United States v. Hill: Sixth Circuit Reaffirms (1) No Reversal for Single-to-Multiple Conspiracy Variance Without Proof of Prejudice, (2) Constructive Possession via Dominion Over Drug Premises, and (3) No Presumed Jury Prejudice After a Full Remmer Hearing

I. Introduction

In United States v. Cortez Lorenzo Hill (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2026) (unpublished), the Sixth Circuit affirmed convictions for (1) conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a) and (2) possession of heroin with intent to distribute under § 841(a).

The case arose from a DEA investigation into a multi-person drug-trafficking organization operating in the Detroit area. Agents surveilled Hill and searched two homes he owned (Helen Street in Detroit and Salisbury Street in St. Clair Shores), recovering, among other things, 2.75 kilograms of heroin at the Helen Street property and drug-trafficking indicia at both locations.

On appeal, Hill raised three principal issues:

Variance / conspiracy proof: whether the indictment’s alleged “single conspiracy” was undermined by proof of multiple conspiracies, and whether the evidence otherwise supported the § 846 conspiracy conviction.
Sufficiency / possession: whether evidence supported that Hill possessed heroin with intent to distribute (primarily through constructive possession tied to the Helen Street property).
Juror impartiality: whether denial of a mistrial violated the Sixth Amendment after a juror disclosed a personal connection to heroin overdose and a possible link to “Helen Street,” followed by dismissal of that juror and a Remmer hearing of the remaining panel.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed across the board. It held that:

The evidence permitted a reasonable jury to find a single “chain” conspiracy with a common goal of drug distribution for profit; and even assuming a variance, Hill did not show it affected a substantial right.
The evidence sufficiently established Hill’s constructive possession of heroin found at his Helen Street home through dominion over the premises and corroborating circumstances (documents, surveillance, and cooperating-witness testimony).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial: after dismissing the juror who made the statement and conducting a thorough Remmer hearing, Hill failed to prove actual juror partiality, and the Sixth Circuit declined to presume prejudice.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited (and How They Drove the Result)

1) Appellate review of sufficiency and inferences

United States v. Campbell and United States v. Sheppard: The court began with the standard sufficiency lens—view evidence “in the light most favorable to the government” and draw reasonable inferences for the prosecution. This framing is decisive in close cases because it limits appellate reweighing of competing narratives (e.g., Hill’s “rental property” claim).

2) Variance in conspiracy cases: single vs. multiple conspiracies and prejudice

United States v. Caver: Supplies the governing variance framework and the prejudice requirement. The court leaned on Caver both for the definition of variance (single conspiracy charged, multiple proven) and for the rule that reversal requires the variance to have substantially influenced the outcome.
United States v. Guerrero: Reinforces that the single-vs-multiple conspiracy determination is typically for the jury and is reviewed with deference to the verdict when evidence supports a single enterprise.
United States v. Warman (quoting United States v. Smith): Provides the three-factor test—common goal, nature of scheme, and overlapping participants. The panel applied these factors to Hill’s role: housing participants, arranging rental cars, coded messages, and the presence of trafficking tools at his properties.
United States v. Warner: The key conceptual authority for Hill’s argument that not all conspirators directly interacted. Warner recognizes “chain” conspiracies typical in narcotics distribution, where agreement can be inferred from interdependence rather than universal direct contact. This directly undermined Hill’s “no direct interaction” theory.
Kotteakos v. United States: Anchors the prejudice inquiry: it is not enough to speculate the jury “might” have decided differently; the defendant must show the error substantially influenced the verdict.

3) § 841(a) possession with intent: constructive possession and circumstantial proof

United States v. Carson: Emphasizes the “heavy burden” for sufficiency challenges, reinforcing why Hill’s alternative explanations (not present on search day; no attempt to destroy drugs) did not defeat the verdict on appeal.
United States v. Coffee and United States v. Lloyd: Supply the elements of § 841(a) and the “any rational trier of fact” standard for sufficiency.
United States v. Reed: Confirms that circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a conviction, important here because constructive possession often depends on inference rather than direct physical seizure from the defendant.
United States v. Latimer and United States v. Bailey: Define constructive vs. actual possession; Latimer provides the two routes to constructive possession (control over the item or dominion over the premises). The panel used this structure to avoid needing proof of Hill physically holding heroin.
United States v. Raymore: Validates proving constructive possession by circumstantial evidence alone, supporting reliance on ownership records, surveillance, and witness testimony.
United States v. Wheaton: Reinforces the “dominion over premises” concept as a basis for constructive possession.
United States v. Hill (142 F.3d 305) and United States v. Sheppard: These cases connect residency/ownership indicia and presence at a location to constructive possession. The panel used them to treat documents bearing Hill’s name/address and observed use of the house as probative links.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.: Cited for the proposition that credibility determinations and weighing evidence are for the jury, which allowed the panel to defer to the jury’s rejection of the “rental property” defense.
United States v. Garcia: Used to police the appellate role—no independent reweighing of evidence—further insulating the verdict.
United States v. Morris: Appears through quotation in the discussion of inferences from contraband found in a home, framing the baseline inference (and the need for extra evidence where multiple occupants exist).

4) Juror misconduct, extrinsic information, and the Remmer hearing framework

Remmer v. United States and United States v. Zelinka: The opinion treats Remmer as the procedural cornerstone: the trial court must determine circumstances, impact, and prejudice in a hearing where parties can participate. The district court’s compliance (individual questioning of each juror; counsel participation) was central to affirmance.
Smith v. Phillips: Supports the idea that juror impartiality safeguards are imperfect and that the remedy for potential bias is a careful inquiry rather than automatic reversal.
United States v. Pennell and United States v. Branham: Establish the Sixth Circuit’s rule that, on improper juror communication, the defendant must prove actual juror partiality and that prejudice is not presumed. This allocation of burden was outcome-determinative because Hill offered speculation rather than evidence of partiality.
In re Sittenfeld: Reinforces that misconduct/extraneous information alone does not require a new trial absent actual prejudice.
United States v. Corrado: Provides the deference principle: appellate courts give substantial deference to the district judge’s assessment of juror credibility when jurors assure impartiality after questioning.
United States v. Soto and United States v. Lanier: Reaffirm the constitutional baseline (impartial jury; even one biased juror is too many), while still allowing that the defendant must show bias in fact under circuit standards.
United States v. Lloyd and United States v. Shackelford: Cited for the district court’s duty to investigate possible juror misconduct—supporting the adequacy of the district court’s prompt inquiry here.
United States v. Lawson: Not adopted; the panel used it to clarify that the Fourth Circuit’s presumption of prejudice approach is not the Sixth Circuit’s rule, citing Pennell as controlling.
Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland and United States v. Cavazos: These were cited to justify declining reliance on other circuits’ constructive-possession cases because binding Sixth Circuit precedent already resolved the question.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The “single conspiracy” proof and variance claim

The panel treated Hill’s variance theory as largely incompatible with how narcotics conspiracies are typically proven. Applying Warman’s three considerations and Warner’s “chain conspiracy” concept, the court held that the jury could infer a single agreement from interdependent roles: suppliers importing and delivering heroin, Hill providing a Detroit base, arranging logistics (rental cars), housing participants, and facilitating coded communications.

Critically, the court also made variance reversal turn on prejudice. Even if one assumed multiple conspiracies were shown, the panel found Hill did not argue (much less establish under Caver and Kotteakos) that the “single indictment / multiple conspiracies” problem substantially influenced the outcome. The assertion that it is “impossible to say” the variance did not matter was treated as insufficient.

2) Constructive possession at the Helen Street home

The court affirmed on a dominion-over-premises theory under Latimer. Ownership was undisputed, and the jury had additional connecting evidence: Hill’s business and personal documents tied to the address, surveillance and utility involvement, cooperating testimony that Hill stored drugs there, and the home’s condition and contents consistent with drug processing rather than habitation.

The panel rejected Hill’s emphasis that he was not present during the search and did not attempt to destroy drugs. That argument misunderstands constructive possession: by definition it does not require contemporaneous physical control (per Bailey) and can be proven circumstantially (per Reed and Raymore).

3) Juror statement, dismissal, Remmer hearing, and mistrial denial

The court held the district judge followed the proper constitutional procedure: remove the problematic juror and then conduct a Remmer-style inquiry with party participation. The remaining jurors were questioned individually; all stated they could remain impartial and would not treat the statement as evidence.

Under Pennell, Branham, and In re Sittenfeld, Hill had the burden to show actual juror partiality, with no presumption of prejudice. The panel treated Hill’s argument (“could have been influenced”) as speculation, and it deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations under Corrado.

C. Impact

Variance challenges remain prejudice-centered in the Sixth Circuit. Even where defendants can plausibly recharacterize the proof as multiple conspiracies, Hill underscores that reversal will typically hinge on a concrete showing that the joint trial and single-conspiracy instruction actually skewed the verdict.
Constructive possession remains readily provable via premises dominion plus modest corroboration. The decision reinforces that documents, surveillance, witness testimony, and drug-processing indicia can satisfy the “minimal” extra link referenced in Latimer, even if the defendant is absent at the moment of the search.
Juror-misconduct claims will rise or fall on the Remmer record and proof of actual bias. The opinion incentivizes litigants to develop concrete bias evidence at the hearing; absent that, appellate deference to juror assurances and trial-court credibility findings will be difficult to overcome.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Variance (in conspiracy cases): A mismatch between what the indictment charges (e.g., one conspiracy) and what the evidence shows at trial (e.g., several separate conspiracies). In the Sixth Circuit, even if a mismatch exists, the defendant generally must also show it hurt the fairness of the trial in a concrete way.
Chain conspiracy: A distribution “pipeline” where participants may not all meet, but each relies on the others’ roles (supplier → transporter → distributor). Agreement can be inferred from the interdependence of the scheme.
Constructive possession: Legal “possession” without physically holding the item—shown by power and intent to control it, often proven by control over the place where it is kept.
Remmer hearing: A court hearing used to investigate possible juror exposure to improper outside information or influence. The point is to determine what happened, whether it affected jurors, and whether it created bias requiring a mistrial or new trial.
Actual juror partiality (bias): Not mere concern or emotional reaction, but a demonstrated inability to decide the case fairly on the evidence and the law.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Hill consolidates three practical rules that often decide federal drug appeals: (1) single-to-multiple conspiracy variance claims require not just a variance theory but a showing of outcome-linked prejudice; (2) constructive possession under § 841(a) can be sustained by dominion over drug premises with corroborating circumstances; and (3) when a district court promptly removes a problematic juror and conducts a thorough Remmer inquiry, the Sixth Circuit will not presume prejudice and will defer heavily to the trial court’s credibility-based finding of juror impartiality.