United States v. Hunter: Preserving the “Breach of Trust” Rationale in Supervised Release Revocations After Esteras

I. Introduction

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Justice Hunter, No. 25‑3069 (6th Cir. Dec. 26, 2025) (not recommended for publication), sits squarely at the intersection of three important strands of modern federal sentencing law:

the evolving law of supervised release and revocation under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e);
the Supreme Court’s recent limit in Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025), on which § 3553(a) factors may be considered at revocation; and
the longstanding “breach of trust” theory used by courts and the Sentencing Commission to justify sanctions for supervised release violations.

Although the panel ultimately resolves Hunter’s appeal on plain‑error grounds, the case is significant because:

the per curiam majority confirms that, at a minimum, it is not “plain” (i.e., obvious) error for a district court to consider a defendant’s breach of the court’s trust when imposing a revocation sentence, even after Esteras; and
Judge Thapar’s separate concurrence goes further, arguing that considering breach of trust is not error at all and remains affirmatively authorized by Supreme Court precedent and by the statutory scheme governing supervised release.

Practically, the decision reassures district courts in the Sixth Circuit that they may continue to rely on breach‑of‑trust considerations at revocation, and it warns defense counsel that generalized objections (such as saying a sentence is “greater than necessary”) will not preserve more specific, procedural challenges on appeal.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Underlying Conviction and Original Sentence

Justice Hunter was a member of “Shorb Blocc,” a Canton, Ohio street gang involved in trafficking cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and fentanyl. During a federal investigation of this organization, Hunter sold cocaine to a confidential informant, which led to a grand jury indictment in 2021 of Hunter and fifteen co‑conspirators.

Hunter pled guilty to:

distribution of a controlled substance; and
conspiracy to possess cocaine, cocaine base, and fentanyl with intent to distribute.

The district court sentenced him to:

24 months’ imprisonment; and
three years of supervised release, with standard conditions, including prohibitions on:
- committing new crimes,
- possessing or using controlled substances, and
- possessing firearms or ammunition.

B. Supervised Release Violations

Hunter’s supervised release began on May 8, 2023. The supervision went off course almost immediately:

On May 9, at his first drug test, he tested positive for four different controlled substances.
Two months later, police executed a search warrant at Hunter’s residence and found:
- two handguns and ammunition;
- he was also involved in three controlled buys in which he purchased fentanyl.
He pled guilty in state court to four drug charges arising from this conduct.

Probation reported these violations. At the revocation hearing, Hunter admitted the violations.

C. Revocation Hearing and Sentence

Under the Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter 7 policy statements, Hunter’s advisory revocation range was:

30–37 months’ imprisonment,

but 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) capped the permissible term at 24 months (the statutory maximum for his class of offense).

The district court stated that it:

considered the applicable § 3553(a) factors; and
considered the nonbinding Chapter 7 policy statements.

Focusing on the immediacy and seriousness of Hunter’s relapse into criminal conduct, the court emphasized his rapid return to drug trafficking and possession and concluded:

“I don’t know how we can impress upon you, Mr. Hunter, that you can’t go back to selling drugs. . . . But, in this case, I am going to revoke your term of supervised release just because your immediately returning to criminal conduct was a serious breach of this Court’s trust.”

The court then imposed:

24 months’ imprisonment (the statutory maximum);
no mention is made of any further supervised release term in the excerpt, so the commentary focuses on the imprisonment component.

D. Objections and Appeal

After pronouncing sentence, the district court invited objections. Defense counsel said only:

“[W]e would just object to the sentence for the record.”

The court asked for clarification, noting the objection was “general.” Counsel then specified:

“[We] object [that] the term of imprisonment was greater than necessary.”

On appeal, however, Hunter did not argue that the sentence was simply too long in a general sense. Instead, he raised a more targeted claim: that the district court impermissibly relied on his breach of trust as a sentencing factor, which he cast as a challenge to the sentence’s substantive reasonableness.

III. Summary of the Opinion

A. Majority (Per Curiam)

The majority does three main things:

Reclassifies Hunter’s claim as procedural. A claim that the court relied on an impermissible sentencing factor is a procedural error, not a substantive one. Thus, even though Hunter labelled his challenge “substantive,” the court treats it as procedural.
Holds the argument unpreserved and applies plain‑error review. Because Hunter’s objection at sentencing—that the term was “greater than necessary”—is understood in Sixth Circuit law as preserving only substantive reasonableness, his specific complaint about reliance on breach of trust is deemed unpreserved procedural error. The court therefore reviews only for plain error, an “extremely deferential” standard.
Concludes there is no “plain” error in considering breach of trust. In light of:
- longstanding Sixth Circuit precedent allowing courts to consider breach of trust at revocation,
- the Supreme Court’s discussion in Haymond endorsing the breach‑of‑trust view,
- the Supreme Court’s express reservation of the breach‑of‑trust question in Esteras, and
- the Sentencing Commission’s continued adoption of breach‑of‑trust in Chapter 7,
the panel holds that—even if breach‑of‑trust were later deemed impermissible—its use here is not an “obvious or clear” error under existing law. Therefore, no relief is warranted on plain‑error review, and the sentence is affirmed.

B. Judge Thapar’s Concurrence

Judge Thapar concurs in the judgment but writes separately to argue that the majority goes too far in suggesting there might be error at all. His position:

Esteras does not prohibit reliance on breach of trust; it only prohibits consideration of § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s retributive factors (seriousness, respect for law, just punishment) at revocation.
Under the Marks rule, Justice Breyer’s controlling concurrence in Haymond positively endorses the breach‑of‑trust framework, and four dissenters in Haymond did likewise. Thus, Supreme Court precedent supports (rather than imperils) breach‑of‑trust reasoning.
Statutorily, breach of trust is encompassed by permissible § 3553(a) factors (history and characteristics, deterrence, and public protection) cross‑referenced in § 3583(e).
Historically and practically, supervised release is a form of conditional liberty grounded in a trust relationship between the court and the defendant; violating conditions is, in fact, a breach of that trust.
While Sentencing Commission commentary is not binding after cases like Havis and in light of Loper Bright, the Commission’s longstanding commentary on breach of trust is persuasive under Skidmore.

He would therefore affirm on the straightforward ground that considering breach of trust is permissible, not merely non‑plain error.

IV. Legal Framework

A. Supervised Release and Revocation under § 3583(e)

Supervised release is a post‑imprisonment monitoring regime created by Congress “to assist individuals in their transition to community life.” United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, 59 (2000). For federal defendants, after they complete their prison term, they may be placed under supervised release with conditions. If they violate those conditions, a district court may:

revoke supervised release; and
impose a further term of imprisonment, subject to statutory maximums tied to the original offense class. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).

Section 3583(e) lists the factors a court may consider at revocation, incorporating some, but not all, of § 3553(a):

§ 3553(a)(1): the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant;
§ 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C): the need to afford adequate deterrence and to protect the public;
§ 3553(a)(2)(D): the need to provide the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical care, or other treatment;
§ 3553(a)(4)–(7): guidelines, policy statements, avoidance of unwarranted disparities, and restitution.

Conspicuously omitted is § 3553(a)(2)(A), which speaks of:

the seriousness of the offense,
promoting respect for the law, and
providing just punishment for the offense.

In Esteras, the Supreme Court recently held that this omission is meaningful: district courts may not rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s retributive considerations in deciding whether to revoke supervised release and in fixing the revocation sentence.

B. Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness

Federal sentences are reviewed for:

Procedural reasonableness – whether the court:
- properly calculated the Guidelines range,
- treated the Guidelines as advisory,
- considered the statutory factors,
- avoided reliance on clearly impermissible factors, and
- adequately explained the chosen sentence.
Substantive reasonableness – whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the sentence is too long or too short.

In this case, Hunter’s argument that the district court relied on an “impermissible factor” (breach of trust) is classified as a challenge to procedural reasonableness, per United States v. Parrish, 915 F.3d 1043, 1048 (6th Cir. 2019).

C. Preservation and Plain‑Error Review

To preserve a specific procedural objection, a defendant must object on that specific ground at sentencing. The Sixth Circuit stresses:

“[A] party must object in the district court on the same basis that he raises on appeal.” United States v. Sittenfeld, 128 F.4th 752, 776 (6th Cir. 2025).
An objection “to the Court’s sentence in total” as “greater than necessary” is understood as a substantive reasonableness objection, not a procedural one. United States v. Erker, 129 F.4th 966, 978 (6th Cir. 2025); see also Holguin‑Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169, 174–75 (2020).

When an argument is not preserved, appellate courts apply the four‑part plain‑error test (from United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)):

there was an error;
the error was “obvious or clear” under current law;
the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights (usually meaning it likely affected the outcome); and
the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”

Plain‑error review is, in the Sixth Circuit’s words, an “extremely deferential” standard, and reversal occurs only in “exceptional circumstances.” United States v. Hymes, 19 F.4th 928, 933 (6th Cir. 2021).

D. The “Breach of Trust” Theory

For decades, courts and the Sentencing Commission have treated supervised release revocation as primarily about sanctioning the defendant’s breach of the court’s trust—that is, his failure to comply with court‑imposed conditions—rather than punishing the original offense again.

The Sentencing Commission’s Chapter 7 introductory commentary states:

“[A] defendant’s failure to follow the court‑imposed conditions of . . . supervised release” is a “breach of trust.”
“At revocation, the court should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust.” U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3(b) (2025).

The Sixth Circuit has long endorsed this approach, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 204, 207 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Morris, 71 F.4th 475, 482 (6th Cir. 2023). The Supreme Court in Haymond similarly described revocation sentences as “first and foremost” sanctions for breach of trust. 588 U.S. 634, 658 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring).

E. Esteras and the Limits on Retribution at Revocation

In Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. 185 (2025), the Supreme Court held that a district court may not rely on § 3553(a)(2)(A) at revocation because those factors embody the “backward‑looking purpose of retribution,” which is impermissible in the revocation context. The Court:

invalidated the practice of invoking the “seriousness of the offense,” “promoting respect for the law,” or “just punishment” in deciding revocation sentences; but
explicitly reserved the question whether sanctioning the defendant’s “breach of trust” is a permissible consideration. Id. at 194 n.5.

The reserved question is exactly the one lurking in Hunter: can “breach of trust” still be used as a revocation rationale after Esteras, or is it an impermissible proxy for retribution?

V. Analysis of the Majority Opinion

A. Recasting Hunter’s Challenge as Procedural

Hunter framed his appeal as a claim that the district court’s reliance on breach of trust rendered his sentence substantively unreasonable. The majority, relying on Parrish, rejects this characterization:

“Considering an impermissible factor is a ‘procedural, not substantive, error.’”

This classification matters because:

a general “greater than necessary” objection at sentencing, under Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent, preserves substantive reasonableness, but
it does not automatically preserve all possible procedural issues (such as reliance on an impermissible factor).

Thus, by recasting the argument as procedural, the court triggers a demanding preservation requirement and ultimately plain‑error review.

B. Failure to Preserve and Plain‑Error Review

The majority scrutinizes Hunter’s objection at sentencing:

Counsel first offered a generic objection “to the sentence for the record.”
When pressed, he clarified that the term of imprisonment was “greater than necessary considering all of the custody time.”

Citing Sittenfeld and Erker, the court holds:

An objection phrased in “greater than necessary” terms signals a complaint about the length of the sentence (substantive reasonableness), not about how the court went about selecting the sentence (procedural reasonableness).
Because Hunter’s sentencing objection did not mention breach of trust—or any other specific procedural ground—the procedural challenge is unpreserved.

Accordingly, the panel applies the Vonner plain‑error framework, repeating that it will reverse “only in exceptional circumstances to correct obvious errors that would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Hymes, 19 F.4th at 933.

C. Was Use of “Breach of Trust” Plain Error?

The majority’s key move is to sidestep the ultimate merits question and instead focus narrowly on whether any error was “obvious or clear” at the time of sentencing:

Sixth Circuit precedent clearly allows breach‑of‑trust reasoning. The court cites:
- Morris, 71 F.4th at 482, which holds that district courts “may sanction the ‘breach of trust’ associated with a violation”; and
- Johnson, 640 F.3d at 204, for the same idea.
The majority notes that these are published precedents—and mentions “scores” of consistent unpublished decisions (e.g., Blackman, Byrd, Eubanks).
Haymond supports the breach‑of‑trust view. Quoting Justice Breyer’s controlling concurrence, the majority highlights that revocation sentences are “first and foremost considered sanctions for the defendant’s breach of trust.” 588 U.S. at 658. It also notes that four dissenters agreed with that framing. Id. at 670–71 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Esteras does not forbid breach‑of‑trust considerations. The Supreme Court in Esteras:
- forbade reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s retributive factors at revocation; but
- explicitly reserved whether breach of trust is permissible, 606 U.S. at 194 n.5.
The majority then points to its own recent decision in United States v. Hoyle, 148 F.4th 396, 406 & n.1 (6th Cir. 2025), which had already concluded that Esteras does not abrogate Sixth Circuit breach‑of‑trust precedent.
Other circuits continue to endorse breach‑of‑trust post‑Esteras. The opinion cites:
- United States v. Fernandez, 152 F.4th 124 (2d Cir. 2025);
- United States v. Walton, 145 F.4th 476 (4th Cir. 2025);
- United States v. Taylor, 153 F.4th 934 (9th Cir. 2025).
These courts, like the Sixth, have continued to treat breach of trust as a permissible revocation consideration after Esteras.

In light of this doctrinal landscape, even if one thought there might be some tension between Esteras and breach‑of‑trust reasoning, it is impossible to say that using breach‑of‑trust was “obviously” forbidden. At worst, the question remains open and contestable. Plain error requires the error to be clear under controlling law, which it is not.

Thus, the majority’s bottom line is limited but decisive: no plain error; sentence affirmed. The court deliberately does not resolve whether breach‑of‑trust is fully consistent with Esteras at the de novo level. That question is left, implicitly, for another day—or for Judge Thapar’s concurrence to tackle more directly.

D. The Role of the Sentencing Commission’s Chapter 7 Commentary

The majority also emphasizes that the Sentencing Commission’s policy statements continue to treat breach of trust as central to revocation:

Chapter 7, introductory cmt. 3(b), defines supervised release violations as a “breach of trust” and advises that courts should “sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust.”
Hunter argued that recent Commission amendments abandoned this approach. The panel rejects that claim, noting that the 2025 amendments actually retain the breach‑of‑trust language.

This is significant because § 3583(e) explicitly directs courts to consider “the applicable guidelines or policy statements” of the Commission. While Chapter 7 policy statements are advisory and not binding, they remain highly influential in structuring district courts’ revocation reasoning—and they strongly support breach‑of‑trust‑based sentencing.

VI. The Thapar Concurrence: A Full‑Throated Defense of Breach‑of‑Trust Sentencing

Judge Thapar agrees there is no plain error but insists that framing the issue as “no plain error” understates the case. In his view, the district court “didn’t err at all” in considering breach of trust. His concurrence offers a richer doctrinal and theoretical defense of breach‑of‑trust sentencing.

A. Haymond and the Marks Rule

Because Esteras expressly reserved the breach‑of‑trust question, the Supreme Court’s last substantive word on supervised release revocation remains United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. 634 (2019).

Haymond fractured the Court, but under the Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), rule, the opinion concurring in the judgment on the narrowest grounds is controlling. In Haymond:

Justice Breyer concurred and explicitly endorsed the breach‑of‑trust theory, stating that revocation sentences are “first and foremost” sanctions for breach of trust. 588 U.S. at 658 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Four dissenters (Justice Alito, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh) likewise described the supervised release violation as a “breach of trust.” Id. at 671 (Alito, J., dissenting).

Judge Thapar reasons that:

Justice Breyer’s concurrence is controlling under Marks and affirmatively embraces breach of trust; and
There is thus no doctrinal basis in Supreme Court law for suspecting that breach of trust is improper; if anything, it is the Court’s chosen framework for understanding revocation.

Therefore, Esteras cannot be read to quietly overrule or undermine Haymond’s breach‑of‑trust endorsement, especially since Esteras explicitly declined to resolve that very issue.

B. Reconciling Esteras with Breach of Trust

Judge Thapar argues that Esteras and breach‑of‑trust sentencing can coexist because they address different concerns:

Esteras prohibits relying on backward‑looking retributive purposes (seriousness of the original offense, respect for the law, just punishment).
Breach of trust, by contrast, is forward‑looking and relational: it concerns the defendant’s failure to comply with conditions during supervised release and what that failure reveals about:
- the defendant’s characteristics,
- the risk of future misconduct, and
- the need to protect the public and deter future violations.

In his words, breach of trust “speaks to the ongoing relationship between the defendant and the district court: a forward‑looking relationship that’s focused on helping him reintegrate into society.” It is therefore not synonymous with “the backward‑looking purpose of retribution” prohibited in Esteras. 606 U.S. at 196.

C. Statutory Basis in § 3583(e) and § 3553(a)

Judge Thapar next shows how breach of trust fits within the statutory factors that § 3583(e) does permit courts to consider:

§ 3553(a)(1): breach of trust reflects the defendant’s “history and characteristics” (e.g., returning to drug trafficking immediately upon release);
§ 3553(a)(2)(B): a violation shows the need to “afford adequate deterrence” to future criminal conduct;
§ 3553(a)(2)(C): it also shows the need to “protect the public from further crimes” of the defendant.

The Sixth Circuit has, for years, treated breach of trust as encompassed within these permissible factors. See Johnson, 640 F.3d at 207; Blackman, 2025 WL 1262322, at *3 (6th Cir. May 1, 2025).

Thus, far from lacking statutory footing, breach‑of‑trust reasoning is firmly rooted in § 3583(e)’s cross‑references to § 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2)(B)–(C).

D. Historical and Conceptual Foundations of “Trust” in Supervised Release

Hunter argued that supervised release does not involve “trust” because Congress rejected the old parole model, which was historically described as granting conditional liberty as an “act of grace” and could be revoked. Since supervised release is not parole, he insisted, there is no baseline “trust” to be breached.

Judge Thapar rejects this argument as too formalistic:

Even though supervised release is not a direct substitute for parole, it still grants the defendant conditional liberty—a period outside prison subject to court‑imposed conditions.
The Supreme Court describes supervised release as “a form of postconfinement monitoring that permits a defendant a kind of conditional liberty by allowing him to serve part of his sentence outside of prison.” Mont v. United States, 587 U.S. 514, 523 (2019); see also Esteras, 606 U.S. at 192.
Like parole, supervised release is revocable when conditions are violated, § 3583(e)(3), and the very concept of “conditional liberty” implies reliance on the defendant’s compliance—i.e., trust.

In practice, district judges and probation officers heavily invest in supervisees’ reintegration, often through ongoing meetings and supportive interventions. As this relationship develops, so does the level of trust. Violations of conditions are therefore naturally experienced, and reasonably described, as breaches of that trust.

E. Deference to Sentencing Commission Commentary After Loper Bright

Judge Thapar also addresses how much weight courts should give to the Sentencing Commission’s commentary endorsing breach‑of‑trust.

Under United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc), commentary “has no independent legal force”—it may interpret Guidelines text but cannot expand or contradict it.
He notes that the Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), which abrogated Chevron deference and emphasized courts’ “independent judgment” in interpreting statutes, also casts doubt on deference to agencies’ interpretations of their own legislative rules (so‑called Auer deference).
Accordingly, he suggests that courts should not “reflexively defer” to Commission commentary but instead evaluate it under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944), which grants weight proportional to the commentary’s persuasiveness, consistency, and contemporaneity.

Applying Skidmore, Judge Thapar finds the Chapter 7 breach‑of‑trust commentary highly persuasive because:

it does not contradict any text in the Guidelines or statutes;
it has remained consistent “since it was written just a few years after Congress passed the statute at issue”; and
it aligns with the Supreme Court’s own understanding of supervised release in cases like Haymond and Mont.

Thus, even under a more skeptical post‑Loper Bright approach, the Commission’s endorsement of breach‑of‑trust sentencing remains influential and legitimate.

VII. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The Hunter opinions synthesize and extend a range of prior cases. In addition to the key decisions already discussed, several precedents are worth highlighting for their specific roles:

United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc)
Establishes the plain‑error framework in sentencing appeals and emphasizes deference to the district court absent preserved, specific objections. Hunter’s failure to raise breach‑of‑trust below squarely triggers Vonner.
United States v. Hymes, 19 F.4th 928 (6th Cir. 2021)
Characterizes plain‑error review as “extremely deferential” and reversal as appropriate only in exceptional cases. Cited in Hunter to reinforce the reluctance to disturb sentences on unpreserved grounds.
United States v. Jones, 81 F.4th 591 (6th Cir. 2023)
Noted (in a footnote) as consistent with breach‑of‑trust reasoning, though later “abrogated on alternative grounds” by Esteras. Hunter uses this to show that whatever changes Esteras made, they did not target breach‑of‑trust itself.
United States v. Hoyle, 148 F.4th 396 (6th Cir. 2025)
Post‑Esteras Sixth Circuit decision explicitly acknowledging that Esteras “doesn’t abrogate our precedent” allowing consideration of breach of trust. Hunter leans on Hoyle to show doctrinal continuity.
United States v. Sittenfeld, 128 F.4th 752 (6th Cir. 2025)
Clarifies that preservation requires objections on the same basis later raised on appeal—a rule applied in Hunter to deny preserved status to the breach‑of‑trust challenge.
United States v. Erker, 129 F.4th 966 (6th Cir. 2025)
Holds that an objection that a sentence is “greater than necessary” is a substantive challenge and does not preserve procedural objections. Hunter relies on this to characterize Hunter’s sentencing objection.
Holguin‑Hernandez v. United States, 589 U.S. 169 (2020)
The Supreme Court held that a defendant’s request for a lower sentence generally preserves a substantive reasonableness argument. Cited in Hunter to reinforce the narrow effect of such an objection—it preserves substantive but not specific procedural claims.
United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53 (2000)
Provides the widely‑quoted statement that supervised release exists “to assist individuals in their transition to community life.” This undergirds the idea that supervised release has a rehabilitative, trust‑based mission.
Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024)
Abrogates Chevron deference and emphasizes that courts must exercise independent judgment in interpreting statutes. Judge Thapar extrapolates from this that deference to agency interpretations of their own rules (including Commission commentary) must also be reconsidered and governed by Skidmore.
United States v. Bricker, 135 F.4th 427 (6th Cir. 2025)
A Sixth Circuit application of Loper Bright, reinforcing the move away from strong deference to agency interpretations. Hunter uses Bricker to situate its skepticism toward guideline commentary within circuit law.
United States v. Havis, 927 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2019) (en banc)
Holds that guideline commentary cannot expand the Guidelines’ text and has “no independent legal force.” Hunter cites it to justify viewing Chapter 7’s breach‑of‑trust commentary as persuasive but not binding.

VIII. Simplifying the Key Concepts

A. What Is “Plain Error”?

Plain error is a highly deferential standard used when a defendant did not clearly object to a specific issue in the district court. The appellate court will correct the error only if:

there was a mistake;
the mistake is clear under current law;
it likely changed the result; and
leaving it uncorrected would seriously damage the integrity or reputation of the courts.

In Hunter, even if one harbored doubts about breach‑of‑trust reasoning, the key point is that any such error is not “clear” in light of existing binding precedent and Supreme Court reservations.

B. Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness in Everyday Terms

Procedural reasonableness: Did the judge follow the right steps, consider the right factors, and avoid forbidden ones?
Substantive reasonableness: Is the sentence actually fair in length, given the facts and permissible factors?

Hunter’s appellate argument was procedural (impermissible factor) but his sentencing objection was substantive (“greater than necessary”). That mismatch drove the application of plain‑error review.

C. What Is the “Breach of Trust” Theory?

The breach‑of‑trust theory says:

Supervised release is based on the court trusting the defendant to follow certain rules while living in the community;
When the defendant violates those rules, the main problem is not the original crime (for which he has already been punished) but his new failure to keep the court’s trust;
The revocation sentence is therefore meant primarily to respond to that breach of trust, not to increase punishment for the original crime.

This distinguishes revocation from a second round of retribution for the original offense, which Esteras forbids.

D. Conditional Liberty and Supervised Release

“Conditional liberty” means the defendant is free from prison but only on certain terms. Supervised release is such a conditional liberty:

The defendant remains under the court’s authority;
He must follow conditions (e.g., no drugs, employment, no new crimes);
A violation can lead to re‑incarceration.

The concept helps explain why courts speak of “trust”: the court is essentially saying, “We trust you to live in the community under these conditions.” Failure to do so is naturally seen as a breach.

E. The Marks Rule in Fragmented Supreme Court Decisions

Sometimes the Supreme Court issues a decision with no single majority opinion. Under Marks, the “holding of the Court” is the position taken by the Justice(s) who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds. In Haymond:

Justice Breyer concurred on narrow grounds and endorsed breach‑of‑trust; thus his view controls;
This matters because it means the Supreme Court itself has adopted breach‑of‑trust as the proper lens for supervised release revocations, pending any later explicit change.

F. Deference to Sentencing Commission Commentary After Loper Bright

Previously, courts often deferred heavily to agency interpretations of their own rules (including guideline commentary). After Loper Bright and related cases:

Court must independently assess statutory and regulatory meaning;
Guideline commentary is treated as an interpretive aid, not binding;
Its persuasive force depends on factors like consistency, logical coherence, and fit with the governing text.

In Hunter, the Commission’s longstanding characterization of supervised release violations as a “breach of trust” is found to be persuasive even under this stricter approach.

IX. Likely Impact and Future Implications

A. For District Courts in the Sixth Circuit

Even though Hunter is “not recommended for publication,” it:

reinforces existing published precedent that district courts may consider and sanction breach of trust at revocation;
clarifies that Esteras has not (yet) undermined that practice;
signals that district judges remain on firm ground when they explicitly frame revocation as a response to a defendant’s failure to comply with conditions.

The majority’s plain‑error posture and the concurrence’s robust defense together send a strong message: Sixth Circuit district courts can continue to invoke “breach of trust” without fear of reversal, so long as they avoid explicit reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s retributive concepts at revocation.

B. For Defense Counsel and Appellate Strategy

Hunter is a cautionary tale about preservation:

Simply objecting that a sentence is “greater than necessary” preserves a substantive reasonableness challenge but not specific procedural claims (like reliance on impermissible factors).
To preserve those procedural issues, defense counsel must:
- explicitly object that the court is relying on a factor forbidden by § 3583(e) or Esteras; or
- specifically challenge the consideration of a “breach of trust” rationale if they believe it has become impermissible.

Absent such specificity, appellate review will typically be under plain error, which is rarely successful—especially when circuit precedent appears to authorize the challenged practice.

C. For the Law of Supervised Release Revocation

Substantively, Hunter cements three points in the post‑Esteras landscape:

Retribution is out; breach of trust is (still) in.
Esteras barred reliance on § 3553(a)(2)(A)’s retributive factors at revocation but left breach of trust untouched. Hunter, along with Hoyle and similar decisions in other circuits, confirms that breach‑of‑trust remains a viable and central rationale for revocation sentencing.
Breach of trust is understood as forward‑looking, not retributive.
The concurrence in particular provides a coherent conceptual account of breach of trust as tied to:
- the defendant’s current history and characteristics,
- risk of future crimes, and
- the need to deter and protect the public,
which are all permissible factors under § 3583(e).
Supervised release remains anchored in a trust‑based model of conditional liberty.
Despite the demise of parole, supervised release continues to be seen as a structured relationship of delegated freedom conditioned on compliance. Courts’ doctrinal vocabulary—“conditional liberty,” “breach of trust”—reflects and reinforces that model.

D. Open Questions and Possible Future Developments

While Hunter answers some questions, others remain open:

Will the Supreme Court eventually address breach of trust directly?
Esteras explicitly reserved the issue, and Haymond (as interpreted through Marks) supports breach‑of‑trust. A particularly sharp conflict or divergent use of breach‑of‑trust language across circuits could prompt the Court to clarify its precise contours.
Where is the line between breach of trust and retribution?
Although Hunter insists they are distinct, future cases might test edge situations where judges appear to use breach‑of‑trust rhetoric to smuggle in retributive concerns about the original offense. Courts will need to police that line carefully.
How will post‑Loper Bright skepticism toward deference affect other aspects of the Guidelines?
Hunter applies Skidmore‑type reasoning to Commission commentary, but broader questions remain about the interpretive status of other guideline provisions and commentary across the system.

X. Conclusion

United States v. Hunter is, on its face, a straightforward affirmance of a statutory‑maximum revocation sentence under plain‑error review. But doctrinally, it performs important work in the post‑Esteras era:

It confirms that, in the Sixth Circuit, district courts may continue to treat supervised release revocation as a sanction for the defendant’s breach of the court’s trust.
It clarifies that such breach‑of‑trust reasoning is not plainly (or clearly) forbidden by Esteras, by § 3583(e), or by Supreme Court precedent; indeed, the concurrence argues it is affirmatively endorsed by Haymond and consistent with the statutory factors.
It underscores the critical importance of precise, issue‑specific objections at sentencing if defendants hope to obtain more searching appellate review of alleged procedural errors.

In the broader supervised release jurisprudence, Hunter helps stabilize the law after Esteras: while retributive factors are off the table at revocation, courts remain empowered to respond to supervisees’ non‑compliance as a forward‑looking breach of trust, grounded in permissible considerations of characteristics, deterrence, and public safety. That framework preserves both the rehabilitative aims of supervised release and the judiciary’s capacity to impose meaningful consequences when conditional liberty is abused.