United States v. Holt: Spoliation, Daubert Harmless Error, Self‑Defense Closings, and Upward Departures in the Tenth Circuit

I. Introduction

In United States v. Holt, No. 24‑7044 (10th Cir. Dec. 16, 2025) (published), the Tenth Circuit addressed a multi‑issue criminal appeal arising from a fatal gunfight in Idabel, Oklahoma. The case touches four major areas of federal criminal procedure and evidence:

the government’s constitutional duty to preserve “potentially exculpatory” evidence under Arizona v. Youngblood;
the trial judge’s gatekeeping obligations under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert, and when a gatekeeping error can be deemed harmless;
the permissible scope of prosecutorial argument on self‑defense, especially the role of a defendant’s “other options” and the “no duty to retreat” doctrine;
the substantive reasonableness of a substantial upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(a)(3), up to the 15‑year statutory maximum for voluntary manslaughter.

The panel (Chief Judge Holmes, and Judges Moritz and Rossman, with Judge Moritz writing) rejected every claim of error and affirmed Holt’s conviction and sentence. The opinion is notable less for announcing a single dramatic new rule than for clarifying and knitting together several important strands of Tenth Circuit law:

what makes evidence “potentially exculpatory” (and when that becomes too speculative) under Youngblood;
how an inadequate Daubert ruling can be salvaged on appeal via a robust trial record on methodology;
how prosecutors may argue about a defendant’s failure to retreat or take other options without creating a de facto duty to retreat;
how upward departures and § 3553(a) substantive reasonableness review interact, including a pointed (if unresolved) question about the correct approach to departure review.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The confrontation and shooting

The case began with a theft and a planned fistfight. In July 2019, Lauren Hefner and her boyfriend, Tralyn French, stole about $10,000 from Hefner’s ex‑boyfriend, Sebastian Yanez. After a hostile encounter at French’s home, Yanez and French agreed to resolve the dispute the next day in a fistfight at an apartment complex in Idabel, Oklahoma.

Yanez stopped at defendant Jordan Holt’s home en route and had an AK‑47 rifle in the front seat. Holt took the rifle, told Yanez to “just fight” French, placed the rifle in his own vehicle, and drove separately to the complex. A sizeable crowd (15–50 people) assembled, including Larintino Scales. Holt saw Scales was armed and believed other bystanders were armed as well; later testimony confirmed multiple armed bystanders.

Holt retrieved the AK‑47 and remained by his car, parked behind a dumpster enclosed on three sides by a sheet‑metal fence. Yanez and French began fighting. When Yanez gained the upper hand, French’s siblings jumped in, beating Yanez. Adrian Valdez, one of Yanez’s cousins, then fired a revolver into the ground or air.

Witness accounts diverged on who fired the next three shots, but several witnesses (including Holt and one of Yanez’s cousins) testified that Scales fired those shots. Others were unsure or inconsistent. In any event, Holt ducked behind the dumpster and fired at least 22 rounds from the AK‑47 toward the crowd. Police later recovered casings matching the rifle near the dumpster and 17 casings from at least three different 9mm firearms around where the crowd had been.

Scales was mortally wounded. An autopsy showed a deformed bullet fragment had entered his forehead. The medical examiner initially thought a close‑range small‑caliber shot was likely (based on apparent soot), but conceded the wound could also be consistent with a fragment from a high‑powered rifle round that had ricocheted.

B. Charges, defenses, and key evidentiary disputes

Holt was charged in federal court with multiple counts arising from Scales’s death:

first‑degree murder in Indian country;
second‑degree murder in Indian country;
using a firearm in furtherance of those murders under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c);
killing someone in the course of a § 924(c) offense;
voluntary manslaughter in Indian country;
being a felon in possession of a firearm.

Holt advanced two central trial themes:

Self‑defense: he claimed he reasonably believed he needed to use deadly force to protect himself (and perhaps others) after shots were fired in his direction.
Causation: he argued the government could not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his shots, rather than those from one of the 9mm shooters, caused Scales’s death.

Four issues became focal points:

Spoliation of a purported bullet fragment discovered five months later inside the dumpster’s sheet‑metal enclosure. Law enforcement chose not to retain the item. Holt claimed this destroyed evidence could have supported his self‑defense theory by showing someone had fired at him.
Expert trajectory testimony from Brad Knight, an Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation (OSBI) crime‑scene investigator, who reconstructed bullet trajectories and opined that the fatal bullet traveled westward from Holt’s position, struck a minivan’s C‑pillar, fragmented, skipped over another vehicle, and hit Scales.
Prosecutor’s closing argument on self‑defense, specifically comments suggesting Holt “could have stayed behind the dumpster” or done “anything other than what he actually did,” which the defense argued effectively imposed a duty to retreat.
Sentencing, where the district court departed upward five offense levels under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(a)(3), raising the guideline range from 87–108 months to 151–188 months, and imposed the statutory maximum of 180 months (15 years) for voluntary manslaughter.

C. Trial outcome and sentence

The jury acquitted Holt of both murder counts and the § 924(c) counts, but convicted him of:

voluntary manslaughter in Indian country; and
being a felon in possession of a firearm.

With a total offense level of 29 and criminal history category I, Holt’s initial guideline range was 87–108 months. The district court granted an upward departure, finding Holt’s conduct—firing over 20 AK‑47 rounds toward a crowd from behind a dumpster—took the case outside the “heartland” of voluntary manslaughter. After departing five offense levels to an effective range of 151–188 months, the court imposed:

180 months on the manslaughter count (the statutory maximum);
96 months concurrent on the felon‑in‑possession count; and
three years of supervised release.

Holt appealed his manslaughter conviction and sentence on the four grounds noted above. The Tenth Circuit affirmed in full.

III. Summary of the Court’s Holdings

Spoliation / Youngblood: The late‑discovered metal fragment lacked “potentially exculpatory” value within the meaning of Youngblood. Given the time lapse, location, and uncertainty about what it was, any link to the shooting and to the 9mm weapons was too speculative. Without potentially useful evidence, there was no due process violation, and the court did not need to reach bad faith or remedy.
Rule 702 / Daubert: The district court erred, or at least arguably erred, by treating Knight’s qualifications as sufficient to establish the reliability of his opinions, effectively collapsing the two required Rule 702 inquiries. But this gatekeeping error was harmless because Knight’s trial testimony described a sufficiently reliable trajectory methodology, and there was no serious basis to conclude the testimony should have been excluded. The court also held that Knight’s description of the wound in Scales’s forehead fell within his trajectory expertise and did not require forensic pathology credentials.
Prosecutorial Misconduct / Self‑Defense: In context, the prosecutor’s rebuttal comments did not misstate the law by imposing a duty to retreat. Instead, the comments argued that Holt’s failure to use available alternatives showed his resort to deadly force was unreasonable—something the law permits the jury to consider. Because there was no misstatement of law, there was no due process violation.
Substantive Reasonableness of Sentence: The 15‑year sentence, achieved via a five‑level upward guideline departure and then a statutory maximum sentence grounded in § 3553(a), was substantively reasonable. The district court adequately explained why Holt’s conduct was extraordinarily dangerous, tied its decision to multiple § 3553(a) factors, and permissibly discounted Holt’s mitigating evidence and national sentencing averages.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Spoliation and the Limits of “Potentially Exculpatory” Evidence

1. Legal framework: Trombetta, Youngblood, and Tenth Circuit gloss

The court starts from the familiar due process framework governing lost or destroyed evidence:

California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) applies when evidence has apparent exculpatory value at the time it was destroyed and is not otherwise obtainable. In those cases, negligence can be enough to violate due process.
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) covers evidence that is merely “potentially useful,” i.e., where “no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant.” Such evidence has “latent, rather than patent, value” (United States v. Bohl, 25 F.3d 904, 910 (10th Cir. 1994)) and requires proof of bad faith to establish a due process violation.

Holt explicitly disclaimed any argument under Trombetta, leaving only Youngblood in play. Under Youngblood, the court emphasized:

Defendants bear the burden of showing that the evidence was “potentially useful” and that the government acted in bad faith in destroying it. (Johnson v. City of Cheyenne, 99 F.4th 1206, 1229, 1231 (10th Cir. 2024); United States v. Hood, 615 F.3d 1293 (10th Cir. 2010)).
The appellate court reviews the district court’s determination that the evidence lacked potentially exculpatory value for clear error, overturning only if it has a “definite and firm conviction” that the lower court exceeded “the bounds of permissible choice.” (United States v. Walker, 85 F.4th 973, 979 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Merritt, 961 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 2020))).

2. The fragment and the chain of speculation

The evidence at issue was a small piece of metal found five months after the shooting inside the sheet‑metal enclosure by the dumpster where Holt had taken cover. An attorney (for Adrian Valdez) discovered what he “thought was a bullet” and turned it over to law enforcement. The collecting officer variously described it as “a piece of metal,” “possibly a bullet fragment,” and “a small piece of, like, gold metal bullet fragment.” Law enforcement did not retain or test it.

Holt argued that:

Testing could have shown the metal was a bullet fragment;
That fragment might have been fired from a 9mm; and
If shown to be 9mm, it might corroborate his self‑defense claim by showing a 9mm shooter fired in his direction.

The panel found this reasoning too speculative to establish “potentially exculpatory” value:

It was not even certain the object was a bullet fragment; both discoverer and officer spoke in tentative terms.
Even if testing confirmed “bullet fragment” status, that alone would not establish:
- when it was fired (no way to date it to the August 1 shooting); or
- what specific firearm it came from (weapons were never recovered).
At most, testing might show caliber. But there were at least three unrecovered 9mm guns on the scene, and the area had experienced multiple other shootings. A caliber match, standing alone, would not reliably tie the fragment to this incident or any particular shooter.

Critically, the Tenth Circuit highlighted the Holt would need:

“[F]or the metal fragment to have potentially exculpatory value based on Holt’s theory, we would have to assume that it could have been shown to be a bullet fragment, could have been dated to August 1, and could have been connected to a specific and unrecovered 9mm used on August 1. That’s at least one assumption too many.”

Because Holt failed at the threshold step—showing the fragment was even “potentially useful” under Youngblood—the court did not reach the issues of bad faith or remedies and affirmed denial of the spoliation motion.

3. Precedential significance

Several points of doctrine emerge or are reinforced:

High bar for “potentially exculpatory” evidence. The opinion confirms that mere possibility of helpful test results is not enough when connecting the evidence to the crime and to the defense theory requires an extended chain of unproven inferences.
Temporal and contextual attenuation matters. The five‑month delay in discovery and the fact the location had seen “multiple shootings” heavily undercut the fragment’s connection to Holt’s incident.
Defendant’s burden is real and demanding. Relying on Johnson, the court underscores that defendants must do more than hypothesize abstract testing; they must articulate a non‑speculative path from the evidence to potential exculpation.
No adverse instruction request required to preserve the constitutional claim. The government argued plain‑error review should apply because Holt did not request an adverse‑inference instruction under Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d). The panel rejected this, holding that Holt’s pretrial spoliation motion properly preserved his due process claim based on alleged bad‑faith destruction, distinct from any jury‑instruction theory.

Practical takeaway: in the Tenth Circuit, defendants arguing Youngblood violations must concretely show how the lost item could have been materially useful, taking into account time, place, and the specificity of any forensic link. Remote or multi‑step speculation will not suffice.

B. Expert Testimony, Rule 702, and Harmless Gatekeeping Error

1. Rule 702 and the Daubert gatekeeper function

The Tenth Circuit restated its standard framework under Rule 702 (citing United States v. Foust, 989 F.3d 842 (10th Cir. 2021) and United States v. Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009) (en banc)):

Qualifications: the expert must possess the requisite “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.”
Reliability: the expert’s opinions must be grounded in a reliable methodology and reasoning, evaluated through flexible factors (testability, peer review, error rate, standards, general acceptance, etc.).

The district court:

Recited Knight’s certifications and experience and found him qualified “to opine as an expert on crime‑scene investigations, including on the general reconstruction of bullet trajectories.”
Acknowledged that the government had only “summarized” Knight’s report rather than describing his methodology in detail.
Nevertheless held that Knight’s “numerous qualifications” and OSBI’s institutional status were “sufficient” to demonstrate the reliability of his anticipated testimony.

In other words, the court effectively collapsed the qualifications and reliability inquiries—precisely what Rule 702 and Daubert forbid.

2. Standard of review and preservation

On appeal:

The Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo whether the court “applied the proper legal test” and genuinely performed its gatekeeper role (United States v. Pehrson, 65 F.4th 526, 541 (10th Cir. 2023); Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212 (10th Cir. 2003)).
It reviewed the ultimate admission decision for abuse of discretion.

The government again urged plain‑error review, arguing Holt had not renewed his objections at trial and had not specifically framed them as “gatekeeping” objections. The panel rejected that contention, distinguishing:

United States v. Nevels, 490 F.3d 800 (10th Cir. 2007), where a pretrial motion was denied “without prejudice” and no renewed objection was made; and
United States v. Mathews, 928 F.3d 968 (10th Cir. 2019), where the defendant never challenged reliability at all.

Here, by contrast:

The district court’s ruling on Holt’s motion in limine to exclude Knight’s testimony was definitive, not “without prejudice.”
Holt expressly argued that Knight’s opinions lacked indicia of reliability and involved improper medical conclusions.

Those steps sufficed to preserve his Daubert challenge.

3. Collapsing qualifications and reliability: error assumed but harmless

The court, invoking Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 2000), reaffirmed that district courts have “no discretion to avoid performing the gatekeeper function.” There, the absence of any Daubert analysis required reversal. Here, the court acknowledged that the district court’s reasoning “collapsed two aspects of the Rule 702 test” by substituting Knight’s CV and OSBI affiliation for a true reliability analysis.

However, the panel proceeded under a key Tenth Circuit doctrine: an inadequate gatekeeping ruling may be harmless if the record clearly shows the expert testimony was in fact admissible. Citing Storagecraft Tech. Corp. v. Kirby, 744 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2014), and United States v. Hunt, 63 F.4th 1229 (10th Cir. 2023), the court explained:

“If it is readily apparent from the record that the expert testimony was admissible, it would be pointless to require a new trial at which the very same evidence can and will be presented again.”

Looking at Knight’s detailed trial testimony, the court found:

Knight explained how he generally reconstructs trajectories (string and protractor, trajectory rods, laser) and why those “preferred methods” were unavailable that night (no long enough rod, no laser, late‑night scene).
He explained how he substituted a flashlight to project light through bullet defects to see alignment—“similar” in effect to a laser—and how he used the shape of bullet defects (round versus elongated) to infer directionality.
He walked through his analysis of:
- the “mostly round” defect in the minivan C‑pillar, indicating a shot from directly east rather than at a significant angle; and
- a shallow elongated “ricochet defect” on the adjacent vehicle’s roof, confirming the bullet skipped westward before striking Scales.

Holt criticized these methods as unreliable because Knight:

did not use string, protractor, or laser;
worked at night under time pressure; and
did not precisely account for the heights and exact positions of Holt and Scales.

The Tenth Circuit treated these criticisms as matters for cross‑examination rather than grounds for exclusion:

The methodology—using defect shape and alignment, substituting a flashlight for a laser—was sufficiently analogous to the accepted techniques Knight usually used.
Holt did not challenge the reliability of those usual methods.
Defense counsel thoroughly cross‑examined Knight on weaknesses, allowing the jury to weigh any shortcomings.

On this record, the court concluded any gatekeeping error was harmless: there was no realistic chance a proper Daubert analysis would have excluded Knight’s testimony.

4. Scope of expertise: ballistics vs. forensic pathology

Holt additionally argued that Knight offered “medical” or “forensic pathology” opinions regarding Scales’s head wound without medical training. The panel rejected that characterization.

Relying on Black’s Law Dictionary, the court defined “forensic pathology” as the branch of medicine concerning diseases, bodily disorders, and causes of death.
It distinguished that medical discipline from Knight’s testimony, which concerned:
- the shape and nature of the wound (“defect”) in Scales’s forehead, and
- what that shape indicated about the bullet’s physical condition (an intact bullet versus a fragment) and trajectory.

For example, Knight testified the wound’s non‑circular margins were “consistent with the shape of a severely deformed gray metal bullet” and suggested it was “not an intact, spin‑stabilized bullet,” but rather a bullet fragment. The court saw this as the final step in a trajectory analysis—one more “object” the bullet struck—not an opinion on Scales’s physiology or cause of death (which came from the medical examiner).

Given that Holt conceded Knight was qualified as a trajectory expert, the court held it was within the district court’s “ample discretion” to allow Knight to discuss the bullet’s point of entry into a human head as part of its physical trajectory.

5. Precedential impact on Daubert practice

The opinion reinforces several points important to practitioners and trial judges:

Gatekeeping is mandatory and two‑step. Courts cannot satisfy Rule 702 by relying on credentials and institutional affiliation alone; they must separately assess methodology and reasoning.
Harmless‑error safety net. In the Tenth Circuit, when the trial record robustly demonstrates reliability (through detailed expert testimony and meaningful cross‑examination), thin or flawed Daubert rulings may be upheld as harmless. However, this presupposes a sufficient trial record; perfunctory expert testimony may not be salvageable.
Preservation through definitive limine rulings. When a motion in limine is definitively denied and the movant’s arguments directly attack reliability, the movant ordinarily need not re‑object at trial to preserve appellate review.
Defining the edge of expertise. The line the panel draws between ballistics/trajectory (permissible) and forensic pathology (impermissible without medical training) will be useful in future disputes over cross‑disciplinary expert testimony.

Note also that the court applied the pre‑2023 version of Rule 702 because Holt’s trial occurred in 2022, but its insistence on a real reliability inquiry aligns with the spirit of the 2023 amendments, which emphasize that the proponent must demonstrate reliability to the court by a preponderance of the evidence.

C. Prosecutorial Argument on Self‑Defense and the “No Duty to Retreat” Doctrine

1. The challenged rebuttal argument

In rebuttal closing, the prosecutor argued Holt’s self‑defense claim failed because:

Holt “set the situation up”; and
he “is only allowed to use force that is necessary.”

The prosecutor told the jury:

“In other words, you have to find that he did what he did because he didn’t have any other options. But he did. He obviously did. He was already behind the dumpster. He could have stayed there.”

Defense counsel objected that this “misstate[d] the instructions.” The court overruled the objection, and the prosecutor continued:

“He could have stayed behind the dumpster. His car was right there. He could have done anything other than what he actually did.”

[Holt’s actions were] “a total disregard for human life” and “completely unnecessary.”

The jury was correctly instructed that:

Holt could use deadly force if he “reasonably believe[d] that force [was] necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm” to himself or another;
To convict, the government had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that Holt did not act in self‑defense or that it was not reasonable for him to think the force he used was necessary.

2. Tenth Circuit self‑defense law: no duty to retreat, but retreat is relevant

The panel grounded its analysis in two key precedents:

United States v. Toledo, 739 F.3d 562 (10th Cir. 2014): Self‑defense requires only that the defendant reasonably believed deadly force was necessary; there is no “duty to retreat or recognize the unavailability of reasonable alternatives.”
United States v. Hicks, 116 F.4th 1109 (10th Cir. 2024): There is “no legal obligation to retreat or consider alternatives so long as [the defendant] reasonably believed deadly force was necessary.” However, the jury may consider a defendant’s opportunity to retreat as one factor in assessing whether deadly force was reasonably necessary.

Thus, prosecutors may:

argue that a defendant’s access to safer alternatives (like retreat) suggests his belief in the necessity of deadly force was unreasonable; but
may not argue that the law requires retreat or denial of self‑defense simply because the defendant failed to retreat.

3. Applying those principles: no misstatement here

The court evaluated the prosecutor’s remarks in full context, consistent with United States v. Currie, 911 F.3d 1047 (10th Cir. 2018), and Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637 (1974), emphasizing that courts should not “lightly infer” that an ambiguous remark was intended in its “most damaging meaning.”

Two aspects of the context were critical:

The prosecutor framed the “other options” argument as part of an unnecessary‑force theory: Holt was “only allowed to use force that is necessary” and what he did was “completely unnecessary.”
The statements were made against the backdrop of correct jury instructions on self‑defense, which did not impose any duty to retreat and focused on reasonableness.

While the phrase “you have to find that he did what he did because he didn’t have any other options” could, if read in isolation, be taken to suggest a stricter standard than the law requires, the court declined to read it that way in context. Instead, it understood the prosecutor as arguing:

Even if some use of defensive force were justifiable once shots were fired, Holt’s actual response—firing over 20 rounds toward a crowd—went far beyond what was reasonably necessary.
Holt’s ability to remain behind the dumpster or get into his car showed that this extended volley was an unreasonable escalation, not a necessary response to danger.

The court distinguished Hicks, where reversal was required after the district court refused to instruct the jury there was no duty to retreat and the government had made failure to retreat a central theme “from opening to closing,” repeatedly emphasizing specific alternatives the defendant allegedly should have chosen. In Holt, by contrast:

There was a single, brief argument about “other options,”
The jury was properly instructed on the governing law, and
The prosecutor framed his comments within the legally correct “necessity and reasonableness” standard.

Because the court found no misstatement of law, it did not reach the second step of prosecutorial misconduct analysis (the likely effect on the verdict).

4. Preservation without “magic words”

The government again pushed for plain‑error review, arguing defense counsel had not objected on “prosecutorial misconduct” grounds. The panel rejected this formalism, holding that objecting that the prosecutor “misstate[d] the instructions” sufficiently preserved the claim as a challenge to improper legal argument, citing United States v. Anaya, 727 F.3d 1043 (10th Cir. 2013).

5. Implications for trial advocacy

Holt provides useful guidance for both sides:

Prosecutors may:
- argue that a defendant’s failure to take safer or less violent options (including retreat) is evidence that his resort to deadly force was unreasonable and thus not justified; but
- should avoid language that could be construed as asserting a legal obligation to retreat or as conditioning self‑defense on the absolute absence of any alternative.
Defense counsel should:
- be alert to closing argument formulations that risk converting a permissible “reasonableness” argument into a de facto duty to retreat;
- preserve objections by explicitly linking them to jury instructions and self‑defense law, even without using the term “misconduct.”

D. Sentencing: Upward Departures, § 3553(a), and Substantive Reasonableness

1. The departure and sentence

After calculating a guideline range of 87–108 months (offense level 29, CHC I), the district court:

Granted the government’s motion for an upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(a)(3);
Departed five levels upward, producing a range of 151–188 months; and
Imposed a sentence of 180 months, the statutory maximum for voluntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112(b).

Section 5K2.0(a)(3) allows an upward departure in “exceptional” cases where a factor is already taken into account in the guideline calculation but is present “to a degree substantially in excess of” that ordinarily involved in the offense.

The court found Holt’s conduct exceptionally dangerous:

He fired more than 20 rounds from an AK‑47 toward a crowd of bystanders;
He did so from behind partial cover (the dumpster enclosure), elevating his relative safety and enabling sustained fire; and
It was “a miracle that no one else was shot.”

The district court then tied the 180‑month sentence to the § 3553(a) factors, citing:

Holt’s history and characteristics:
- a prior juvenile offense and a prior adult conviction, both involving firearms;
- a history of substance abuse and mental‑health concerns during incarceration;
The seriousness of the offense and the need for just punishment, deterrence, respect for the law, public protection, and effective correctional treatment.

2. Standard of review and the departures vs. variances question

The Tenth Circuit reviewed the sentence for substantive reasonableness under the familiar abuse‑of‑discretion standard, asking whether the sentence “exceeds the bounds of permissible choice” given the facts and law (United States v. Lewis, 116 F.4th 1144, 1177–78 (10th Cir. 2024); United States v. Ware, 93 F.4th 1175 (10th Cir. 2024)).

Substantive reasonableness focuses on whether the length of the sentence is reasonable in light of the § 3553(a) factors (United States v. Alapizco‑Valenzuela, 546 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Conlan, 500 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 2007)), not on any rigid formula based on percentage deviation from the guideline range (United States v. Garcia, 946 F.3d 1191, 1212 (10th Cir. 2020); United States v. Sample, 901 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2018)).

Intriguingly, the panel paused to question how this § 3553(a)-centered substantive reasonableness review fits when the district court’s non‑Guidelines sentence is the product of a departure (under the Guidelines) rather than a variance (based directly on § 3553(a)):

“Departures are ‘non‑Guidelines sentences imposed under the framework set out in the Guidelines,’ whereas variances are ‘non‑Guidelines sentences’ arising from the district court’s case‑specific analysis of § 3553(a).” (United States v. Barnes, 141 F.4th 1156 (10th Cir. 2025); United States v. Vazquez‑Garcia, 130 F.4th 891 (10th Cir. 2025); United States v. Martinez‑Barragan, 545 F.3d 894 (10th Cir. 2008)).
The court noted prior authority suggesting a distinct, more structured four‑part test for reviewing departures (Alapizco‑Valenzuela; United States v. Adams, 751 F.3d 1175 (10th Cir. 2014)), but also referenced United States v. Begaye, 635 F.3d 456 (10th Cir. 2011), which described a “unitary abuse of discretion standard.”

Ultimately, the panel sidestepped the conflict, reasoning that:

the parties framed the appeal purely in § 3553(a) substantive‑reasonableness terms; and
it was unnecessary to decide whether a distinct four‑part departure review standard applied.

Still, the opinion flags an unresolved doctrinal tension in Tenth Circuit sentencing law that could invite en banc or Supreme Court clarification in the future.

3. Weighing of § 3553(a) factors

Holt argued the sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court:

focused almost exclusively on the seriousness and circumstances of the offense;
ignored or undervalued mitigating evidence (steady work history, desire to be a good father, plans to improve his life); and
created an unwarranted disparity relative to national averages for voluntary manslaughter for category I offenders (median/average around 82–83 months).

The Tenth Circuit rejected each argument:

No impermissible single‑factor focus: While acknowledging the seriousness of Holt’s conduct was a dominant theme, the panel noted the court also explicitly discussed his criminal history, substance abuse, mental health, the need for public protection, deterrence, respect for law, and correctional treatment (cf. United States v. Crosby, 119 F.4th 1239, 1247 (10th Cir. 2024) (warning against reliance solely on one factor)).
Mitigating factors were considered but discounted: The district judge acknowledged Holt’s positive attributes and plans (albeit after announcing the sentence) but implicitly gave them little weight relative to the extreme recklessness of the offense. The Tenth Circuit reiterated that it does not re‑weigh sentencing factors on appeal; disagreement with the district court’s balancing is not enough (United States v. Cookson, 922 F.3d 1079, 1094 (10th Cir. 2019)).
Sentencing disparities argument unpersuasive: Section 3553(a)(6) focuses on avoiding unwarranted disparities among defendants with similar records and similar conduct. National averages and medians for voluntary manslaughter do not capture the specific factual extremity of Holt’s case (an extended AK‑47 barrage into a crowd). The district court’s finding that Holt’s conduct was far outside the “heartland” justified treating his case differently.

On this record, the Tenth Circuit held the 15‑year sentence did not exceed the “bounds of permissible choice” and was substantively reasonable.

E. Cumulative Error

Holt raised a cumulative‑error argument. The panel disposed of it briefly, citing United States v. Butler, 141 F.4th 1136, 1149–50 (10th Cir. 2025): cumulative error requires more than one underlying error. The panel assumed only one error (the Daubert gatekeeping issue) and found that error harmless. Without multiple errors, there could be no cumulative prejudice.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. Spoliation, “potentially exculpatory” evidence, and bad faith

Spoliation in criminal cases refers to the government’s loss or destruction of evidence that might have helped the defense.
“Potentially exculpatory” under Youngblood means evidence that might have produced test results favorable to the defendant, even though that value is not obvious on its face (“latent” value).
To win a due process claim under Youngblood, a defendant must show:
1. the evidence was “potentially useful” in a non‑speculative way; and
2. the government acted in bad faith, i.e., destroyed or failed to preserve the evidence for the purpose of impeding the defense or with conscious disregard of its potential exculpatory value.

2. Rule 702, Daubert, and “gatekeeping”

Under Rule 702, expert testimony is admissible only if:
- the witness is qualified (by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education);
- the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
- the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
- the expert reliably applies those principles to the facts of the case.
Under Daubert, trial courts act as “gatekeepers,” screening out unreliable expert testimony before it reaches the jury.
Qualifications vs. reliability:
- Qualifications: does this person have enough expertise in this field to offer an opinion?
- Reliability: are the methods they used scientifically or technically sound and properly applied?
Harmless gatekeeping error means that even if the judge’s Rule 702 analysis was flawed, the error did not affect the outcome because the expert’s testimony was in fact admissible and would be the same at any retrial.

3. Self‑defense and duty to retreat

Federal self‑defense generally requires that the defendant:
- reasonably believed he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm; and
- reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to prevent that harm.
No duty to retreat (per Toledo, Hicks): a defendant does not have to prove he exhausted all alternatives or retreated before using deadly force.
Retreat as a factor: the jury may consider whether the defendant could have safely retreated (or taken another less harmful course) as part of deciding whether his belief in the necessity of deadly force was reasonable.

4. Sentencing departures, variances, and substantive reasonableness

A departure is a guideline‑based change in the advisory range, authorized by specific provisions in the Guidelines (like § 5K2.0), often because particular circumstances make the case atypical.
A variance is a sentence outside the guideline range imposed directly under § 3553(a) based on the totality of circumstances, irrespective of any departure provision.
Substantive reasonableness asks whether the sentence’s length is justified in light of all § 3553(a) factors. Appellate courts apply a deferential abuse‑of‑discretion standard.
§ 3553(a) factors include:
- nature and circumstances of the offense;
- history and characteristics of the defendant;
- need for the sentence to reflect seriousness, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford deterrence, protect the public, and provide correctional treatment;
- the guideline range;
- need to avoid unwarranted disparities, and more.

VI. Broader Impact and Practical Implications

1. Evidence preservation and spoliation motions

For law enforcement and prosecutors in the Tenth Circuit, Holt confirms that:

They are not constitutionally obligated to preserve every late‑discovered, marginal item, especially when:
- its connection to the crime is tenuous (e.g., found months later in a location with other shootings);
- its nature is uncertain (not even clearly a bullet); and
- linking it to the defendant’s theory requires multiple speculative steps.

For defense counsel, the case underscores:

The need to present a concrete, fact‑based theory of how the lost evidence could realistically have been exculpatory, rather than relying on broad “might have exonerated” statements.
The importance of timely pretrial spoliation motions to preserve constitutional claims, separate from any jury‑instruction remedies.

2. Expert challenges and record‑building under Rule 702

Holt sends a clear message to trial judges:

They must not shortcut the Daubert gatekeeping process by equating a strong CV with methodological reliability.
Detailed findings on reliability are not just formalities; they are essential to meaningful appellate review.

At the same time, the opinion reinforces a defense‑side imperative:

Even where pretrial challenges fail, thorough cross‑examination of experts on their methods is vital to develop a record that either:
- shows unreliability (supporting exclusion or reversal); or
- at least frames the weaknesses for jury consideration.

Because the Tenth Circuit will conduct a harmless‑error review based on the trial record, the scope and depth of expert testimony at trial can make or break an appellate Daubert challenge, even where the initial ruling was thin.

3. Closing argument boundaries in self‑defense cases

For prosecutors, Holt sketches a relatively clear safe zone:

They may emphasize that the defendant had other options—especially safer ones—as evidence that his decision to use deadly force was unreasonable and unjustified.
They should anchor such arguments explicitly in the jury instructions’ language about “necessity” and “reasonableness” to minimize any chance of being read as imposing a duty to retreat.

Defense attorneys, in turn, should:

Be prepared to distinguish between legitimate necessity arguments and improper duty‑to‑retreat implications;
Object specifically when argument appears to shift the legal standard (e.g., requiring that no other options exist), while simultaneously requesting appropriate clarifying instructions where warranted (as in Hicks).

4. Sentencing advocacy and appeals in departure cases

On sentencing, Holt offers several lessons:

Exceptional conduct can justify substantial departures even for first‑time or low‑history offenders, especially where the offense created extraordinary risk (e.g., spraying automatic‑type fire into a crowd).
Mitigating factors can be overwhelmed by offense seriousness; appellate courts will generally not re‑balance the § 3553(a) factors.
Statistical comparisons (average and median sentences) are of limited use when the district court reasonably finds a case to be far outside the norm.
Departure vs. variance doctrine remains unsettled in the Tenth Circuit. Lawyers should be prepared, in appropriate cases, to brief both:
- the sufficiency of the departure rationale under the Guidelines; and
- the substantive reasonableness of the ultimate sentence under § 3553(a).

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Holt is a comprehensive reaffirmation and refinement of several important strands of Tenth Circuit criminal law:

It tightens the standard for what counts as “potentially exculpatory” evidence under Youngblood in spoliation claims, especially when evidence is remote in time and location from the offense.
It reiterates that Rule 702’s gatekeeping function cannot be satisfied by expertise alone, while simultaneously confirming that a well‑developed trial record on methodology can render Daubert errors harmless.
It clarifies that prosecutors may argue about a defendant’s “other options” in self‑defense cases as a measure of reasonableness, so long as they do not transform that into a legal duty to retreat.
It upholds a significant upward departure and statutory‑maximum sentence as substantively reasonable, while openly questioning—but not resolving—the precise doctrinal framework for reviewing departure sentences in the post‑Booker era.

Viewed together, these holdings provide detailed guidance for district courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel across the Tenth Circuit on evidence preservation, expert practice, trial advocacy in self‑defense cases, and sentencing in extreme‑risk homicides. Although the court ultimately found no reversible error, the opinion’s careful articulation of standards and its handling of close questions make it an important reference point for future criminal litigation in the circuit.