United States v. Hubbard: Admitting Domestic‑Violence Body‑Cam Hearsay in Supervised Release Revocation Hearings

I. Introduction

The Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished decision in United States v. Michael Hubbard (No. 24‑13158, Dec. 17, 2025) addresses a recurring and increasingly important issue: how courts may use police body‑camera footage and other hearsay evidence in supervised release revocation proceedings, particularly in the context of domestic violence where victims may refuse to testify.

Hubbard, previously convicted in federal court for possession of a stolen firearm, was on supervised release when he allegedly assaulted his former partner (Jasmine Webb) and later resisted arrest after a dispute involving another woman (Ashley Douglas). His supervised release was revoked and he received a 24‑month prison term and an additional 12 months of supervised release.

On appeal, Hubbard’s central claim was that the district court violated his due process rights by admitting and relying on hearsay statements captured on police body‑camera videos—especially Webb’s on‑scene statements—to find that he committed a felony family violence battery under Georgia law, which in turn drove up his “violation grade” and justified the maximum revocation sentence.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding in essence that:

A district court may admit a domestic‑violence victim’s body‑cam statements at a revocation hearing without live testimony where there is “good cause” (e.g., the victim’s refusal and trauma) and the statements are demonstrably reliable.
Even if the court fails to conduct the full Frazier balancing test for an officer’s on‑scene statements, any error can be harmless where those statements qualify as a classic hearsay exception (here, a present sense impression under Fed. R. Evid. 803(1)).

Although designated “not for publication” and therefore not binding precedent, the opinion is a detailed and revealing application of the Eleventh Circuit’s confrontation‑and‑hearsay framework in revocation proceedings, especially for domestic violence and body‑camera evidence.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Federal Conviction and Supervised Release

In 2021, Hubbard pleaded guilty in the Northern District of Georgia to possession of a stolen firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(j), 924(a)(2). The district court sentenced him to:

70 months’ imprisonment, followed by
3 years of supervised release.

He was released from federal custody on July 3, 2023, at which point his supervised release term began.

B. The Alleged Violations: New Georgia Offenses and Technical Breaches

On January 18, 2024, Hubbard’s probation officer filed a Violation Report and Petition to Revoke, alleging three categories of violations:

Violation One – New Georgia crimes
Alleged new offenses against two women:
- September 2023 – Webb incident: “Simple Battery – Family Violence,” based on Webb’s claim that Hubbard punched her and pulled her hair, while armed with a firearm in his waistband.
- December 2023 – Douglas incident: First-degree burglary, theft by taking, and obstruction, based on Douglas’s report that Hubbard entered her apartment without permission, took her spare car keys, stole her car, and later resisted officers when they tried to detain him.
Violation Two – Drug use
Alleged unlawful use of marijuana on two dates in July 2023.
Violation Three – Technical violation
Failure to report to the probation officer on two occasions between October and December 2023.

Hubbard admitted Violation Three (failures to report). The district court later rejected Violation Two for insufficient proof. The appeal thus focuses on the evidentiary rulings regarding Violation One, particularly the Webb incident.

C. The Webb Incident: Domestic Violence Allegations and Body‑Cam Evidence

Webb, the mother of Hubbard’s child, told responding officer Gabriel Gaescudero‑Suarez that:

She had gone to a family member’s house with her son around 8:15 p.m.
Hubbard, the child’s father, took the child’s phone and argued with Webb when she demanded it back.
Knowing Hubbard could “just flip” and having a history of domestic violence with him, she was fearful and carried a pistol in her purse.
As she and her son moved to leave in their car, Hubbard followed, acted aggressively, and taunted her about the gun he knew she carried.
After she started to back out of the driveway, she stopped briefly to photograph Hubbard’s license plate. Seeing this, Hubbard came to her car and punched her on the left side of her face near her ear.
He then pulled a patch of hair from the back of her head.
Hubbard retrieved a gun from his vehicle and kept it tucked in his waistband throughout the encounter, although he did not point or brandish it.
Webb ultimately drew her own gun, pointed it at Hubbard, and told the officer she was “tired” of 12 years of abuse and wanted to “do something about him.”

Officer Gaescudero‑Suarez’s body‑camera video:

Captured Webb’s narrative within about an hour of the incident.
Showed the officer examining Webb’s face; due to intense flashlight glare, the video did not clearly show facial injuries.
Recorded the officer reporting to another officer that Webb seemed fine and showed no obvious markings, but later clarifying to a domestic violence detective that Webb had “a little bit of redness” on the side of her face and ear, though no lacerations.

His written police report:

Listed the offense as “Simple Assault.”
Described Webb as having “superficial injuries” and an “apparent minor injury” consisting of redness on the cheek from being punched.

The state “simple battery – family violence” charge was later dismissed when Webb did not appear in state court, but that dismissal had no binding effect on the federal revocation.

D. The Douglas Incident: Car Keys, Car Theft Allegation, and Obstruction

In December 2023, Douglas told officers that:

Hubbard had been living with her after his federal release but had been kicked out.
She saw, via her video doorbell, Hubbard entering her apartment without permission while she was away.
Her car was then taken, and she believed Hubbard had used her spare key, stolen from her apartment.

Body‑cam footage from Officer Taylor showed:

Officers locating Douglas’s car in the apartment complex parking lot with Hubbard asleep inside.
Hubbard being repeatedly instructed to turn off the vehicle, get out, and place his hands behind his back.
Hubbard attempting to break free and flee; one officer yelling, “Don’t do it!”
Taylor deploying a taser; Hubbard was taken to the ground and handcuffed.

Officer Taylor’s report alleged:

Felony burglary and felony theft by taking of Douglas’s vehicle.
Misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer by hindering arrest.

Probation Officer Robinson later testified that when she served Douglas with a subpoena in July 2024, Douglas privately admitted there had been a physical altercation that night but that she had been too afraid to disclose that to the police at the time.

E. Revocation Proceedings and the District Court’s Rulings

At the final revocation hearing (September 18, 2024), the Government offered:

Police body‑camera footage (Webb and Douglas incidents).
Police reports.
Probation Officer Robinson’s testimony.

Hubbard objected that the body‑cam statements and reports were inadmissible hearsay and that, under United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994), the court could not rely on such hearsay without:

Balancing his confrontation right against the Government’s reasons for not producing the declarants, and
Finding that the statements were reliable.

The Government responded that:

It would not call Webb or Douglas due to their history as domestic violence victims of Hubbard and the trauma associated with testifying.
It had been unable to secure Webb’s cooperation despite attempts; she had expressly indicated she did not want involvement.
The officers’ body‑cam footage captured their perceptions in real time, and there was “nothing more” they could add.
Webb’s credibility was bolstered because she incriminated herself by admitting she had pulled a gun on Hubbard.

The district court admitted the videos and reports and made these key findings:

Webb incident:
- Hubbard committed felony family violence battery under Georgia law (a “Grade A” violation under USSG § 7B1.1).
- Hubbard, as a convicted felon, possessed a firearm during the incident (a “Grade B” violation).
Douglas incident:
- The Government failed to prove burglary or theft by taking.
- The Government did prove misdemeanor obstruction when Hubbard tried to flee from the officers (a “Grade C” violation).
Technical violations (Violation Three):
- Hubbard’s admitted failures to report were established (also Grade C).

Because the Grade A violation controlled the guideline calculation, with a criminal history category of VI Hubbard’s advisory range would normally be 33–41 months. However, the maximum revocation term was capped by statute at 24 months because the underlying firearm offense was only a Class C felony. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(a)(2), 3559(a)(3), 3583(e)(3); USSG § 7B1.4(b)(1).

The district court revoked supervised release and imposed 24 months’ imprisonment plus 12 months of supervised release.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the revocation and sentence, holding:

The appeal was not moot even though Hubbard had finished his 24‑month prison term, because he remained on supervised release, which entailed continuing restraints on liberty. Success on appeal could vacate that term.
Even though Hubbard’s admitted Grade C technical violations alone would have justified revocation, the key issue on appeal was whether the district court properly treated the Webb incident as a Grade A felony family violence battery, which determined the guideline range and allowed the 24‑month sentence.
The district court:
- Did not violate due process by admitting and relying on Webb’s statements captured on body‑camera video, because it had:
  - Balanced Hubbard’s confrontation rights against the Government’s reasons for not producing Webb, and
  - Found her statements reliable based on timing, consistency, self‑inculpation, refusal to exaggerate, and corroboration by Hubbard’s similar prior convictions.
- Committed, at most, harmless error by not performing a full Frazier balancing for Officer Gaescudero‑Suarez’s statements, because those statements would likely be admissible as present sense impressions under Fed. R. Evid. 803(1) and were not shown to be materially false or unreliable.
Any alleged errors related to:
- Notice of a felon‑in‑possession revocation theory, or
- Frazier analysis regarding body‑cam footage of the Douglas incident,
were immaterial, because the established Grade A felony family violence battery alone drove the guideline range and statutory maximum.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Legal Framework: Supervised Release, Due Process, and Hearsay

Supervised release revocation hearings occupy a middle ground between criminal trials and purely administrative proceedings. Key features include:

No application of the Federal Rules of Evidence (Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)); hearsay is not per se inadmissible.
Minimal due process protections grounded in Morrissey v. Brewer and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, codified in part in Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2). These include:
- Notice of the alleged violations,
- An opportunity to appear and present evidence, and
- The right to question adverse witnesses unless the court finds “the interest of justice” does not require their presence.

The Eleventh Circuit has developed this framework through a line of cases culminating in Frazier, which requires:

A balancing test (often referred to as “Frazier balancing”): the court must weigh the defendant’s confrontation interest against the Government’s reasons for not calling the witness.
A requirement that the hearsay be reliable. If the hearsay is unreliable, its admission can violate due process even if there are reasons to excuse live testimony.

Frazier and related cases thus import a two‑part test into revocation practice: (1) good cause for denying confrontation, and (2) reliability of the hearsay used.

B. Precedents Shaping the Decision

1. Frazier and Penn: The Balancing Test and “Good Cause”

In United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110 (11th Cir. 1994), the Eleventh Circuit held that in revocation hearings:

“The court must balance the defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses against the grounds asserted by the government for denying confrontation.”

Failure to conduct this balancing is itself a due process error.

United States v. Penn, 721 F.2d 762 (11th Cir. 1983), earlier recognized that “good cause” to admit hearsay without confrontation may exist where it would be difficult, expensive, or otherwise impractical to procure live witnesses—an important flexibility given the often informal and resource‑constrained nature of revocation proceedings.

In Hubbard, the panel:

Explicitly invoked Frazier’s balancing requirement.
Relied on Penn to recognize that unavailability plus practical obstacles—here, the victim’s refusal and trauma—can amount to “good cause.”

2. Reme, Baptiste, Chapman: Reliability Factors

The Eleventh Circuit frequently cites United States v. Reme, 738 F.2d 1156 (11th Cir. 1984), to identify circumstances that make hearsay reliable:

Temporal proximity to the event.
Spontaneity rather than reflective fabrication.
Statements against the declarant’s own penal interest.
Corroboration by independent evidence.

United States v. Baptiste, 935 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2019), reaffirmed the value of corroboration, while United States v. Chapman, 866 F.2d 1326 (11th Cir. 1989), underscored that consistency, detail, and lack of apparent motive to fabricate all strengthen reliability.

The Hubbard panel operationalizes these factors when it upholds the admission of Webb’s statements: timing (within an hour of the event), self‑inculpatory admissions (pointing her gun), refusal to exaggerate, and corroboration by Hubbard’s prior convictions.

3. Scrima and Rule 803(1): Present Sense Impressions

Even though the Federal Rules of Evidence do not formally govern revocation hearings, the Eleventh Circuit often uses them as a yardstick for reliability. United States v. Scrima, 819 F.2d 996 (11th Cir. 1987), explains the rationale of Rule 803(1), the “present sense impression” exception:

The “substantial contemporaneity of the event and the statement negate the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.”

In Hubbard, the panel explicitly invokes Rule 803(1) to hold that Officer Gaescudero‑Suarez’s on‑scene descriptions of Webb’s injuries were likely admissible as present sense impressions, and therefore sufficiently reliable to render any Frazier‑balancing error harmless.

4. Taylor: Material Falsity and Due Process

United States v. Taylor, 931 F.2d 842 (11th Cir. 1991), establishes that at a revocation hearing:

“[T]he defendant must show that the challenged evidence is materially false or unreliable” to establish a due process violation.

Hubbard leans on this standard in its alternative holding: even apart from Rule 803(1), Hubbard never showed that the officer’s description of facial redness was materially false or contradicted by the video or any other evidence.

5. Mootness and Jurisdiction: Farmer, Dawson, Lopez

The jurisdiction section relies on:

United States v. Farmer, 923 F.2d 1557 (11th Cir. 1991): sentencing appeals generally become moot upon completion of the custodial term.
Dawson v. Scott, 50 F.3d 884 (11th Cir. 1995): an appeal remains live if the defendant is still serving supervised release, because that term restricts liberty and may be altered on remand.
United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2009): underscores the court’s obligation to assess mootness sua sponte.

Applying these, the panel finds Hubbard’s appeal justiciable because he remains subject to supervised release conditions.

C. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Jurisdiction: Non‑Mootness Despite Completed Prison Term

The court first confirms it has jurisdiction. Although Hubbard has completed the 24‑month revocation prison sentence, he remains on supervised release. If the appeal succeeded, the revocation could be vacated and the new supervised release term altered or eliminated.

Consistent with Dawson, that ongoing restraint is enough to sustain a live controversy. This portion of the opinion is doctrinally straightforward but important because it preserves appellate oversight of revocation decisions affecting ongoing supervision.

2. Threshold: Revocation Was Justified Regardless of the Webb Incident

The panel notes that:

Hubbard admitted Violation Three (failures to report), and
Such Grade C violations alone suffice to justify revocation. See United States v. Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303 (11th Cir. 2014).

Thus, the question is not whether revocation itself was proper, but how serious the violations were (Grade A vs C) and whether the 24‑month sentence was lawful and reasonable. That, in turn, depends on whether the district court properly relied on the body‑cam statements to find a felony family violence battery.

3. Admitting Webb’s Body‑Cam Statements: Good Cause and Reliability

The panel “assume[s] arguendo” that Frazier applies to a victim’s body‑cam statements. It then affirms the district court’s admission of Webb’s statements for two core reasons: good cause for not requiring live testimony and reliability of the statements.

a. Good Cause / Frazier Balancing

The district court:

Heard testimony from Probation Officer Robinson about her efforts to serve Webb and Webb’s expressed unwillingness to participate (“already told them [she] didn’t want to have anything to do with this”).
Considered the Government’s representation that Webb had endured systemic domestic violence at Hubbard’s hands for over a decade.
Weighed Hubbard’s interest in cross‑examining Webb against the risk of forcing a reluctant victim of long‑term abuse to relive that trauma on the stand.

The Eleventh Circuit held that this constituted a sufficient Frazier balancing. The Government’s showing—practical inability to secure Webb plus strong reasons grounded in victim protection—amounted to good cause under Penn and Frazier.

This is especially noteworthy in the domestic violence context: the court essentially endorses the proposition that a victim’s refusal to testify, coupled with documented prior abuse by the defendant, can justify reliance on recorded statements rather than live testimony, so long as reliability is independently demonstrated.

b. Reliability of Webb’s Statements

The panel identifies several reliability markers:

Temporal proximity: Webb’s statements were made within about an hour of the assault, reducing the likelihood of calculated fabrication.
Consistency and detail: Webb provided a relatively detailed, internally consistent narrative under questioning by the officer.
Self‑inculpation: She candidly admitted pulling and pointing her own gun, which could expose her to criminal liability; such self‑inculpatory statements are generally seen as particularly trustworthy.
Refusal to exaggerate: She did not claim that Hubbard brandished or pointed his gun, even though that could have supported a more serious aggravated assault charge. Her unwillingness to overstate Hubbard’s use of the firearm bolstered her credibility.
Corroboration by prior conduct: Hubbard’s criminal record included multiple prior convictions for family violence battery and related crimes against Webb and another victim (Douglas), closely mirroring Webb’s description of a long history of abuse. This pattern robustly corroborated her account.

As to the legal element of “visible bodily harm” under Georgia law, the panel notes (via Gilbert v. State, 629 S.E.2d 587 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)) that redness in the face after a punch can qualify. Webb reported being punched and the officer later described her ear/cheek as red, thus satisfying state law’s threshold for bodily harm—even if the injury was minor and not clearly discernible on the video.

In combination, these factors led the Eleventh Circuit to uphold the reliability finding and reject any due process challenge regarding Webb’s body‑cam statements.

4. Officer Gaescudero‑Suarez’s Statements: Harmless Error via Present Sense Impression

The parties agreed that the district court did not expressly conduct a Frazier analysis before admitting and relying on the officer’s own body‑cam statements describing Webb’s injuries. The court partially relied on these statements (e.g., about facial redness) to find a felony family violence battery.

The Eleventh Circuit concludes that any failure to conduct formal Frazier balancing was harmless because:

The officer’s descriptions of what he saw on Webb’s face were made immediately after he examined her.
Those on‑scene descriptions fit squarely within the present sense impression exception under Rule 803(1): statements “describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.”

The panel emphasizes that present sense impressions are considered reliable precisely because they are contemporaneous and therefore unlikely to be fabricated. Applying Scrima, the court reasons that the body‑cam statements:

Were “substantially contemporaneous” with the officer’s observations.
Were consistent with his written report describing redness on Webb’s face.
Were not contradicted by the video (which simply did not capture sufficient detail due to the flashlight glare).

The court also reconciles the officer’s seemingly inconsistent remarks:

To a supervising officer he said Webb did not have “any markings left,”
But to a domestic violence detective he described “a little bit of redness” on the side of her face and ear.

The panel treats these as different levels of descriptive precision depending on the audience, not as contradictions. Furthermore, the video does not show clear injury either way due to lighting; thus, it does not impeach the officer’s reports.

Finally, invoking Taylor, the court notes Hubbard did not show that the officer’s account was materially false or unreliable. Therefore, even if a strict Frazier balancing was required and omitted, the admission of the officer’s statements did not prejudice Hubbard’s substantial rights.

5. Hubbard’s Remaining Arguments and the Role of the Grade A Violation

Hubbard advanced additional due process challenges, including:

Insufficient notice that the Government would rely on his firearm possession (as a felon) during the Webb incident as an independent revocation ground.
Failure to conduct Frazier balancing regarding Officer Taylor’s body‑cam statements for the Douglas incident (obstruction).

The panel deliberately sidesteps these issues as non‑dispositive. Because:

The Webb felony family violence battery, standing alone, was a Grade A violation under USSG § 7B1.1(a)(1), and
That Grade A violation drove both:
- the guideline range (which was capped at the 24‑month statutory maximum), and
- Hubbard’s ultimate sentence,

the court concludes that any errors concerning the firearm or obstruction theories would not affect the outcome, and thus need not be resolved.

V. Impact and Implications

A. Domestic Violence Victims and “Good Cause” for Hearsay in Revocations

Hubbard is especially significant for domestic violence–related revocations. It implicitly recognizes:

That domestic violence survivors may refuse to cooperate or testify, even when they called police initially or made incriminating on‑scene statements.
That forcing such victims to testify—especially against an abuser with a history of similar violence—can itself be a serious harm.

By affirming “good cause” in these circumstances, the Eleventh Circuit signals that:

Courts may, in appropriate cases, rely on recorded statements made close in time to the event, even without live victim testimony,
So long as they carefully analyze reliability under Reme/Baptiste/Chapman and articulate their reasoning on the record.

This has practical consequences:

Prosecutors in revocation proceedings may increasingly rely on body‑cam recordings and 911 calls when domestic violence victims are unwilling to testify.
Defense counsel must be prepared to challenge reliability aggressively—e.g., by scrutinizing inconsistencies, motives, or corroboration—rather than relying solely on confrontation rights.
Probation officers and AUSAs should document efforts to contact victims and any statements showing reluctance or fear, as these will feed directly into the Frazier “good cause” analysis.

B. The Growing Role of Body‑Camera Evidence in Revocations

The opinion also reflects the increasing centrality of police body‑camera footage in revocation proceedings:

Body‑cams capture not only what officers see but also what victims and suspects say in real time.
The Eleventh Circuit treats such recordings as powerful reliability tools, especially when they:
- Show the victim’s demeanor,
- Record spontaneous answers to officer questions, and
- Include officers’ immediate reactions and descriptions.

Hubbard suggests a two‑track approach:

Victim statements on body‑cam: subject to Frazier balancing plus reliability analysis; domestic violence dynamics can legitimately support “good cause” for not calling the victim.
Officer statements on body‑cam: may often qualify as present sense impressions, and thus be admitted as inherently reliable hearsay, potentially reducing the need for live officers in routine, descriptive testimony.

C. Confrontation Rights in the Revocation Context

The decision reinforces several themes about confrontation in revocation hearings:

Defendants do have a limited right to confront adverse witnesses, but that right is not equivalent to the Sixth Amendment trial right.
Courts must explicitly perform the Frazier balancing if confrontation is restricted, but failure to do so may be harmless where:
- The hearsay fits a robust evidentiary exception like Rule 803(1), and
- There is no showing that the hearsay is materially false or unreliable.
Defense strategy must therefore focus not only on whether hearsay is used, but on how reliable it is and whether additional cross‑examination would realistically change the fact‑finder’s assessment.

D. Sentencing Consequences: The Power of a Grade A Finding

Hubbard also illustrates the dramatic sentencing consequences of a single Grade A finding in a revocation context:

Without the Webb felony family violence battery, Hubbard’s violations would have been Grade C (failures to report, obstruction), and his guideline range would likely have been significantly lower.
With the Grade A determination, the guideline range jumped to 33–41 months, only constrained by the statutory maximum of 24 months tied to the original Class C felony.

Thus, the classification of the violation (Grade A vs B vs C) can matter far more than the sheer number of violations, making evidentiary challenges around alleged new felonies especially crucial.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Supervised Release and Revocation

Supervised release is a period of community supervision after a defendant leaves prison. It comes with conditions (e.g., no new crimes, drug testing, reporting to probation). If the person violates those conditions, the court can:

Continue supervision,
Modify conditions, or
Revoke supervised release and impose more prison time.

The maximum length of any revocation prison term depends on the classification (A–E) of the original offense (here, a Class C felony, maximum 2 years).

2. Grades of Violations (A, B, C)

The Sentencing Guidelines (Chapter 7) categorize supervised release violations into:

Grade A: Most serious—usually a crime of violence, controlled substance offense with high penalties, or other serious felony.
Grade B: Lesser felonies.
Grade C: Misdemeanors or “technical” violations (like failing to report or follow conditions).

The highest grade of violation determines the guideline range for the revocation sentence. In Hubbard, the Georgia felony family violence battery was treated as a Grade A violation.

3. Hearsay and Reliability

“Hearsay” is any out‑of‑court statement offered to prove what it says. At trial, hearsay is mostly inadmissible unless an exception applies. In revocation hearings, hearsay is not automatically barred, but due process requires:

A reasonable justification for not having the witness testify live, and
A determination that the hearsay is sufficiently reliable.

Reliability can be shown if:

The statement is made near in time to the events;
The statement is spontaneous and not rehearsed;
The speaker risks self‑incrimination;
Other evidence corroborates the statement.

4. Frazier Balancing

In Frazier, the Eleventh Circuit said that when the Government wants to use hearsay instead of calling a live witness at a revocation hearing, the court must:

Weigh the defendant’s interest in cross‑examining that witness, against
The Government’s reasons for not presenting the witness (e.g., logistical difficulties, trauma to the witness, refusal to appear).

If the Government’s reasons (“good cause”) outweigh the confrontation interest, and the hearsay is reliable, the court may admit and rely on it.

5. Present Sense Impression (Rule 803(1))

A present sense impression is a statement that:

Describes or explains an event or condition, and
Is made while or immediately after the speaker sees or experiences the event.

Because there is no time to fabricate, such statements are considered highly reliable and are allowed at trial even if the speaker is not in court. In Hubbard, the officer’s live description of Webb’s facial redness shortly after looking at her was treated as this kind of statement.

6. Good Cause and Due Process in Revocations

“Good cause” to use hearsay instead of live testimony can include:

Witnesses who cannot reasonably be located or compelled,
Witnesses whose testimony would impose undue hardship or trauma (e.g., domestic violence survivors),
Situations where live testimony would be prohibitively expensive or impractical for the court.

Due process is satisfied if:

The court explicitly considers the defendant’s confrontation interest,
Finds good cause for not requiring live testimony, and
Ensures the hearsay being used is reliable and not materially false.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Hubbard is a detailed application of the Eleventh Circuit’s revocation‑hearing jurisprudence to a modern evidentiary landscape dominated by body‑camera footage and the realities of domestic violence. The decision:

Affirms that domestic‑violence victims’ on‑scene statements can be admitted without live testimony when their refusal and trauma provide “good cause,” and when those statements are carefully evaluated and found reliable.
Clarifies that officers’ immediate, on‑scene descriptions captured on body‑cams may qualify as present sense impressions under Rule 803(1), making any technical Frazier error harmless if the statements show no signs of material falsity.
Underscores the outsized sentencing impact of a single Grade A violation in a revocation proceeding, especially when the underlying offense caps the maximum imprisonment term.

Although non‑precedential, Hubbard is a strong indicator of how the Eleventh Circuit will analyze future revocation cases involving:

Reluctant domestic‑violence complainants,
Body‑camera and other recorded hearsay, and
Challenges to the use of such evidence to support the most serious violation grades.

For practitioners, the opinion highlights the importance of building (or challenging) a thorough record on both sides of the Frazier equation: documenting good cause to excuse live testimony, and rigorously testing the reliability of the hearsay that ultimately drives the revocation sentence.