United States v. Honors: Tenth Circuit Limits Custodial No‑Contact Orders and Demands Compelling Justification for Familial Restrictions on Supervised Release

I. Introduction

In United States v. Honors, No. 24‑3118 (10th Cir. Nov. 26, 2025), the Tenth Circuit confronted three interrelated issues arising out of a highly aggravated sex‑offense prosecution:

whether the jury instructions on a federal child‑pornography charge (18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)) constructively amended the indictment;
whether the district court had authority to impose a no‑contact order during the defendant’s term of incarceration by labeling it a “civil injunction” under its supposed ancillary jurisdiction; and
whether a special condition of supervised release barring all contact with the defendant’s wife and biological children was lawful and constitutional.

The case arises from horrific facts. Eric Honors, a long‑haul truck driver, sexually assaulted his sixteen‑year‑old stepdaughter, B.J., in the sleeper cab of his semi‑truck parked at their Kansas home, and then transported her from Kansas through Oklahoma to Texas while repeatedly assaulting her. He filmed several episodes of the abuse. Federal agents recovered three videos made in Kansas; B.J. testified about additional, unrecovered videos made in Oklahoma and Texas.

A federal jury convicted Honors of:

Transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a) (Count 1); and
Production of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) (Count 2).

The district court imposed:

60 years’ imprisonment (35 years on Count 1 and 25 years on Count 2, consecutive), effectively a life sentence given Honors’s age; and
10 years of supervised release, with a special condition prohibiting any contact with B.J. and “the victim’s family,” which encompassed Honors’s wife and his four young biological children (B.J.’s half‑siblings).

Initially, the court declined to extend the no‑contact requirement into the custodial period, recognizing the Bureau of Prisons’ (BOP) primary authority over conditions of confinement. But about ninety minutes after adjourning sentencing, the court sua sponte reconvened, invoked “ancillary civil jurisdiction,” relied on an unpublished Tenth Circuit decision (Grigsby), and entered a separate “civil injunction” barring Honors from contacting B.J. or her family during his entire term of incarceration.

On appeal, Honors challenged:

the alleged constructive amendment of Count 2 based on jury instructions and argument that allowed conviction resting on unrecovered Oklahoma and Texas videos;
the district court’s authority (statutory and inherent) to impose the custodial no‑contact order; and
the supervised‑release no‑contact condition as applied to his wife and biological children.

The Tenth Circuit:

Affirmed the conviction on Count 2, holding that any error in the jury instructions was not “plain” under the constructive‑amendment doctrine;
Vacated the custodial no‑contact order in its entirety, holding the district court lacked statutory authority to modify the sentence after a “formal break” in proceedings and that any inherent or ancillary authority to impose such orders is, at most, extremely narrow and inapplicable on these facts; and
Vacated the supervised‑release no‑contact condition as applied to Honors’s wife and biological children, holding that it infringed his fundamental right to familial association without compelling, record‑based justification.

The precedential significance of Honors lies primarily in two areas:

It sharpens the limits on a district court’s ability to alter the terms of incarceration post‑sentencing, rejecting a broad view of “ancillary jurisdiction” to impose custodial no‑contact orders; and
It reaffirms and strengthens protections for familial association in supervised‑release conditions, especially where conditions will operate only after children reach adulthood.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Constructive Amendment of Count 2

Count 2 of the indictment charged a § 2251(a) offense using boilerplate language, including the phrase:

“On or about February 15, 2023, in the District of Kansas, the defendant … used … [B.J.] to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct….”

At trial:

The parties initially proposed jury instructions requiring the government to prove that “[s]ome or all of Mr. Honors’s actions occurred in Kansas,” but the district court struck the Kansas language, viewing it as a venue matter.
The final instruction allowed conviction if the jury found that defendant used or coerced B.J. to engage in sexually explicit conduct “for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct,” without geographic limitation.
The prosecutor’s closing argument invited the jury to rely either on the recovered Kansas video (Gov‑3) or the unrecovered Oklahoma and Texas videos described in B.J.’s testimony.
The verdict was general; it did not specify which video(s) formed the basis for the § 2251 conviction.

Honors argued this combination of proof, instruction, and argument constructively amended the indictment, which he claimed was limited to the Kansas video. Reviewing for plain error

It was not “plain”, because the indictment was ambiguous as to whether it limited the charge to a video made in Kansas, or merely located some element of the offense (e.g., coercion) in Kansas while allowing the visual depiction to be recorded elsewhere.
No binding Tenth Circuit (or Supreme Court) authority clearly establishes that ambiguous indictment language—reasonably read either as limiting the factual basis or as describing only a jurisdictional/venue component—triggers constructive‑amendment concerns under plain‑error review.

Because the second prong of the plain‑error test was not met (error not “clear or obvious”), the conviction on Count 2 was affirmed.

B. Custodial No‑Contact Order

After initially declining to impose a no‑contact order during incarceration, the district court, on its own initiative, reconvened the same day and entered a “civil injunction” prohibiting any contact by Honors with B.J. or “the victim’s family” while he was in BOP custody. The court cited the Tenth Circuit’s unpublished United States v. Grigsby as authority to use ancillary civil jurisdiction to protect victims and family members.

The Tenth Circuit:

Held that the first sentencing hearing ended with a “formal break”, making the oral pronouncement of sentence final under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(c) and Tenth Circuit precedent (Luna‑Acosta);
Concluded that any change to the terms of incarceration thereafter was a sentence modification governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c);
Found that none of the three statutory exceptions in § 3582(c) (Rule 35/statutory authority, BOP/defendant motion for compassionate reasons, or guideline‑range reduction) applied; and
Rejected the government’s attempt to save the order as a freestanding civil injunction under the court’s inherent or ancillary powers, holding that, in the absence of rare, compelling circumstances related to protecting the administration of justice (e.g., preventing witness intimidation in a pending or retrial‑posture case), the court had no such authority to add new custodial conditions.

Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit vacated the custodial no‑contact order in its entirety, including as to B.J. herself, notwithstanding that Honors had not challenged the order as applied to the victim. The court treated the defect as jurisdictional and therefore non‑waivable.

C. Supervised‑Release No‑Contact Condition

The district court also imposed, as a special condition of supervised release, a ban on any contact between Honors and “the victim, or victim’s family” unless approved by the court. Because “victim’s family” included his wife and four biological children, this functioned as a blanket ban on contact with his nuclear family.

Critically:

Honors received a 60‑year prison term; he was 38 at sentencing.
All four biological children were very young at sentencing (3, 5, 6, and 8). They will be well into adulthood by the time any supervised‑release term begins.

The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed that:

The right to familial association—with one’s children and spouse—is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.
Conditions of supervised release that interfere with that right are permissible only in “compelling circumstances” and must be “especially fine‑tuned” to the statutory sentencing purposes under § 3553(a).
When a condition restricts contact with children, the record must “unambiguously” support a finding that the defendant is a danger to those specific children.

Applying these standards, the court held that the record did not support a complete ban on contact with his wife and biological children during the supervised‑release period, because:

The supervised‑release term would not commence until decades later, when the children would be adults;
The district court made no findings—and the record contained no evidence—that Honors would pose a danger to his adult children or to his wife at that distant future time;
The district court’s rationales (“not a good dad,” the “horrific” nature of his crimes, obstruction efforts via letters, and skepticism that the children would want contact) were insufficient bases to override a fundamental liberty interest decades in advance.

The Tenth Circuit therefore:

Vacated the supervised‑release no‑contact condition as applied to Honors’s wife and biological children, but
Left intact the condition prohibiting contact with B.J., which Honors did not challenge.

III. Analysis

A. The Constructive‑Amendment Claim and § 2251(a)

1. Doctrinal Background: Variance vs. Constructive Amendment

Under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, a federal defendant:

must be tried only on charges returned by a grand jury; and
must receive fair notice of the nature of those charges.

The Tenth Circuit distinguishes:

Simple variances – where the charging terms remain the same, but the evidence at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged (e.g., slightly different dates or minor factual details), and
Constructive amendments – where the evidence and jury instructions broaden the possible bases for conviction beyond what the indictment charged, effectively modifying an essential element or permitting conviction for a different offense.

Constructive amendments are “more dangerous” because they undermine grand‑jury control over the charges and impair notice. The line can be “shadowy,” but the core inquiry is whether the district‑court proceedings:

altered an essential element or
created a “real possibility” the jury convicted on a factual basis outside the indictment’s essential allegations.

The court relies on precedents such as:

Hunter v. New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595 (10th Cir. 1990): articulating the constructive‑amendment framework; and
United States v. Miller, 891 F.3d 1220 (10th Cir. 2018): holding that when an indictment specifies a particular false statement, jury instructions and evidence must be limited to that statement; allowing conviction based on another statement is a constructive amendment.

2. The Indictment vs. Instructions in Honors

The indictment’s key sentence for Count 2 alleged that:

“On or about February 15, 2023, in the District of Kansas” Honors knowingly used or coerced B.J. “to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction of such conduct.”

The jury instruction for Count 2, however, required only that Honors used or coerced B.J. to engage in sexually explicit conduct “for the purpose of producing any visual depiction of such conduct,” without mention of Kansas.

Moreover, the prosecutor expressly pointed the jury to:

the recovered Kansas Gov‑3 video; and
the unrecovered videos B.J. testified about in Oklahoma and Texas.

Honors’s theory: the indictment limited Count 2 to the Kansas Gov‑3 video, but the jury was invited to convict based on uncharged Oklahoma/Texas material, thereby broadening the indictment.

3. Why the Error Was Not “Plain”

Under plain‑error review, the question is not just whether the district court erred, but whether any error was “clear or obvious under current law.” Here, two aspects defeated Honors’s claim:

Ambiguity of the indictment
The key clause—“on or about February 15, 2023, in the District of Kansas”—could:
- modify the coercive act (i.e., Honors used/coerced B.J. while in Kansas), even if the visual depiction was filmed later out‑of‑state; or
- modify B.J.’s engagement in sexually explicit conduct, which would more strongly connect to a Kansas‑only video.
Both readings are textually plausible. The Tenth Circuit viewed this as genuinely debatable.
Lack of controlling authority on ambiguous particulars
Existing Tenth Circuit constructive‑amendment cases (e.g., Miller) involved:
- indictments that plainly and expressly limited the charges to specific factual particulars (a specific false statement, named victims, etc.); and
- trial proceedings that clearly went beyond those particulars.
In Honors, by contrast, the indictment’s “in the District of Kansas” language is not clearly either:
- a factual limitation on the location of the visual depiction, or
- simply a description of where some part of the offense (e.g., coercion or transport) occurred.
The panel noted that no settled Tenth Circuit law addresses constructive‑amendment claims where the alleged limiting language itself is ambiguous.

Because reasonable judges could read the indictment either way, any failure to constrain the case to the Kansas video could not be branded a “clear or obvious” error. That failure to meet the second prong of plain error doomed the constructive‑amendment claim, without the need to reach the prejudice or fairness prongs.

4. Practical Significance

The constructive‑amendment portion of Honors does not significantly alter doctrine, but it does underscore some important points:

Indictment drafting matters. If prosecutors intend to preserve flexibility to rely on multiple acts or depictions across different locations, they should avoid language that reasonably appears to limit the offense to a specific act, victim, or place.
Defense counsel must object early. By failing to object to the instruction removing the Kansas reference—and to the prosecutor’s broad reliance on out‑of‑state videos—defense counsel forced the case into plain‑error review, where ambiguity in the indictment cut against relief.
Ambiguity favors the government under plain error. Where indictment language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, courts will be reluctant to find a “plain” constructive amendment absent settled precedent squarely on point.

B. Authority to Impose a Custodial No‑Contact Order

1. Statutory Limits on Modifying a Sentence: § 3582(c) and Rule 35

The Tenth Circuit begins with a foundational principle: once a district court has imposed a sentence, it generally has no authority to modify it, except as expressly provided by statute or rule. That principle is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).

Section 3582(c) provides three narrow exceptions:

Modification “as expressly permitted by statute or by Rule 35” (e.g., to correct clear error within 14 days or on government motion for substantial assistance);
Compassionate release or similar modifications on motion of the BOP or the defendant when extraordinary and compelling circumstances (or certain age/time‑served conditions) are present; and
Reductions based on retroactive lowering of a guideline range by the Sentencing Commission.

In addition, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(c) defines “sentencing” as the oral announcement of the sentence, and Tenth Circuit precedent (Luna‑Acosta) adopts the “formal break” standard: once the court has fully pronounced sentence, allowed objections, and clearly adjourned, sentencing is final.

In Honors:

The first sentencing hearing ended at 11:46 a.m. with a complete pronouncement and adjournment.
The district court later reconvened at 1:26 p.m. and effectively added a new condition to Honors’s incarceration—a comprehensive no‑contact injunction.

The panel held that this was unambiguously a sentence modification. None of § 3582(c)’s exceptions applied. Therefore, as a matter of statute, the district court lacked jurisdiction to add the custodial no‑contact order.

2. Inherent or Ancillary Authority: Wheeler, Morris, Grigsby, and Santos Diaz

The government argued that the order was not part of the sentence at all, but a separate civil injunction within the court’s “ancillary” or inherent powers to protect the administration of justice and safeguard victims, relying heavily on:

Wheeler v. United States, 640 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Morris, 259 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 2001); and
the Tenth Circuit’s own unpublished Grigsby decisions.

The Tenth Circuit examined these authorities carefully:

Wheeler (9th Cir.)
The Ninth Circuit suggested that a court may, in some circumstances, issue a no‑contact order after trial as part of its inherent power to protect witnesses and the administration of justice. A witness in that case had personally sought the order due to ongoing harassment that threatened to chill future cooperation.
Morris (7th Cir.)
The Seventh Circuit upheld a custodial no‑contact order between a defendant and his minor victim (and the victim’s family) where the defendant was attempting to withdraw his guilty plea and was indirectly contacting the victim, potentially undermining her willingness to testify at a possible future trial. The court characterized such orders as permissible in “rare and compelling circumstances” to prevent witness intimidation and protect the integrity of a prospective trial.
Grigsby (10th Cir. – unpublished)
In Grigsby I, the Tenth Circuit characterized a similar no‑contact order as a “civil injunction pursuant to ancillary jurisdiction” for purposes of procedural classification (Rule 60(b) vs. § 2255), and relied on Morris. The panel in Honors correctly noted that unpublished decisions are not binding and that Grigsby I did not actually decide whether the order’s issuance was substantively proper in the circumstances.
Santos Diaz (3d Cir.)
More recently, the Third Circuit in United States v. Santos Diaz, 66 F.4th 435 (3d Cir. 2023), sharply criticized the Wheeler/Morris line, emphasizing that courts may not use inherent authority to add punishment not authorized by statute or to override express statutory limits on modifying a sentence. It vacated a custodial no‑contact order barring contact with the defendant’s fiancée, imposed after a supervised‑release revocation.

3. The Tenth Circuit’s Resolution

The Tenth Circuit did not categorically disavow the possibility that inherent authority might permit some post‑trial protective orders, but it substantially narrowed any such potential:

It emphasized the Supreme Court’s admonition that inherent powers must be exercised with “great caution” and only as a reasonable response to problems directly affecting the court’s ability to administer justice.
It explicitly stated that to the extent such authority exists, it is confined to “rare and compelling circumstances.”
It highlighted that no such circumstances were present in Honors’s case:
- The criminal proceedings were complete; no retrial was pending or reasonably anticipated.
- There was no suggestion that B.J. or her family would be witnesses in any future criminal proceeding.
- Neither B.J. nor any family member had requested the order or alleged post‑trial harassment as in Wheeler.

Given this context, the custodial no‑contact order functioned solely as an additional punitive restriction—not as a measure necessary to protect ongoing judicial proceedings. The court therefore held:

The district court lacked statutory jurisdiction to modify the sentence under § 3582(c); and
No “ancillary” or inherent power could cure that defect on these facts.

As a result, the no‑contact injunction was vacated entirely.

4. Implications

The custodial‑order holding in Honors is quite consequential:

District courts in the Tenth Circuit cannot use ancillary or inherent authority to re‑shape the terms of incarceration after sentencing, absent extraordinary case‑linked needs (such as protecting the integrity of an impending or potential retrial).
Labeling an order a “civil injunction” is not enough if its effect is to alter the defendant’s conditions of confinement in a way that operates like additional punishment.
BOP remains the primary authority over inmate contact restrictions during incarceration, absent specific statutory authority given to courts (e.g., under certain protective‑order statutes).
Unpublished decisions like Grigsby will be read narrowly and cannot justify broad assertions of inherent sentencing power.

C. Supervised‑Release Condition and the Right to Familial Association

1. Statutory Framework: § 3583(d) and § 3553(a)

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), any special condition of supervised release must satisfy three requirements:

Be reasonably related to certain § 3553(a) factors—particularly:
- the nature and circumstances of the offense and history and characteristics of the defendant (§ 3553(a)(1));
- deterrence (§ 3553(a)(2)(B));
- protection of the public (§ 3553(a)(2)(C)); and
- rehabilitation/treatment needs (§ 3553(a)(2)(D)).
Not involve a greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary to achieve those purposes.
Be consistent with Sentencing Commission policy statements.

When the condition burdens a fundamental constitutional right, courts apply a more exacting standard. The Tenth Circuit has repeatedly held that conditions interfering with familial association are permissible only in “compelling circumstances” and must be “especially fine‑tuned” to the statutory goals.

2. The Fundamental Right to Familial Association

The opinion draws on a line of Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit cases establishing that:

Parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children (Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)).
This right survives incarceration (Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)).
Spousal relationships similarly fall within protected associational interests (Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1993)).
The Tenth Circuit has recognized this in criminal‑sentencing contexts: Edgin, Smith, White, Lonjose, and more recently in unpublished decisions like Astorga.

From these cases, Honors reaffirms two critical propositions:

A parent’s right to maintain a familial relationship with his children (and, more broadly, with his spouse) is fundamental—even after conviction.
Any supervised‑release condition that restricts such contact requires individualized, record‑based findings showing a compelling need, especially when it involves a parent‑child relationship.

3. Application to Honors’s Supervised‑Release Condition

Honors challenged the special condition only as it applied to his wife and biological children, not as to B.J. The Tenth Circuit analyzed the condition against the backdrop of:

the temporal reality – supervised release begins only after 60 years of imprisonment, assuming Honors lives that long;
the ages of the children at sentencing – 3, 5, 6, and 8; thus all would be adults by the time supervised release begins; and
the rationale articulated by the district court:
- it doubted that the children would want contact with him;
- it believed his conduct showed he was not a “good dad”;
- it found his obstruction efforts via letters to his wife troubling; and
- it viewed the case as “especially horrific.”

The appellate court concluded that these reasons do not amount to compelling circumstances justifying a categorical ban on familial contact decades in the future:

Future adulthood of the children: By the time the condition would take effect, the children will no longer be minors. Many other circuits emphasize that categorical no‑contact conditions for sex offenders with their own minor children must be justified by concrete evidence that they pose a risk to those specific children. That logic applies with even greater force where the children will be adults.
No findings of future danger to spouse/adult children: There were no findings—and no record evidence—suggesting that Honors would seek to sexually exploit or otherwise harm his adult children or spouse upon eventual release.
Speculation is insufficient: The court’s “skepticism” that the children would want contact cannot justify severing constitutional family ties in advance. Adult children can choose to avoid contact; state power to their contact with a parent requires much more.
Overbreadth: A decade‑long, across‑the‑board prohibition on contact with all family members sweeps far more broadly than necessary to protect public safety or deter crime, particularly when it takes effect only after six decades.

Thus, the court held that:

The supervised‑release no‑contact condition, as applied to Honors’s wife and biological children, imposes a “greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary” under § 3583(d); and
It improperly burdens a fundamental familial right without compelling justification.

Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit found an abuse of discretion and vacated that portion of the condition.

4. Broader Impact

This part of Honors sends a strong signal to district courts:

Categorical no‑contact conditions with family members will be closely scrutinized. Courts must identify specific risks to those exact individuals, supported by the record—especially where the condition interferes with parent‑child relationships.
Temporal realities matter. A condition that might be justified immediately post‑offense (e.g., for very young children) may not be justified decades later. When supervised release will begin only after an extremely long custodial term, judges must consciously grapple with this time lag.
Victim‑family status alone is not sufficient. The mere fact that family members are also related to a victim (e.g., half‑siblings of the victim) does not automatically show they are at risk of abuse or that all future contact is harmful or coercive.
Adult children have their own autonomy interests. As in other circuits (e.g., Cabrera‑Rivera, Davis, Widmer, Fey), the Tenth Circuit acknowledges that adult children have their own rights to decide whether to maintain contact with a parent, and blanket legal prohibitions must be justified by more than generalized moral judgments about the parent’s character.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Constructive Amendment vs. Simple Variance

Indictment: The formal written charges approved by the grand jury.
Simple variance: The trial evidence differs from the indictment in minor or non‑essential ways (e.g., the crime happened on February 14 rather than February 15). This usually does not automatically require reversal unless it prejudices the defendant.
Constructive amendment: The trial evidence and/or jury instructions effectively change what crime is being charged—broadening it to include conduct the grand jury never approved. This violates the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and is generally reversible error.

In Honors, the question was whether the case had shifted from “production of a Kansas video” to “production of any video anywhere,” but because the indictment’s reference to Kansas was ambiguous, the court could not say the change was “plainly” a constructive amendment.

B. Plain‑Error Review

When a defendant fails to object in the district court, appellate courts apply the “plain error” standard, which requires the defendant to show:

There was error;
The error was plain (clear or obvious under current law);
The error affected the defendant’s substantial rights (usually meaning it likely affected the outcome); and
The error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

Here, the court focused on the second prong: because it was not clear that the indictment limited Count 2 to Kansas‑based videos, any error in failing to so limit the jury was not “plain.”

C. Ancillary / Inherent Jurisdiction

Inherent powers: Powers necessarily possessed by courts to manage their own proceedings (e.g., sanctioning misconduct, regulating attorneys, protecting the integrity of ongoing cases).
Ancillary jurisdiction: A form of jurisdiction allowing courts to hear matters that are closely related to a case already properly before them and necessary to effectuate their judgments.

These powers are not a blank check. They cannot be used to:

circumvent clear statutes limiting sentencing authority; or
add new punishment not authorized by law.

In Honors, the attempt to frame the custodial no‑contact order as a civil injunction resting on ancillary jurisdiction failed because it functioned as an unauthorized sentence modification, not as a measure genuinely necessary to administer justice in a pending case.

D. Supervised Release vs. Incarceration

Incarceration: The period during which the defendant is in BOP custody serving the prison term. Conditions are largely controlled by BOP regulations and policies.
Supervised release: A period after completion of the prison term when the defendant lives in the community under court‑imposed conditions, enforced by probation officers. Courts have explicit statutory power to set and modify supervised‑release conditions under § 3583.

In Honors, the court emphasized that:

Judges have far more structured authority to tailor supervised‑release conditions than to dictate detailed terms of incarceration.

E. Fundamental Right to Familial Association

“Familial association” means the right of family members (parents, children, spouses) to maintain their relationships, including physical contact, communication, and emotional bonds. Courts treat it as a fundamental liberty interest under the Due Process Clause.

When the government’s action (including a supervised‑release condition) significantly interferes with this right, courts require:

“Compelling” reasons, such as protection of minors from credible risk of harm; and
Conditions that are no broader than necessary to address those specific risks.

Honors applies this principle by rejecting a blanket ban on contact between Honors and his adult children/spouse absent record‑based evidence that such contact would endanger them or others.

V. Overall Impact and Future Implications

A. For District Courts

Custodial no‑contact orders:
- Courts in the Tenth Circuit should assume they lack authority to impose broad no‑contact conditions during incarceration once sentence is imposed, except where a specific statute authorizes it or perhaps in extremely rare, case‑linked situations (e.g., preventing witness intimidation in an anticipated retrial).
- In most cases, any necessary restrictions on inmate communications should be routed through the Bureau of Prisons, which possesses primary regulatory authority.
Sentencing finality:
- Once a sentencing hearing has clearly concluded—oral sentence pronounced, objections received, proceeding adjourned—courts must treat the sentence as final for purposes of § 3582(c). Post‑hoc alterations are presumptively beyond jurisdiction.
Supervised‑release conditions involving family:
- Courts must make individualized findings that the defendant poses a concrete, ongoing risk to the specific family members whose contact is being restricted.
- They must consider timing: a restriction that might be justified when children are minors may not be tenable when enforcement will occur only after they reach adulthood.
- Conditions cannot be justified solely by the horrifying nature of the underlying offense or broad assertions about moral character; they must be fine‑tuned to the statutory purposes and supported by the record.

B. For Prosecutors

When seeking no‑contact restrictions:
- Define clearly whether the government seeks custodial restrictions (during incarceration), supervised‑release restrictions, or both—and identify the statutory basis.
- For supervised‑release restrictions on familial contact, build a record showing:
  - why the defendant poses a risk to these particular family members (not just minors in general);
  - why lesser‑restrictive alternatives would be inadequate; and
  - how the restriction advances deterrence, public protection, or rehabilitation.
In drafting indictments and jury instructions:
- Be thoughtful about when to include or omit limiting factual particulars (e.g., specific video, location) that could later be argued to narrow the permissible theories of conviction.
- Coordinate instructions with charging language to reduce the risk of variance or constructive‑amendment arguments, even under plain error.

C. For Defense Counsel

Object early and specifically to:
- jury instructions that seem to broaden the indictment’s factual scope; and
- broad no‑contact conditions with family members, especially when:
  - children will be adults by the time the condition applies; or
  - no record evidence shows danger to specific family members.
In challenging custodial no‑contact orders:
- Point to § 3582(c) and the “formal break” rule; argue that any post‑sentencing addition is a jurisdictionally defective modification unless clearly authorized.
- Highlight the division of authority between the BOP and the sentencing court over incarceration conditions.

D. For Victims and Families

The opinion emphasizes:
- Victims and their relatives can request no‑contact orders, but courts must still operate within statutory and constitutional limits.
- The absence of a broad no‑contact order does not compel contact; adult family members remain free to decline communication.
Where no‑contact is desired, engaging with prosecutors and victim‑witness coordinators early may help ensure that lawful and properly tailored conditions are sought at sentencing or through BOP channels.

VI. Conclusion

United States v. Honors is a significant Tenth Circuit decision at the intersection of criminal procedure, sentencing authority, and constitutional family‑rights doctrine.

On the procedural side, the court:

clarified that ambiguous indictment language will not, under plain‑error review, readily support a finding of constructive amendment; and
reinforced the strict statutory limits on post‑sentencing modifications of incarceration terms, rejecting attempts to use ancillary civil jurisdiction to add punitive no‑contact conditions after sentencing is complete.

On the substantive rights side, the opinion powerfully reaffirms that:

Even those convicted of egregious sex offenses retain a fundamental right to familial association with spouses and children; and
Supervised‑release conditions that interfere with these relationships require compelling, individualized, and record‑based justification, especially where the conditions will only operate after children reach adulthood.

In vacating the custodial no‑contact order and the supervised‑release no‑contact condition as applied to Honors’s wife and biological children, the Tenth Circuit struck a careful balance: it left intact the conviction and all contact restrictions vis‑à‑vis the victim herself, while firmly policing the outer boundaries of judicial authority and reaffirming that fundamental constitutional rights survive even in the shadow of a de facto life sentence.