United States v. Harbuck: Eleventh Circuit Confirms South Carolina “Assault with Intent to Kill” Is an ACCA Violent Felony and Re-Affirms the Elements Clause’s Constitutional Certainty

1. Introduction

United States v. Todd Joseph Harbuck, No. 23-14007 (11th Cir. July 28, 2025), tackles two recurring flashpoints in federal sentencing:

Whether a particular state offense—here, the South Carolina common-law crime of assault with intent to kill—qualifies as a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
Whether the ACCA’s “elements clause” (§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i)) is void for vagueness, either facially or as applied.

The panel (Chief Judge William Pryor, and Circuit Judges Grant and Kidd—opinion by Judge Kidd) rejects both challenges, affirming a 188-month sentence. Crucially, the court clarifies that South Carolina’s assault-with-intent-to-kill offense:

“requires the purposeful or knowing intent to commit a violent injury … [and] therefore qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense under the elements clause.”

Additionally, relying on Johnson v. United States (2015) and Taylor v. United States (2022), the panel holds the elements clause is “a straightforward job” and not unconstitutionally vague.

2. Summary of the Judgment

After pleading guilty to felon-in-possession (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)), Harbuck disputed the ACCA enhancement premised on three prior state convictions. He conceded Georgia aggravated assault and obstruction of an officer but contested the South Carolina assault-with-intent-to-kill conviction. The district court deemed the offense a “violent felony,” triggering the 15-year mandatory minimum, and sentenced him to 15 years 8 months. On appeal he argued:

The South Carolina offense is not a violent felony because it can rest on “implied malice” (extreme recklessness) rather than purposeful force.
The ACCA’s elements clause is void for vagueness, especially given South Carolina’s historical practice of labelling the crime a “misdemeanor.”

The Eleventh Circuit, reviewing de novo, held:

The offense is indivisible; under the categorical approach it necessarily involves an “unlawful attempt to commit a violent injury … with malicious intent,” satisfying § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Even if implied malice sufficed, Borden left extreme recklessness open, and Eleventh Circuit precedent (Alvarado-Linares) treats such mens rea as violent.
The elements clause is not vague; “violent felony” is cabined by the requirement of “force” and punishability >1 year, unlike the discarded residual clause.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) – Struck down ACCA residual clause. Court distinguishes Johnson because the elements clause does not invite the same abstraction.
Mathis v. United States, 579 U.S. 500 (2016) – Dictates categorical vs. modified-categorical analysis depending on whether statute is divisible.
Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021) – Held mere “recklessness” insufficient for ACCA; footnote 4 left “extreme recklessness” unresolved.
Alvarado-Linares v. United States, 44 F.4th 1334 (11th Cir. 2022) – Found Georgia malice murder (including implied malice) satisfied § 924(c) “crime of violence.” Used to analogize extreme recklessness to violence.
United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022) – Reaffirmed categorical approach is “straightforward” under elements clause.
Other Eleventh Circuit authorities: Sharp, Howard, Ferguson, Jackson, Gundy, Carter.

These cases provide the doctrinal scaffolding: how to parse state statutes (divisibility), apply the categorical approach, and address vagueness.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

Determine statute type. South Carolina assault-with-intent-to-kill has a single set of elements (indivisible). Hence, pure categorical approach.
Compare elements to § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).
- Elements include “unlawful attempt” + “violent injury” + “malicious intent” + “present ability.”
- “Violent injury” + malicious intent necessarily presuppose force. Therefore minimum conduct uses, attempts, or threatens force.
Address implied malice argument. Even if statute allows conviction via implied malice (extreme recklessness), Eleventh Circuit precedent deems such mens rea sufficient. Panel notes Borden left issue open; court fills gap relying on Alvarado-Linares.
Reject vagueness challenges.
- Text of elements clause gauges “force” in straightforward terms.
- Label “misdemeanor” irrelevant; ACCA uses >1-year punishment test.
- Supreme Court in Johnson and Taylor expressly preserved elements clause.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation

Clarifies South Carolina landscape. Federal courts must now treat assault-with-intent-to-kill as a qualifying ACCA predicate. This likely affects both ACCA and Guidelines career-offender calculations.
Extends “extreme recklessness” line of cases. Combines Borden footnote 4 with Alvarado-Linares to keep door open for mens rea above negligence but below purpose.
Vagueness wall strengthened. Defendants attacking elements clause face uphill battle; Eleventh Circuit treats the issue as closed by Supreme Court dicta.
Practical Sentencing Effect. Prosecutors can rely with greater certainty on state assault-with-intent-to-kill convictions (even if historically labeled misdemeanors) for ACCA enhancement, so long as statutory max exceeds one year.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Categorical Approach: A method where the court looks only at the legal elements of the prior offense, not the defendant’s actual behavior, to see whether every violation involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.
Divisible vs. Indivisible Statutes: If a statute lists alternative elements (truly different crimes), it is “divisible,” and courts may examine certain records to discover which alternative applied. If it lists various means of committing the same crime, it is indivisible, and courts can’t look past the text.
Elements Clause vs. Residual Clause: The elements clause focuses on the force required by the crime. The residual clause—struck down in 2015—looked abstractly at whether the crime “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk,” which was deemed too fuzzy.
Malice (Express vs. Implied): Express malice = deliberate intent to kill.
Implied malice = extreme recklessness showing “abandoned and malignant heart.” Both exceed ordinary recklessness.
Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine: Constitutional rule that laws must give ordinary people fair notice of prohibited conduct and guard against arbitrary enforcement.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Harbuck cements two propositions in Eleventh Circuit jurisprudence:

South Carolina common-law assault with intent to kill, punishable by more than one year, categorically involves violent force and is an ACCA predicate.
The ACCA’s elements clause withstands vagueness challenges; its language and Supreme Court guidance supply clear standards.

Beyond Harbuck’s 188-month sentence, the decision offers prosecutors and defense counsel alike a definitive roadmap for evaluating similar assault-type convictions and forecloses a fertile vagueness argument. In the broader ACCA landscape—where every incremental holding shapes mandatory minimum exposure—this judgment reinforces doctrinal stability and clarifies the reach of “violent felony” post-Johnson and Borden.