriguez to frame the “arrestee vs. non-arrestee” access distinction.
- United States v. Baker, 47 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 1995): Upheld a protective search where officers observed nervousness, inconsistent accounts, and ammunition in plain view—illustrating the kind of encounter-linked facts supporting danger.
- United States v. Silva, 957 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1992): Association with a suspected felon was not enough; flight supplied the necessary additional fact. The majority treated Silva as strong support for requiring more than relationship/propinquity alone.
- United States v. Wallen, 388 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 2004): Upheld a protective search where multiple contemporaneous safety facts existed (known weapons, disobedience, nighttime stop).
- Estep v. Dallas Cnty., 310 F.3d 353 (5th Cir. 2002): Emphasized that even under “collective knowledge,” officers need communicated specific articulable facts supporting danger.
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) and Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000): Totality of the circumstances and commonsense inferences; both sides invoked these themes, but the majority insisted that inferences must still rest on facts.
- United States v. Ducksworth, No. 24-60473, 2025 WL 3292614 (5th Cir. Nov. 26, 2025) (publication forthcoming), mandate held, Dec. 16, 2025: The government’s closest analogy. The majority distinguished it as involving numerous contemporaneous situational danger signals (night, high-crime area, lone officer outnumbered, driver found armed after lying). The dissent read Ducksworth more broadly to allow suspicion to extend through close association plus circumstances.
Procedural/review standards: United States v. Keller, United States v. Martinez, United States v. Massi, United States v. Michelletti. These cases supplied the appellate standards of review and “any reasonable view of the evidence” framing, but did not drive the substantive rule.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

Step 1 — Identify the governing exception: The search was warrantless, presumptively unreasonable, and the government bore the burden to justify it (citing United States v. Wallen and United States v. Alvarado-Zarza). The government invoked the Long protective-sweep doctrine, not probable cause or a traditional search-incident rationale.
Step 2 — Separate “weapon may be present” from “who is dangerous and has access”: The panel accepted that it was reasonable to suspect a weapon could be in the car given Johnson’s background and suspicious conduct at arrest. But because Johnson was under arrest, Long could not be justified based on Johnson’s potential access. The doctrinal pivot was Simmons: only if officers had reasonable suspicion that she was dangerous and could access a weapon would the protective search be valid.
Step 3 — Require individualized reasonable suspicion tied to the encounter: The majority reiterated that “individualized suspicion [is] required for an automobile search” (quoting United States v. Hunt) and rejected a “mere hunch” approach (citing United States v. Lopez-Moreno). It acknowledged that relationship to a suspect and criminal history are relevant, but held they were insufficient here because the record lacked any fact arising from the encounter indicating Simmons might attack, reach for the car, disobey instructions, show hostility, or otherwise present an immediate threat.
Step 4 — Articulate a “contemporaneous fact” requirement as inherent in Terry/Long: While admitting the Supreme Court did not expressly state such a requirement, the majority treated it as built into the nature of officer-safety searches: they are justified by swift, on-scene observations and rational inferences from what officers perceive during the interaction. The opinion framed its holding as a failure of the government’s proof on dangerousness, not a rejection of officer experience.
Step 5 — Distinguish comparators: The court distinguished cases upholding searches where officers observed concrete, contemporaneous indicators of danger (e.g., ammunition in United States v. Baker, disobedience and known weapons in United States v. Wallen, furtive movements and gang-related context in United States v. Rodriguez). It distinguished United States v. Ducksworth as involving markedly different situational risks and direct discovery of a gun on the driver after deception.

3.3. Impact

Narrowing “third-party” Long searches in post-arrest settings: The decision clarifies that when the arrestee cannot access the vehicle, police must show individualized, objectively grounded suspicion that a non-arrested person on scene is dangerous—not simply connected to the arrestee.
Elevating evidentiary discipline for officer-safety rationales: Officers and prosecutors should expect closer scrutiny of (a) what was known about the third party, (b) what was observed during the encounter, and (c) whether any “collective knowledge” was actually communicated with specific articulable facts.
Practical consequences for arrest operations at residences/driveways: In planned arrest scenarios, police frequently encounter companions or family members near vehicles. Johnson signals that officers cannot automatically perform a quick passenger-compartment sweep on the theory that a companion might “get emotional,” absent some concrete indicator of danger.
Likely future litigation: The dissent forecasts that defendants will cite Johnson to argue officers must observe “immediate suspiciousness,” while the government will argue the majority merely demanded encounter-linked articulable facts (which can include communicated intelligence and reliable tips, not only personal observation). How later Fifth Circuit panels reconcile Johnson with United States v. Ducksworth will likely shape the doctrine’s reach.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Protective sweep” / “Long search”: A limited search for weapons in a vehicle’s passenger area, justified not to find evidence but to prevent an immediate weapon grab that could harm officers. It is narrower than a full search and requires reasonable suspicion of danger plus access.
Reasonable suspicion: A lower standard than probable cause. It requires specific, articulable facts that make a danger (or crime) reasonably likely—not a guess or generalized fear.
Individualized suspicion vs. guilt by association: Police must have suspicion focused on the person whose conduct or danger is at issue; being near, dating, or riding with a suspect does not by itself justify a frisk or search.
Objective reasonableness: Courts judge whether the facts would justify the search to a reasonable officer, regardless of the officer’s subjective motives, labels, or after-the-fact explanations.
Collective knowledge doctrine: An officer may rely on information possessed by other officers if that information amounts to reasonable suspicion and was communicated in a way that provides specific articulable facts supporting the action taken.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Johnson reinforces that Michigan v. Long is an officer-safety tool bounded by individualized, fact-based suspicion. When the arrestee is secured and cannot access the vehicle, the government must show reasonable suspicion that the remaining person who may regain access is potentially dangerous—and the Fifth Circuit held that relationship to the arrestee and vague criminal-history information, without encounter-linked indicators of threat, do not meet that standard. The dissent underscores an emerging fault line: how much “on-the-scene” conduct is necessary before courts will permit a weapon sweep based on the foreseeable volatility of an arrest.