United States v. Johnson: Criminal Contempt Orders Are Immediately Appealable (14-Day Deadline), and Expert PowerPoint Slides May Be Admitted as “Secondary-Evidence Summaries” When Backed by Admitted Records and Proper Limiting Instructions

1. Introduction

Case: United States v. David Johnson (Sixth Circuit, Jan. 2, 2026) (unpublished).
Parties: United States (Plaintiff-Appellee) v. David Johnson (Defendant-Appellant).
Underlying convictions: Four Hobbs Act robberies (18 U.S.C. § 1951), four § 924(c) brandishing counts (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)), and felon-in-possession (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)).
Key appellate issues:

• Evidentiary: Whether the district court erred by admitting portions of an FBI agent’s PowerPoint summarizing voluminous phone records and Google geolocation data.
• Contempt: Whether multiple summary criminal contempt orders were valid, and whether earlier contempt orders could be appealed with the later final criminal judgment.
• Sentencing/constitution: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s consecutive-sentence mandate (including consecutive to a state sentence) violates the Fifth or Eighth Amendments as applied.

The case sits at the intersection of modern digital-location proof, courtroom control through contempt, and the strict appellate timing rules that can foreclose review even of liberty-depriving sanctions.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit:

• Affirmed the conviction and sentence, including the admission of the excerpted PowerPoint slides.
• Affirmed the October 2, 2024 criminal contempt order (six months).
• Dismissed the appeal of the August 29, 2022 and April 11, 2023 contempt orders as untimely under Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i), because contempt orders are final and immediately appealable and must be appealed within 14 days of docket entry when the government invokes timeliness.
• Rejected Fifth Amendment (due process/equal protection) and Eighth Amendment challenges to § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s requirement that § 924(c) terms run consecutive to any other term of imprisonment, including state sentences (relying on United States v. Gonzales).

3. Analysis

A. Admission of the Expert’s PowerPoint: “Secondary-Evidence Summaries” After United States v. Bray and United States v. Kerley

1) The doctrinal framework

The court began with the standard evidentiary review principles from United States v. Churn (abuse of discretion; harmless-error inquiry if admission was erroneous). On the merits, it acknowledged Fed. R. Evid. 1006 (effective until Nov. 30, 2024), which permits summaries to prove the content of voluminous materials. But the panel ultimately relied on a Sixth Circuit line recognizing a distinct category: “secondary-evidence summaries.”

2) The controlling precedents cited

• United States v. Bray — The foundational Sixth Circuit discussion distinguishing:
  • Rule 1006 summaries (substitute evidence of voluminous records);
  • pedagogical devices (typically not evidence); and
  • secondary-evidence summaries: summaries admitted in addition to the underlying evidence because they “so accurately and reliably summarize complex or difficult evidence … as to materially assist the jurors.”

  Bray also emphasized the need for a limiting instruction that the summary is not independent proof and is only as reliable as the evidence summarized.

• United States v. Kerley — The panel used Kerley to neutralize the defense argument that Bray was dicta, explaining that Kerley “explicitly adopted Bray’s approach.”

3) Application to Agent Kunkle’s slides

The panel upheld admission of slides 9–20 not by treating them as a pure Rule 1006 compilation, but as an admissible “secondary-evidence summary.” It acknowledged the slides contained pedagogical features beyond raw records—e.g., labeling robbery locations, depicting a stolen-credit-card transaction, directional arrows, and use of a Google Maps background. The key, however, was reliability of the “core information” (cell tower locations and time-linked approximations of the phone/Google account location) and the absence of a concrete defense claim that the slides distorted that core information.

Crucially, the district court (1) admitted the underlying phone/Google records, and (2) instructed the jury that the slides were not independent evidence and were only as valid as the underlying records—tracking Bray’s cautionary requirement. With those safeguards, the Sixth Circuit found no abuse of discretion.

4) Practical impact

• For prosecutors: The decision reinforces a workable path to admit map-based and timeline-based visualizations of technical location evidence—especially after a first trial revealed juror demand for the visual aid—so long as underlying records are admitted and limiting instructions are given.
• For defendants: Generalized complaints that a summary is “interpretive” may be insufficient; a stronger attack is to identify inaccuracies, disputed assumptions, or prejudicial embellishments that undermine “accurately and reliably summarize.”
• For trial courts: The opinion implicitly endorses careful redaction plus clear instructions as the price of admission for potentially persuasive visuals.

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B. Criminal Contempt: Finality, Timeliness, and the Narrow Space for Summary Punishment

1) Contempt authority and procedural routes

The panel reaffirmed inherent contempt power (Ex parte Terry) and statutory contempt under 18 U.S.C. § 401, while emphasizing the dangers of unbounded contempt authority (Bloom v. Illinois). It then framed Rule 42’s two tracks:

• Fed R. Crim. P. 42(a) — prosecution on notice (more process)
• Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b) — summary punishment for contempt in the judge’s presence, with a written order reciting facts

Substantively, the panel applied the Sixth Circuit’s four-part test from In re Chandler: misbehavior; obstruction; in-court presence; and intent to obstruct.

2) The timeliness holding: contempt orders must be appealed within 14 days of entry

The opinion’s most consequential procedural point is the dismissal of two contempt appeals. The government invoked the appellate timing rule in Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i), and under United States v. Payton the court treated the rule as a mandatory claims-processing rule once raised.

• Finality premise: The panel relied on In re Mfrs. Trading Corp. for the proposition that “[a]n order adjudging one guilty of criminal contempt is final and appealable.”
• Defendant’s argument rejected: Johnson argued the “or” in “entry of either the judgment or the order being appealed” resets the clock upon entry of the final criminal judgment. The panel rejected this as inconsistent with contempt finality.
• Textual move: The court emphasized the definite article “the” in Rule 4(b)(1)(A)(i), citing Slack Techs., LLC v. Pirani for the interpretive significance of particularity.
• Contempt order as its own “judgment”: Using King v. Morgan (quoting Deal v. United States) and Massengale v. United States, the panel reasoned that “judgment” in a criminal case includes adjudication plus sentence—precisely what each contempt order did.

Result: the August 29, 2022 and April 11, 2023 contempt orders were independently appealable, and because no notice of appeal was filed within 14 days of their docket entry, the court dismissed those challenges.

3) Summary contempt at sentencing: no bright-line “trial-only” rule

Johnson argued the court could only use Rule 42(b) when an “immediate response” is necessary—and suggested that only disruptions during trial qualify—citing Harris v. United States and United States v. Wilson. The panel rejected that as an overreading.

• Harris v. United States: summary contempt was disfavored where the witness’s refusal to testify lacked affront, disturbance, or insolent tactics.
• United States v. Wilson: recognized trial time pressures, but still did not impose a categorical rule requiring noticed contempt proceedings for non-trial events; it stated, “Where time is not of the essence … [notice procedures] may be more appropriate.”

The panel then assembled prudential constraints from: Anderson v. Dunn (least possible power), In re Oliver (summary contempt as a narrow exception where immediate punishment is essential to prevent demoralization of authority), and Sacher v. United States (judgment may be deferred without losing summary contempt power). It also invoked discretion to manage disruptive defendants from United States v. Donaldson (quoting Illinois v. Allen).

Applying those principles, the court found Johnson’s repeated interruptions at sentencing—after warnings and in front of the public—met In re Chandler’s elements, justified Rule 42(b), and supported the single six-month contempt term ultimately imposed.

4) Jury trial limits and cumulative contempt

• Six-month ceiling for summary contempt without a jury: The panel cited Cheff v. Schnackenberg and Bloom v. Illinois for the rule that sentences exceeding six months for criminal contempt require a jury trial (or waiver).
• Cumulative sentences and Codispoti v. Pennsylvania: The panel noted that multiple discrete contempt findings can cumulatively exceed six months if handled as separate episodes at different points in the proceeding.

5) § 3553(a) and contempt sentencing

On the claim that contempt punishment was procedurally unreasonable for failure to consider 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the panel applied plain-error review (citing United States v. Sears) and relied on United States v. Martin for the proposition that guidelines do not apply to contempt convictions carrying sentences of six months or less. No plain error was found.

6) Practical impact

• Appellate practice: A contempt order that adjudicates guilt and imposes jail time is not a “later-with-the-final-judgment” issue in this circuit; it is an immediately appealable judgment with a 14-day clock if the government insists on timeliness.
• Trial management: The opinion supports sentencing-stage summary contempt where disruption is repeated, warned against, and public-facing—while still positioning summary contempt as exceptional and process-limiting.

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C. Constitutionality of § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii)’s Consecutive Mandate (Including Consecutive to State Sentences)

1) Statutory premise

The court treated the statutory command as clear: § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii) requires that a § 924(c) term not run concurrently with “any other term of imprisonment,” including state sentences under United States v. Gonzales.

2) Fifth Amendment equal protection/due process (rational basis review)

Johnson claimed the statute arbitrarily disadvantages defendants whose state sentencing happens first. The panel applied rational basis review, drawing on Chapman v. United States (equal protection and due process overlap in this setting) and United States v. Dunham (no suspect class; rational basis suffices; justification may be conceived, citing Est. of Kunze v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue).

It found a legitimate purpose—deterrence of firearm use in crimes of violence—and cited sister-circuit support: United States v. Khan and United States v. Thomas. It also rejected the “happenstance” objection using Heller v. Doe by Doe (no need for “mathematical nicety”) and analogized to the convicted/unconvicted distinction accepted in Williams v. Meyer.

3) Eighth Amendment challenge

Johnson did not raise a gross-disproportionality argument; the panel observed that Sixth Circuit precedent has not found § 924(c) consecutive mandates unconstitutional on that basis (United States v. Watkins; United States v. McDonel). Instead, Johnson asserted an “arbitrary punishment” theory via Gregg v. Georgia, arguing the statute is “so totally without penological justification” that it becomes cruel and unusual. The panel characterized this as novel in the sentencing context and distinguished the conditions-of-confinement lineage (e.g., Rhodes v. Chapman; and Johnson’s cited Quintanilla v. Bryson, which also concerned confinement conditions).

Even assuming such a theory could apply to sentencing, the court held the consecutive mandate has penological justification (deterrence), echoing its Fifth Amendment reasoning, and therefore does not violate the Eighth Amendment.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 1006 summary vs. secondary-evidence summary: A Rule 1006 summary can function as proof of voluminous records’ content. A “secondary-evidence summary” (from United States v. Bray and United States v. Kerley) is admitted alongside the underlying evidence to help jurors understand complex evidence—so long as it is accurate, reliable, and accompanied by a limiting instruction.
• Summary contempt (Rule 42(b)): A judge can punish contempt immediately when it occurs in the judge’s presence and threatens the court’s ability to conduct proceedings. But it is exceptional; it must be fact-certified in a written order, and it must satisfy substantive elements (misbehavior, obstruction, presence, intent) under In re Chandler.
• Claims-processing rule: Some deadlines are not “jurisdictional” but still must be enforced if the opposing party insists. Under United States v. Payton, once the government invokes Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)’s timing, the court enforces it.
• Rational basis review: If no suspect class or fundamental right is involved, a statute survives if any reasonable justification can be conceived (United States v. Dunham), even if the rule produces some real-world inequality (Heller v. Doe by Doe).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Johnson delivers two especially practical lessons. First, in the Sixth Circuit, a criminal contempt order that adjudicates guilt and imposes incarceration is a final, immediately appealable judgment subject to Rule 4(b)’s 14-day clock; a later criminal judgment does not revive the deadline. Second, the court reaffirmed and operationalized the United States v. Bray/United States v. Kerley doctrine permitting admission of “secondary-evidence summaries,” allowing juries to receive carefully limited visual syntheses of technical digital-location evidence when the underlying records are admitted and the summary is shown accurate and reliable. The panel also resisted attempts to constitutionalize an as-applied exception to § 924(c)’s consecutive mandate, reaffirming deterrence as a sufficient justification under both the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.