United States v. Horsley: Sixth Circuit Clarifies Explanation Requirements and Appellate Review Standards for § 3582(c)(2) Sentence Reductions Post-Amendment 821

1. Introduction

United States v. William Radley Horsley, No. 24-5658 (6th Cir. July 2, 2025), addresses the interplay between the new criminal-history “status-point” revisions in Sentencing Guideline Amendment 821, the retroactivity mandate of Amendment 825, and the scope of appellate review when a district court sua sponte reduces a sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).

The appellant, William Horsley, pled guilty in 2022 to methamphetamine trafficking and felon-in-possession charges pursuant to a binding Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea. After the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowered criminal-history “status points,” the district court cut Horsley’s sentence from 180 to 168 months. Horsley appealed, claiming procedural and substantive unreasonableness. The Sixth Circuit affirmed, and in doing so:

• Re-confirmed that Dillon v. United States limits § 3582(c)(2) proceedings and that “reasonableness” review is generally barred absent government invocation of 18 U.S.C. § 3742.
• Held that where the government forfeits any § 3742 limitation, the panel may assume (without deciding) that it can review for procedural and substantive reasonableness.
• Applied Chavez-Meza v. United States to find that a brief form order explaining reliance on the § 3553(a) factors, the original plea agreement, and criminal history is sufficient.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the 168-month modified sentence, concluding:

• No procedural error: the district judge adequately explained the new sentence and referenced the relevant § 3553(a) considerations; a fuller explanation was unnecessary under Chavez-Meza.
• No substantive error: the 168-month term sits at the top of the amended guideline range (135–168 months) and remains presumptively reasonable; Horsley failed to rebut that presumption.
• Scope of review: although § 3742 normally forecloses “reasonableness” challenges to § 3582(c)(2) modifications, the court—following recent circuit practice (Obi, Payne)—assumed authority to conduct such review after the government’s forfeiture.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Appellate Jurisdiction & Standard
   • § 3582(c)(2) modifications are normally reviewed only for (a) legal error or (b) misapplication of Guidelines under § 3742.
   • Because the government did not press § 3742, the court followed Obi/Payne and “assumed” the wider reasonableness review.
2. Procedural Reasonableness
   • The district court satisfied Chavez-Meza: it had sentenced Horsley originally, possessed the full record, adopted Probation’s recalculation, cited § 3553(a), the seriousness of meth distribution, Horsley’s gun possession, prior convictions, and career-offender-type history.
   • No obligation to mirror the original “8-months-off-the-top” proportionality rule requested by Horsley.
3. Substantive Reasonableness
   • A within-Guidelines sentence carries a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness (Sears).
   • Horsley’s argument that the court “over-weighted” bad conduct and “under-weighted” prison good behavior merely sought re-weighing—disfavored under Rayyan.
   • Enhanced deference applies at the modification stage (Obi) because Congress instructs courts to consider § 3553(a) “to the extent applicable.”

3.3 Impact on Future Cases

• Explanation Standard Post-821 – Confirms that concise form orders remain sufficient if contextualized by sentencing history, limiting grounds for reversal based on brevity alone.
• Forfeiture of § 3742 Arguments – Continues an emerging line of cases (Begley, McMillin, Obi, Payne) suggesting that if the government remains silent, panels may entertain reasonableness challenges. Defense counsel may thus strategically press such appeals, while prosecutors may begin explicitly invoking § 3742 to cabin review.
• Amendment 821 Litigation Guidance – Provides a template for district courts recalculating criminal-history scores and selecting a point within the new range; aligns with Commission Commentary: status-point elimination can drop Criminal History Category but does not guarantee a proportional downward move inside the new span.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• § 3582(c)(2) Modification – A narrow, statutorily-created mechanism allowing sentence reduction when the Sentencing Commission later lowers the relevant Guideline and makes it retroactive. It is not a “full resentencing.”
• Status Points (Old vs. New) – Pre-Amendment 821, two criminal-history points were added if the defendant committed the federal offense while under any criminal justice supervision. Amendment 821 reduced this to one point and only if the defendant already had ≥7 criminal-history points.
• Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness
  • Procedural: Did the court follow correct steps (calculate range, consider factors, explain)?
  • Substantive: Is the length of the sentence defensible in light of those factors?
• § 3742 as Claims-Processing Rule – An appellate filter that can be waived—forfeited by silence—allowing broader review than Congress otherwise intended.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Horsley cements two practical takeaways in the Sixth Circuit. First, post-Amendment 821 sentence-reduction orders need only brief reasoning if anchored in the record and key § 3553(a) factors. Second, unless the government invokes § 3742, defendants may still secure appellate “reasonableness” review of § 3582(c)(2) outcomes, though the standard remains highly deferential. District courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel alike must recognize both the procedural efficiencies endorsed and the strategic importance of preserving—or waiving—§ 3742 objections.