Uncorroborated PSR-Relayed Co-Conspirator Statements Cannot Support Drug-Quantity Findings for Sentencing

1. Introduction

This consolidated appeal arises from a methamphetamine-distribution conspiracy in the Eastern District of Tennessee involving Julianna Hawkins (a reseller/distributor) and Jimmy Crafton, Jr. (a supplier). Both defendants pleaded guilty and challenged their sentences as unreasonable under Sixth Circuit sentencing precedent.

The central issue for Hawkins was a recurring federal-sentencing problem: when drugs are not fully seized, courts must estimate drug quantity. Hawkins argued the district court’s estimate—driven primarily by Crafton’s out-of-court claim that Hawkins bought “85 percent” of his supply over seven months—rested on speculation and unreliable hearsay. Crafton’s appeal focused on whether the district court adequately considered his age, health, and criminal-history arguments when refusing a downward variance.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• Hawkins: The Sixth Circuit held her sentence was procedurally unreasonable because the district court clearly erred in adopting a PSR drug-quantity calculation that relied heavily on Crafton’s scant, uncorroborated, out-of-court statement. The panel reversed and remanded for resentencing, directing the district court to limit its drug-quantity determination to evidence already in the record and refusing the government a “second bite at the apple.”
• Crafton: The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Procedurally, plain-error review applied because Crafton did not object after the district court invited objections. Substantively, the within-Guidelines, bottom-of-range sentence was presumptively reasonable and not shown to be an abuse of discretion.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited (and How They Shaped the Decision)

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Hawkins: Why the Sixth Circuit Found Procedural Unreasonableness

(1) The court properly framed the claim as procedural.
By tying Hawkins’s argument to the factual foundation of her base offense level (drug quantity), the panel applied United States v. Small and United States v. Miller: reliance on erroneous assumptions and unreliable information is procedural error. It also invoked United States v. Parrish to treat “unreasonable speculation” as procedural.

(2) The governing evidentiary standard is permissive but not toothless.
Sentencing allows estimates and consideration of evidence broader than trial proof, but the panel emphasized two constraints: (a) the government must prove the quantity by a preponderance (United States v. Histed; United States v. Simpson), and (b) the evidence must have “a minimal level of reliability,” and courts should “err on the side of caution” (United States v. Sandridge; United States v. Anderson).

(3) Crafton’s statement lacked corroboration and was contradicted by other record evidence.
The PSR’s methodology attributed 85% of Crafton’s asserted biweekly supply to Hawkins over seven months. The panel found the government’s attempted corroboration failed:

• Hawkins’s admissions did not match Crafton’s 85% claim. Hawkins said the most she bought was eight ounces but “normally” four-ounce quantities and did not specify frequency—an implication inconsistent with routinely purchasing 85% of a ten-ounce biweekly supply.
• Physical seizures did not support the 85% inference. The June 9 seizure (108.5 grams) was about four ounces—consistent with Hawkins’s “normally four-ounce” statement, not with 85% of Crafton’s ongoing supply. The court also corrected the record: the claimed “98.86 grams” bought “from her and Crafton” was not attributed to Hawkins’s sales; Hawkins’s controlled buys totaled only 20.04 grams.

(4) Comparison to prior cases highlighted what was missing here: detail, testing, and consistency.
The panel distinguished:

• United States v. Moncivais (agent testimony supporting reliability; statement “richly detailed,” internally and externally consistent);
• United States v. Swanberg (PSR-relayed co-conspirator statement consistent with other evidence);
• United States v. Armstrong (informant statements corroborated by officers and extensive detail);
• and numerous cases where co-conspirators testified and could be assessed and cross-examined, such as United States v. Mosley and United States v. Hough, or where trial testimony supported the PSR, such as United States v. Bradley and United States v. Henley.

By contrast, Crafton’s “three-line statement” was out-of-court, lacking specificity, and uncorroborated—“mere allegation,” which fails even the “relatively low hurdle” of reliability (United States v. Moncivais; United States v. Johnson (732 F.3d 577)).

(5) Remedy: remand, but confined to the existing record.
Invoking United States v. Histed, the panel required the resentencing court to limit its drug-quantity determination to evidence already in the record and denied the government a “second bite at the apple” (United States v. Mukes; United States v. Goodman; United States v. Gill). This remedial direction is itself consequential: it treats evidentiary insufficiency at sentencing as a forfeited opportunity for the government, not a problem to be cured on remand.

B. Crafton: Why the Sixth Circuit Affirmed

(1) Procedural challenge reviewed for plain error.
Because Crafton did not object after the district court invited objections, the panel applied plain-error review (United States v. Jeter; United States v. Vonner).

(2) New appellate theories were not preserved.
Crafton’s reliance on Sentencing Commission research about age and recidivism was raised for the first time on appeal. Under United States v. Embry and United States v. Winfree, a district court does not plainly err by failing to address an argument never made. The panel also emphasized that courts are not required to consult Sentencing Commission research sua sponte (United States v. Hymes; United States v. Bailey (Gilman, J., concurring)).

(3) The district court sufficiently considered what Crafton actually argued.
Crafton’s below-guidelines request was sparse (“age, health issues, background”). The district court responded that the Bureau of Prisons could account for his “physical history and characteristics” and recommended appropriate placement for medical needs. Under Rita v. United States and United States v. Madden, a brief explanation can suffice—particularly where the arguments are underdeveloped—and the court’s statement that it considered the § 3553(a) factors satisfied United States v. Brooks.

(4) Substantive reasonableness: deference plus presumption.
With a within-Guidelines sentence at the bottom of the range, Crafton faced the presumption of reasonableness (United States v. Vonner; United States v. Perez-Rodriguez). The panel reiterated that sentencing courts may give greater weight to certain factors (United States v. Gardner), and appellate courts do not reweigh factors absent arbitrariness or impermissible considerations (United States v. Rayyan; United States v. Robinson; United States v. Petrus). The court found none and affirmed.

3.3. Impact

A. Sentencing practice in drug cases: reliability limits on PSR-driven “ghost weight”

• Practical evidentiary rule: A PSR’s drug-quantity calculation that materially drives the Guidelines range cannot be propped up by an untested, uncorroborated co-conspirator assertion. If the government wants to attribute large quantities, it should expect to offer corroboration (records, surveillance, controlled buys tied to the defendant, admissions that align, agent testimony) or live testimony that can be credibility-tested.
• Caution principle enforced: The decision gives teeth to Sandridge/Anderson’s command to “err on the side of caution,” particularly where the estimate determines whether a defendant is sentenced as responsible for kilograms rather than grams.

B. Remand discipline: no “second bite at the apple” at resentencing

• The panel’s directive (from United States v. Histed and United States v. Mukes) meaningfully constrains the government’s ability to shore up a weak sentencing record after reversal, incentivizing robust proof at the first sentencing.

C. Appellate preservation lessons

• Crafton underscores that defendants must develop mitigation theories (including empirical recidivism arguments) in the district court and must object procedurally when invited, or face plain-error review and likely affirmance (United States v. Jeter; United States v. Vonner).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: “Procedural” asks whether the judge used the right process (correct Guidelines calculation, reliable facts, consideration of § 3553(a), adequate explanation). “Substantive” asks whether the sentence length is too long/short given those factors.
• Drug-quantity “estimate” / “ghost weight”: When drugs are not fully seized, courts estimate how much was involved, often using testimony, admissions, or transaction patterns. But estimates must rest on reliable evidence, not speculation.
• “Minimal indicia of reliability”: Even at sentencing (where hearsay can be used), the information must have some trustworthy basis—detail, internal consistency, external corroboration, or testing through testimony/cross-examination.
• Clear error vs. plain error: “Clear error” is a deferential factual-review standard but allows reversal when the appellate court is firmly convinced a mistake occurred. “Plain error” is harder for appellants: they must show an obvious error affecting substantial rights and the integrity of proceedings.
• Variance vs. departure: A variance is a non-Guidelines sentence based on § 3553(a). A departure is a Guidelines-authorized adjustment. The opinion treated Crafton’s arguments largely as variance/substantive reasonableness issues.
• “No second bite at the apple” on remand: If the government had the burden to prove a sentencing fact and failed, it generally cannot present new evidence after reversal to fix the deficiency.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Hawkins tightens the Sixth Circuit’s insistence that drug-quantity findings—especially those that drive substantial Guidelines exposure—must be anchored in evidence with “a minimal level of reliability,” not a thin, uncorroborated co-conspirator assertion repeated in the PSR. The decision also reinforces a consequential remedial rule: when the government fails to carry its sentencing burden, remand is limited to the existing record. In the same opinion, the court’s affirmance of Crafton’s sentence reiterates preservation and deference principles: underdeveloped mitigation arguments and unpreserved procedural objections rarely succeed on appeal, and within-Guidelines sentences remain presumptively reasonable.