United States v. Hoyle: Post-Esteras Prohibition on § 3553(a)(2)(A) Factors in Supervised-Release Revocation Sentences

1. Introduction

United States v. Malcolm L. Hoyle, Nos. 23-3977/3978 (6th Cir. Aug. 6 2025), is the Sixth Circuit’s first published decision applying the Supreme Court’s 2025 ruling in Esteras v. United States, 606 U.S. — (145 S. Ct. 2031). Hoyle simultaneously challenged (i) a new 96-month sentence for a felon-in-possession conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and (ii) a consecutive 24-month sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release stemming from a 2015 firearm conviction.

Three principal issues reached the Court:

Whether Hoyle knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a full revocation hearing under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2);
Whether the district court imposed a procedurally unreasonable sentence for the supervised-release violation by consulting impermissible sentencing factors;
Whether the district court mis-calculated the advisory Guidelines range for the new § 922(g)(1) offense by treating two Ohio drug convictions as “controlled-substance offenses.”

While Hoyle lost on Issues 1 and 3, he prevailed on Issue 2. Citing Esteras, the Sixth Circuit held that a district court commits procedural error when it relies on § 3553(a)(2)(A) (“just punishment,” “respect for law,” “seriousness of the offense”) at a revocation sentencing. The panel therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for resentencing on the supervised-release violation.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Revocation-hearing waiver: No plain error; Hoyle received sufficient notice, was represented by counsel, and repeatedly admitted the violation.
Revocation sentence: Procedurally unreasonable. Under Esteras, retributive considerations in § 3553(a)(2)(A) are off-limits in the revocation context; the district court’s heavy reliance on those considerations required reversal.
Substantive § 922(g)(1) sentence: Affirmed. Sixth Circuit precedent (United States v. Smith, 960 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2020)) foreclosed Hoyle’s attack on the career-offender calculation.

3. In-Depth Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Esteras v. United States (2025) – The cornerstone of the decision. Esteras held that § 3553(a)(2)(A) may not be considered when deciding whether to revoke supervised release or when fixing the term of imprisonment after revocation. Hoyle is the Sixth Circuit’s first application of this rule, cementing its binding effect within the Circuit.
United States v. Melton, 782 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2015) – Established a “totality of the circumstances” test for determining a knowing and voluntary waiver of revocation rights. The panel used Melton’s framework to reject Hoyle’s waiver attack.
United States v. Nesler, 659 F. App’x 251 (6th Cir. 2016) – Clarified that a defendant can waive Rule 32.1 rights without uttering the word “waiver”; cited to show no “magic words” are needed.
United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195 (6th Cir. 2011) – Identified which § 3553(a) factors survive into the supervised-release framework under § 3583(e). Hoyle re-affirmed its continuing vitality post-Esteras.
United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2007) – Previously allowed consideration of “respect for law” in revocation sentences; implicitly overruled by Esteras and expressly rejected in Hoyle.
United States v. Smith, 960 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2020) – Held that Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.03(A)(2) is a “controlled-substance offense” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b). Bound the panel to affirm Hoyle’s career-offender calculation.
Numerous plain-error cases (Puckett, Hobbs, Hamm) guided the standard-of-review analysis.

3.2 Legal Reasoning of the Court

3.2.1 Waiver of Revocation Hearing

Applying Melton’s totality approach, the panel concluded that Hoyle had notice of (i) the alleged violation, (ii) the evidence, (iii) the potential penalties, and (iv) his rights to counsel, silence, and confrontation. He acknowledged those rights across multiple proceedings and expressly admitted the violation. No “clear or obvious” error occurred, and no prejudice could be shown because Hoyle’s own guilty plea to § 922(g)(1) rendered any full evidentiary revocation hearing futile.

3.2.2 Improper § 3553(a) Factors at Revocation Sentencing

Section 3583(e) expressly omits § 3553(a)(2)(A). Esteras confirmed that Congress thereby excluded retribution-based factors from the revocation calculus. The district court nevertheless stressed “seriousness,” “respect for law,” and “just punishment,” commenting that Hoyle had squandered “opportunity after opportunity.” Because these are quintessential § 3553(a)(2)(A) considerations, their prominence created procedural error requiring remand. The panel found a “reasonable probability” the sentence would have been lower absent the error, satisfying both abuse-of-discretion and plain-error tests.

3.2.3 Guidelines Calculation for the New Offense

Hoyle’s challenge to the controlled-substance categorization was foreclosed by Smith. Under Sixth Circuit rule, one panel may not overrule a prior published panel. Therefore, the 96-month sentence—well within the 110- to 120-month capped range—was procedurally sound.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Judgment

Circuit-wide Binding Effect. District courts in the Sixth Circuit must now carefully segregate § 3553(a) analysis when sentencing on a revocation. Any allusion to “respect for law,” “just punishment,” or “seriousness of the offense” risks reversal.
Sentencing Practice. Presentence reports in revocation cases will likely exclude § 3553(a)(2)(A) narratives; defense counsel may object if probation officers include them.
Plea-and-Waiver Protocols. Although Hoyle’s waiver survived scrutiny, the Court’s meticulous review signals that district judges should make an explicit waiver inquiry on the record to avoid later litigation.
Overruling Prior Sixth Circuit Law. Hoyle acknowledges that Lewis (2007) can no longer be relied upon—important for practitioners who previously cited Lewis to justify harsher revocation sentences.
Controlled-Substance Offense Definition. By reaffirming Smith, Hoyle quietly solidifies the Sixth Circuit’s broad reading of state drug statutes under § 4B1.2(b), an issue that still splits the circuits.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Supervised Release: A period of community supervision that follows federal imprisonment, akin to parole but governed by federal statute (18 U.S.C. § 3583).
Revocation Hearing: A court proceeding to determine whether a defendant violated supervised-release conditions and, if so, what sanction to impose.
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2): Guarantees notice, evidence disclosure, counsel, confrontation, and mitigation opportunities before revocation imprisonment can be imposed.
§ 3553(a) Factors: Statutory considerations that guide federal sentencing. For revocations, Congress excludes two of them—§ 3553(a)(2)(A) (retribution) and § 3553(a)(3) (kinds of sentences)—to focus primarily on deterrence, protection of the public, rehabilitation, and Guidelines policy statements.
Plain-Error Review: On appeal, an unpreserved error must be (1) error, (2) clear or obvious, (3) affecting substantial rights, and (4) seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Controlled-Substance Offense (Guidelines): A prior felony involving manufacture, distribution, or possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. Under Sixth Circuit precedent, Ohio Rev. Code § 2925.03(A)(2) qualifies.

5. Conclusion

Hoyle crystallizes the post-Esteras landscape in the Sixth Circuit: retributive aims have no place in revocation sentencing. District courts must cabin their analysis to the limited § 3553(a) subset in § 3583(e) or face reversal. At the same time, the decision underscores the robustness of procedural-rights jurisprudence—courts will examine the totality of the record to validate waiver—and reaffirms precedent regarding controlled-substance offenses under the Guidelines. Going forward, practitioners should:

Object whenever a district court references § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors in revocation cases;
Ensure Rule 32.1 rights are expressly waived or fully exercised;
Recognize that, within the Sixth Circuit, Ohio drug-trafficking convictions typically trigger higher Guideline ranges.

United States v. Hoyle thus serves both as a cautionary tale for sentencing courts and as a strategic roadmap for counsel navigating the complex intersection of new criminal conduct and supervised-release obligations.