United States v. Johnson (4th Cir. 2025): Circumstantial Proof of Firearm Knowledge in Jointly Occupied Homes Suffices for § 924(c) Aiding-and-Abetting

Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit (Unpublished)

Date: October 22, 2025

Panel: Judges Niemeyer, Gregory, and Harris (opinion by Judge Harris)

Parties: United States (Appellee) v. Aaric Murray and Richard Kirkland Johnson (Appellants)

Introduction

In this consolidated appeal from the Northern District of West Virginia, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the § 924(c) firearm convictions of co-defendants Aaric Murray and Richard Johnson. The decision clarifies how prosecutors may use circumstantial evidence to establish a defendant’s knowledge of firearms located in a jointly occupied residence when prosecuting an aiding-and-abetting charge under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i).

After a false 911 hostage report led deputies to a Morgantown mobile home shared by Murray and Johnson, officers saw drug-packaging paraphernalia and a holster in plain view in the front room. A warrant-backed search yielded two firearms—a Glock pistol and a Rossi revolver—inside a green cloth bag sitting atop a cabinet behind the table with the paraphernalia. A jury convicted both defendants of multiple drug offenses and of aiding and abetting possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. On appeal, Murray and Johnson challenged only the firearm count, arguing the government failed to prove they knew the guns were present in the home.

The Fourth Circuit rejected that challenge. Reaffirming the power of circumstantial evidence in joint-occupancy cases, the court held that: (1) a resident’s occupancy permits an inference of knowledge/constructive possession of contraband found in the home; (2) in joint-occupancy settings, the “additional nexus” requirement is satisfied by evidence linking the defendant to the specific area where contraband was stored, including common-area access; (3) plain-view indicia like a holster bolster knowledge of nearby firearms; and (4) circumstantial proof need not exclude every hypothesis consistent with innocence.

Summary of the Opinion

Standard of review: De novo review of the denial of Rule 29 motions; defendants face a “heavy burden” challenging sufficiency. The court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and affirms if supported by substantial evidence.
Knowledge requirement: For aiding and abetting a § 924(c) offense, the government had to show defendants knew of the firearms (and their possession in furtherance of drug trafficking). Defendants challenged only their knowledge of the guns’ presence in the home.
Key evidentiary features: The guns were in a visible green bag in the front room. A holster and drug-packaging tools were in plain view on a nearby table. Body-camera footage showed the bag was visible. The room functioned as a common area/living room.
Holding as to Murray: As a primary resident with personal belongings in the front room, Murray was tied to the location. The visible holster and visible bag, together with his drug trafficking activity near the table, provided substantial evidence he knew of the firearms.
Holding as to Johnson: Even as a “temporary occupant,” Johnson’s residence permitted an inference of knowledge. Evidence that the front room was a common area, combined with his drug trafficking convictions suggesting frequenting the drug-packaging table, supported the inference he knew of the visible bag and firearms.
Alternative innocent theories: The suggestion that the guns could belong to a prior occupant did not defeat the verdict; circumstantial evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence.
Result: Convictions affirmed; 60-month mandatory consecutive terms for the § 924(c) count stand.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65 (2014): Establishes that aiding-and-abetting a § 924(c) offense requires “advance knowledge” of the firearm. The panel cites Rosemond for the knowledge requirement but notes that defendants here contested only knowledge of presence, not the “advance” timing or the “in furtherance” link.
United States v. Herder, 594 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2010): Constructive possession requires knowledge of the contraband’s presence and dominion or control. The court relies on constructive possession principles to analyze the knowledge component at issue.
United States v. Shorter, 328 F.3d 167 (4th Cir. 2003): Contraband found in a defendant’s home permits an inference of constructive possession/knowledge; plain-view ammunition/holsters can bolster knowledge of a nearby firearm. This is a central pillar of the court’s reasoning for both defendants.
United States v. Hicks, 64 F.4th 546 (4th Cir. 2023): Reiterates inference principles in constructive possession when contraband is in a residence, supporting the use of occupancy-based inferences.
United States v. Kimbrough, 477 F.3d 144, 147 n.5 (4th Cir. 2007): Notes that a fact-finder may infer possession of a gun from its presence in the area where the defendant lives (e.g., basement), reinforcing home-based inference.
United States v. Blue, 808 F.3d 226 (4th Cir. 2015): In joint-occupancy cases, mere co-tenancy is insufficient; an “additional nexus” linking the defendant to the contraband is required. The court distinguishes this case by finding that nexus via access to the common area and visible items.
United States v. Hall, 858 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 2017): Where contraband is in a locked bedroom and there is no evidence the defendant had access, a knowledge inference is weaker. The panel uses this to show that here, in contrast, the guns were not in a locked or hidden space.
United States v. Blue, 957 F.2d 106 (4th Cir. 1992): Passenger-in-car case reversing a firearm conviction, emphasizing that mere proximity in a vehicle does not establish constructive possession. The panel distinguishes residences from vehicles and notes the visual accessibility of the green bag and the presence of a holster.
United States v. Benson, 957 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2020): Knowledge for aiding and abetting § 924(c) may be proven with circumstantial evidence alone. Supports the court’s reliance on non-direct proof.
United States v. Moody, 2 F.4th 180 (4th Cir. 2021): Articulates the “heavy burden” on sufficiency challenges, endorses reliance on circumstantial evidence, and instructs viewing the record favorably to the verdict.
United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018 (4th Cir. 1982): Circumstantial evidence is as competent as direct evidence.
United States v. Lawing, 703 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 2012): Reversal for insufficiency is warranted only when the prosecution’s failure is “clear.”
United States v. Jackson, 863 F.2d 1168 (4th Cir. 1989): Circumstantial evidence supporting conviction need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

Legal Reasoning

The court proceeds from familiar sufficiency principles: it reviews de novo the denial of Rule 29 motions while applying a highly deferential lens to the jury’s verdict, asking only whether substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, supports it when the record is viewed in the government’s favor.

The defendants framed a narrow challenge: they argued that, because no direct proof showed they owned, handled, discussed, or forensically touched the guns—and because the green bag allegedly concealed the guns—the jury could not find beyond a reasonable doubt that they knew the firearms were present. The court rejected this on several grounds.

Occupancy-based inference: When contraband is found in a defendant’s home, the jury may infer knowledge/constructive possession. This baseline inference applies to both Murray (a primary occupant for 1–2 months) and Johnson (a month-long “temporary” occupant). The car-passenger rule in Blue (1992) does not apply; residences are treated differently than transient presence in vehicles.
Joint occupancy nexus satisfied: Because two people lived there, the court required an “additional nexus” to connect each defendant to the contraband. For Murray, that nexus was strong:
- Direct linkage to the front room (personal belongings there; admissions placing him in the room).
- A holster in plain view on the adjacent table, recognized as a knowledge-bolstering indicator.
- Drug-packaging paraphernalia on the same table, supporting the inference that he spent time in that space.
- The green bag was visible in body-cam footage to anyone in the room, undermining any claim that the guns were “so well hidden.”
For Johnson, there was no direct proof of time in the room, but the nexus was nonetheless satisfied:
- Evidence allowed the jury to find the front room was a common area/living room (sofas, food/drink items, no bed, deputy’s description).
- As a resident, Johnson likely frequented the common area.
- His drug trafficking convictions made it more likely he used the area with the drug-packaging table.
Visibility defeats “hidden contraband” objections: The court distinguished cases where contraband was locked away or truly concealed (e.g., a locked bedroom in Hall or contraband hidden in furniture in Blue 2015). The green bag here was visible; the jury saw it on video. That visibility, together with the holster in plain view, allowed a reasonable inference of knowledge.
Circumstantial evidence can be decisive: Aligning with Benson, Moody, Tresvant, and Jackson, the panel emphasized that circumstantial proof can establish knowledge. The absence of fingerprints, DNA, or admissions did not doom the government’s case—especially when the presence of a holster and a visible bag, coupled with residence and drug activity, made knowledge a reasonable inference.
Alternative ownership theories do not negate guilt: Even if the guns belonged to a prior occupant, defendants could still know about them and constructively possess them in furtherance of trafficking. The prosecution need not exclude every alternative hypothesis consistent with innocence.

Notably, while Rosemond demands “advance knowledge” for aiding-and-abetting § 924(c), the only knowledge issue raised here was awareness of the guns’ presence. The panel did not need to resolve timing questions (e.g., when knowledge attached relative to drug trafficking) because defendants did not contest that element or the “in furtherance of” connection as instructed to the jury.

Impact and Practical Significance

Although unpublished and thus non-binding within the circuit, the opinion is likely to be persuasive in future Fourth Circuit district court litigation. Its practical contributions are substantial:

Common-area doctrine sharpened: Prosecutors can rely on the character of a room as a living room/common area, supported by photos, body-cam footage, and witness descriptions, to bridge the nexus requirement in joint-occupancy cases.
Plain-view adjuncts matter: Items like holsters or ammunition in plain view near a weapon’s storage location are potent circumstantial evidence of knowledge. Even if the firearm itself is in a container, visibility of the container and its proximity to the plain-view adjunct can carry the day.
Body-camera footage is probative: Video showing the visibility (or lack thereof) of containers can influence whether contraband is deemed “so well hidden” that knowledge can’t be inferred. Here, visibility cut decisively against the defendants.
Forensic gaps are not fatal: The absence of fingerprints, DNA, ownership records, or preserved physical exhibits (the holster and bag were not preserved) does not preclude conviction when circumstantial proof supports knowledge.
Drug-trafficking context strengthens inferences: Evidence of drug distribution activity in the same area as a firearm can support an inference that the defendant frequented the location and was aware of the gun, reinforcing § 924(c)’s “in furtherance” theory (even if that element is not litigated on appeal).
Defense strategies refined: Defense counsel confronting § 924(c) aiding-and-abetting theories in joint residences will need to present concrete evidence that the space was private, locked, or outside the defendant’s access; that containers were truly hidden; or that the defendant demonstrably lacked access to and presence in the relevant area.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Constructive possession: You don’t need to hold the item to possess it. If you know it’s there and you have the power to control it, the law treats you as possessing it. Finding contraband in your home often allows a jury to infer you knew about it and could control it.
Joint occupancy “additional nexus”: When multiple people share a residence, the law usually requires something extra to link a specific person to contraband—like evidence they used the room where the item was found, kept belongings there, or had access to that area.
Aiding and abetting a § 924(c) offense: To be liable, a defendant must know about the gun and participate in the underlying drug trafficking crime while knowing a firearm will be used or carried in relation to it. In this appeal, defendants challenged only whether they knew the guns were present in the home.
“Advance knowledge” (Rosemond): For aiding and abetting, the defendant must have learned about the gun in time to walk away from the crime. The timing of knowledge wasn’t disputed here on appeal, so the court didn’t address it in depth.
“In furtherance of” a drug trafficking crime: The firearm must help, advance, or protect the drug activity (e.g., for protection, intimidation, or safeguarding drugs/cash). The defendants didn’t challenge this element on appeal.
Rule 29 and sufficiency: After the government’s case (and again after the verdict), a defendant can argue the evidence is too weak to convict. Appellate courts give juries wide latitude, affirming if a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence: Proof through circumstances (not eyewitnesses or admissions) can be enough to convict. The law does not require the government to negate every innocent explanation.

Key Takeaways

Residency in a home where contraband is found permits an inference of knowledge/constructive possession; joint occupancy simply adds a requirement for an additional nexus, which can be satisfied by access to a common area.
Visibility matters: a gun in a visible container (here, a green bag) in a common room, plus a holster in plain view, robustly supports an inference of knowledge.
Drug distribution paraphernalia in the same area strengthens inferences that the defendant frequented the area and knew of the nearby firearms.
The absence of direct or forensic evidence does not defeat a § 924(c) aiding-and-abetting case; circumstantial evidence can be sufficient even in joint-occupancy scenarios.
Alternative explanations (e.g., prior owner’s guns) do not require reversal; the government need not exclude every innocent hypothesis.
Unpublished decisions aren’t binding precedent in the Fourth Circuit, but this opinion provides persuasive guidance to trial courts and litigants on how to prove and contest knowledge in § 924(c) aiding-and-abetting cases arising from jointly occupied residences.

Conclusion

United States v. Johnson reinforces a pragmatic evidentiary roadmap for § 924(c) aiding-and-abetting prosecutions in residential settings: inferences from occupancy, access to common areas, visible containers, and plain-view adjuncts like holsters can satisfy the knowledge requirement even without direct testimony, forensic links, or preserved physical exhibits. By carefully distinguishing vehicle proximity cases and hidden/locked-room scenarios, the Fourth Circuit confirms that visibility and context—the use of a room as a common area and the presence of drug-packaging paraphernalia—matter greatly. While unpublished, the decision is a detailed and useful template for how circumstantial evidence, sensibly marshaled and presented, can carry the government’s heavy burden against Rule 29 challenges in joint-occupancy firearm prosecutions under § 924(c).